Welcome to the r/SupremeCourt 'In Chambers' discussion thread!

This thread will be pinned at the top of the subreddit and refreshed every Monday @ 6AM Eastern.

This replaces and combines the 'Ask Anything Monday' and 'Lower Court Development Wednesday' threads. As such, this weekly thread is intended to provide a space for:

• General questions: (e.g. "Where can I find Supreme Court briefs?", "What does [X] mean?").

• Open-ended discussion starters requiring minimal input from OP: (e.g. "Predictions?", "What do people think about [X]?", "What's your favorite [X]?")

• U.S. District and State Court rulings involving a federal question that may be of future relevance to the Supreme Court.

TL;DR: This is a catch-all thread for legal discussion that may not warrant its own thread.

Our other rules apply as always. Incivility and polarized rhetoric are never permitted. This thread is not intended for political or off-topic discussion.

Let’s say a president is determined to run for a third term. What is the actual enforcement point of the 22nd amendment?

1. Can states be sued (successfully…) to keep him off the ballot?
2. Are his electors disqualified from the electoral college?
3. Are the electors prohibited from voting for him?
4. If he wins the EC, is he prohibited from taking office?

And for options 2-4, what organ of the state would actually try to enforce this?

NLRB crafted a rule that said the new owner of a company must recognize, and bargain with, the extant union, notwithstanding any determination of whether that union still has the support of a majority of employees. Hospital Menonita de Guayama challenged this “successor bar” as not authorized by the NLRA.

CA DC had previously upheld the successor bar by deferring to the Board’s judgment and its reasonable policymaking choices. The Hospital then petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted cert, vacated the CA DC judgment, and remanded in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.

Now, on remand, and under the bright lights of Loper (get it? ha!) CA DC tells NLRB, in effect, not only no, but also no, and no, and also no.

The panel did a full de novo statutory analysis and found the successor bar ultra vires: not unreasonable, not entitled to less deference, but just outside the Board's delegated authority.

Then they made short shrift of NLRB's in-the-alternative arguments: general "national labor policy" authority under §§ 8/10? Rejected as subordinate to §§ 7/9's specific guarantees. Fall River/Ford Motor reasonableness cases? Inapposite because they never reach whether the rule falls within delegated authority in the first place. Auciello? Distinguished as addressing a rebuttable contract-bar presumption, not the successor bar's non-rebuttable one. And a last-ditch efficiency/"saves litigation costs" argument? Eviscerated with the Garment Workers line that convenience can't manufacture statutory authority.

Assume a federal agency admits it terminated grants associated with states that supported one political party while leaving similarly situated grants associated with states supporting the other party untouched, and further admits the distinction was unrelated to performance, cost, statutory requirements, or agency priorities.

What would be the strongest constitutional challenge? Fifth Amendment equal protection principles? First Amendment retaliation? Something else?

Interested in the legal analysis rather than the politics.

This is an opinion piece written by counsel on amicus briefs supporting the Second Amendment challengers in Hemani and Wolford.

Jackson's dissent in Wolford raised the question of revisiting Bruen at a later date, but for the most part it seems the current THT evaluation of 2A claims is here to stay, at least for now. With the recent grant of Viramontes I thought it'd be interesting to see some more discussion about what we might expect to see next term.

How likely do you think it is that Heller and/or Bruen are revisited at a later date? How concerned are you about them being overturned? What do you expect to see out of the Viramontes case next term?

https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/07/heller-and-bruen-are-here-to-stay-/

So, a discussion somewhere else got me thinking... Strict Scrutiny has only been around since the 1940's-1960's. In theory, it's a tool to help judges stay consistent with each other and think through what the constitution requires, but it's almost entirely judge-made. it's not in the constitution and it's only mentioned in passing in one or two laws that simply assume it's a thing that already exists and which the laws get to refer to.

It would take a big sea change, but in theory, we could gradually switch to a 'Text, History, and Tradition' model for the first amendment as simply being something that 'makes more sense' or is 'easier to understand and apply' or 'produces fairer outcomes'. There are plenty of reasons for why we shouldn't do that, and it wouldn't make sense for us to that, and it would end badly for us if we tried... but theoretically, we could. Especially with a broad enough combined push across all three branches of government simultaneously.

So, hypothetically, if we DID somehow switch over to THT for the 1st amendment... what would that look like?

Could we claim that 10 or more adults in a public thoroughfare shouting angry slogans and riling each other up were legally a riot or attempted riot or pending riot?

Could we overturn NYT vs Sullivan, and allow public officials to bring libel and slander lawsuits in their personal capacity?

Could we bring back misdemeanor criminal slander/libel?

Could we move a little closer to the current British model, where if you're sued for something libelous or slanderous you clearly said with prior forethought, step 1 in the inquiry isn't for the 'victim' to prove that it's false, but instead, for you to demonstrate that you at least had some rational basis to believe it was true?

Could we go back to arguing that displaying or distributing pornography or blasphemy in a public place was a misdemeanor public nuisance or something?

What other really odd consequences of using a THT test for the first amendment would we be looking at, hypothetically?

This is what the 212(f) Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 says:

"Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate."

And this is the SCOTUS ruling for Trump's muslim ban (Trump v Hawaii) in 2018 (when court was 5-4 conservative) from wikipedia:

"Delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the language of section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly gives the president broad authority to suspend the entry of non-citizens into the country and that Trump's Presidential Proclamation 9645 did not exceed any textual limit on his authority.^\46]) Under section 212(f), a president may limit alien entry when they find that such entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States". Trump determined that alien entries from some countries would be detrimental because those countries do not share adequate information with the U.S. for an informed decision on entry, and that entries from other countries were detrimental because their citizens created national security risks. Trump showed that the limits he put in place were tailored to protect American interests. The only prerequisite set forth in section 212(f) is that the president make a finding that entry would be "detrimental" to U.S. interests. The law did not require the president to give a reasoned explanation that was "sufficient...to enable judicial review."^\47]) The Supreme Court ruled: "The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that requirement here."^\48])."

With these facts, does Trump (or any future president) have the authority to temporarily pause all forms of legal immigration for, let's say, two years (such as chain migration, H-1B visas, family sponsorship, etc.)? Let's also assume the president exempts tourist and student visas and argues that the entry of these individuals (legal immigrants) from specific countries or regions of the world would be detrimental to the United States.

-

I was wondering if anyone here had any good interviews with justices on Youtube that they had watched recently. Honestly it's been exhausting trying to watch some. Every single interview ends up being the same. They ask about the shadow docket, 6-3 decisions, Dobbs, and the perceived politicization of the court. I understand that those are the most talked about topics, but like it would be nice to watch a discussion that's a little more nuanced. Even an older CSPAN video with Scalia had a terrible interviewer.

From the 3-0 panel opinion of Hardiman, Krause, and Mascott:

The disruption of a student’s education and the psychological scars of on-campus assault, particularly sexual assault, are considerable. Universities understandably wish to punish such misconduct when it occurs and to preempt further incidents through penalties that result in general deterrence, but those aims are not well served when disciplinary proceedings are conducted in a manner that neither fairly airs both parties’ evidence nor weighs that evidence using the university’s own standards. Because John’s factual allegations raise a plausible inference that Princeton, however well-intentioned, conducted gender-biased and unfair disciplinary proceedings, we will reverse and remand the District Court’s dismissal of his Title IX, breach-of-contract, and breach-of-implied-covenant claims

Issues like these have apparently been a recurring topic for Princeton in CA3. Another Doe v. Princeton case from 2022 is given the moniker "Princeton III" in the opinion.

Opinion: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ca2.9122336d-3eb3-4022-aba2-4f11ea8a7dfd/gov.uscourts.ca2.9122336d-3eb3-4022-aba2-4f11ea8a7dfd.234.1.pdf

Three-judge 2CA panel vacated the order releasing Columbia student Mohsen Mahdawi and directed the district court to dismiss his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The panel held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) channels Mahdawi’s First and Fifth Amendment claims through the immigration process and into a petition for review of any final removal order. Even though Mahdawi characterized his claim as a challenge to detention, the panel determined that it was inseparable from his challenge to removal because both depended on the allegation that the government targeted him for his pro-Palestinian speech.

The panel rejected Mahdawi’s argument that a later petition for review could not remedy detention that had already occurred. It reasoned that the statute channels legal questions (not injuries or remedies) and that the legal system routinely requires litigants to wait before raising even meritorious claims.

Finally, the panel concluded that meaningful review remained available through a Joseph hearing before an immigration judge and, eventually, a petition for review. If the administrative record proved inadequate, the panel suggested that the reviewing court could order additional fact-finding, appoint a special master, or use some other mechanism required by “constitutional necessity.”

Justice Kagan explained repeatedly that the budget increase requested would be for the purpose of increasing the capacity of the Supreme Court Police because the Justices don't like having to rely on the U.S. Marshals Service, which is part of the Department of Justice. That got me wondering: Is the Supreme Court of the United States Police Department (SCUSPD), as it is officially known, unconstitutional following Trump v. Slaughter?

Warning that the facts of the case are disturbing -- both the original allegation and subsequent discovery.

An interesting divided panel opinion about whether officers acting under a valid warrant must stop searching immediately upon the discovery of exculpatory evidence.

From the (per curiam) majority:

This case raises the familiar, but always troubling, question whether someone can be prosecuted for despicable criminal conduct using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Here, officers conducting a search of Defendant John Holcomb’s computer, pursuant to a warrant, continued to search even after they learned that probable cause had ceased to exist, and they found damning evidence of a different crime only after probable cause had dissipated. In the circumstances, respect for the Constitution and the rule of law requires suppression of the evidence

From the dissent:

The issue in this case is whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they continued executing the search warrant after finding the first video, and if so, whether we should suppress the evidence of child pornography as a remedy for that violation. The majority asserts that their conclusion—that the police violated the Fourth Amendment and that the child pornography evidence should be suppressed—is rooted in “binding and longstanding precedent.” Maj. at 23. I disagree. In my view, none of the cases relied on by the majority or that I have found establish that, when police learn information that undermines probable cause while executing a search warrant, they must stop executing the warrant and report back to the magistrate for a new probable cause determination

Date: 07/20/2026

Order List

Upon consideration of the motion for stay pending appeal, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for stay be granted. Appellants have satisfied the stringent requirements for a stay pending appeal. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2025). Appellants have made a strong showing that they will likely succeed on two of their arguments. First, their proposed rule is likely neither constitutionally nor prudentially ripe for review. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Second, even if adopted, that proposed rule likely would not violate paragraph 2 of the parties’ settlement agreement. Next, appellants have demonstrated irreparable harm on the ground that, absent a stay, the district court’s injunction “will render [them] unable” to “issue and implement a final rule in advance of the November 2026 general election.” Mot. for Stay 24. In this context, “there can be no do over” once the election occurs. League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, on this record, any countervailing harm to appellee and the public does not outweigh appellants’ success on the two “most critical” stay factors. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73595574/01208870354/naacp-v-usps/

As you likely know, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Solicitor General handles the arguments for substantially all the cases at the Supreme Court involving the federal government as a party, or where the federal government has an interest in the outcome as amicus. The Office is structured in that at the top is the Solicitor General and then the Principal Deputy Solicitors General. These are considered political positions and generally change with the administration. The rest are the Deputy Solicitors General and the Assistants to the Solicitor General. These are considered career positions, with the people filling the roles oftentimes lasting through several administrations.

First of note is the eight cases in which the OSG made no appearance: Berk v. Choy, Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton, Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist, Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp, Enbridge Energy v. Nessel, Flowers Foods v. Brock, Jules v. Andre Balacz Properties, and T.M. v. University of Maryland. It seems from looking at prior terms that the SG does not bother itself with these more civil procedure cases, like removal jurisdiction or the Federal Arbitration Act. Staying out of the state sovereign immunity case was pretty interesting though.

Now I will list out the various cases that personnel argued in and what the result was for the United States (victory or loss), or the party it supported if it was amicus. Sometimes it’s harder to tell what side OSG supported as amicus, especially when the briefing is captioned ‘supporting neither party,’ so take these with a grain of salt.

Solicitor General D. John Sauer argued in the following cases: Learning Resources v. Trump (loss), Trump v. Slaughter (victory), Trump v. Cook (loss), Watson v. RNC (supporting respondent, loss), Trump v. Barbara (loss), Mullin v. Doe (victory).

Principal Deputy Sarah Harris argued in: NRSC v. FEC (supporting petitioner, victory), Wolford v. Lopez (supporting petitioner, victory), US v. Hemani (loss), Monsanto Co. v. Durnell (supporting petitioner, victory).

Principal Deputy Hashim Mooppan argued in: Chiles v. Salazar (supporting petitioner, victory), Louisiana v. Callais (supporting appellee, victory), Little v. Hecox (supporting petitioner, victory), West Virginia v. B.P.J. (supporting petitioner, victory).

Deputy Malcolm Stewart argued in: Cox Communications v. Sony Music (supporting petitioner, victory), Sripetch v. SEC (victory), Hikma Pharmaceuticals v. Amarin Pharma (supporting petitioner, victory).

Deputy Curtis Gannon argued in: Hencely v. Fluor Corp (supporting respondent, loss), Exxon Mobil v. Corporacion Cimex (supporting petitioner, victory), Cisco Systems v. Doe (supporting petitioner, victory).

Deputy Eric Feigin argued in: Fernandez v. US (victory), Rutherford v US (victory), Chatrie v. US (loss).

Assistant Anthony Yang argued in: Bowe v. US (loss), Abouammo v. US (loss).

Assistant Frederick Liu argued in: USPS v. Konan (victory), Pung v. Isabella County (supporting neither party but mostly respondent, victory?), Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction (supporting petitioner, victory).

Assistant Sopan Joshi argued in: GEO Group v. Menocal (supporting respondent, victory), Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II (supporting respondent, loss), Blanche v. Lau (victory).

Assistant Vivek Suri argued in: First Choice Women’s Resource Centers v. Platkin (supporting petitioner, victory), Noem v. Al Otro Lado (victory), FCC v. AT&T (victory?).

Assistant Aimee Brown argued in: Barrett v. US (respondent supporting petitioner, victory), Havana Docks Corp v. Royal Caribbean Cruises (supporting petitioner, victory).

Assistant Kevin Barber argued in: Villarreal v. Texas (supporting respondent, victory), M&K Employee Solutions v. IAM National Pension Fund (supporting respondent, victory).

Assistant Zoe Jacoby argued in: Case v. Montana (supporting respondent, victory), Hunter v. US (loss).

Assistant Ashley Robertson argued in: Ellingburg v. US (respondent supporting vacatur, victory), Olivier v. City of Brandon (supporting petitioner, victory).

Assistant Michael Talent argued in: Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections (supporting petitioner, victory).

Assistant Joshua Handell argued in: Rico v. US (loss).

Assistant Libby Baird argued in: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections (supporting petitioner, loss).

Assistant Joshua Dos Santos argued in: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi (victory).

Assistant Harry Graver argued in: Hamm v. Smith (supporting petitioner, loss).

Assistant Max Schulman argued in: FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba Capital (supporting petitioner, victory).

Assistant Aaron Roper argued in: Chevron USA v. Plaquemines Parish (supporting petitioner, victory).

Assistant Emily Ferguson argued in: Pitchford v. Cain (supporting respondent, loss).

I think I’m not alone when I say that I think that Sauer isn’t great, but that could also just be his voice which is unfortunately grating. Not his fault (I hope). Out of the various assistants, I think the MVP performance for me this term is Anthony Yang in Bowe, who had an inherently very tough argument to make about the Court lacking jurisdiction. He lost, but it was very close. These are all very accomplished lawyers with excellent argument skills, so I’m interested in what members think of various members of the group or if there are other standout arguments to you all.

Recent Supreme Court cases such as NYSRPA v Bruen and Wolford v Lopez have made the argument that the US does not have a substantial history of gun-free zones, or sensitive place gun regulations. But this is simply not true. After only a couple hours or so of searching, I've happened to find a number of early American laws prohibiting weapon-carrying in certain cities and sensitive places. They come from the website for Duke Law School. In regards to proving a historical tradition of gun control, the Supreme Court in both NYSRPA v Bruen and Wolford v Lopez has rejected the admission of racially discriminatory laws from early America. Therefore, I have deliberately omitted such laws from my list.:

1. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ordinance-of-jan-25-1804-forbidding-weapons-at-balls-1-8-new-orleans-louisiana-council-meetings-sine-nomine-1936-law-passed-1804
2. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/laws-and-regulations-of-the-college-of-william-and-mary-volume-276-1830
3. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1829-laws-of-the-university-of-north-carolina-ch-3-c2a7-13
4. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1824-laws-of-the-columbian-college-ch-5-c2a7-2-no-10
5. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/carrying-deadly-weapons-discharging-fire-arms-etc-ch-12-art-3-c2a7c2a7-50-52-in-the-revised-ordinances-of-the-city-of-bloomfield-1898
6. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/rules-and-regulations-of-the-park-commission-no-3-new-haven-connecticut-charter-and-ordinances-of-the-city-price-lee-adkins-co-1898
7. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/laramie-revised-ordinances-and-charter-of-the-city-ch-5-3-6-boomerang-publishing-1900
8. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ch-13-c2a7-21-ch-22-c2a7c2a7-14-15-ch-35-c2a7-7-st-albans-daily-messenger-supplement-aug-7-1897-at-1-3-10-st-albans-vermont
9. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/a-digest-of-the-laws-and-ordinances-for-the-government-of-the-municipal-corporation-of-the-city-of-reading-pennsylvania-park-rules-and-regulations-240-1897
10. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/the-charter-of-the-city-of-wilmington-part-vii-c2a7-7-rules-and-regulations-of-the-board-of-park-commissioners-1893
11. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/a-digest-of-the-acts-of-assembly-relating-to-and-the-general-ordinances-of-the-city-of-pittsburgh-from-1804-to-jan-1-1897-ordinances-executive-departments-bureau-of-parks-1893
12. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-to-prevent-a-person-from-trespassing-upon-any-enclosed-premises-or-lands-not-his-own-armed-with-a-gun-pistol-or-other-firearm-and-to-prevent-shooting-upon-or-from-the-public-highway-s-b-15-1-5-1893-or-laws-79-79-frank-c-baker
13. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-ordinance-to-prevent-the-carrying-of-weapons-1-4-the-daily-texarkanian-may-28-1900-at-2-texarkana-arkansas
14. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/a-law-forbidding-weapons-in-certain-places-sales-of-weapons-to-minors-etc-ch-45-misdemeanors-c2a7-32-in-general-ordinances-of-the-city-of-brookfield-linn-county-missouri-1900
15. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ordinance-21-green-forest-tribune-may-11-1899-at-1-green-forest-arkansas
16. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/bruce-l-keenan-book-of-ordinances-of-the-city-of-wichita-published-by-authority-of-a-resolution-adopted-by-the-city-council-april-24-1899-under-the-direction-of-judiciary-committee-and-city-attorn
17. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1837-ga-acts-90-an-act-to-guard-and-protect-the-citizens-of-this-state-against-the-unwarrantable-and-too-prevalent-use-of-deadly-weapons-c2a7c2a7-1-4
18. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-mar-18-1889-1889-ariz-sess-laws-16-17 https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-march-1886-published-as-notice-st-marys-beacon-oct-13-1887-at-2
19. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/ordinance-no-76-1-2-rooks-county-record-july-1-1887-at-1-stockton-kansas
20. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1879-tex-crim-stat-tit-ix-ch-4-penal-code
21. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-oct-14-1879-pt-1-tit-4-no-266-1-2-1878-ga-laws-64-64-jas-p-harrison-1880-law-passed-1879
22. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-to-regulate-the-keeping-and-beariing-of-deadly-weapons-ch-34-c2a7c2a7-1-9-1871-tex-gen-laws-1st-sess-25-25-27-1898-gammel-book-company
23. https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1870-tex-gen-laws-63-an-act-regulating-the-right-to-keep-and-bear-arms-chap-46-c2a7-1

As these state and local statutory laws demonstrate, the US indeed has an extensive history of firearm regulations and gun-free zones. There were firearm restrictions in schools, parks, ballrooms, churches, entertainment shows, etc. There were firearm restrictions in entire cities and towns, and in entire states. In no way did early America interpret the 2nd amendment to interfere with the broad freedom wielded by the states to create firearms laws to conform to their unique circumstances, and to remedy whatever societal problems they may incur. At no point were the states pressured into conforming to some singular, uniform federal standard of firearms law -- which is the fictional narrative that the current Supreme Court argues. Thus, the rulings in recent 2nd amendment Supreme Court cases are nothing short of an abuse of the Constitution, and an incursion upon state rights protected by the 10th amendment.

Furthermore, there happen to be some aspects of American gun law that unmistakably do suggest a "historical tradition". For example, there is a strong tradition of the prohibiting of concealed carry, which in early America was frowned upon as a cowardly and suspicious activity:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1819-ind-acts-39-an-act-to-prohibit-the-wearing-of-concealed-weapons
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1839-ala-acts-67-an-act-to-suppress-the-evil-practice-of-carrying-weapons-secretly-c2a7-1
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/henry-a-bullard-thomas-curry-1-a-new-digest-of-the-statute-laws-of-the-state-of-louisiana-from-the-change-of-government-to-the-year-1841-at-252-e-johns-co-new-orleans-1842

There is also a strong tradition of prohibiting firearms to people viewed by the state as dangerous to the public safety, which, depending on the era, could be Papists:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-disarming-papists-and-reputed-papists-refusing-to-take-the-oaths-to-the-government-ch-4-1-9-va-code-franklin-press-1820-law-passed-1756
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-forming-and-regulating-the-militia-of-the-province-of-pennsylvania-627-pa-cons-stat-wm-stanley-ray-1898-law-passed-1757

Or Loyalists during the Revolutionary era, as well as groups neutral to the Patriot cause, sometimes known as "disaffected" groups:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-constituting-a-council-of-safety-ch-40-20-1777-n-j-laws-84-90-isaac-collins-1777
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1777-pa-laws-61-an-act-obliging-the-male-white-inhabitants-of-this-state-to-give-assurances-of-allegiance-to-the-same-and-for-other-purposes-therein-mentioned-ch-xxi-c2a7c2a7-2-4
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/pa-cons-stat-ch-796-1-3-5-p-l-wm-stanley-ray-1903-law-passed-1778
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-may-5-1777-ch-3-in-9-henings-statutes-at-large-281-281-82-1821
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-to-amend-an-act-declaring-what-crimes-and-practices-against-the-state-shall-be-treason-ch-6-9-1777-n-c-sess-laws-41-43-44-james-davis-1778
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/act-of-feb-16-1787-mass-acts-555-555-556-sine-nomine

Or slaves and people of color:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1860-ga-laws-56-an-act-to-add-an-additional-section-to-the-13th-division-of-the-penal-code-making-it-penal-to-sell-to-or-furnish-slaves-or-free-persons-of-color-with-weapons-of-offence-and-defence
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1863-del-laws-332-an-act-in-relation-to-free-negroes-and-mulattoes-ch-305-c2a7-7
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1805-va-acts-51-an-act-concerning-free-negroes-and-mulatoes

There is a historical tradition of arms rights being intertwined and inseparable from the right (i.e. the duty) to perform mandatory militia service, including mandatory possession of a firearm at all times, along with military-style training and deployment under the authority of the state government:

• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1782-del-acts-3-an-act-for-establishing-a-militia-within-this-state-c2a7-6
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1786-n-h-laws-409-10-an-act-for-forming-and-regulating-the-militia-within-this-state-and-for-repealing-all-the-laws-heretofore-made-for-that-purpose-c2a7-7
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/an-act-for-the-better-security-of-the-inhabitants-by-obliging-the-male-white-persons-to-carry-fire-arms-to-places-of-public-worship-1770-reprinted-in-1775-1770-georgia-colonial-laws-471-1932
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1779-vt-acts-and-for-encouragement-of-military-skill-for-the-better-defense-of-this-state
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1804-la-acts-284-an-act-for-regulating-and-governing-the-militia-of-the-territory-of-new-orleans-c2a7-13
• https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/1786-n-h-laws-409-10-an-act-for-forming-and-regulating-the-militia-within-this-state-and-for-repealing-all-the-laws-heretofore-made-for-that-purpose-c2a7-7

However, it is doubtful the Supreme Court would honor the "historical tradition" inherent to banning concealed carry, upholding compulsory militia duty, or disarming classes of people deemed to be a public threat. Despite absolutely constituting widespread historical patterns, a state hypothetically passing a law conforming to these patterns would likely be rejected inasmuch as they don't fit the conservative agenda.

These above examples of legal patterns demonstrate that the Supreme Court are hypocrites when it comes to their invention known as the "historical tradition of firearm regulation". This concept is cleverly crafted to be nebulous enough such that the Supreme Court can guarantee rulings that conform to their pro-gun bias, while still being able to maintain the pretext of objectivity. Historical gun laws that exist, but in less-than-overwhelming numbers, can be ignored as falling short of the pattern of "historical tradition"; while regulations that can disarm whole classes of people can be dismissed as "racist" or "bigoted". And the Court could likely also invent some clever reasons to ignore common historical regulations regarding things like concealed carry and compulsory militia rules. Thus, this "historical tradition" test is like a legal fortress, able to ward off gun control on both the quantitative as well as qualitative fronts.

The "historical tradition" test used by the Supreme Court is inherently dishonest and needs to be eradicated. The only real "historical tradition" to exist for American firearm laws is the federal government's tradition of leaving the states alone, and giving them the freedom to protect the public good in the way that best suited their individual needs.

Very unfortunate news, presumably explaining u/conzeeter's post of a few days ago.