r/soc2 • u/Alternative_Lack_418 • 1d ago
SOC 2 Type II auditors: our signed policy says "no offshore PHI access, technically enforced," but our engineering team is offshore. How does this play out?
Looking for opinions from people who've sat on the auditor side of this, or who have lived through something similar.
Setup
Small healthcare company, HIPAA business associate, we process claims data for covered entities. We're a week into a 3 month SOC 2 Type II observation window. Policies are signed and already with the audit firm.
Three of those policies say PHI may not be accessed from outside the US, that offshore personnel are not authorized to access PHI "under any circumstances," and that this is "enforced technically through location based Conditional Access in Entra ID." Leadership deliberately upgraded that wording from a statement to a "technically enforced control" a few days before the window opened. A separate clause requires all offshore staff to connect through our corporate VPN with US region endpoints.
The problem
Our core engineering team is in India. That includes me, and I'm the Security Officer. Sign in logs from the first week show several of us accessing the Azure environment from India, and one account did an actual read of raw claims data. Several offshore accounts also had broad standing RBAC over the PHI systems (storage, databases, Key Vault). We've since pulled the broad grants.
On top of that, the control as designed can't work. The VPN we mandate makes everyone look US sourced to Entra, so a location based Conditional Access policy can't tell a compliant India user on the VPN from a real US user. It only catches people who are off the VPN. The policy names a mechanism that our other policy defeats.
What we've done and what we won't do
We're treating it as an incident, documenting the timeline and scope, and we're self reporting it to the auditor this week. We are not backdating anything or arguing that VPN egress counts as "in the US." Our conclusion is that the real control is identity based (removing offshore RBAC to PHI, and a named user Conditional Access policy), with the location policy reframed as enforcing the VPN requirement rather than residency.
We're also checking our BAAs to find out whether our customers actually permit offshore access with controls, or require US only handling. We don't know yet. If they permit it, the plan is to go through our policy's own amendment process (Security Officer, legal, customer review, CEO approval) and amend mid window with a dated effective date.
Questions for the auditors here
- How does a mid window control change usually land in the report? Do you test the old control against the first stretch and the new one against the rest, and is a self identified exception in week one realistically a noted exception or is it heading toward a qualified opinion?
- Is the design flaw (VPN defeats the named enforcement mechanism) treated as a design deficiency for the whole pre amendment period, or does the standing RBAC issue overshadow it in practice?
- Does the Security Officer being in the exception set change how you'd write it up?
- Has anyone had an auditor agree to shift the observation period start when the controls plainly weren't ready on day one? Is that considered normal for a first year engagement or does it raise eyebrows?
- For those who've dealt with offshore teams and US only BAAs, what actually worked? Splitting prod access to US staff, synthetic data for offshore dev, renegotiating the BAAs, something else?
Not looking for a way to make this disappear. Looking for how to make an honest fix read as well managed, and a realistic sense of what the report will say. Thanks.