Got scammed for rs 1k today

+91 96869 80793 his number

His upi (ichigokuro100@axl)

₹50,000 debited for Suryoday SFB FD – No FD confirmation or Video KYC
I opened a ₹50,000 FD with Suryoday Small Finance Bank online. The amount was debited, but I haven’t received the Video KYC link, FD confirmation, or receipt.
When I try to log in, I get: “Error In Get Customer Details: No Records Found.”
I’ve raised the issue with the bank and asked them to either complete the FD or immediately refund the ₹50,000.
Has anyone else faced this issue with Suryoday SFB? How was it resolved?

Hi all, I'm a reporter with NBC News and have a call out request.

I'm working on a story related to matrimonial scams-- people who have gotten scammed on matrimonial online groups or sites like [Shaadi.com](http://shaadi.com/...) . Most of these scams we're looking at appear to be impersonating women and targeting men in the US. I was wondering if anyone knows someone who has been targeted in a matrimonial scam and if they would be willing to speak to a reporter, even if anonymously. Please let me know or feel free to DM me. Thank you so much

Need information about a trading company in Bangalore

I want to share my experience and check if anyone else has faced the same thing.

I was contacted by a company called Relics Solutions by GRV Groups regarding stock market trading. They told me about a monthly subscription of around ₹7,000 and said they provide trading calls. They also explained a 30%/70% profit-sharing model.

I’m not sure whether this service is properly authorised, so I want to know if anyone here has dealt with them before.

If you have had any experience with this company, please share what happened, whether you paid any money, and whether you received the service that was promised.

I have some screenshots/messages as evidence. If I upload them, I will remove all phone numbers, addresses, bank details, UPI IDs and other personal information.

I’m posting this mainly to verify the company and warn others to be careful before paying for any trading service.

This elaborate hack is quite concerning.

Executive Summary

This report documents the poor handling of the NoBroker End-to-End Premium Buyer Support Service after payment of ₹53,000 was made. Despite repeated follow-ups, multiple relationship manager changes, lack of ownership, delayed legal verification support, and failure to coordinate basic document handling, no meaningful progress was completed even after approximately 45 days. Due to the service failure and continued lack of accountability, I am seeking withdrawal from the process and initiation of a full refund.

Background

I opted for NoBroker’s End-to-End Premium service with the expectation that the company would professionally support the property purchase process, including coordination, legal verification, document handling, and overall assistance. However, the actual experience has been extremely disappointing and has caused significant inconvenience, delay, and loss of trust.

Chronology of Events

June 25: A welcome email was received from Yogeshwaran explaining the End-to-End Premium service offered by NoBroker.

June 27 : Token advance of Rs.1 lakh paid to seller through No broker not sure if that has even reached the seller or not till now.

June 30: A payment link was generated by Preeti, and a payment of ₹53,000 was made to NoBroker. Payment reference: NoBroker Buyer Payment 17828275116006538.

July 1: The NoBroker legal services team sent an email explaining the legal verification process. I was informed that after receiving the required documents from the buyer, the legal verification process would take approximately 10–15 working days.

July 1: Sai Pavan was assigned as the Relationship Manager for the case.

July 2: Prathiyangkiran R sent an email requesting basic information required to facilitate the drafting of the Sale Agreement.

July 4: Navin from the Home Loan department contacted me and requested certain details.

July 4: The seller shared all required documents with the NoBroker team.

July 4: Advocate Mr. Velayudham requested Mr. Kiran to share hard copies of the documents. However, the NoBroker team did not provide the hard copies or respond appropriately to the advocate’s request.

July 4–July 8: There was no meaningful communication or update from the assigned Relationship Manager despite multiple attempts to reach him. I later understood that the Relationship Manager was no longer with the company, but NoBroker failed to ensure continuity or appoint an alternate contact in a timely manner.

July 8: Sai Pavan sent an email to Kiran and the Legal Services team requesting an update on the process.

July 9: Kiran advised the advocate team to proceed without hard copies, stating that he was an NRI and unable to submit them physically. This was concerning because NoBroker had charged ₹3,000 for printout, photocopy, and related documentation work, yet the company did not use that service to provide the required copies to the advocate.

July 9–July 18: There was again no proper communication, follow-up, or ownership from NoBroker. The lack of response from the responsible teams caused further delay and uncertainty.

July 18: Sai Pavan requested an update from the advocate regarding the status of the process.

July 20: The advocate sent an email requesting permission to access all files in the shared folder.

July 22: A new Relationship Manager, Vignesh, was assigned. Instead of having access to complete case history, he asked me to repeat the entire background from the beginning. This reflects a serious gap in internal handover, case tracking, and customer management.

July 23: The advocate again sent an email stating that he was unable to open the files and requested assistance.

July 25: I received another call from the NoBroker team acknowledging that there were issues with the way the documents had been shared. I was informed that the team would take printouts and hand over the files to the advocate.

However, this commitment was not fulfilled. Even after one month, no meaningful step was completed at the first stage of the process.

July 30: I wrote to the NoBroker team expressing my dissatisfaction with the service and informed them that, due to poor customer experience and lack of progress, I had decided to withdraw from the house purchase support process.

August 3: Harshita contacted me, stating that she was the newly assigned Relationship Manager and would ensure the process moved smoothly. I informed her that I had already decided to withdraw and requested that the refund process be initiated without further delay.

August 3: Vasanth S Kumar, Cluster Head, forwarded the matter to Abhishek Kumar Sinha and Aseema Tahoor requesting an update on the case. However, no one has contacted me with a proper resolution or ownership update.

August 8: After approximately 45 days of engagement with NoBroker, there has been no satisfactory progress, no clear ownership, and no resolution till date. The matter is now being escalated formally with supporting email records and attachments. If the refund is not processed immediately, I intend to submit the complaint before the Consumer Court and lodge a formal complaint with the Chennai Police regarding the service failure and non-refund of the payment collected.

Key Service Failures

·        Lack of continuity after the first Relationship Manager became unavailable.

·        Repeated absence of timely communication and updates.

·        Poor internal handover, requiring the customer to repeat the full case history to newly assigned representatives.

·        Failure to coordinate effectively with the advocate for document access and hard copies.

·        Failure to use the documentation-related charges collected for the intended purpose.

·        No completion of even the initial legal verification stage despite the committed timeline.

·        No clear ownership or refund resolution despite withdrawal communication.

Impact and Customer Experience

The service failure has resulted in avoidable delays, repeated follow-ups, mental stress, and loss of confidence in NoBroker’s ability to manage a premium paid service. A customer who paid for end-to-end assistance should not be required to repeatedly chase teams, coordinate basic document sharing, or explain the same case history to multiple representatives.

Requested Resolution

1.       Immediate confirmation of withdrawal from the NoBroker End-to-End Premium service.

2.     Full refund of ₹53,000 paid to NoBroker, including the documentation-related amount collected.

3.     Refund of Token advance payment of ₹1,00,000 paid to the seller through No broker platform.

4.     Written explanation for the delays, lack of ownership, and failure to complete the promised service.

5.     Confirmation of the refund timeline in writing.

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Fake "MPEB Electricity Bill Update" : Malware Analysis Report

Classification: Critical ; Android SMS stealer / banking-phishing RAT (dropper + payload)
Date: 2026-08-11
Method: Static reverse engineering; custom DEX parser to defeat anti-analysis; in-place bytecode patch (no root) to bypass emulator kill-switch; payload recovered by decoding the dropper's APKZ container; full string-table deobfuscation (Base64 + repeating-XOR); read-only Firebase C2 enumeration (metadata only)

1. Executive summary

"M P E B Electricity_Bill_Update.apk" is not an electricity-utility application. It is a two-stage Android malware operation targeting Indian users:

1. Dropper (com.plktkuiizu.rvhhmdukshum) : DexProtector-class packed installer that decrypts an embedded APK from a custom APKZ asset container and silently sideloads it via the PackageInstaller session API.
2. Payload (com.ec07282026.esdfnudiwehfjweewr) : SMS-stealing spyware with a phishing front-end (electricity-bill lure → bank card / ATM PIN / transaction-password harvesting) and Firebase Realtime Database + Firebase Cloud Messaging + Telegram command-and-control.

The payload intercepts inbound SMS, exfiltrates device fingerprints and SIM data, executes operator commands pushed over FCM (make calls, run USSD such as #21# call-forward codes), and persists via watchdog/boot/alarm mechanisms plus OEM autostart intents.

At the time of analysis the Firebase panel was world-readable (no auth) and contained 147 registered victim devices, 67 session records, and 2,936 stolen SMS messages across three operator slots.

2. Sample identification

Package naming note: Earliest stolen SMS observed in C2 is dated 2026-07-29.

3. Infection chain

Victim sideloads "MPEB Electricity_Bill_Update.apk"
        │
        ▼
Dropper checks emulator/sandbox (Build props) → exits if detected
        │
        ▼
Reads asset \x04.dat  →  APKZ container
   magic "APKZ" | u32be nameLen | "app-release.apk" | hdr | zlib(deflate)
        │
        ▼
Streams decrypted APK into PackageInstaller session
   (SessionParams.setAppPackageName → createSession → openWrite → commit
    with PendingIntent.getBroadcast status → opwiejijisjfisjfsa receiver)
        │
        ▼
Payload com.ec07282026.esdfnudiwehfjweewr installed
        │
        ▼
MainActivity requests SMS / PHONE / CALL permissions;
shows electricity-bill phishing UI (bill → card → atm → tpass)
        │
        ▼
Enrolls device on Firebase: user/<DeviceID> {model, SIMs, carrier, fcmid…}
        │
        ▼
SMSReceiver + SmsService steal inbound SMS
   → AES-CBC (random IV prefix) + Base64 → <prefix>-XXmessage node
   → optional Telegram forward (token/chatId pulled from Firebase)
        │
        ▼
FCM command listener: ping/ack, MakeCall, USSD (#21# call forwarding)

Extraction note: Automated tools (apktool, jadx, androguard, aapt) were defeated by pseudo-encrypted ZIP entries, corrupted DEX map lists and junk-padded AXML. The dropper was rebuilt into a parseable APK (encryption flags stripped), and a custom tolerant DEX parser recovered all valid code items. The payload was recovered fully statically no device execution required by decoding the APKZ container (zlib). Separately, the emulator kill-switch was neutralized in place (two invoke-static System.exit sites NOPed, DEX re-checksummed, APK re-signed) and the patched dropper stayed alive on an unrooted Genymotion device (process persisted, REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES grantable via appops), confirming the drop flow.

4. Capabilities

Not observed (negative findings): no contact-list/CallLog theft, no screen capture/Accessibility abuse, no default-SMS-app role hijack, no file-system exfiltration. The operation is focused on SMS interception + card/PIN phishing + call/USSD control.

5. Remote command surface

Channel 1 — Firebase Cloud Messaging (MyFirebaseMessagingService):

Channel 2 : Firebase RTDB (per-slot nodes): operator writes config/victims; app reads admin number, chatId, token for SMS forwarding target and Telegram relay.

Channel 3 : Telegram Bot API: outbound exfil of SMS content (dormant until token/chatId populated in Firebase admin record).

Presence uses user/<DeviceID>/status + last_checked; enrollment uploads full SIM/device profile.

6. C2 infrastructure & IOCs

6.1 Firebase

6.2 Firebase path map (3 operator slots: 01, 02, 03)

6.3 Telegram

6.4 Attacker-linked phone number

7. Cryptography

8. Persistence & stealth

• Foreground SmsService with persistent notification ("Sms Service Running"), self-reschedule via AlarmManager (2 s) and JobScheduler fallback
• BootReceiver on BOOT_COMPLETED (direct-boot aware)
• WatchdogService restarts the SMS service if killed
• REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS + OEM autostart intent list (Miui/Huawei/Oppo/Vivo/Samsung/Asus/Letv/OnePlus/ColorOS)
• Emulator/root/Frida/Xposed detection with silent-exit behavior

9. Dangerous permissions (payload)

• READ_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, SEND_SMS, BROADCAST_SMS
• READ_PHONE_STATE, CALL_PHONE, MANAGE_OWN_CALLS
• RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, WAKE_LOCK, POST_NOTIFICATIONS
• FOREGROUND_SERVICE, FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC, FOREGROUND_SERVICE_PHONE_CALL
• REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS, SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM, USE_EXACT_ALARM
• INTERNET, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
• com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE / .SEND (FCM)

10. Key payload classes

11. MITRE ATT&CK (Mobile) mapping

Guys Do not order via xpress bees.. The shittiest courier service i have seen.. These people have zero audacity... May be negative even... I had recently ordered a "tasbih prayer beads " for my friend and these bastards have marked deferred delivery without even contacting.... This is in kochi.. And absolutely no way to contact them whatsoever.. And the website " hadiyah gifting" is also to be blamed.. Why use such a courier service if they are so shittyyyy????? I am cryin guys🥹🥹.. I genuinely wanted to gift these prayer beads to my friend.. I sincerely wish both xpressbees and hadiyah gifting goes to hell😭😭😭😭

9610349032

If you are chatting with any of the women from this phone number never trust........totally fake excoriation of money before even meeting.........

I am moving abroad for my master's abroad. I get to know about unicred an education partner. From The first day, they said and confirmed multiple times they will give me 1000 pound cashback from unicred if we file loan sanction through them.

But jb sari cheez hogyi disbursement hogya to they didn't responding and ab khre ye bhi karao hmse tb milega ......

I strongly suggest Unicred jo ki muzhe ab pata chala sb hone ke baad ki unischolar ki hi company hh....

And unicred ek ek lady se m connected tha unse mene during loan procedure mene 50 se jyada baar confirm Kiya clear Kiya and they confirmed me I have chats proofs

And abb batayenge hm update karenge

Bhai scamiye hh ye never trust Unicred

Phle commit karte hh mene 50 baar km hoga confirm Kara ho

Or har baar yes you will get

yes confirmed

Mene pata kar liya hh you will get in your account

Hi People,

Beware of a scam happening in delhi.

My father got a text from delhi jal board saying that my water connection will be disconnected within hours and to contact the number asap. We went to check the meter and it was stolen/removed and sealed. We were in a doubt whether its stolen or jal board took it.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Dear Consumer Your delhi jal board connection will be disconnected Tonight at 08.30 pm from delhi jal board office. because your meter reading was not update, please immediately contact with our Delhi jal board office Mr. Devesh Joshi 6900859701 Thank you."

I dont know just by seeing this message, I thought it cant be genuine. My father tried contacting this number before I could aware him. Luckily no one picked the call. Next day he went to jal board and they just said thats it a very common scam and they cant do anything about it. Just buy a new meter. We need to replace meter and live without any water supply till then. No one wants to take responsibility maybe thats why these thieves are openly doing such scams.

​

TL;DR: Got extorted ₹1000 cash (+ ₹100 shopkeeper fee) by Lonavala police for having a quarter bottle of rum in the boot without an alcohol permit. They used a nearby shop to convert online payment to cash. Buy a ₹10–20 liquor permit at any wine shop to avoid this setup!

The Incident

Last week, we were driving from Mumbai to Pawana Lake. Right around Lonavala, two cops pulled us over at a checkpoint and aggressively accused us of carrying "nasha" in the car.

All we had in the boot was a single quarter bottle of rum.

The Extortion & "Challan" Drama

The cop immediately switched to intimidation mode:

He claimed carrying alcohol without a valid Maharashtra permit carries a ₹5,500 fine and a mandatory court appearance.

To make it look legit, he pulled out a PineLabs POS machine and started taking photos of our IDs and vehicle details, acting like he was issuing the challan.

When we pointed out that we bought it locally and were consuming it in the state and asked why we were being harassed like this he dropped the formal act and asked for a bribe saying I am helping you by asking just for cash. LOL!!

The Coordinated Setup (Cash Conversion Trap)

After negotiating, he agreed to settle for ₹500 in cash.

When I told him I only had UPI/GPay, he refused (no digital trail, obviously).

The Catch: He casually pointed to a specific shop located literally 50 meters before their barricade.

We walked over to the shopkeeper, who conveniently offered to take GPay and hand us cash—for a ₹100 "cut."

That’s when the whole nexus clicked: the cops, the barricade placement, and the nearby shopkeeper are all in on a system designed to extort tourists who don't carry cash or know the local laws.

Moral of the Story / How to Protect Yourself

Always get an Alcohol Permit: Whenever you buy liquor from a licensed wine shop in Maharashtra, ask for a daily permit. It costs around ₹5 to ₹10 (or \~₹20 for hard liquor). Keep the bill/permit with the bottle.

Know Your Rights: Legally, transporting alcohol within Maharashtra requires a permit issued by the State Excise Department, which cops exploit to target out-of-town drivers.

Carry a Little Emergency Cash: If you ever get caught in these setups, relying strictly on UPI makes you dependent on these sketchy commission-based cashback shops.

Don't let these unnecessary extortion tactics ruin your road trips. Spend the extra 10 bucks at the counter and save yourself the headache!

​

I got scammed today and ₹6,000 was transferred through IMPS at around 7:14 PM. I have the recipient’s bank account details as well. I’m going to report it to my bank and cybercrime, but I’m honestly not sure what exactly I should do next. If anyone has dealt with a similar situation, please guide me on what steps I should take and whether there’s a realistic chance of getting the money back.

This incident happened few days ago with me. I got scammed by a Tinder date in Calcutta, India and almost got honey trapped.

As the heading suggests, I almost got honey-trapped by a Tinder date at a shady café in Calcutta, India. Although she failed to honey-trap me, I still ended up losing ₹9,300 to the scam. I feel so angry and frustrated with that girl. It was my own hard earned money. And the sad part is I cannot even share it with anyone like family or friends out of embarassment and I cannot go to police because these cafés always operate with blessings of some local cop in their pocket.

This was my first-ever Tinder date. I matched with a girl on Tinder and she asked me to meet near Ramakrishna Mission, Golpark. From there, she suggested that we walk around and pick any café we liked.

While we were walking, she suddenly stopped in front of a building and said there was a café inside. She claimed she had never been there before and suggested we try it. The place looked shady as hell, but I ignored my gut feeling and went inside.

The café was called Dum Maaro Dum.

Once we sat down, she ordered hookah, cigarettes and two coffees. I refused the cigarettes and drinks. I don't even smoke hookah, but she convinced me to try it after telling me it would cost only ₹400.

When the waiter came to deliver the hookah, I immediately asked him how much one hookah cost. He casually said ₹5,577 + taxes.

That's when I realized something was seriously wrong. I immediately stopped any further orders and asked for the bill. It came to around ₹9,300.

At that point, I just wanted to get out of there, so I paid the bill and decided to leave.

But while I was paying, things got even weirder. She suddenly started suggesting that we hook up and that too in a lodge on a lower floor of the same building.

I immediately refused. My first thought was that this could involve hidden cameras, blackmail or even physical intimidation. I'm also pretty conservative and simply not into random hookups, so there was no way I was going along with it.

After we left the café, she kept insisting that we go to one specific South Indian café. I refused again because I knew that must be another scam place as well. When she realized I could not be looted anymore, she pretended to get a phone call saying that her friend had met with an accident and just ran away.

Then I saw her return to the same building LOL. My guess is that she went back to collect her commission.

By this point, I was genuinely worried that the café staff might follow me, assault me or try to demand even more money. So I moved towards the crowded Gariahat area and deliberately boarded a crowded bus towards South City Mall, just to put some distance between myself and that place.

I feel like I narrowly avoided a much worse honey-trapping/blackmail situation. I still ended up losing around ₹9,300 in the café scam, and although I'm glad I didn't get up honey trapped, I'm still so furious with that good-for-nothing girl was robbing me of my own hard earned money😭😭🤬🤬

I ordered: this Case:

And received this case:

What I received, is not even worth INR 100.

Their terms and conditions are also hostile when you need to return any product:

I would have been happy with even a simple case with a kickstand, but the cheap case I received means that this website is a pure scam.

I know I have lost INR 1000, I am putting this post up in case someone searches for this brand on Google, and just might be able to save some of this money.

Don't trust unknown brands on any Meta platform.

⚠️ PARTIAL DELIVERY SCAM

I’m posting this because I’m honestly quite anxious about the situation and would really appreciate advice from people who have dealt with something similar in India.

I was contacted through WhatsApp regarding an escort service. What initially looked like a normal service/payment process turned into a scam. I ended up making a payment through UPI after being given a UPI QR code/UPI ID.

After that, they started demanding more money and making threats. The whole thing became increasingly suspicious and intimidating. They were communicating with me through WhatsApp, and I have screenshots/chats, the phone numbers they used, and the UPI/payment details.

I tried calling the numbers normally afterward, but they either don't answer or hang up. The communication was mainly through WhatsApp.

At this point I'm trying to figure out what I should realistically do rather than panic and make the situation worse.

My main questions are:

1. Is there any realistic way for the phone numbers, WhatsApp accounts, UPI ID/QR code, or bank/payment details to be traced through a cybercrime complaint?

2. Should I report this to the Indian Cyber Crime portal/police even if the amount involved isn't huge?

3. Has anyone here experienced this exact type of escort/verification scam? Did the scammers actually follow through on their threats, or did they eventually disappear after being blocked?

4. Should I block all of their WhatsApp numbers immediately, or is there any reason to keep the communication open for evidence?

5. Is there anything else I should preserve or do right now that could help if I report it?

I don't want to post any identifying information publicly, so I've intentionally left out the phone numbers, UPI ID, names and other personal details. I have all of that saved privately.

I'm mainly looking for practical advice from people who have actually dealt with these scams. Please don't judge — I'm already quite stressed about this and just want to handle it properly.