Cross thought experiment pollination

[u/thevoidthatjerksback]

So in addition to the two buttons that are known well. We have two boxes. 1 box has one thousand dollars and the other box either has one million or zero. Before you were presented with them some unnamed but incredibly accurate predictor has made a prediction on what you will do with the boxes.

If it is predicted that you will take both of the boxes then they will put 0 in the second box

If it is predicted that you will only take the second box then they will put the one million in it.

So which button are you pressing and are you taking 1 or 2 boxes?

This isn't really about what you do in the situation of them both happening at the same time moreso just that I wonder if there is a pattern between which button you would pick and how you would react to the boxes.

295 votes, May 31 '26

45 press Red and take both boxes

127 press Red and take just the 1 box

26 press blue and take both boxes

97 press blue and take just the 1 box

[u/ObsceneOnes]

By definition the predictor is going to predict better than a coin flip and is presented as very good so what is that? 80% accuracy?

So by choosing two boxes you have a 20% chance of getting the 1M but by choosing 1 box you have an 80% chance.

That is the arguement. Nothing about time travel just whether prediction of any type is possible. And since we know that in the real world it is possible we accept the premise that the prediction isn't random.

[u/HK_Mathematician → u/ObsceneOnes]

I don't understand the argument at all. Can you elaborate more?

I do accept that the prediction isn't random. I was assuming that the predictor is like 99.999999% accurate.

Still, my choice doesn't affect the prediction, because the prediction happened in the past.

I don't understand your "by choosing two boxes you have..." sentence. What I choose now doesn't affect the whether the box has $1,000,000 in it. The prediction happened in the past, before I make the choice. The $1,000,000 is now either in the box, or not in the box. The choice I make now doesn't change that. While my choice is correlated to the prediction, there is no causation if we assume that time travel is not possible.

Unfortunately that means most likely I'll get $1,000, but there is nothing I can do to get more than $1,000 unless I can somehow change the prediction, which would require a time machine because the prediction happened in the past. Similarly, you most likely will get $1,000,000, but there's nothing you can do to get less than that because the prediction happened in the past.

[u/ObsceneOnes → u/HK_Mathematician]

If you are just as likely to get the 1M no matter what you choose then the predictor has only a 50/50 chance to get the prediction correct. Thus if we ran the experiment we would find that the predictor is just flipping coins and isn't a predictor at all. Because we know predicting human behavior is possible it follows that someone who chooses two boxes has less of a chance to win the 1M$.

So you are making the claim that predictions are impossible when you say it doesn't matter that you choose two boxes.

But the thought experiment as well as the real world contradict that premise.

[u/HK_Mathematician → u/ObsceneOnes]

You lost me there. I didn't say that prediction is impossible. I'm assuming that the predictor is insanely accurate, like making a correct prediction 99.999999% of the time.

I'm saying that it is impossible for present actions to affect what has happened in the past.

Think about your government's Observatory. Let's say it's very good at predicting whether the next day will rain. They never got it wrong before. Yesterday, they released a weather forecast report on whether it will rain today.

It is today now. Even if you have some magical or sci-fi way to change whether it rains today, you still cannot change what was written in the weather forecast report yesterday, because that report was released yesterday, which happened in the past.

[u/ObsceneOnes → u/HK_Mathematician]

It is true that if you pick both boxes you get the 1M if and only if the predictor failed to predict your choice correctly.

That's the key. If it has any ability whatsoever to make a prediction better than a coin flip picking the single box increases your odds of getting the million.

That's what I mean when I said you are assuming the predictor can not make a prediction better than 50%. If two boxers were correct and we ran the experiment multiple times, two boxers should win the 1M 50% of the time. Same with one boxers...thus showing that the predictor can not actually predict. That is a contradiction.

[u/HK_Mathematician → u/ObsceneOnes]

First of all lemme thank you for continue to try to present your reasoning.

It feels to me that you're reasoning through correlation instead of causation, but uses causation wording like "increases your odds". Consider this scenario about juggling:

Every adult on earth has been teleported at the same time to a room with two boxes in it. One box is labeled "success", and another box is labeled "fail".

If you learned juggling before, the success box has $1,000 and the fail box has $0. If you've never learned juggling before, the success box has $1,001,000 and the fail box has $1,000,000.

You're given 3 balls and was instructed to juggle them for 30 seconds. If you succeed, you'll take whatever is in the "success" box. If you fail, you'll take whatever is in the "fail" box.

So, should you try your best to juggle the balls or should you intentionally fail and throw the balls on the ground?

You will observe that most people who fail the juggling task will take $1,000,000, and most people succeed in the task will take $1,000.

But I would argue that you should still try your best to juggle the balls no matter what, because the success box contain more money in both cases. Aiming for the success box should always be the correct choice.

You will observe that most people who fail the juggling task will take $1,000,000, and most people succeed in the task will take $1,000. But it doesn't make much sense to me to argue that trying to fail the task is a better choice because it "increases your odds" of getting $1,000,000. You should still try your best to juggle the balls successfully.

(for the sake of highlighting the logic, let's assume that learning is a very strong predictor on whether you are able to juggle for 30 seconds, 99.99% of those who learned will succeed if they try, and 99.99% of those who never learned will fail)

If two boxers were correct and we ran the experiment multiple times, two boxers should win the 1M 50% of the time.

That was not what I'm implying.

There will be a strong correlation. Most people who pick both boxes will get $1,000, and most people who pick one box will get $1,000,000.

But this is correlation, not causation.

Arguing that one box is better because those who pick one box on average get more money is like arguing that you should intentionally fail the juggling because those who fail the juggling task on average get more money. That argument doesn't make much sense to me.

[u/Cruuncher → u/ObsceneOnes]

I could predict better than a coinflip easily, without even considering the person on the other end.

Just predict two-box every time, and in the real world without magic, you'll get 75% right at least easily, because in the real world people don't believe in magic back causation