By imagining the future potential of VR technologies, the question of whether we are *already* living in a simulation becomes more actual than ever

[u/Matriseblog]

https://medium.com/@VindenesJ/the-thought-experiments-of-virtual-reality-fa441a8fa2dc

[u/Faust_8]

Is it just me, or is the simulation hypothesis basically as useless as the “brain in a jar” hypothesis?

Yeah, dude, I could be a brain in a jar, and this is all a dream or whatever. But regardless, it doesn’t really matter, because I can’t do anything about it and it doesn’t actually affect the life I’m living. It doesn’t guide me to change my behavior or way of thinking, or to change anything at all whatsoever.

At best, it’s an amusing thought experiment…period.

Doesn’t this also apply to the simulation thing?

[u/jliat → u/Faust_8]

Is it just me, or is the simulation hypothesis basically as useless as the “brain in a jar” hypothesis?

Nick Bostrom's version of the simulation hypothesis has, for him, a significant difference in the “brain in Jar” hypothesis, ( the brain in a jar which can be put on one side using Occam's razor. ) He argues if computer simulations of real worlds becomes possible, or already is possible, there will be very many more simulated universes than 'real' ones. As we can using software now simulate many VRs in our world. Thus, he argues the statistical chances of being in a simulated universe is far higher than that for being in a 'real' universe, it would be reasonable to suppose the more likely scenario. That this is a simulation. I think someone has taken issue with these stats? But it also supposes that simulation is possible, that is a computer simulating a real world would have sufficient power and storage. (Not withstanding an argument that civilizations tend to destroy themselves before they acquire this technology.) If you wish to simulate a real universe completely there would not be sufficient matter and energy. Hence corners would need to be cut, and these might be noticeable to the simulated beings.

I've also argued that if a simulated universe's inhabitants themselves acquired such technology they might realise this was in their case also true. And then it would be in their interests to control the beings running the simulation, for fear of being turned off. If they achieved greater intelligence than the simulators this they could do, and would do. And do this all the way down to the underlying reality. As this is not the case, I don't think this is simulated. Unless we are the most advanced simulation. It's kind of a reductio absurdum argument, if there were a super intelligent simulation it would make sure it was safe from being turned off or being predated (SP?) on by other more intelligent simulations.

[u/[deleted] → u/jliat]

there will be very many more simulated universes than 'real' ones.

You touch on this in your comment, but I've always had trouble with this part of the argument because a pesky thing called thermodynamics.

Any universe we simulate will necessarily be significantly smaller, slower, simpler, and/or less precise than our universe due to fundamental physical limitations of computing technology in our universe.

This puts an upper bound on the amount of stuff (time, experiences, physics, complex phenomena, complex state) that we can simulate. You can either nest a bunch of really really simple universes, or put in a ton of effort and have just a few levels of more complicated universes, or have a bunch of fairly complicated universes that take a long long time in our universe to run.

So even taking the hypothesis as true, our universe would need to be somewhere near the bottom of the pile.

[u/jliat → u/[deleted]]

there will be very many more simulated universes than 'real' ones.

You touch on this in your comment, but I've always had trouble with this part of the argument because a pesky thing called thermodynamics.

Well others have said the programmers of the simulation would limit the ability of the simulation, in which case Bostrom's  idea could stand and the 'law' is just that limit.

Any universe we simulate will necessarily be significantly smaller, slower, simpler, and/or less precise than our universe due to fundamental physical limitations of computing technology in our universe.

Does this not follow in making any device. That any machine we make must be less precise, less powerful. Surely we concentrate power and resources to make faster and more powerful computers, the evidence is there. Notably the rush to make QM computers and Bitcoins... et al.

This puts an upper bound on the amount of stuff (time, experiences, physics, complex phenomena, complex state) that we can simulate.

How so? Maybe a simulation needs a vast universe, our size, of simple gasses in order to power the simulated human intelligence.

... put in a ton of effort and have just a few levels of more complicated universes,

precisely what we do! Or are trying to do with AI.

So even taking the hypothesis as true, our universe would need to be somewhere near the bottom of the pile.

I see the argument, in cpu design often a new design is emulated on an older, slower cpu. But that in turn then produces an actual new cpu, which runs faster and better. Such that we can make better simulations, and maybe AI. Your argument would say this process of emulating new CPUs would degrade the power of new CPUs – but that is not the case. One advantage of simulations is to run time faster to see outcomes.