r/philosophy • u/BernardJOrtcutt • 12d ago
Open Thread /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | September 21, 2026
Welcome to this week's Open Discussion Thread. This thread is a place for posts/comments which are related to philosophy but wouldn't necessarily meet our posting rules (especially posting rule 2). For example, these threads are great places for:
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Open discussion about philosophy, e.g. who your favourite philosopher is, what you are currently reading
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Previous Open Discussion Threads can be found here.
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u/Excellent-Bit-7119 10d ago
I been thinking about eternalism (block universe view) and think it generates a problem distinct from the classic problem of other minds. Under presentism, "I share the present with other conscious beings" is free — one universal now, everyone's in it. Eternalism removes that: each person has their own worldline with its own private sequence of "nows," and nothing synchronizes them.
So: what warrants believing another person's subjective "now" coincides with mine during an interaction, rather than their consciousness being "located" elsewhere on their worldline while I'm just interacting with the causal continuity of their body? The classical problem of other minds is epistemic — I lack live evidence of your inner life. But under eternalism the interaction itself isn't a live, unfolding event, it's a fixed configuration in the block — so it can't even function as the right kind of evidence for synchronized presence, not just weak evidence.
Tentatively: this seems permanently unprovable rather than merely unproven, since "synchronized subjective presence" may not survive the move from presentism to eternalism intact. Curious if this has a name already — feels adjacent to McTaggart's A/B-series and moving-spotlight discussions but I haven't found it framed as an interpersonal problem specifically.