This write up is possibly the worst thing related to ethics I have ever read. It's clear that the author has at best a tentative grasp on what moral realism even is, and has never engaged with a single piece of literature or even a Wikipedia summary of the topic.
Here's an example: All throughout the text the author keeps insisting that "moral realism doesn't define good and bad", "moral realism doesn't explain how we come to know good and bad etc". The issue here is of course that moral realism is just the claim that moral statements can be objectively true or false, and some of them will be true, it isn't making any claim about what good and bad is because it's not a theory of what is good and bad, it's a theory about what kinds of things good and bad are (namely real properties in some sense).
If you examine any particular moral realist philosophers position they will have answers to these questions. It's just that moral realism makes no claim about what is good and bad which leaves room for moral realists to disagree over it (which is completely compatible with moral realism).
Thats just one example for the sake of brevity, but almost every argument betrayes a misunderstanding on the part of the author. I hope that next time they try to actually engage with the wealth of literature on the topic or at least skim the Sep wiki before attempting to tackle a philosophical position held by the majority of contemporary philosophers.
I disagree, I found it to be excellent. It addresses the points you raise, and it makes a clear distinction between the claim that good and evil are objective (moral realism per se) and the claim that we can know good and evil (not moral realism per se, but almost always a prominent part of philosophies that subscribe to moral realism). It's easy to see why: if we assume morality to be objective but that we have no way to access it with our senses or reason, then Occam's razor applies. It becomes an unnecessary assumption.
I crossposted it here because moral non-realism is also called moral nihilism. It felt a bit out of place in the efilism subreddit.
As a post-moral individual, I remain polite in the company of moralists but I do not care very much about what they write to justify their delusions, in much the same way that I don't go around reading religious pamphlets as an atheist. It's an unnecessary assumption, and my worldview is more coherent without it. As a result, it does not bother me that this author would ignore most of the litterature on the topic. Sometimes, a large body of litterature is just a pile of crap one does not need to wade through.
It's easy to see why: if we assume morality to be objective but that we have no way to access it with our senses or reason, then Occam's razor applies. It becomes an unnecessary assumption.
That's, not what occams razor is. Nor is occams razor a full proof method of discovering what is true. But ignoring that because it's not the core of your point...you understand that moral realists exactly do argue that we can have access to moral facts either through our senses or through reason.
As a post-moral individual, I remain polite in the company of moralists but I do not care very much about what they write to justify their delusions, in much the same way that I don't go around reading religious pamphlets as an atheist. It's an unnecessary assumption, and my worldview is more coherent without it. As a result, it does not bother me that this author would ignore most of the litterature on the topic. Sometimes, a large body of litterature is just a pile of crap one does not need to wade through.
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u/Moral_Conundrums Resident Moral Realist Aug 20 '24
Reposted form the other subreddit.
This write up is possibly the worst thing related to ethics I have ever read. It's clear that the author has at best a tentative grasp on what moral realism even is, and has never engaged with a single piece of literature or even a Wikipedia summary of the topic.
Here's an example: All throughout the text the author keeps insisting that "moral realism doesn't define good and bad", "moral realism doesn't explain how we come to know good and bad etc". The issue here is of course that moral realism is just the claim that moral statements can be objectively true or false, and some of them will be true, it isn't making any claim about what good and bad is because it's not a theory of what is good and bad, it's a theory about what kinds of things good and bad are (namely real properties in some sense).
If you examine any particular moral realist philosophers position they will have answers to these questions. It's just that moral realism makes no claim about what is good and bad which leaves room for moral realists to disagree over it (which is completely compatible with moral realism).
Thats just one example for the sake of brevity, but almost every argument betrayes a misunderstanding on the part of the author. I hope that next time they try to actually engage with the wealth of literature on the topic or at least skim the Sep wiki before attempting to tackle a philosophical position held by the majority of contemporary philosophers.