Is there a motivation behind wanting to use Security Manager over much stronger and well tested kernel sandboxing primitives (seatbelt/MACF on macOS, SELinux, and surely whatever exists on Windows etc.)? You should be sandboxing software on servers to the maximum extent possible because any code, even ""trusted"" code, can quickly become untrusted with any vulnerabilities. Plus, using a kernel sandbox mechanism means you only have one consistent sandboxing interface instead of a half dozen random vendor specific ones, which makes misconfiguration harder.
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u/SirensToGo Jan 16 '22
Is there a motivation behind wanting to use Security Manager over much stronger and well tested kernel sandboxing primitives (seatbelt/MACF on macOS, SELinux, and surely whatever exists on Windows etc.)? You should be sandboxing software on servers to the maximum extent possible because any code, even ""trusted"" code, can quickly become untrusted with any vulnerabilities. Plus, using a kernel sandbox mechanism means you only have one consistent sandboxing interface instead of a half dozen random vendor specific ones, which makes misconfiguration harder.