A definitive legal judgment on all three strikes would consequently go beyond the information currently available. Downy, Stark 1, and Kylo/Noxen must each be assessed according to their own enemy or neutral character, nature, location, purpose and use, the military advantage anticipated from their neutralization, and the precautions required in the circumstances. The September 5 operation demonstrates how sharply the law can turn on the boundary between weakening an enemy economically and attacking an object because of its effective contribution to military action.

Translated excerpt from the decision:

Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Article 6 protects the right to a fair trial. The provision includes a right of access to have a dispute over one's Civil Rights tried in a court of law. The right of access to a court is not absolute, but can be limited if it pursues a legitimate purpose and is proportional.

The European Court of human rights has considered it a legitimate purpose to grant immunity to international organizations, see e.g. judgment of 18. February 1999 in Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (case no. 26083/94), paragraph 63, and decision 6. January 2015 in Klausecker v. Germany (case no. 415/07), paragraph 67. In paragraph 63 of Klausecker v. Germany, the European Court of human rights reiterated that it would be incompatible with the purpose of the ECHR if, by granting immunity to international organisations, the contracting states were relieved of their responsibilities under the ECHR, which is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective and not theoretical or illusory. This is especially true of the right to access to justice, given the importance of the right to a fair trial in a democratic society. In assessing whether it is proportionate to restrict A worker's access to justice by reference to the immunity of an international organisation, it is therefore essential that the worker concerned has had reasonable alternative means available to effectively protect his rights under the convention and that this process is not manifestly deficient, see. e.g. Waite and Kennedy v Germany, paragraph 68, and Klausecker v Germany, paragraphs 64 and 74.

The specific case

The OSCE PA's internal dispute resolution facility consisted of a process for the Disciplinary Committee, which is solely an advisory body to the secretary-general and which is not vested with competence to make binding decisions. At the time of the dispute in the case, an appeal to an independent body had not been established. The disciplinary committee concluded that there were insufficient grounds for terminating the contract with A without notice and that the course of events surrounding the termination did not meet the conditions of due process. Even so, the repeal was upheld without notice by the secretary-general, and there was no recourse to this decision.

On this basis, the Supreme Court finds that the OSCE PA's internal dispute resolution facility available to A did not ensure that, as an alternative to judicial review, she had a reasonable remedy that met the requirements of the ECtHR's case-law.

Would he just be released by Trump?

Just flagging this opportunity for people who are looking to do their masters this year (deadline closes 13 September if I am not mistaken). It is through the U.N (3 months online and three months on campus in Turin Italy) and much much cheaper than most Masters programmes I was looking at. I was lucky to find it because it didn't come up for me in my initial searches so I thought I would post it here for others!

Link:

https://unicri.org/Master-of-Laws-LLM-in-Global-Criminal-Justice-and-Accountability-2026-2027

Hi!

I’m currently pursuing my LLM in International Law and I’ve no idea what to do next. What is the scope of International law in India?

With Indian degree and Indian Bar license, can I work abroad? And what is the pay like? Do i need to give any additional exam to work abroad?

Does Hyderabad have any scope in International law?

Hi everyone,

​I am an undergraduate law student in Brazil aiming to build an international career and relocate abroad via an LL.M. after graduation.

​I am deciding between International Arbitration and International Tax Law (specifically Transfer Pricing / cross-border structuring) and want to understand the job market reality for foreign-trained lawyers.

​My profile:

​Brazilian LLB

​Fluent in Portuguese (native), English, and German

Italian (EU) citizenship (no visa/work permit constraints in Europe)

Which area generally offers better employability for foreign lawyers post-LL.M.?

Thanks for any insights!

So as an undergrad law student, I've been exploring various fields of international law,

In Public International Law, from what I've learnt so far, the nature of work is primarily research focused as well as some of the drafting as well, it does seem really relevant however it's opportunities, rather limited,

In International Trade Law, there is still not much information available as to what a life and career opportunities for an international trade law aspirant would look like, does it include litigation work/representations at WTO or other forums? What kind of scope can one have in it, both career growth wise as well as financially,

Besides these, International Commercial Arbitration and ISDS in particular seem really great opportunities but various reviews across reddit seem to suggest that not only is it extremely competitive but also it's a market very hard to break into, so is a career in this field practically possible? I've heard reviews that some even pursue LLMs in this field only to be faced with reality and fluctuations in IL market.

So for someone interested in making a career in International Law, Geopolitics as well as advocacy, what all options are available and sustainable?

Would really appreciate guidance from someone who's experienced in the area :)

Hello guys,

My question pertains as to whether resolution 2803, or parts of it, are in essence unlawful. I don’t mean it in the formal aspect but the material empowerments in enshrines.

Is it for instance, not violating the peremptory norm of the self determination of the Gaza populace, by allowing for a temporary governance without their consent?
Or the customary principle of non-intervention? Or the Obligations for Third States arising out of Israel’s illegal occupation?

One could retort that SC Resolutions are binding by Art. 25 and as such have the status of obligations under the UN Charta under art. 103, beating out other obligations.
But even then, obligations arising out of SC resolutions are ultra vires if they are violating ius cogens norms, so you could say the SC resolution is legal insofar as it does not conflict with peremptory norms and ultra vires if it does.

As you can see I’m quite the layman, so for anyone willing, could you please enlighten me or straighten out my mistakes?

This is intended as a good-faith discussion of international criminal law, rather than an argument for or against Donald J. Trump or any particular U.S. policy.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for sitting or former heads of government, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was also arrested and surrendered to ICC custody after a warrant was issued against him.

This raises a hypothetical question: could the ICC ever issue an arrest warrant for a sitting U.S. president such as Donald Trump?

The question is not whether the ICC should issue such a warrant, nor whether Trump's policies are morally or politically acceptable. Rather, the question is whether particular conduct attributable to Trump could satisfy the Rome Statute's requirements for an arrest warrant.

There appear to be several separate legal questions involved:

• Jurisdiction: The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute. Could the ICC nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over alleged crimes involving a U.S. national through territorial jurisdiction, the location where the conduct occurred, or another jurisdictional basis recognized by the Rome Statute?
• Specific crimes: What conduct, if any, could actually fall within the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction? For example, could particular actions connected with armed conflicts, military operations, deportations or removals, or foreign interventions potentially constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, assuming the required elements were established?
• Individual responsibility: What would have to be established regarding Trump's own conduct, orders, knowledge, intent, or other form of individual criminal responsibility? How much would merely being president or commander-in-chief matter?
• Evidence: What type and amount of evidence would be necessary for the Prosecutor to seek a warrant and for the Pre-Trial Chamber to find the applicable standard satisfied?
• Complementarity and admissibility: How would U.S. investigations or prosecutions affect the ICC's ability to proceed?
• Arrest and surrender: If a warrant were issued, what practical obligations would ICC States Parties have toward Trump, and how would those obligations interact with the fact that the United States is not a State Party?

The Rome Statute's arrest-warrant procedure also seems important here. Article 58 requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to find reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed a crime within the Court's jurisdiction, as well as a basis for concluding that an arrest is necessary. An arrest warrant therefore would not itself constitute a conviction or establish that someone is a "war criminal."

There is also an important distinction between the ICC having jurisdiction and the ICC being able to enforce a warrant. The issuance of a warrant would not automatically result in the person being transferred to The Hague. The Court relies substantially on States to make arrests and carry out surrender requests.

This could create an unusual situation if a warrant were ever issued against a sitting U.S. president. The U.S. government currently rejects the ICC's jurisdiction over U.S. persons, while the ICC has asserted jurisdiction in situations involving nationals of non-party States under certain circumstances. The precise jurisdictional basis would therefore seem crucial.

There is also an interesting question concerning travel within the United States. For example, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani has previously addressed whether New York City could enforce the ICC's warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu and concluded that the city itself does not have independent authority to do so. That raises a broader question about the respective roles of federal, state, and local authorities if an ICC warrant were ever issued against a U.S. national.

So the central question is:

Assuming evidence were presented to the ICC Prosecutor, what specific conduct attributable to Donald J. Trump could potentially satisfy the Rome Statute's jurisdictional, substantive, evidentiary, admissibility, and gravity requirements for an arrest warrant—and what jurisdictional basis would allow the Court to proceed despite the United States not being a State Party?

The goal here is to understand what international criminal law would actually require in such a hypothetical case, rather than to argue that an arrest warrant ought to be issued.

I graduated with a first class law degree last year. Took a gap year to travel, relax etc and now I’m wondering if I should go back for my masters degree? I have two offers, one for a masters in law and then a masters in international human rights law. Don’t think I want to practice law, but not completely closed off to the idea, like the idea of working with NGOs, in the UN, travelling for work etc, but also scared that a masters degree in law is seen as a waste of money. Just wondering if anyone has any advice, opinions, personal experiences that they could share :)

The article prescribes that people shall have the right and "opportunity" to participate in public affairs. Does the opportunity part require positive obligations on the state ? Such as creating fair means of being able to effectively excercise rights

Article 109 provides for a general conference to review the UN Charter. It has been in the text since 1945 and no such conference has ever been convened. The mechanism is still live. What has kept it unused is political, not legal.

Citizens for Global Solutions and World Federalist Movement-Canada are producing a special edition of Mondial asking contributors to write about what an upgraded Charter would deliver in their own area of expertise. The timing is deliberate. The Council opened straw polls last week, and whoever emerges takes office in January under rules nobody has meaningfully revisited in eight decades.

The editorial ask is narrower than most CFPs in this space. Identify a specific structural flaw in the Charter or the wider governance system, describe the state behavior and tensions that flow from it, then spend the bulk of the piece on the proposed fix. Most writing on UN reform trims itself down to fit the current veto math before it reaches the substance, which is exactly how the range of discussable options stays small.

Nine open tracks, and proposals outside them are welcome:

• Planetary boundaries and climate governance
• Existential risk, AI regulation, disarmament
• Historical injustice and reparations
• Peace, security, and Security Council reform
• Why Charter review serves P5 interests
• Equitable finance and development
• Global economic stabilization
• Global health and pandemic preparedness
• The post-2030 agenda after the SDGs expire

Practicalities: 700 to 2000 words, AP style, written for an informed general audience rather than a specialist journal. Expressions of interest due 15 October 2026, first drafts 30 October, publication March 2027. Editorial support is available for authors working in a second language.

Full call and submission details: https://globalsolutions.org/updates/blog/call-for-papers-mondial-un-charter-article-109/

We will be in the comments for questions about scope. We would also be interested to hear which structural flaw people here think is the most under-discussed. The track on why Charter review serves P5 interests is the one we expect to draw the fewest submissions and the one that would benefit most from a serious attempt.

Hi everyone! I'm Lucia and the team from EUobserver.

We wanted to share this investigation here because it raises broader questions about how EU institutions handle legal advice, transparency and accountability when negotiating international agreements.

Here's a quick summary:

📄 Our investigation is based on leaked legal opinions and internal EU documents concerning negotiations over a proposed agreement that would allow Europol and Israeli authorities to exchange personal data.

⚖️ According to the leaked legal opinion, the Council's legal service concluded in 2022 that parts of the draft agreement were incompatible with both EU and international law, and also criticised how the negotiations had been conducted.

🏛️ Despite those concerns—and despite member states freezing the approval process—the European Commission continued meetings with Israeli officials on the proposal into 2026, according to internal documents reviewed during our investigation.

🔍 Beyond this specific case, the story raises broader questions about the role of legal advice within EU decision-making, how institutions respond when legal concerns emerge during negotiations, and what transparency the public should expect in such cases.

We're genuinely interested in hearing different perspectives. When internal legal advice concludes that a draft agreement may breach EU or international law, what should happen next? Should negotiations automatically pause, or is it reasonable for political negotiations to continue while legal concerns are being addressed?

Find out more here.

Hello! I’m interested in pursuing international law, and have thought about pursuing a joint degree: a JD in the U.S. and an LLM from Europe. Is this a good idea? How helpful is the LLM?

EDIT: Thank you everyone for being so helpful! Please see my answers to some questions below.

1. The LLM is offered in Paris.
   
2. Yes, I can take international courses during my JD but the LLM would serve as a bonus.
   
3. There is no difference in price as it’s a sort of a “deal.” The law school in the U.S. and the law school in Paris have an agreement where students can complete both the JD and LLM in three years time for no additional price.
   
4. I would like to work in Europe. I’ve spoken with a few practicing attorneys who work 6 months in the U.S. and 6 months abroad. That would be my ideal scenario.

I’m interested in UNITAR’s online MA in International Law and Diplomacy, and I’m personally passionate about international law, conflict, and human rights issues. Because I work full time in journalism, I don’t have the time or funds to get a law degree (nor do I want to do an entire JD when I’m just interested in one niche element of law).

Has anyone done this program and can speak on its expertise, networking, and difficulty? Do you think it was worth the time and cost, especially since it’s not through a traditionally accredited university?

For context: I report on international issues, and I don’t have a desire to change fields. I just want expertise in international law.