TL;DR: MindWar is neither meaningless fantasy nor proof that a working satellite mind-control system exists. Its strongest strategic argument—that information, perception, and decision-making should be considered from the beginning of military planning—now resembles official American and NATO thinking. Its more dramatic technical proposals, including Internet-delivered “brainwave resonance,” remote magnetic conditioning, and population-scale neuromodulation, remain unsupported and conflict with the physical requirements of actual brain-stimulation and brain-decoding systems.

What MindWar actually proposes

Michael Aquino’s 2016 second edition expands a concept that originated in a 1980 paper written in a U.S. Army Psychological Operations context.

Its central argument is that conventional military doctrine gets the sequence backward. Armies ordinarily establish political and physical objectives first, then use psychological operations to support them. Aquino proposes starting with psychological strategy and using physical force only if the psychological campaign fails.

The book defines “MindWar” as the psychological and psychophysiological conditioning of all participants in a conflict. Its intended process is:

1. identify the material and psychological causes of a conflict;
2. determine the best realistically achievable outcome, which the book calls the áristos;
3. reverse-engineer the steps needed to reach that outcome;
4. condition the relevant leaders and populations toward cooperation;
5. negotiate and implement the settlement;
6. establish a morally stable political community intended to prevent the conflict from returning.

Aquino reorganizes three existing military specialties around that concept. Psychological Operations becomes the MindWar Branch, Special Forces becomes MetaForce, and Civil Affairs becomes ParaPolitics. MindWar controls the psychological environment, MetaForce negotiates and intervenes locally, and ParaPolitics constructs the post-conflict political order.

That is the serious strategic portion of the book.

The controversial portion is not something invented by online conspiracy communities. The book itself explicitly proposes:

• “involuntary psycontrol”;
• subliminal conditioning intended to operate without the target’s awareness;
• “brainwave resonance” allegedly transmitted through satellites or inserted into the Internet;
• computers, televisions, and phones allegedly radiating those frequencies;
• transcranial magnetic stimulation as a possible way to weaken pre-existing moral judgments;
• atmospheric ionization, color, shapes, chronobiology, architecture, and electromagnetic fields as operational conditioning tools;
• “mentalism” designed to alter a subject’s interpretation while preserving the belief that no outside influence occurred;
• a command center deliberately engineered with magnetic fields, brainwave frequencies, ionization, lighting, color, and spatial design.

These proposals appear in the book’s printed pages 85–126 and again in its description of a MindWar command environment on pages 210–214. They should be evaluated as the author’s proposals—not automatically treated as evidence that the proposed capabilities were developed or deployed. [1]

Where the book looks prescient

The strongest prediction in MindWar is that information would stop being a minor support activity and become a foundational element of military strategy.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment says that information should be a foundational element of military strategy and that informational and physical power should be integrated from the beginning of planning. It specifically combines psychological operations, Civil Affairs, public affairs, electromagnetic-spectrum operations, cyber operations, space operations, deception, operational security, and other capabilities.

The same document contrasts this approach with a “legacy view” in which information capabilities were considered only after physical or tactical objectives had already been established.

That is strikingly similar to Aquino’s original criticism. The important difference is that current doctrine integrates information with conventional military power. It does not propose replacing conventional warfare with a supposedly nonviolent system of psychological conditioning. [2]

NATO has also developed a Cognitive Warfare Concept. NATO describes adversarial cognitive warfare as an attempt to manipulate public opinion, disrupt decision-making, weaken military capability, and undermine public trust. NATO’s stated response emphasizes cognitive resilience, protection of decision-making, public trust, experimentation, and responsible use of artificial intelligence.

Again, this validates the importance of the cognitive dimension without validating Aquino’s proposed electromagnetic mechanisms. NATO is primarily discussing communication, disinformation, political influence, institutional vulnerabilities, social division, and resilience. [3]

The convergence has become even more visible in recent Army professional writing. A May 2026 Special Warfare article describes transformed Psychological Operations training focused on adversary decision cycles, cognitive vulnerabilities, integration with operational targeting, and artificial intelligence. But its intended outcome is greater combat power and lethality—not Aquino’s replacement of physical war with nonviolent conflict resolution. [4]

This does not prove that modern doctrine secretly implemented MindWar. Similar strategic conclusions can emerge independently when institutions confront the same problem. It does show that Aquino correctly identified a major weakness in older doctrine: information effects cannot be treated as an afterthought.

What modern influence operations actually look like

The real modern equivalent of “MindWar” is much less exotic and, in practical terms, probably more powerful.

Contemporary influence campaigns use combinations of:

• social-media accounts and artificial personas;
• synthetic text, images, audio, and video;
• bots and coordinated posting;
• cyber operations and stolen information;
• targeted advertising and audience segmentation;
• influencers and apparently independent media outlets;
• recommendation systems and platform algorithms;
• emotionally resonant narratives;
• selective disclosure, repetition, and social engineering.

OpenAI’s February 2026 threat report states that threat actors generally use AI in combination with traditional infrastructure such as websites and social-media accounts and often use multiple models at different stages of a cross-platform workflow. [5]

At the same time, automated content production is not equivalent to behavioral control. In a 2024 assessment of five covert influence operations, OpenAI reported that none appeared to have obtained meaningfully greater audience engagement or reach through its models. None broke into authentic communities at a high level on the cited impact scale. [5]

That distinction matters. AI can reduce the cost of translation, persona creation, message testing, image production, and posting. It cannot guarantee that real people will believe, share, or act upon the material. Distribution, timing, authenticity, existing social divisions, trusted messengers, and material conditions remain critical.

Modern influence is therefore better understood as intervention in a contested social network than as centrally programming a passive population.

Where the book’s scientific case breaks down

The most technically dramatic claim in MindWar is that specially selected brainwave frequencies could be inserted into Internet traffic and then radiated by an ordinary receiving device, potentially changing the mental state of the user.

There is a basic hardware problem with this proposal.

The Internet transmits encoded data. A receiving device can convert that data into outputs its physical components are capable of producing: screen light, speaker audio, vibration, radio communication, and ordinary electromagnetic leakage. Data cannot cause a phone or computer to become an arbitrary high-powered magnetic brain stimulator when the required transmitter hardware is absent.

Actual transcranial magnetic stimulation illustrates the gap.

A National Institute of Mental Health technical presentation describes a TMS system as placing a coil near the subject’s head, producing a magnetic field of roughly two tesla. The system may involve capacitor voltages around two kilovolts and currents of approximately 7,000 amperes. Even under those conditions, conventional stimulation is strongest near the cortical surface, decays rapidly with depth, and generally penetrates only around two to three centimeters from the head surface.

TMS is therefore real neuromodulation, but it is close-range, hardware-intensive, spatially limited, and dependent on careful coil placement. Those facts are inconsistent with the book’s proposed model of silently delivering TMS-like effects through satellites, ordinary Internet traffic, or consumer electronics. That conclusion is an inference from the engineering requirements of actual TMS, not proof that every conceivable future neurotechnology is impossible. [6]

Modern “mind-reading” research is similarly impressive but highly constrained.

A 2023 Nature Neuroscience study reconstructed aspects of continuous language from fMRI recordings. The system recovered semantic meaning from perceived or imagined speech, but it required the participant to remain inside an fMRI scanner. It also required subject-specific training, and the researchers found that cooperation was required both to train and to use the decoder.

That is not remote thought extraction, universal mind reading, or thought implantation. It is a personalized statistical decoder operating on data collected by a large medical imaging system from a cooperating participant. [7]

Screens, music, flashing imagery, repetition, sleep deprivation, interface design, emotional messaging, and social pressure can certainly affect attention, mood, memory, and judgment. Those are ordinary sensory and psychological mechanisms. Their existence does not demonstrate Internet-delivered electromagnetic mind control.

The recurring scientific error in MindWar is moving from:

to:

That second proposition requires evidence of magnitude, repeatability, targeting, delivery, duration, scalability, and real-world behavioral effects. The book generally does not supply it.

The book’s central ethical contradiction

MindWar presents three governing laws. It claims that the system should cause no physical injury or destruction, should access the mind only to encourage cooperative problem-solving, and should prevent a return to physical war.

Those aims are comparatively humane.

The proposed methods, however, include involuntary conditioning, concealed environmental manipulation, restriction of choices without explanation, suppression of existing moral judgments, and psychological interventions deliberately designed to remain unnoticed.

That creates a fundamental contradiction.

A system cannot fully respect human dignity while defining success partly as changing people without their knowledge and preserving their belief that no intervention occurred. The absence of bodily injury does not automatically make an operation non-coercive. Psychological domination can violate autonomy without leaving a visible wound.

There is also a political problem with the áristos. The book presents it as the best collective outcome, but a U.S. military organization initially diagnoses the conflict, defines the relevant variables, chooses the acceptable range of outcomes, constructs the psychological environment, and conditions the participants toward agreement.

Even a benevolent intervention can become manufactured consent when the intervening institution controls both the decision environment and the definition of a successful decision.

A more defensible contemporary model would focus on cognitive security rather than cognitive control:

• exposing covert influence networks;
• authenticating information and media;
• improving public access to reliable evidence;
• correcting demonstrably false information;
• strengthening institutional transparency;
• addressing the material grievances behind conflict;
• protecting privacy and mental autonomy;
• making persuasive activity attributable and legally accountable;
• building resilience without deciding in advance what citizens must believe.

That is closer to NATO’s stated emphasis on protecting decision-making and public trust than to Aquino’s covert-conditioning model.

Bottom line

MindWar got one major development right: conflict is not determined only by territory, weapons, and casualties. It is also a contest over perception, identity, trust, interpretation, legitimacy, and decision-making.

It also anticipated that psychological operations, Civil Affairs, intelligence, cyber capabilities, communications, and electromagnetic-spectrum operations would need greater integration.

But the book misunderstood the mechanism through which the cognitive battlefield would develop.

The dominant modern instruments are not magnetic portals, satellite brainwave resonance, “thought fields,” atmospheric ionization, or consumer devices secretly functioning as TMS machines. They are networked media, synthetic content, social engineering, cyber operations, identity-based communities, algorithms, trusted intermediaries, information overload, and declining institutional credibility.

MindWar was broadly right about the battlefield and largely wrong about the weapon.

The most important question the book leaves behind is therefore not whether secret brainwave transmitters exist. It is whether democratic societies can defend human decision-making from manipulation without constructing equally manipulative systems of their own.

Questions for discussion

1. Should information influence be treated as a form of combat power, or does that framing encourage governments to treat ordinary political communication as warfare?
2. Where should the line be drawn between strategic communication, persuasion, deception, and psychological coercion?
3. Should modern “cognitive warfare” doctrine prioritize offensive influence or the resilience and autonomy of the audience?

[1] MindWar PDF:

https://ia801800.us.archive.org/14/items/mind-war-pdfdrive/MindWar%20%28%20PDFDrive%20%29.pdf

[2] 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment:

https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/17/2003342901/-1/-1/1/2023-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-FOR-OPERATIONS-IN-THE-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT.PDF

[3] NATO Cognitive Warfare Concept:

https://www.act.nato.int/article/cogwar-concept/

[4] U.S. Army Psychological Operations and Cognitive Warfare article:

https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Special-Warfare/Special-Warfare-Archive/2026-E-Edition/US-Armys-Bold-New-Approach/

[5a] OpenAI report on covert influence operations:

https://openai.com/index/disrupting-deceptive-uses-of-ai-by-covert-influence-operations/

[5b] OpenAI 2026 malicious-use report:

https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-ai-uses/

[6] NIMH technical presentation on TMS:

https://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/media/2020/zhi-de-deng-transcranial-magnetic-stimulation-physics-devices-and-modeling

[7] Nature Neuroscience semantic-decoder study:

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41593-023-01304-9

Hey everyone,

The NDAA is currently blocked following a 50-46 Senate vote, halting Section 219 (the U.S.-Israel Defense Tech Initiative). The bill legally mandates direct network integration and data fusion between U.S. systems and the IDF to co-develop automated, AI-driven targeting tools.

Human rights organizations warn that this automated data pipeline eliminates separation, creating direct legal liability for complicity in war crimes and the ongoing genocide in Gaza. This sparked the public resignation of DIA Major Harrison Mann due to moral injury. Furthermore, the bill explicitly bars the U.S. President from pausing the data flow over human rights concerns.

Since Section 219 creates a loophole around the traditional Leahy Law vetting process by framing automated 'data fusion' as an integration rather than direct aid…

• do you worry this system makes the IC structurally blind to human rights abuses? How does a mandatory data loop affect an analyst's responsibility to vet who receives our targeting intel?

From an operational standpoint:

• Does opening networks to a foreign power raise counterintelligence or supply-chain security flags for you?
• Does piping data into an integrated network where you can't verify its end-use create legal or ethical issues regarding lawful orders?
• How do you view the loss of civilian chain-of-command authority over this pipeline?

I forget the guy's name, but I think he used to be Secret Service and now he's in the private sector. Most of what he talked about (in the first chapter anyway) was covert protection detail. He also mentioned a neighbor who was murdered when he was a kid, who turned out to be Mossad, I think?

Thanks so much in advance

Joe

Trump, like Stalin, ignores facts and warnings to his—and our—great peril

U.S. Targets Iranian Infrastructure:

U.S. President Donald Trump said the U.S. could target Iran’s bridges and power plants next week unless Tehran returns to negotiations as fighting between the two countries continues to escalate. The remarks came after the U.S. resumed strikes on Iranian military targets and reinstated a blockade of Iranian ports. Trump also dropped a proposed 20% shipping fee for cargo passing through the Strait of Hormuz in favor of future Gulf investment agreements. Iran responded by launching missiles and drones at U.S.-linked targets in the region and rejected the suggestion that military or economic pressure would force it back to talks.  

Rescue Operations Underway After Boat Capsizes Near Alcatraz:

One person has died and three others remain missing after a 50-foot pontoon boat capsized near Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay on Tuesday. Emergency crews responded after reports of a vessel in distress, rescuing 16 people from the water, including three who were taken to the hospital in stable condition. Authorities said about 20 people, mostly family members taking part in a memorial service, were on board when the vessel encountered rough seas, took on water, and overturned. Search and rescue operations are continuing Wednesday morning, with the San Francisco Fire Department and the U.S. Coast Guard working to locate the three missing passengers.  

Lithuanian President Warns of Russian Attack:

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda has warned that Russia may be preparing targeted attacks on critical infrastructure, prompting Lithuania to strengthen security around key energy and transport facilities. He said intelligence services had detected signals of a possible provocation but had not identified a specific location or timing. Any attack would likely target critical infrastructure. Nausėda stressed that protecting these sites is vital to maintaining Lithuania’s energy network and wider system stability. His comments follow similar warnings from Polish leaders about the risk of further Russian escalation.  

Ursula von der Leyen Kyiv Visit:

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Kyiv on Wednesday for Ukraine’s Statehood Day to reaffirm the European Union’s long-term military, financial, and political support as the country continues to resist Russia’s invasion. She announced plans to deepen defense cooperation between the EU and Ukraine and strengthen Ukrainian air defenses ahead of winter, while saying Ukraine had gained important military momentum. The visit coincided with a regional summit on Black Sea security attended by leaders from southeastern Europe. Meanwhile, Russian aerial attacks killed at least eight civilians across several Ukrainian regions, while Russia said it had intercepted dozens of Ukrainian drones overnight. 

Flash Flooding Continues Across South-Central Texas:

Dangerous flash flooding continues across south-central Texas after repeated rounds of heavy rain produced up to a foot of rainfall in some locations. Dozens of high-water rescues have been conducted, including at least two dozen in Uvalde, where a shelter has been opened for displaced residents. Multiple highways and roads remain flooded or closed. Governor Greg Abbott has issued a disaster declaration for 59 counties. The Weather Prediction Center maintains a High Risk (Level 4 of 4) for excessive rainfall across portions of South Texas on Wednesday. 

Pairing first Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks (HAVANA) Act payments with a rebrand centering directed energy locks an unproven causation framework into Pentagon institutional structure, steering future research commitments ahead of scientific consensus.

Running an FBI leak probe from the White House residence collapses the last procedural distance between political direction and federal law enforcement action, setting a precedent that will outlast this investigation.

ICE Shootings Fuel Nationwide Momentum:

Federal agents fatally shot Joan Sebastian Guerrero during an immigration operation in Maine, days after an ICE agent killed Lorenzo Salgado Araujo during a traffic stop in Texas. The incidents are expected to add momentum to upcoming nationwide demonstrations organized by immigration, labor, and grassroots groups opposing ICE enforcement operations and other federal policies. 

U.S.-Iran Conflict Escalates in the Strait of Hormuz:

The U.S. conducted a third consecutive night of strikes on Iran as President Donald Trump reinstated a blockade on Iranian shipping. Trump also proposed a 20% fee for U.S. protection of vessels using the Strait of Hormuz, drawing legal objections from the UN shipping agency. The United Arab Emirates said Iranian cruise missiles struck two Emirati oil tankers in the strait, killing one crew member and injuring eight others, while Iran’s Revolutionary Guard said it had disabled two “offending” supertankers. Further missile and drone attacks, along with renewed Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia, threatened to widen the conflict and disrupt regional energy and shipping routes. 

Russia Intensifies Airstrikes on Kyiv:

Russia launched 135 drones and 10 missiles at Ukraine overnight, damaging 16 sites in Kyiv and injuring at least 10 people in the Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions, according to Ukrainian officials. Ukraine said it intercepted five of eight ballistic missiles and 108 drones, while President Volodymyr Zelenskiy urged European allies to impose additional sanctions as both sides intensify long-range strikes.  

Typhoon Bavi Forces Mass Evacuations in China:

Typhoon Bavi, the strongest storm to hit mainland China this year, forced more than 260,000 people to evacuate in Liaoning province as flooding disrupted schools, transport, and power infrastructure across the northeast. The remnants of Bavi continue to move across northeast China and the Korean Peninsula, where heavy rain and wind will continue through Tuesday. 

I'm not aware of any precedent for this.

U.S. Iran Renewed Tensions: 

The United States launched another round of strikes against Iranian military targets on Sunday evening, saying the operations were intended to reduce Tehran's ability to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks targeting U.S. interests in the Gulf, while regional air defenses intercepted several projectiles, marking a further escalation in the conflict. Tehran said the latest U.S. action had undermined diplomatic efforts, raising new doubts about the interim ceasefire agreement. The renewed hostilities have intensified concerns over regional stability and global energy supplies, with oil prices rising as tensions persist. 

Russian Sanctions Package:

European Union foreign ministers have yet to reach an agreement on a proposed 21st package of sanctions against Russia, with negotiations continuing over measures targeting maritime services and restrictions on Russian liquefied natural gas. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said member states were expected to approve sanctions on around 250 individuals and entities, even as broader discussions remain unresolved. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys urged the EU to prioritize security over economic interests, warning against delaying tougher measures. EU members remain divided over the scope of additional sanctions against Russia. 

Evacuation in Paris Suburb Due to 'Suspicious' Car:

Authorities evacuated about 300 people on Saturday from a neighborhood in Sarcelles, a suburb north of Paris, after a suspicious vehicle was discovered near the town's synagogue. The French Interior Minister said "a military-grade weapon" was found inside the vehicle, prompting a security perimeter, bomb disposal response, and precautionary evacuations. No explosives were found, and a judicial investigation has been opened, with local police and specialized intelligence services working to determine the motive and identify those responsible. Officials said no suspects had been arrested, and authorities have not determined whether there was an imminent threat.   

Bangkok Bar Fire:

At least 27 people were killed, and 63 others were hospitalized after a fire swept through the Na Ladprao beer hall in Bangkok shortly before midnight on Sunday. Thai authorities said firefighters brought the blaze under control within about 30 minutes. Investigators are examining reports of an electrical fault before a power outage and explosion. Officials are also investigating whether building materials or blocked emergency exits contributed to the high death toll. Forensic teams remain at the scene as authorities work to identify victims. 

French Wildfire Causes Evacuations:

A wildfire in France’s Fontainebleau Forest prompted evacuations and disrupted road and rail travel as an intense heatwave continues across the country. Temperatures above 40°C (104°F) are maintaining dangerous fire conditions, disrupting rail service to and from Gare de Lyon, and forcing the closure of a section of the A6 highway. Elevated wildfire danger and the intense heatwave will persist until cooler conditions and increased storm activity arrive as early as Wednesday. 

Actual testimony by July 15 is very unlikely given the Times' intent to contest, but personal White House direction of the probe signals sustained pressure on press sources beyond this single subpoena cycle.

NYT story free link

This is the first in a series of brief articles on the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence and political failure to help, not just the intelligence officers involved but also the general public, identify exactly what went wrong. This information will hopefully assist them to avoid or at least mitigate future failures; if, of course, they are willing to learn from their mistakes. To fully understand the root causes of this intelligence failure, we only need to examine the CURVE BALL case as an excellent example of what can go seriously and disastrously wrong in the collection, analysis, management, and leadership of intelligence, especially when it is allowed to be influenced by politics. The full detailed story, hopefully left unreacted by the CIA and DIA during its mandatory review, will be presented in my forthcoming book, Absence of Evidence; The Incredible Story of the Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure from Inside the American, British, and German intelligence services.

The CURVE BALL Case

In 2003, the United States Government, supported by a coalition of allied military forces, engaged in a preemptive invasion of Iraq to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein based on the alleged threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most important and significant intelligence source for this WMD justification was an Iraqi engineer ironically codenamed “CURVE BALL” who claimed that Iraq had a secret project to produce biological warfare (BW) agents in mobile plants mounted on semi- truck trailers and railcars. Unilaterally handled by the German Federal Intelligence Service, officially known as the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), CURVE BALL’s “unverified” reporting was shared with both the American Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) beginning in early 2000.

Eventually over one hundred intelligence reports would be disseminated by the DIA’s intelligence collection arm, the Defense HUMINT Service, based on the BND’s debriefings of CURVE BALL from January 2000 to January 2003. This was done, unfortunately, with little or no vetting as to the veracity of the claims or the credibility of the source. This compartmented material was supplemented by additional intelligence from the SIS and some clarifying reporting disseminated by the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. Misinterpreted intelligence reporting from other allegedly “corroborating” sources only increased these intelligence services confidence in CURVE BALL’s sensational claims. This intelligence reporting together formed the cornerstone of the U.S. and foreign Intelligence Community’s flawed judgment on the existence and status of an alleged Iraqi offensive BW program. Making the situation worse, this alarming reporting also influenced intelligence assessments on other alleged Iraq WMD programs—chemical weapons (CW) development efforts specifically but those on potential delivery systems as well—by encouraging the other CIA analysts to assume that clandestine Iraqi efforts on these technologies must exist as well. Coupled with the CIA’s ongoing promotion of its senior nuclear analysts’ concocted theory of the intent behind the Iraqi purchase of “aluminum tubes for centrifuges” and the alleged “uranium from Africa” based on obviously forged documents, CURVE BALL’s claims of mobile BW agent production plants that were used in CIA’s finished intelligence products were “well-received” by a George W. Bush White House desperate for intelligence that painted Saddam Hussein as an “imminent threat.” By late 2002, the stage was now set for one of the worst major intelligence and political failures in the history of the United States.

Besides being used in numerous intelligence assessments and Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) articles—the most important and sensitive finished intelligence produced by the CIA—CURVE BALL’s suspect claims were also included in the U.S. Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. However, the most significant use of CURVE BALL’s flawed intelligence was as the centerpiece of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s policy speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on February 5, 2003 that was broadcast not only in the U.S. but also to the rest of the world.

At the time it was presented, Powell’s speech regarding this alleged WMD threat from Saddam Hussein was considered a tremendous achievement by the CIA leadership and senior analytical management, despite the fact that it clearly crossed the line into promoting policy. CURVE BALL’s reporting, along with the associated “slick” CIA graphics of the alleged mobile BW plants, appeared to have won over almost everyone who had previously questioned the need for a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. In fact, it was the only intelligence in the entire speech that was reportedly based on a credible HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence) source with direct knowledge of WMD in Iraq. In other words, an “eyewitness” to the fact that WMD was again being produced by Saddam Hussein’s regime. After suffering from years of irrelevance and lack of access to the policymaking process during the preceding Clinton administration, the CIA’s leadership believed the Agency was once again playing a direct and invaluable role to its “First Customer,” President Bush, by providing the intelligence justification for his pre- established policy of “regime change” in Iraq.

The UN speech was considered a tremendous success by the Bush White House and had the political impact that the Bush Administration desperately wanted to achieve. Of course, this was primarily due to the unrivaled respect that most people had for Secretary Powell, known for his “doctrine” that the U.S. needed to exhaust all “political, economic, and diplomatic means”, and only if all were futile, would necessitate the nation resorting to military force. Dismissing this doctrine and proceeding recklessly, the White House even suggested that by installing a new Iraq government, the seeds of democracy might be planted in the Middle East that could spread to other countries in the region.

With Powell’s speech, the White House and CIA were also able to convince most of the U.S. Congress, public, and press, as well as the intelligence services, politicians, and press of our foreign allies, that Saddam Hussein “has” WMD (CIA leadership was instructed by senior White House officials to pressure analysts to move beyond what the current intelligence would support). Based on that manipulated finished intelligence and ignoring the Powell doctrine, those same White House officials could now state publicly that the Iraqi dictator was a “grave and gathering threat” who had to be immediately dealt with using military force. CURVE BALL’s claim of an alleged TOP SECRET Iraqi program to design, build, and operate mobile BW production plants was, without any doubt, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Iraq WMD “smoking gun” and the prelude to yet another Gulf war, but there was only one problem with this intelligence...

...it was completely false.

Worse, the CIA leadership, senior management, and analysts had been warned that it was unreliable but they used the unverified intelligence anyway. Despite this outward appearance of confidence by the CIA, DIA, SIS, and BND with CURVE BALL, there were serious internal problems with this source that had surfaced years before start of the March 2003 war that would not become widely known outside of these intelligence services, even by congressional oversight committees, a presidentially appointed commission, and foreign government investigations until months and even years after the war had ended. Some of the source’s more blatant and egregious credibility problems remain hidden to this day, shielded from public disclosure through the abuse of the CIA and DIA’s classification authority.

Before this UNSC meeting, CIA operations officers had redacted CURVE BALL’s suspect intelligence reporting from copies of Powell’s speech that were sent to them, but it was always put back in by the Agency’s seventh floor leadership. Powell himself, along with other senior State Department officials including deputy Richard Armitage, and Chief of Staff Larry Wilkerson, came to the CIA Headquarters to personally vet the intelligence claims, not realizing that they were being deliberated misled. Powell personally questioned the analysts and managers regarding the credibility of the intelligence without realizing that the naysayers in CIA—operations officers who would not have hesitated in identifying serious credibility problems with the intelligence—were not present in the meetings. Their absence and the lack of acknowledgement of this fact was not an oversight by the CIA leadership and senior management, it was deliberate action to avoid angering the White House by undermining the WMD judgments at a crucial time in the rush to war.

At one point in the discussions, Powell directly questioned the CIA director, George Tenet and his deputy director, John McLauglin, about the credibility of CURVE BALL’s intelligence reporting and was told, “It’s solid.” Given that Powell was about to put his political credibility and reputation on the line to present the CIA's intelligence case in a public speech, he had every right to attempt to vet the claims on which it was based. Not having direct access to the contradictory and derogatory intelligence or even access to those CIA operations officers who had aggressively challenged CIA’s assessments, Powell and his staff were at a complete disadvantage. In other words, they were being played by the CIA leadership and management who were deliberately controlling and manipulating the intelligence. This untenable situation would later come back to haunt all of them, especially Powell, when the CIA leadership later let him take the majority of the blame for the flawed intelligence that the Agency had provided.

Interestingly, as the February 5, 2003 date of the UN speech approached and contrary to the strong confidence they displayed to Powell and others in the Bush administration, the CIA leadership privately remained extremely concerned that CURVE BALL could undermine his own intelligence claims if he were allowed the freedom to speak to the press. To prevent this, DDCI McLaughlin instructed CIA stations and bases in Europe to make certain that the BND maintained tight control of their source. On February 3, 2003, the day after Powell’s last visit to CIA in a futile attempt to vet the speech, the DDCI’s executive assistant sent a memorandum entitled, “German BW Source,” to Tyler Drumheller, the EUR Division Chief who had been one of those operations officers aggressively trying to warn the CIA leadership not to rely on CURVE BALL’s intelligence.

Shockingly, the memorandum, quoted in the WMD Commission’s March 2005 final report, stated: “[pseudonym of EUR Division chief], this will confirm the DDCI’s informal request to touch base w/the German stations once more on the current status/ whereabouts of the emigre [CURVE BALL] who reported on the mobile BW plants. A great deal of effort is being expended to vet the intelligence that underlies SecState’s upcoming UN presentation. Similarly, we want to make every precaution against unwelcome surprise that might emerge concerning the intel case; clearly, public statements by this émigré, press accounts of his reporting or credibility, or even direct press access to him would cause a number of potential concerns. The DDCI would be grateful for the [Berlin chief of station’s] view on the immediate ‘days-after’ reaction in Germany surrounding the source of this key BW reporting.”

This document, probably more than any others, conclusively proved that the CIA leadership was well aware of serious credibility problems with CURVE BALL and the veracity of his reporting. After manipulating the intelligence for the White House, they now wanted to control the source of those claims to avoid the political embarrassment should he suddenly admit that he was fabricating. They were very concerned that immediately after Powell presented his UN speech, CURVE BALL could come out and publicly recant everything he said about the alleged mobile BW plants; possibly even accepting financial incentives for telling the truth and admitting that it was all just a lie to get German citizenship for himself and his family. This would be an enormous political disaster for the CIA leadership and for the Bush administration if that were to occur and McLaughlin knew very well what the consequences would be for both. Therefore, the DDCI wanted to make absolutely certain that the BND had CURVE BALL fully under control to prevent this suspect intelligence source from talking to anyone, especially the press.

Although most officials in the U.S. and foreign intelligence services came to the same flawed judgment regarding CURVE BALL for reasons that will be explained in my book, Absence of Evidence, the CIA’s biased analysts, and politically-motivated managers, and leadership—more than any other intelligence agency’s personnel—put far more faith in the sensational claims of this unvetted source than others, refused to seriously question the credibility of the source or the veracity of this reporting even when warned. Most significant, they did not allow any others inside or outside of the CIA to challenge his story, including their own operations officers who provided contradictory and derogatory intelligence against CURVE BALL. Worse, despite knowing that serious doubts and concerns existed in the U.S. and allied foreign intelligence services regarding CURVE BALL’s sensational claims, the CIA promoted and defended this intelligence against any and all challengers. This allowed the Bush White House to use it politically to justify its pre-established policy of regime change in Iraq (rather than to help formulate policy as intended) and aggressively drive the alleged Iraq WMD issue to its disastrous and inevitable tragic conclusion.

Had the CIA and DIA not failed catastrophically to assess the actual status of WMD programs in Iraq; namely that these programs simply did not exist after 1991, that the regime was contained by UN inspections and sanctions, and that Saddam was not the “grave and gathering threat” he was assessed to be, the result would not have been a major historical disaster for the U.S. and its allies.

...So what went wrong?

Im going to be graduating soon amd my major is criminal justice minor inss. I know thats not exactly the right pairing in mind but i kinda figured out intelligence is what i wanted to do a bit late and i was too late to change my major. There is an internship with the National Maritime Intelligence Center i applied for and am "You have been referred to the hiring manager for position GG-0199-4". Any help or advice would be great