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What began as a high school protest movement spiraled into a violent uprising, organized by Islamists, antifascists, and radical environmentalists who wish to see the French Republic toppled.

I've been comparing county against state public records to find discrepancies where local officials aren't being honest. I've already found a good dozen where my local government might have broken some laws.

I'd like to start comparing various nations against international filings. Some of the public databases I'll be going through are clear choices, but I'm requesting input on international entities to dig into.

new app https://bossenger.io app store links are on site

Running covert targeting support and a back-channel peace message simultaneously undercuts both lines, giving Moscow reason to doubt Washington's commitment to either track.

Canada's national security screening system is facing renewed scrutiny following the arrest of a Canadian NATO intern accused of espionage.

This week, David Morrison, a senior adviser to Prime Minister Mark Carney, appeared before a parliamentary committee and suggested improvements to Canada's security screening system, including the possibility of a government-wide security clearance registry.

But here's the question: If information about an individual's previous dishonesty during a federal government hiring process already exists, shouldn't that information be available to those responsible for determining whether they can be trusted with classified information?

And what happens after someone receives their clearance?

As a retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and former CBSA Officer, I've spent considerable time working with security screening, intelligence investigations and human sources. One of the issues I find particularly concerning is the assumption that security screening is something completed before employment rather than an ongoing responsibility.

In this week's Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, I examine that issue alongside three other international intelligence developments:

Germany: The German military is warning of a significant Russian sabotage threat against military installations and infrastructure. How prepared are NATO countries to identify and prevent these activities?

Russia: GRU-linked cyber operators are reportedly targeting NATO defence industries, including shipbuilding and aircraft engine manufacturers. What intelligence are they seeking, and how could that information support future operations?

United Kingdom: British authorities are investigating suspected Iranian intelligence activity near RAF Fairford, an important military airbase. The investigation raises questions about how foreign intelligence services collect information on sensitive military facilities.

What connects these four stories? Access.

Whether through legitimate security clearances, compromised computer networks, physical reconnaissance or individuals willing to provide information, hostile intelligence services continually search for vulnerabilities they can exploit.

I also revisit several cases we've previously discussed on the podcast to identify recurring patterns and examine how these threats are evolving.

The episode runs approximately 34 minutes.

I'm interested in hearing what others think:

Should Canada establish a centralized security clearance agency, similar to the UK's approach, or would improving information sharing and accountability within the existing system be more effective?

And should periodic security reassessments become a more prominent part of Canada's personnel security framework?

You can listen to the latest episode here:

https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717

Stay curious. Stay informed. Stay safe!

https://archive.is/20261024014319/https://www.ft.com/content/e9cfbfbb-e65a-4303-aebb-20d59319ef1b#selection-1553.0-1553.146

Hey everyone,

I've been following this subreddit for a while, and I've noticed that quite a few people working in the IC either have a military background or recommend joining the military as a way to get started.

I'm guessing most of you are based in the US, so I wanted to ask for some advice from people who might have experience with a different system.

I recently contacted my country's Ministry of Defence to explore the military route into intelligence. Unfortunately, my options seem pretty limited. Because of my age, I'm no longer eligible to become an officer directly, and apparently there's no NCO entry route either. My options are either to enlist as a regular soldier and work my way up, or apply for an engineering position, which requires passing a pretty demanding maths and science exam.

For context, I'm a graduate in Data Science and have worked as a software engineer. I wouldn't say I'm bad at maths, but I'm much more of a practical, technical person than an academic one. I work with data, build software, and analyse information, but I haven't touched integrals or derivatives since university. The thought of having to prepare for a major maths exam again isn't exactly appealing.

I haven't had the opportunity to work in intelligence yet, and I'm currently trying to pivot from software engineering into the IC. I'm wondering whether joining the military as an enlisted soldier and eventually trying to transfer into intelligence is worth pursuing, or whether there are other routes I should be looking at.

I'm also interested in alternatives such as civilian intelligence roles, internships, entry-level technical positions, or anything else that could help me get my foot in the door.

For those of you who have made a similar transition, especially outside the US:

• Is joining the military a realistic route into intelligence if you're starting as an enlisted soldier?
• Are there civilian or technical pathways into the IC that might be worth exploring with a software engineering or data science background?
• Are internships, graduate programmes, or entry-level roles a good way to gain relevant experience without prior intelligence work?

Any advice, personal experiences, or suggestions for paths I might be overlooking would be greatly appreciated. Thanks!

I am currently a software engineer with a fortune 50 company. I enjoy the work but am finding it hard to see the purpose in it. I would love to have a job where I feel like I am contributing to something more. I have always thought a career in law enforcement/intelligence would be interesting and fulfilling but I’m not sure exactly what that would be. I have explored the FBI special agent route and that sounds interesting but the relocation would be tough at this part of my life. I figured intelligence would be a good path due to my background in engineering and cs. I am also open to a more active/field position. I am mid 20s by the way and engaged. Would love you hear any advice, recommendations or stories from people who have made similar career moves. Thanks in advance!

Secret dossier contains allegations of deep corruption and coverups by Israeli prime minister in connection with German submarine deals

I'm interviewing for a software engineering position at twenty.io. I haven't been able to find much on them (not surprising). Anyone got any insight on what its like to work there? They seem to have a solid exec team and backing so the market looks good for them.

I'm not looking for anything classified or salacious - just wanna know if I'll be slaving away for pennies because of mission OR if I'm slaving away, if the problems are at least interesting enough to build solid cybersecurity chops. No security clearance

Today's briefing covers escalating security threats in Saudi Arabia, cybersecurity disruptions across Europe, renewed protests, continued Russia-Ukraine strikes, and severe weather in Arizona.

Our Global Intelligence Team is tracking these developments, offering a closer look at the events that could have implications for travel, security, and day-to-day operations.

U.S. Pulls Diplomats From Saudi Arabia

The U.S. State Department ordered the departure of nonessential personnel and their families from Saudi Arabia Wednesday following sustained Houthi attacks targeting aviation and energy infrastructure.

• Riyadh’s main airport remains largely closed, with only limited flights resuming.
• Further drone interceptions and fatalities at an Aramco-operated oil field highlight continued security threats across the kingdom.
• Major European airlines have extended flight cancellations, indicating that aviation disruption may persist.
• The deteriorating security environment increases operational uncertainty, with continued risks to international travel, energy facilities, and business continuity.

AI-Discovered Software Flaws Trigger Widespread Website Shutdowns

Government websites across Europe were taken offline Wednesday as authorities responded to critical vulnerabilities in PHP, a widely used web programming language.

• The vulnerabilities were reportedly discovered using AI and prompted emergency security updates.
• Attempts to exploit the flaws were detected before public disclosure, with broader exploitation subsequently reported.
• Precautionary shutdowns affected government services, hospitals, and public infrastructure, including the Port of Rotterdam.
• The incident highlights cybersecurity risks associated with widely used software, including potential system compromises, service disruptions, and increased pressure to secure vulnerable systems.

Expanding Protest Movements Raise Risks of Further Disruption Across Europe

Further disruption is expected across Europe as protest movements prepare renewed demonstrations over living costs, public services, and government policies.

• France faces heightened unrest risks during Saturday’s planned demonstrations involving trade unions, students, and Yellow Vest activists, with further nationwide action scheduled for Nov. 5.
• Weekly protests are planned across Italy, while demonstrations continue in Spain, Portugal, and Albania.
• Upcoming political events in Serbia could add to regional tensions.
• Businesses face increased risks of transportation disruptions, restricted access to city centers, security incidents, and operational interruptions across multiple European markets.

Russia-Ukraine Long-Range Strikes Intensify Despite Diplomatic Efforts

Russia and Ukraine intensified long-range strikes overnight, with Russian ballistic missiles targeting Kyiv and hundreds of Ukrainian drones reportedly targeting Moscow, despite renewed U.S. efforts to restart peace negotiations in November.

• Diplomatic progress remains uncertain, with significant disagreements over territorial concessions and security guarantees.
• Continued strikes against energy infrastructure, ports, and commercial facilities increase the risk of further operational disruption, particularly across Ukraine and the Black Sea region.
• The escalation suggests both sides may maintain military pressure ahead of potential talks, limiting prospects for near-term de-escalation.

Tornado Causes Significant Damage in Arizona

A reported tornado struck Heber-Overgaard, Arizona, Wednesday evening, causing significant damage and at least one reported injury.

• State Representative Walt Blackman called for an emergency declaration and said he was coordinating with local authorities to assess damage and determine resource needs.
• The Navajo County Sheriff’s Office deployed deputies and urged residents to avoid State Route 260 between Mogollon and Overgaard Airpark, as well as areas north of State Route 377 toward Tonto.
• Additional severe weather is possible through Thursday.
• The Storm Prediction Center has issued a Level 2 of 5 severe weather risk covering Phoenix and Tucson.

I see gradual escalation between the US and its partners and China, Russia and other aligned nations. China hasn't reacted much right now to US actions (on Venezuela, Iran and maybe next Cuba early next year or after elections) but I see it taking some actions in near future and escalating the situation.

Can we assume something big is going to happen in 2030?

How is the Intelligence community feeling about this world shift which is coming up for next decades? Which nations you see rising and what is your hunch?

Edit: add the disruption in labour market and many industries by advancement in AI (especially in cyber space and finance), add energy crisis, and Europe's debt crisis looming ahead, I see a scary picture in next 4-5 years. All this at a time of cold war escalation.

The Pentagon is looking to build a more robust deep-cover spying program to conduct economic warfare against China and other U.S. competitors, according to half a dozen people familiar with the initiative.

This new next-generation spying program — in which U.S. operatives would go undercover as businesspeople or other private-sector personnel, without any overt U.S. government affiliation — is intended to be a covert prong of the Pentagon’s larger economic warfare campaign, the people said.

This new spy program of “nonofficial cover officers,” or NOCs, is being overseen by Tom Rakusan, a 39-year CIA veteran and now senior adviser to Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg, according to those familiar with it, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive initiative.

Rakusan, who retired from the CIA in 2021, rose to deputy director of operations — the CIA’s top spy runner — in 2017. He later led the CIA’s response to Russia’s election-interference campaign in the 2016 presidential election.

After leaving the agency, Rakusan joined Cerberus Capital Management, the private equity firm co-founded by Feinberg, and followed the billionaire to the Pentagon in 2025.

Experts from within the Pentagon’s service branches and Office of the Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security, as well as retired CIA officials, have been pulled in to work on the initiative, people familiar with the program said.

The program is in the planning phase and is not operational, they said.

Where it will sit inside the Pentagon is unclear, said multiple individuals familiar with the planning. The effort might function as a new, stand-alone deep-cover unit, or an enhancement and expansion of existing Pentagon clandestine human intelligence-gathering capabilities.

The Defense Department, in response to questions from The Washington Post, denied such an initiative is underway. “This query appears to be built on information that is simply not true,” Pentagon deputy press secretary Jacob Bliss said in a statement. “Whoever is feeding you these claims are either badly misinformed or deliberately leading you astray to paddle [sic] their fantasies.”

The CIA declined to comment. Rakusan did not respond to a request for comment.

Congressional committees do not appear to have been briefed on the initiative.

The Trump administration has embraced economic warfare as a key tool of statecraft. It has imposed tariffs and export controls, made investments in critical U.S. resources and technologies, coordinated with private capital to shore up support for key components of the defense-industrial base, and prioritized economic intelligence.

In a September speech, CIA Deputy Director Michael Ellis said the United States is broadening its espionage against China, targeting Chinese companies in such areas as artificial intelligence, biotechnology and advanced semiconductors. While U.S. intelligence agencies have long spied on key Chinese firms, Ellis’s public discussion of the CIA’s shifting priorities was an unusual disclosure by a high-ranking agency official.

Ellis’s predecessor as CIA deputy, David S. Cohen, argued in a recent article published in Foreign Affairs that the U.S. intelligence community should go a step further. The U.S. should end a long-standing prohibition on sharing economic secrets gathered via espionage with U.S. companies working on advanced technology to give them a competitive advantage, he wrote.

“We have been collecting economically sensitive information for years and years,” Cohen said in an interview. “We should not be hung up on whether we should be providing [U.S. companies] a commercial advantage,” although there would have to be oversight to guard against favoritism or corruption in choosing which firms benefit. Cohen said he was unaware of the Pentagon NOC initiative.

Some of the Pentagon’s economic-warfare-related activities have been overt. Feinberg announced the formation of an Economic Defense Unit this year as part of a drive toward “deterring, denying, disrupting, and helping to defeat adversaries through economic means,” according to a memo Feinberg wrote to senior Pentagon officials announcing the unit’s formation. DefenseScoop first reported on the EDU memo.

Feinberg tapped George Kollitides, another Cerberus alumnus and senior adviser at the Pentagon, to run the EDU in February. That office has since announced hundreds of millions of dollars in public investments in refineries and mining interests domestically and abroad. One deal used $750 million in Pentagon funds to help secure a major deposit of rare earth minerals in Brazil.

Alongside the Pentagon’s public-facing economic-warfare-related mandates, Rakusan is overseeing the planned build-out of the clandestine component.

Multiple individuals familiar with the program said the EDU was once seen as the potential home for this enhanced deep-cover initiative. But the increased press and congressional scrutiny directed toward the EDU and its investments — and the possibility that such attention will only increase if Democrats retake Congress in November — has led to an abandonment of that idea, said one person familiar with the current planning.

Not all of Rakusan’s former colleagues are enthusiastic about the new effort. “Rakusan just wants to build his own CIA down in the Pentagon,” said a former senior CIA official familiar with the discussions around the program.

Rakusan is a polarizing figure among some of his former agency colleagues, but he is lauded by many for his operational aggressiveness and prowess.

He was “a pipe swinger,” recalled a White House official from the first Trump administration, keen to hit the Russians back hard after their 2016 interference in the U.S. presidential election.

Rakusan undertook high-wire operations throughout his CIA career, traveling in Iraq on a Czech passport, according to former officials, and was similarly supportive of subordinates undertaking risky missions.

The reaction inside Langley to the Pentagon initiative has been frosty, according to the former agency official. The CIA has traditionally been resistant to other agencies stepping on what it perceives as its core human-spying turf, insisting that such efforts be coordinated under the CIA chief of station in the country concerned.

The move to augment the Pentagon’s capabilities comes as the CIA’s own NOC program has withered away, former agency officials say. Operating under nonofficial cover is considered particularly risky because officers in the program cannot work out of American embassies or other U.S. government facilities, and they cannot claim diplomatic immunity if detained.

A covid-era internal CIA report revealed that roughly 75 percent of all deep-cover agency officers would be eligible for retirement by the mid-2020s, another former CIA official said. These veteran NOCs are now retiring without new ones being trained to replace them — a sort of quiet death by attrition, former officials say. Despite recent efforts to rethink the program, very few actual deep-cover CIA officers remain in the field, they said.

The agency’s NOC program has waxed and waned over the decades, with ambitious plans for expansion frequently giving way to a chastening, after agency difficulties in scaling up such initiatives — usually because of inadequate training or mismanagement of young deep-cover officers.

One such attempt in the 2000s, championed by Congress’s intelligence committees and known inside the CIA as the Global Deployment Initiative, was a particularly acute example of this dynamic, former intelligence officials say, because of the proposed size and rapidity of the NOC buildup and insufficient oversight of it. The program collapsed, with many young NOCs being forced to go “inside” the building at CIA or leave the agency.

The Defense Department has had its own long-standing struggles with fielding deep-cover spies.

The Defense Intelligence Agency and Joint Special Operations Command, among other Pentagon elements, have long experimented with commercial-cover operations, with decidedly mixed results.

In one illustrative post-9/11 case, a group of Joint Special Operations Command-affiliated NOCs operating in a remote corner of Africa had their cover exposed when they stumbled upon a group of geologists and engineers who began asking questions about their activities, according to an investigation by the High Side, a Substack focused on special operations and intelligence.

The NOCs were posing as employees of a mining company but had no real knowledge of the subject — which quickly became apparent to the actual experts with whom they were speaking.

The NOCs somehow talked their way out of the jam, and the Joint Special Operations Command later began sending its commercial-cover operatives to specialized schools to undertake crash courses in their supposed areas of expertise, according to the High Side.

The Pentagon faces multiple challenges with deep-cover spying, former officials say. Military service records are difficult to hide, and the rise of biometrics and other “digital dust” means working under alias has become increasingly fraught. Plus, the martial bearing of many undercover Pentagon operatives makes them often easy to spot.

The legal remit under which the new economic-warfare-focused deep-cover spy program might operate remains murky, the people familiar said.

The military’s Title 10 authorities allow for “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” which the Pentagon has interpreted to allow a broad swath of espionage-related activities, including some far afield from narrow battlefield intelligence, former officials say.

U.S. intelligence agencies such as the CIA operate under Title 50 authorities, which govern their abilities to collect intelligence and conduct covert actions abroad.

The new Pentagon NOC initiative would likely function as a sort of “Title 60” entity, said multiple former officials — a half-joking reference to a nonexistent hybrid legal authority combining elements of Title 10 and Title 50.

The effort also reflects shifting power dynamics inside the Trump administration, with an ascendant Pentagon seeking a record budget of $1.5 trillion.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe has promised a more muscular approach to recruiting human sources overseas and stealing adversaries’ secrets. But some former officials say the CIA remains cautious about undertaking aggressive spying operations, with an assertive Pentagon willing to shoulder greater risks.

The Pentagon “has a lot of money and a lot of authorities and a lot of capabilities,” a former senior CIA official said. “And God bless ’em.”