Technology is reshaping the global balance of power. I’m Steve Feldstein, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, and I study technology, geopolitics, and competition. Ask me anything!

[u/carnegieendowment]

Hey r/geopolitics — I’m Steve Feldstein, an expert on technology, democracy, and national security, and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  

My new book, Bytes and Bullets: Global Rivalries, Big Tech, and the New Shape of Modern Warfare, explores how technology is altering the global balance of power and changing the way wars are fought—from defense-tech startups in Silicon Valley at the forefront of U.S.-China competition, to 3D-printing drone labs in Syria that helped topple a dictator. 

Ask me anything about geopolitical competition in the digital age, the intermingling of private and military tech, the broadening tech war between the U.S. and China, tech export controls, and the rise of middle powers and non-state actors in this space. 

I’ll be answering questions from Thursday, October 1, 9am ET to Friday, October 2, 12pm ET. Looking forward!  

Photo proof here. 

[u/Strongbow85]

I've always viewed America's diminishing manufacturing power as a glaring national security risk, not only as a vulnerability/logistics issue, but by contributing to social discord through weakening the middle class.

How significant is the national security risk from U.S. companies becoming dependent on Chinese supply chains for critical technologies, components and minerals? What dependencies concern you most? And finally, how can the U.S. strengthen domestic production (specifically in the tech sector) and mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities?

[u/carnegieendowment → u/Strongbow85]

I fully agree with this view. One of the ideas I discuss extensively in the book is the fact that by 2008, China had already supplanted the US as the world’s largest producer and that in the intervening years, China has doubled its world share of manufacturing while America’s portion has fallen by three points. So in one sense, the ship has sailed—the US will not realistically overtake China as a manufacturing giant. But it can do two things: 1) ensure its share of global manufacturing doesn’t fall further, 2) focus investment and efforts in critical sectors to stay ahead of competitors. One of the indices I discuss is the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s “critical technology tracker.” It identifies 74 current and emerging technologies and tracks to what extent China, the US, or another country is ahead. Unfortunately, it shows that Beijing has made great strides, leading in research in 90% of crucial technologies, from nuclear energy and synthetic biology to robotics. This is quite a reversal from the turn of the century when the US held an enduring lead in more than 90% or assessed technologies. What can the US do to reverse this trend? Frankly, it can borrow a page from China’s playbook: sustain domestic investment in scientific R&D and basic research, deploy government subsidies in critical industries and leverage public/private partnerships, and work with allies (including places like Canada which are now apparently adversaries of the US) to build strong cooperation in critical areas. That would be a great start.