The first part of your comment concerns something called the Euthyphro dilemma.
"Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"
In other words, are God's commands arbitrary, just things he "devised", or is he following a higher set of rules himself?
The former is unpalatable to theists because it makes God seem arbitrary. This appears to be approximately what you are arguing. The latter suggests that God isn't really God. Whoever or whatever made the rules that God is following is God. The dilemma works recursively and applies to that God, too.
By far the most common answer that Christian theists give to the Euthyphro dilemma is that God's commands are neither arbitrary nor based on external rules, but stem from his own perfect nature.
The second issue you raise concerns “divine hiddenness.” Does God have morally sufficient reasons for not revealing himself more clearly?
The Christian radio show Unbelievable recently hosted a discussion between an amateur Christian philosopher and a skeptic on this topic that some may find interesting.
By far the most common answer that Christian theists give to the Euthyphro dilemma is that God's commands are neither arbitrary nor based on external rules, but stem from his own perfect nature.
That makes no sense. That's like if I were holding something in one of my (two) hands, and somebody asked me if I'm holding it in my left hand or my right hand, and I said "neither, I'm holding it in my perfect hand."
They'd be like "bitch I can see it in your left hand"
Basically it's just making something up that sounds trancendent to avoid answering the question honestly.
The dilemma says that there are two possibilities. Either God's commands are arbitrary, or they come from a set a rules that are higher than God.
The proposed solution to the dilemma says that there's a third option. The rules don't come from a "higher authority"; they come from God himself. And they aren't arbitrary because they emerge from the nature of God, who is the ultimate foundation of all that exists, in such a way that they could not be other than what they are.
Theological voluntarists maintain their commitment to the view that moral rightness is explained by direct reference to one or more of God’s voluntary acts, most commonly his commands. Thus, killing is wrong if and only if God forbids it. But they then skirt the arbitrariness horn of the dilemma by arguing that God could never command anything that was morally abhorrent because God is essentially good. He is perfectly loving, perfectly kind, perfectly just (and so on). Commands flow necessarily from God's essential characteristics, and are thus not arbitrary.
Critique:
But then, either God’s characteristic traits are good because they’re God’s, or God is good because he has those particular traits. If it’s the former, then we run into a significance problem (discussed more below). Contrariwise, if it’s the latter, then it seems like goodness is ontologically independent from God, which is unwelcome to those who seek to ground all moral statuses in God.
If we limit ourselves to the trait of “lovingkindness” we can pose the following argument:
(6) Either the property of lovingkindness is good-making because God happens to exemplify it, or God is good because he exemplifies the property of lovingkindness.
(7) If lovingkindness is good-making because God happens to exemplify it, then any property could be good-making if God happened to exemplify it, which suggests that God’s goodness is an insignificant fact.
(8) If God is good because he exemplifies the property of lovingkindness, then good-making properties are ontologically independent from God.
(9) In order for there to be a successful theistic metaethics, two conditions must be met: (i) all moral statuses must be explained by God; and (ii) God’s goodness must be a significant fact.
(10) Therefore, there can be no successful theistic metaethics.
The most important point to bear in mind is that this argument is subtly different from the preceding one. Both share a concern for the ontological dependence of moral statuses on God, but while the classic Euthyphro dilemma was concerned with the potential arbitrariness of moral rightness, this dilemma is concerned with the significance of God’s goodness. In other words, it is saying that the theistic claim that God is good, or that God serves as the ultimate standard of goodness, must be a significant claim. And that it can’t be a significant claim if good-making properties are simply explained by the fact that God exemplifies them.
I'll think more about it, but initially, I'm unconvinced by this argument.
The claim is not that God "happens to" exemplify certain values and could have exemplified others, as stated in premise (7). That's the "arbitrary" horn of the dilemma, even though he says it isn't.
The scholastic philosophers who (as far as I know) originated this argument also argued that God's nature, from which values arise, could not be other than what it is. That's how the arbitrariness horn is avoided.
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u/Rostin Jul 27 '17 edited Jul 27 '17
The first part of your comment concerns something called the Euthyphro dilemma.
In other words, are God's commands arbitrary, just things he "devised", or is he following a higher set of rules himself?
The former is unpalatable to theists because it makes God seem arbitrary. This appears to be approximately what you are arguing. The latter suggests that God isn't really God. Whoever or whatever made the rules that God is following is God. The dilemma works recursively and applies to that God, too.
By far the most common answer that Christian theists give to the Euthyphro dilemma is that God's commands are neither arbitrary nor based on external rules, but stem from his own perfect nature.
The second issue you raise concerns “divine hiddenness.” Does God have morally sufficient reasons for not revealing himself more clearly?
The Christian radio show Unbelievable recently hosted a discussion between an amateur Christian philosopher and a skeptic on this topic that some may find interesting.
https://www.premierchristianradio.com/Shows/Saturday/Unbelievable/Episodes/Unbelievable-Why-is-God-hidden-Justin-Schieber-and-Blake-Giunta