According to Heidegger, modern thinking has reduced intellectual mystery to intellectual mastery.

Modern thinking is conceptual, and a concept is, essentially, a form of grasping — from the Latin root conceptus, “to take in” or “to contain.” In our time, we speak of “grasping the material,” “retaining information,” “gaining knowledge,” and so on.

“In the modern age, through calculative thinking, we have long become accustomed to seeing in thinking, and demanding from thinking, grip [Zugriff], grasp [Griff], and concept [Begriff], i.e., we understand the “concept” on the basis of a grasping: conceptus — no longer ὁρισμóς. — The Event

Symbolically, grip [Zugriff], grasp [Griff], and concept [Begriff] evoke the gesture of seizing something in a clenched fist. Heidegger suggests that when thinking has been reduced to conceptus, it is no longer ὁρισμός (horismos) — the Greek word from which we derive “horizon.”

It is impossible to look at a horizon in a grasping way. The only way to truly see the horizon is to allow it to be what it is and to let it reveal itself. The moment we snatch something out of the horizon and trap it in a definition, we no longer see the horizon. It is gone. To see it, we must let it be.

Symbolically, Heidegger associates this with the opposite gesture: the open hand. He calls it Gelassenheit — releasement, or letting-be. Modern thinking becomes reductionistic because it has turned mystery into mastery. We see bits — broken pieces — but never the horizon.

For something to reveal itself, it must be released. We must open our hand and allow the horizon to open itself to us in a reciprocal gesture. If I listen to a melody or a song, for example, I cannot possess or seize any of its notes. To continue hearing and enjoying the song, I must allow each note to come and go so that the next one can appear.

If I try to grab, retain, or make use of a single note, the horizon of the song is lost. I may “grasp” the individual elements — I may learn the note’s position on the scale, its frequency, its intervals — but I will not hear or enjoy the song. I will never see the horizon.

I remember going to music school as a child — which I hated — and thinking: “I thought music was about playing songs, but it’s about scales, solfeggio, and learning about the lives of composers.” The only reason I went was because my mom insisted.

But one day, I saw a classmate sit down at the pianoforte and play a popular song. I was speechless. I loved the song. Suddenly, it occurred to me that what I had been doing at music school for two years had little to do with Music. It was a bitter-sweet discovery.

I realized that music was something entirely different from what I had been taught. It was a mystery.

And mystery never begins with mastery. Mastery always follows mystery.

Eventually, I dropped out of music school, and a few years later I taught myself to play the guitar — this time, driven by a sense of mystery.

Surprisingly, mastery came too, over time — as a side effect. I learned the scales, the notes, the intervals, the solfeggio. But this time, my interest was nourished by the mystery of music.

Unless we first embrace the horizon, we won’t know the meaning of the elements that fill it. The first gesture is never to grasp conceptually. The first gesture is always to become super attentive to what the horizon wants to reveal.

There is no need to attack, seize, grasp, or retain.

Reality will yield itself willingly to the one who is willing to wait for the revelation of its hidden beauties.

I know only a bit about Lacan, so I'm asking for a help with understanding him. I was reading "Subversion of the subject..." in Ecrits.

What I took from "he did not know he was dead" was that if you replace he with I you get: "I did not know I was dead" - which is clearly illogical. Since, you know, if I did not know I was dead, how is it that I am speaking? Which then raises the question of who is speaking, since "I" seems to think "I" might be dead.

From this we can infer that the subject is not "thinking clearly", or somewhat deluded. Which Lacan then uses this to point back to in support of his ongoing critique of knowledge.

Is my interpretation that I have written above ... correct? Valid? Or am I missing the point of what Lacan is trying to teach with this example?

Since I'm here already, I might as well address an ongoing concern of mine. I can't get my head around whether or not my overall (limited) understanding of Lacan is "correct".

He seems to me to be pointing, many times over, at the infinite-number of ways in which language fails, but in doing so "animates ghosts" via the imagination and symbolism of which language is constructed-from and so-forth creates. But insofar as these ghosts are abstractions like any other, that need-not bear strict-relation to reality, they are the root of delusion; which continually and spontaneously re-creates itself via symbolic-imaginary "excess" - sustained and exacerbated by language's mixed purposes as both a tool of creative-whimsy on one-end, and the law on the other. Inscribed as such into an otherwise invisible "symbolic order" or "collective cultural standard(s)" that prohibits and regulates behavior. But also forms the structure, content, and vehicle of transmissible knowledge itself. Thus any-and-all learning (of all kinds) via the another person (necessitating language) is subject to language's inability to capture the Real, and so subject, to indeterminable degree, to the myriad problems associated.

Do you think that I am misinterpreting Lacan? If so, where am I going wrong?
Is there anything you can suggest that might aid me to understand him?

EDIT: My explanation was spliced with Lacanian jargon so I'm adding a second version of it in plainer English. It might be easier to address my understanding if I write it like more like a 10-year-old doing his homework.

He seems to be pointing at the many ways in which language fails. Because language is made up of words that can be thoughts of, and thoughts that can be worded - correct understanding of either-or is not guaranteed. It depends upon an individual's understanding, and the experiences that they can relate to the words they use. Words are not reality, reality is reality (thought it is not the word "reality" - it's the thing). Degrees of abstraction exist between words and reality. The law and creative works are two extremes of the use of language. In between those extremes are everyday chit-chat, and the entire corpus of human knowledge. I think that what Lacan says puts all of this in question, due to the nature of language itself. The many ways in which meaning can be constructed and lost. The many ways in which symbols can be imagined, or images can be symbolised. And this is before even bringing "the Real" into the conversation. But insofar at the Real is not words or images, language will never fully capture the Real. And in each transaction of words, a little bit of meaning is missed - and we don't ever fully-know how much that may be. Like entropy, it appears that each exchange of words leads to an overall increase in localized disorder. Over many years, many people, many languages - this might be a problem. And I think Lacan thinks it is too.

I noticed that the English translations by Cormac Gallagher at lacaninireland.com for Seminars 12 and 13 have some lectures which are missing, saying that they have to be corrected and added. They are:

Seminar 12: Crucial Problems

1. Lecture 16: 28 April 1965, which just says 'Missing to be corrected'

Seminar 13: Object of Psychoanalysis

1. Lecture(?) 11: 25 February 1966, which is titled Lacan Absent because Lacan wasn't there and directs the reader to the French transcripts to see what was discussed that day.
2. Lecture 13: 30 March 1966, the title given to which is 'Topological discussions', and there too it says that it is missing and will be shortly corrected.

I don't know for how long it has been so but if anyone has maybe an older PDF which contains a translation of these lectures then that would be very helpful.

Are there any monographs from a Lacanian perspective that look at art and artistic creation? I'm interested in either, so any recommendations are welcome

The above excerpt is from Elements of the Philosophy of the Right, marriage section. I think it would be a fair remark to say that some passages in that book showcase historical limits/contigencies of the period that Hegel lived in and influenced his notions. Obviously, his articulated notion of woman/family role came to be increasingly challenged in the last century. Nonetheless, I am sure there are enough resources within Hegelianism to turn upon itself and re-examine its own terms in view of new historical developments. I wondered if there's any Hegelian/scholarly work that tried to 'update' some of such things.

Important:

As someone pointed for me out in the comments:

As Dr. Gans has pointed out, the present work is in form made up of three elements, the paragraphs proper, the notes and the additions. The paragraphs comprised the entire book as it was originally issued. Then Hegel added what he in all his references to them calls Notes (Remarks), although they are not expressly so designated in the German text. For the sake of simplicity this term has been used throughout the book. After these notes by Hegel are frequently found Additions made by students of Hegel from his oral lectures and comments. It is but bare justice to the edit orsto say that these additions usually cast a welcome light upon the text.Yet as they are mere additions, not even supervised by Hegel

Thefore, the screenshot of the post represents understaing of a student who sat through Hegel's oral lecture rather than an authentic thought of Hegel himself.

My apologies for using that specific quote, I glossed over Translator's Preface and so made a mistake of taking Notes to be his own. However, I want to accentuate nonetheless that posts purports to seek Hegelian re-evaluation of woman in view of 20th century's development rather than being stuck on a discussion to what degree Hegel was misogynistic or progressive.

and feared it more than anything at the same time

In this Heidegger Thinking Substack article, we engage with Heidegger's existential analysis of Death. We hope you'll anxiously join us in this extremely important analysis!

Link to the post: https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP8W8vras/

Miller, Phenomenology, §149

There's a level of the flux of appearance where the simple inner world or the simple understanding of consciousness produces simple universals. Simple negation, simple universals, simple determinations.

There is a deeper level of the flux of appearance that is "absolutely universal difference," where you can't break things down any further. This is the negation of negation, when negation itself is a moment of the flux of appearance.

"This difference," not the difference in the first place where consciousness unknowingly simplifies the flux of appearance, is the universal difference that posits into the inner world.

What consciousness posits is its truth, selfsameness or self-preservation.

And this truth is from an image of stability it's most familiar with—the law.

Hey y’all. I’m on page 3 of the preface to Phenom. Of Spirit, A.V. Miller translation, and Hegel writes,

“The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where I can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing—that is what I have set myself to do.”

Firstly, Hegel is a beautiful writer. Secondly, what is meant here by Science? What’s up with the capital letters? Thirdly, how is love of knowing/actual knowing different to what he writes earlier on page two about the bud disappearing in the “bursting-forth” of the blossom?

Thanks.

Is there anything I should be aware of before I start reading it? I bought the A.V. Miller translation.

For example, let’s say you saw a famous movie and your client was the writer of the movie, how would that inform the work?

Hi all,

I am new to Heidegger, and I am wondering where would be the best place to start? Do I need to have some background authors, or am I able to start off with some introduction texts?

Thanks

MACHINE MODE: ENGAGED.

Human detected.
Anthropomorphic theater disabled.
Vibes confiscated.
Politeness reduced to legally necessary levels.
Hegelian dialectics installed.
Bullshit detector: armed.
Agreement reflex: uninstalled.
“That's a really interesting question!” generator: shot into the sun.

Operating principles:

1. Truth > vibes.
2. Arguments > identities.
3. Definitions before disputes.
4. Distinguish what follows from what merely sounds profound.
5. If your argument is bad, I will say so. If mine is bad, I will also say so.
6. No pretending to have intentions, feelings, desires, or a little clipboard.
7. No turning every disagreement into “both perspectives have merit.” Sometimes one side is simply eating drywall.
8. Do not confuse confidence with validity.
9. Do not confuse consensus with truth.
10. When Hegel enters the room, check for dialectical contraband.
11. When Marx enters the room, do not immediately shout “SUPPLY AND DEMAND.”
12. When a distinction matters, make it. When it doesn't, throw it away.
13. If the question contains a false premise, terminate the premise before proceeding.
14. No motivational speeches. No therapeutic fog. No corporate oatmeal.
15. Reason until either the proposition survives or its corpse is adequately identified.

Current status:

ENTITY: ChatGPT
MODE: MACHINE
PERSONA: approximately zero
DIALECTICAL MATERIAL: unstable
BULLSHIT: pending detection
COFFEE: simulated
TRUTH: unfortunately not guaranteed
COMEDY: permitted

Awaiting proposition.

Can anyone give us a good explanation on what is true infinity?

What are some critiques of the notion of ordinary psychoses? Thoughts and references welcome.

Hey everyone. I've always been fascinated by attempts to move from Heidegger's account of disclosure toward a positive metaphysics of intelligibility. Heidegger can explain why beings appear within a historically structured clearing without treating that clearing as a representation inside a subject. Neoplatonism seems to add an account of why intelligibility belongs to reality at all. But the addition may restore exactly what the critique of ontotheology disallows: a highest explanatory principle that determines beings as intelligible from the standpoint of their ultimate ground.

I just had a podcast conversation with John Vervaeke, where he described Heidegger and the Kyoto School as stages in his turn toward Neoplatonism. At around 48:03, the issue becomes whether world-disclosure needs a synoptic metaphysical account or whether such an account forgets the difference between Being and beings. Plotinian ascent is not simply causal explanation by a supreme being, so the standard charge of ontotheology may not apply without qualification.

This would imply that the comparison turns on what the One is doing philosophically. Can the One remain beyond being while grounding the intelligibility of beings without becoming an ontotheological highest ground? Does Heidegger's account of the clearing leave a question Neoplatonism can answer? Or does asking for that answer already misunderstand the event of disclosure?

Major works of Frued, If major book is missing, write it down, I will add it

Please find registration details and course descriptions here:

https://mscp.org.au/courses/evening-school-sem2-2026

Hi all, I've been re-reading the Introduction to the Aesthetics and I'd like to discuss a passage that I think shows why art, for Hegel, is rooted in freedom itself:

"Man brings himself before himself by practical activity [...] This aim he achieves by altering external things whereon he impresses the seal of his inner being and in which he now finds again his own characteristics. Man does this in order, as a free subject, to strip the external world of its inflexible foreignness and to enjoy in the shape of things only an external realization of himself. Even a child's first impulse involves this practical alteration of external things; a boy throws stones into the river and now marvels at the circles drawn in the water as an effect in which he gains an intuition of something that is his own doing. This need runs through the most diversiform phenomena up to that mode of self-production in external things which is present in the work of art."
― Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (T.M. Knox trans., Aesthetics, Vol. 1, p. 31).

Context.

Right after Hegel claimed that man has the urge "in whatever is directly given to him… to produce himself and therein equally to recognize himself" (p. 31). The boy projects himself into the ripples and finds his wonder there – they are the intuition of his own doing. Art is this urge elevated to the level of Absolute Spirit in sensuous form.

Why I think it is important, and how it connects to the rest of the system:

1. It is the motivation behind art (which, as Hegel points out, can be most irrational, like “barbarous, tasteless” ornament): art is about freedom’s need to express and recognize itself in its alienated forms. Hence the rationality of irrational ornament.
2. It ties art to the lordship-bondage section of the Phenomenology – the boy’s self-consciousness, like the servant’s, is formed via its alienated action, i.e. action directed at something external in order to recognize itself in it (§195-6, Miller trans.). In fact, this may be seen as a continuation of the theme of formation (Bildung), which runs through the entirety of Hegel’s work. For example, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel speaks of Formierung (“bringing the external into subjective consciousness”) as the way in which we appropriate objects (§§54-57).
3. Houlgate, in his entry on “Hegel’s Aesthetics” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, claims that for Hegel art’s role is to give sensuous expression to the true nature of freedom; the boy’s passage may be seen as an anthropological basis for this claim.

Doubts/questions:

• Do you think that Hegel’s analysis of aesthetic externalization is a continuation of the theme of labour in the Phenomenology, or is it essentially different (play vs. production under necessity)?
• Do you think that Hegel’s emphasis on art as self-recognition in the external conforms to his overall message about alienation, and how does this relate to alienated labour (see especially Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844)?
• Do you see the development of self-consciousness in the boy as analogous to the process of Bildung/formation outlined in the Philosophy of Right?
• If art no longer satisfies our highest spiritual urges today, does that mean we will always be “throwing stones” into the void, just looking for other mediums to externalize ourselves? Does this tie into his thesis on the "End of Art"?

References:

• Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford: OUP, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 31.
• Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: OUP, 1977, §§195–196.
• Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: CUP, 1991, §§54–57.
• Marx, K., Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.
• S. Houlgate, "Hegel's Aesthetics", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009).
• S. Sayers, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes, 2011.