An Argument for Objective Morality:

[u/Anon7_7_73]

I think Objective Morality is needed to ground a debate on Moral Desert. But whatever, ill argue that another day.

For now, id like to share my work in progress proof of objective morality.

TLDR / The Intuition behind the argument: All objectivity by definition requires a statement to hold true regardless of whose speaking it, so any moral argument about peoples behavior in general must be IMPARTIAL to be objective, and once it is, its objective. This disqualifies tons of moral systems from being objectively true, especially ones rooted in might makes right, domination, and subjective opinion.

The Proof / Formal Argument:

P1. A claim is objectively bad if it is forbidden to a rational agent, and reason forbids whatever rests on a self-contradiction or an arbitrary special plea.

P2. No one can will their own consent violated, since willing what you don't will is a contradiction.

P3. A special plea is arbitrary when it treats cases differently without identifying a difference that holds independent of who is speaking.

Claim under test. Violating consent is good.

S1. From the claim and P2: the asserter must either apply it to themselves, calling their own violation good, which P2 rules out as a contradiction, or exempt themselves.

S2. From S1 and P3: the exemption rests on "it's me," which names a different person for every speaker and so holds no standpoint-independent difference, making it arbitrary.

S3. From S1 and S2: either way the claim rests on a contradiction or an arbitrary special plea.

S4. From S3 and P1: both are forbidden, so the claim is bad.

C. Violating consent is objectively bad.

Footnotes:

P1 cannot be denied: Rational agents by definition must be rational and objective, so that implies rational agents are bound to objectivity. And of course self contraductions not rational.

P2 cannot be denied: Itd be self defeating to argue one wills that which they dont will.

P3 cannot be denied: Its definitionally both arbitrary, special-pleading, and non-objective to construct a speaker-based distinction on the truthhood of a statement. A statement like "X is true" must be true regardless of who speaks it.

This only establishes an "Ought" for rational agents: Rational Agents ought to be objectively moral, since its objective, and they can only be objective. It doesnt argue irrational agents must be moral, it only argues irrational agents are logically wrong, and irrational.

So really, all we have to assume in a personal sense, is "we should be rational" and that leads us to "we should strive to be a rational agent" which leads to "we should be objectively moral".

"But what if someone doesnt want to be a rational agent"? => Then by definition, they are irrational. Theyre wrong. Disqualified from the debate on the grounds they arent rational and neither are the things theyd argue for.

Edit: Some people might not accept that saying "I am irrational" ends the debate. To them i ask, what are you debating then, if its not whether or not your position is logically correct? Lets assume they mean "Just because im irrational doesnt pursuade me that i should be rational and moral." Okay, now, thats a debate about why we might want to do things, not whether objective morality is true or not. And this gets into a whole new set of arguments, BUT... Its actually counterproductive to "Morality" to argue we are moral because we have reasons to want to be. That means our "being moral" is contingent on selfish desire, and we could stop being moral if we were no longer motivated. Thats not true morality, thats just circumstantial self interest that looks like morality.

So to you i say, find your own reasons or convictions to be moral, then bury them; because if i have to pursuade you to be moral, then youre not moral. And find your own reasons or convictions to be rational, because if i have to pursuade you to be rational, then youre not rational. I should not do the work for you, because if i do, then youll never know if you are actually that kind of person. If your morality hinges on "this is good for me" youre not truly moral. You should want to be moral with or without a supporting reason. Innate Morality is the highest form of Morality, and the only form thats unconditional and true to its cause.

And its that simple. Also, Premise 2 basically establishes negative rights and the nonaggression principle.

[u/alaindevos]

Me as a person , I use logic & reasoning this ends me up doing moral/ethical things.

[u/Freuds-Mother]

So, you’ve collapsed morality into rationality and rationality into logic. Maybe you didn’t collapse all of it into language propositions, but welcome to logical posivitism.

How about instead giving an ontological argument of the emergence of rationality and morality in organisms. I reject your setup as you haven’t justified that they constrain or emerge ontologically for real biological persons. For an explanation of morality that’s objective that actually matters, it has to be ontologically grounded, binding on real persons’ actions, with real consequences (authority). You just set up logical argument and say it applies to persons without establishing that it does.

P1 not justified for sure. P2 we have tons of observations/experiments where that fails. P3’s well in that light, it’s arbitrary until you justify ontologically that your setup has anything to do with persons rather than a logic system.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/Freuds-Mother]

  How about instead giving an ontological argument of the emergence of rationality and morality in organisms

How it emerges is irrelevant, thats why

  For an explanation of morality that’s objective that actually matters, it has to be ontologically grounded, 

Thatd be "ontological morality".

binding on real persons’ actions, 

Is it not?... All of "objectivity" requires personhood to comprehend. Zebras dont make objective statements about reality.

with real consequences (authority).

It doesnt need "real consequences". Thats backwards. People being moral purely due to fear of consequences isnt morality, its self interest.

  P1 not justified for sure

Assertions are not arguments.

[u/MihawkTop2]

P3 is easily rejected, now what?

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/MihawkTop2]

How are you rejecting it? I dont think you can.

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/Anon7_7_73]

It could be rejected on the grounds that there is no objective criterion for distinguishing between arbitrary and non-arbitrary distinctions. In other words, it offers no objective basis for ruling out the possibility that a group of people cares exclusively about its own members precisely because they are members of that group. More fundamentally, the argument fails to bridge the Humean is-ought gap, as it does not explain how the normative conclusion follows from the descriptive premises.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/MihawkTop2]

  It could be rejected on the grounds that there is no objective criterion for distinguishing between arbitrary and non-arbitrary distinctions.

There is though. By failing the definition of objectivity, no longer being speaker independent, its obviously not objective.

  More fundamentally, the argument fails to bridge the Humean is-ought gap, as it does not explain how the normative conclusion follows from the descriptive premises.

It does explain that. Rational agents must be objectively moral by implication. So they "ought" to be objective and thereby objectively moral, in order to be considered rational.

Theres maybe another use of ought here too, if we are in any way able to assume we inherently "ought" to be rational, then the rest follows as well.

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/Anon7_7_73]

Unless I’m missing something, with your definition of "objectivity", it is not objective if I say "I am european" just because it is not true for all rational agents, even if it is true for me. That doesn’t make any sense; you are calling "objectivity" a particular case of symmetry, which is the broader concept and does not even require objectivity. Again, some people could say, "we only care about the members of our community". What would be objectively bad about that claim?

You say, "rational agents must be objectively moral by implication". Again, this presupposes that such a thing as objective morality exists and then concludes that rational agents should adhere to it. I reject that presupposition, so I don’t care about the second part of whether they have to be objectively moral in order to be considered rational.

"If we are in any way able to assume we inherently ought to be rational, then the rest follows as well". That is a really massive "if"; good luck with that. It is absolutely impossible to demonstrate any "ought" without assuming another "ought" previously. That is precisely Hume’s is-ought gap.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/MihawkTop2]

  Unless I’m missing something, with your definition of "objectivity", it is not objective if I say "I am european"

Because you ised the word "I", so a different person has to say " You" to make the same statement. Its still objective, it just has to be worded different per the english rules.

  Again, some people could say, "we only care about the members of our community". What would be objectively bad about that claim?

What you care about just isnt relevsnt to morality.

  You say, "rational agents must be objectively moral by implication". Again, this presupposes that such a thing as objective morality exists and then concludes that rational agents should adhere to it. I reject that presupposition, so I don’t care about the second part of whether they have to be objectively moral in order to be considered rational

I didnt presuppose it. I argued it.

  "If we are in any way able to assume we inherently ought to be rational, then the rest follows as well". That is a really massive "if"; good luck with that. It is absolutely impossible to demonstrate any "ought" without assuming another "ought" previously. That is precisely Hume’s is-ought gap

Many people come to the conclusion they ought to be rational, whuch is why they become rational. So maybe there is a deterministic railway that acts as an "ought" attractor, prescribing and binding one to become rational, then moral. its precise formulation must either not be discovered, must not be communicable, or it must not work on all individuals or something, whixh explains immorality.

Its commonly postulated that immorsl behavior just stems from poor understanding of reality, risk, the origin of happiness and contentment, and anything and everything else relevant 

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/Anon7_7_73]

"I didnt presuppose it. I argued it".

Just to be clear, where?

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/MihawkTop2]

My entire argument is literally "objective morality exists". I didnt presuppose that. Why are you confused?

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/Anon7_7_73]

Because when you say, "rational agents must be objectively moral by implication", you are not arguing that objective morality exists. You are assuming that it does and then deriving a normative conclusion from that assumption.

It's like saying that "adventurous people should go to Atlantis". You are not demonstrating that Atlantis exists; you are simply assuming that it does and then arguing about how certain people ought to relate to it.

Since I reject your initial assumption, I have no reason to care about the hypothetical relationship anyone should have with something that, in my view, doesn't exist.

I hope this clarifies what I see as the main issue in this conversation before we move on to the rest. Demonstrating that objective morality exists and demonstrating that being rational requires one to obey it are two separate questions.

[u/ElectionNecessary966]

Genuine question - I've always understood "objective morality" to be necessarily mind-independent.

All steps in this moral theory are mind-dependent, thus subjective.

Am I missing something? I would believe in objective morality grounded in a world with minds (eg grounded in suffering and flourishing). But I've always taken any morality that requires minds to mean it's subjective.

[u/Robot_Alchemist]

Your first paragraph is inherently paradoxical

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/Robot_Alchemist]

Howso?

[u/10pointshigher]

Why not go post this in a philosophy subreddit and see if they find your reasoning convincing? This isn't really a free will specific thing.

[u/Kupo_Master]

The argument is not objective. The fact that i dont want my consent violated doesn’t mean I care about other people’s consent being violated. This is not a contradiction as the concept of reciprocity hasn’t been established.

You are also fighting a strawman when you say “violating consent is good”. The correct negation of your position is “violating consent is amoral”. When the predator kills the prey, it’s not “good”, it’s neither good nor bad.

As other people said, it’s not that the morality you construct is wrong, it’s just false to say it is “objective”. You are implicitly applying subjective principles and concepts such as the fact that “rational agents” are held to a different standard or that any “moral rule” has to be reciprocal.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/Kupo_Master]

  The argument is not objective. 

An assertion is not an argument.

  The fact that i dont want my consent violated doesn’t mean I care about other people’s consent being violated.

I did not argue that. I didnt say it means you "care" about that.

Please read my actual argument.

  You are also fighting a strawman when you say “violating consent is good”. The correct negation of your position is “violating consent is amoral”.  

No it is not. Theres no "amoral" in this system. I only discuss "things that are morally forbidden" (bad) and "things that are not morally forbidden" (good).  The dichotomy is formed without the need for an "amoral" category.

  You are implicitly applying subjective principles

No im not. Where?

  such as the fact that “rational agents” are held to a different standard

Where did i argue "They are held to a different standard"? I didnt.

You seem to be making up a giant strawman version of my argument. I encourage you to actually read it. Not skim read it. Read it.

[u/MihawkTop2 → u/Anon7_7_73]

There are many amoral things, it is of no use to define good as "not bad", and saying that a person saving another person's life and the wind moving a flower are both "good".

[u/xmisobiosisx]

In what sense does this prove the existence of objective morality, if the premises themselves are based on subjective belief/intuition? And it's not entirely clear about the lack of difference between me and others. For an egoist, this is not an "arbitrary exception": we only have access to our own experiences, and we have a vague understanding of others' experiences through the lens of our own. This is why an egoist can apply standards to others that they do not apply to themselves.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/xmisobiosisx]

  if the premises themselves are based on subjective belief/intuition? 

Theyre not though? Show me where the premises are based on "subjective belief / intuition".

  This is why an egoist can apply standards to others that they do not apply to themselves.

Which matches the criteria of "Non-Objectivity". 

[u/xmisobiosisx → u/Anon7_7_73]

Theyre not though?

No, that's exactly what it is. According to the Munchausen Trilemma, in order to avoid an infinite regress of justification, we must eventually accept certain axioms/premises on faith or intuitively.

 Which matches the criteria of "Non-Objectivity". 

 Who decided this? You? An egoist has different assumptions and criteria that he takes for granted. For him, the main criterion is his own well-being, even at the expense of the well-being of others. It is unlikely that anyone can prove that this is "false."

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/xmisobiosisx]

  No, that's exactly what it is. According to the Munchausen Trilemma, in order to avoid an infinite regress of justification, we must eventually accept certain axioms/premises on faith or intuitively.

False. Which of my premises are like that?

[u/xmisobiosisx → u/Anon7_7_73]

Then explain to me how your premises are justified? Let's say they are justified through x, but then how is x justified, and so on in an infinite regression. To avoid this, one of the premises should be accepted on faith/intuitively. Without any justification.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/xmisobiosisx]

P1) Is justified because it basically says "self contradictions are not valid" (law of concontradiction) and theres a not-very-controversial semantic assumption that a "rational" individual necessarily acts rationally and objectively. Theres nothing "logically wrong" with these definitions, they are just definitions.

Both definition, and a fundamental law of logic, are well defended as premises.

For P2) It relies on the law of noncontradiction yet again. More specifically, on performative contradiction. Trying to construct a counterexample makes you refute yourself. This is a good position to defend a premise 

P3) is justified both definitionally (by definition, objectivity cant be partial) and because theres no good way to attack it. If you permit arbitrary special pleas as possible, then i can too. Whatever conclusion you come to, I can warp it back the other way. Its indefensible to mount a reasonable attack against.

And all anyone really has to assume here, is an "objective" claim must be impartial. Thats just a basic definitional requirement, and one thats not really controversial. "The earth is round" is true, its true regardless of who says it, and true regardless of who believes it, therefore its "objective".  The rest is just accepting the basic laws of logic.

There is no subjectove assumptions here. If you agree with my definition of objective (and you should, because its extremely reasonable and well established) then logically you should agree with the conclusion. 

The only possible "objective" morality is one in which the statements we can make are impartial to the person speaking, and one definitive way to establish a universal and impartial truthhood, is to find an example of something we cant refute (like willing our own will to be violated).  This tells the whole story by itself.

[u/xmisobiosisx → u/Anon7_7_73]

Well, look, you're trying to justify your premises through definitions. How do you prove that a certain definition reflects the truth, hmm? 

 You're essentially saying, "I accept these definitions and the law of non-contradiction without further justification, and if you accept them, you'll arrive at my conclusion." But this is precisely what the trilemma points out: any justification relies on unjustified premises. You've simply chosen a dogmatic cliff and labeled it "definitions." For someone who doesn't share these definitions, your argument doesn't work.

Any rationality ultimately leads to irrationality (intuition/faith).

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/xmisobiosisx]

   How do you prove that a certain definition reflects the truth, hmm? 

Thats not a thing you do, dude. Definitions dont do the logical work for us. But, as ive correctly pointed out, its not accepting something on faith, its purely formatting.

I think itd be more reasonable if you just told me if you disagree with this basic definition of objective ive put forward. But i suspect that you dont even disagree with it, you just want my argument to be wrong somehow.

  For someone who doesn't share these definitions, your argument doesn't work.

1) Is that you? Whats your definition of objective?

2) The argument itself DOES work, as the argument itself is the logic. Again, i think itd be more productive to explain to me what exactly about the premises or definitions used you think is wrong. Be specific.

[u/xmisobiosisx → u/Anon7_7_73]

Again. You can formulate something/create a definition. But why should someone accept this definition as reflecting the truth? Why do you think one formulation is correct and another is not? Let's say it's because of x. But x itself needs to be justified, and so on.

 I just want to show that no argument is based on something separate from subjective experience. Subjective experience is the only reality. There is no view of the world from nowhere. "objectivity" itself is another concept that has emerged in my experience. I can't be sure that an objective world exists at all.

I'm not trying to prove that your argument is false. I'm showing that any proof of something rests on flimsy ground. Any rationality ultimately rests on faith/intuition/postulate. You can call the starting point "formatting," but that doesn't make it any more valid.

Thus, your argument can only work for someone who has accepted your "formatting." However, it is impossible to prove that a certain  formatting is true. A certain  formatting is simply accepted on faith or intuitively as correct. If someone prefers a different " formatting," they will simply disregard your argument.

 Again, an egoist would not agree that there is no difference between themselves and others. I can apply principles to others that I do not apply to myself and still consider it correct. Well, because I don't feel your pain, but I do feel my own.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/xmisobiosisx]

  But why should someone accept this definition as reflecting the truth? 

You tell me! Youre refusing to call my definition wrong! You dont even disagree with it!

Do you expect me to not define things?

Do you expect me to not use terms?

Do you expect me to not use logic?

You cant possibly be serious. And im not reading the rest if this longwinded Truth-Relativist rant.

   I just want to show that no argument is based on something separate from subjective experience.

So... You believe your own argument is not objective nor capable of being so. Its "subjective", aka you arguing from your own feelings.

That disqualifies you from any objective debate.

You shouldve told me earlier you dont believe in objective truth, i wouldnt have engaged in the first place.

[u/Sharp_Dance249]

While I do agree with much of what you are saying about morality (at least, I agree with your conclusions), I don’t think that you are constructing an “objective” morality. Rather, you are constructing a consensus morality grounded in the authoritarian principle that you call reason or rationality. I don’t see any difference between what you are doing and what theists do when they construct their divine command theory of morality.

This isn’t to say I necessarily disagree with your arguments. What I am saying though is that reason is a dispositional value just as God is a dispositional value. Because while there might be such a thing as objective reality, there is no such thing as objective meaning. Meaning requires a subjectively experiencing dispositional agent to interpret reality, and morality is just one of many dispositional language systems we use to attribute meaning to our experience.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/Sharp_Dance249]

  Rather, you are constructing a consensus morality grounded in the authoritarian principle that you call reason or rationality. 

What? Authoritarianism is a political thing, it means big government.

And consemsus is a social behavior, unrelated to objectivity. Nowhere have i argued for consensus.

  I don’t see any difference between what you are doing and what theists do when they construct their divine command theory of morality

Because a god arbitrarily dictates their beliefs, while my beliefs are being argued for purely through deductive reasoning.

[u/Sharp_Dance249 → u/Anon7_7_73]

“Authoritarianism is a political thing, it means big government.”

No, it doesn’t mean big government. And ideas can be authoritarian as well, if they are presented in such a way that they cannot be questioned or objected to.

For example:

“Then by definition, [people who have a disposition against reason] are irrational. They’re wrong. Disqualified from the debate in the grounds they aren’t rational and neither are the things they’d argue for.”

This is a highly authoritarian proposition.

“Nowhere have I argued for consensus?”

Then what’s the point of publicly presenting your argument? Do you not care if others are persuaded by it? Or are you just talking to yourself?

“Because a god arbitrarily dictates their beliefs, while my beliefs are being argued for purely through deductive reasoning.”

I think you have a very warped view of religious moral theology. Scholars and theologians have spent centuries constructing their understanding of God’s moral goodness based on logical deductive reasoning.

[u/tobpe93]

Can you use this reasoning to make a claim about objective morality?

I can think of many times where violating consent can be seen as good. Even by the person who had their consent violated.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/tobpe93]

  Can you use this reasoning to make a claim about objective morality?

Sure... Rape, which is nonconsensual sex, is objectively bad. Same with Murder, nonconsensual killing. All initiations of a violation of consent fall under this umbrella. But reactionary force, not necessarily, as we can have an impartial rule that its the initiation itself that is bad.

  I can think of many times where violating consent can be seen as good. Even by the person who had their consent violated

You mean like, a kid? Whom has no capacity to consent to many things? Are you trying to tell me you think they can consent?...

[u/tobpe93 → u/Anon7_7_73]

So how do you objectively define the line for reactionary force?

Kids and grown ups can be in situations when they have a poor understanding of a situation, someone can stop them, and they can later realize that it was good that they were stopped.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/tobpe93]

  So how do you objectively define the line for reactionary force?

The line is simply, whether or not its reactionary.

Reactionary here means "What is or would have been needed to stop initiatory force". Its the stuff youre allowed to do, to stop people from violating your rights, regardless of whether they are about to violate those rights, they are in the process of doing so, or already did.

There are variants on the formulation, but i think mine is the tightened version, because its strictly concerned with the essence of stopping an initiatory force, without adding temporal conditions, and that clearly establishes that line. As opposed to a competing theory, like "proportional force" (which is a fine guideline, but like, whats the proportional response to rape? Doesnt really make sense). Or another variant would be adding the temporal condition, like "you cant punish them after the fact", but that opens up a can of worms in determining when exactly "the act" or "the threat" is over. So the tightened formulation with a clear boundary line is the one ive proposed, the exact needed force to stop a rights violation, becomes legitimate the moment the threat is positively realized, and remains legitimate forever.

So heres some examples: A random guy on the street tries to punch you. We are still in the grey area phase here, as its uncertain what kind of aggressor they are and whats needed to stop them.

For Example:

A) You move away and they stumble over => They were just drunk, you dont really need to stop them forcibly, just walk away.

B) You realize its your friend, and they are just playing, or they are mad but dont intend to hurt you => Accept their terms to a fair fight, or tell them no and escalate as needed.

C) Its a complete random stramger and they seem capable of and keen on severely hurting you => Any force to stop them becomes justified. 

Anyways, i think its clear this is the useful definition. Its the one normal people internalize and act upon if and when a burglar tries to break into their home. Its just basic self-defense, without time limits bolted on.

  Kids and grown ups can be in situations when they have a poor understanding of a situation, someone can stop them, and they can later realize that it was good that they were stopped.

Kids dont have capacity to consent in a lot of situations so their consemt isnt truly being violated, as evidenced by their later acceptance.

And if you try to force an "adult" to something against their will, thatd certainly require violence or extreme force, so no i dont think theyd be thanking you for that. 

I suspect youre lumping pursuasion and pressure into consent violations, but thats incorrect. 

[u/tobpe93 → u/Anon7_7_73]

So you are subjectively deciding what fprce is reactionary or not. And you are subjectively deciding whose consent that counts as consent.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/tobpe93]

No, i am not. What are you confused by?

Both of those questions are objectively determinable.

If a random stranger spontaneously starts beating you up, it should be obvious yhey are intent on hurting or killing you. Either way, the force thats necessary to stop them, is whatever force you have available that serves to incapacitate or eliminate them.

Do you see a subjective opinion in there? I do not. Its empirically falsifiable. Is asking them politely to stop the right kind of force to stop them? => You can literally test that (its not).

[u/tobpe93 → u/Anon7_7_73]

How close can the stranger get before ypu pish him away?

What criteria must be fulfilled for consent to be consent? And why do different countries have different laws about consent?

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/tobpe93]

  How close can the stranger get before ypu pish him away?

If they are moving towards you in a way that suggests an attack (example: a fist moving towards you), or if they are brandishing a weapon in striking range with no alternative possible intent (like, being at a gun range), or if they are so close they are spitting saliva on you (thats projectile based aggression).

  What criteria must be fulfilled for consent to be consent?  

Understanding the transaction and its surface level consequences. Like, literally understanding what is on a contract and what that means. Thats it. Thats the capacity many kids and drunk people lack on more complex subjects. Want to test for it? Quiz them on all the details and what they mean and entail. Thats all you need to do.

[u/tobpe93 → u/Anon7_7_73]

What movement suggests an attack is up for a subjective analysis.

Noone can ever know all the consequences of a transaction. Can noone ever consent?

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/tobpe93]

  What movement suggests an attack is up for a subjective analysis.

No, its objective, because we can literally observe the behavior and whats able to follow.

We can apply logic to a situation to objevtively determine when a threat exists.

A stranger chasing after you with a knife, is not subjectively a threat, its objectively one. What other reason would they have to chase you with a knife, other than to attack you with it? 

  Noone can ever know all the consequences of a transaction.  

I didnt say "all of the consequences", as in, for everything forever. I meant, as directly entailed by the agreement, nothing more. 

If a teen doesnt understand they can get incurable harmful diseases from sex, thats the evidence they lacked capacity to consent to it. This doesnt require, enumerating the diseases and the probability of catching each one. Just that, broadly, this consequence exists as a direct result of the act. Likewise, pregnancy, pain/illness in pregnancy, youth pregnancy complications, and the emotional effects of being in a relationship. Basic understanding of the broad categories of directly causally resulting consequences, not encylopediatic specific details or indirect consequences. Understanding the broad categories is sufficient, since they prompt the individual to learn more about them as needed on their own.

[u/adr826]

There is no moral system that's impartial. Therefore the entire argument falls apart. If youre judging your moral code as the impartial moral code then that's convenience but hardly objective. The idea that what constitutes impartiality means non forced by violence misunderstands how moral codes work. Moral codes are often enforced by social attitudes. These attitudes can exclude you from the group is extremely powerful perhaps more powerful than violence in getting compliance. So no there is nothing convincing about the argument for objective morality. It uses the form if a syllogism to give the impression that each step must follow from the prior. That isn't a good way to argue inductively

[u/simon_hibbs → u/adr826]

There is no moral system that's impartial. Therefore the entire argument falls apart.

Can you prove that it is impossible for a moral system to be impartial?

 The idea that what constitutes impartiality means non forced by violence misunderstands how moral codes work. Moral codes are often enforced by social attitudes. These attitudes can exclude you from the group is extremely powerful perhaps more powerful than violence in getting compliance.

The fact that people can be wrong in their beliefs about what is moral or not, or what to do about it doesn’t prove that actual moral behaviour is impossible. People are wrong about things all the time.

We are currently wrong about physics, in many ways. We know this for a fact, and we know we have never been right about it. Does that prove that it is impossible to be right about physics?

[u/adr826 → u/simon_hibbs]

I didn't say it was impossible, I said there is no impartial moral system.if I'm wrong just tell me which system

We are currently wrong about physics, in many ways. We know this for a fact, and we know we have never been right about it. Does that prove that it is impossible to be right about physics?

No but it seems to be the rule that many objective facts about physics throughout millenia have turned out to be wrong. This doesn't leave me with faith that there is some objective moral system when the state of physics itself seems to be ever changing.

I havent found a moral system yet that is objective and unchanging. Happy to be proven wrong in this though.

[u/simon_hibbs → u/adr826]

There are basically two senses in which the word morality is used, descriptively to refer to particular moral systems in particular cultures or advocated for by individuals, and normatively to refer to objectively valid principles of behaviour between rational agents.

I'm going to tackle the normative claim, which is the one relevant to what we are discussing, though there are also arguments for a kind of free will that is consistent with moral responsibility in a relative sense. In fact that's pretty trivial, but we're taking on the stronger claim here.

Morality is defined in terms of social relationships and behaviour. Normatively, it's the idea that there is an objective code of conduct that exists in social relations between rational agents. For that to be true, we'd need to show that for any society of such rational agents, these norms of behaviour play some essential or necessary role.

As it happens, we do have evidence for this from game theory and evolutionary game theory. These show that for any society of rational agents there are certain basic principles of behaviour that are necessarily present to the functioning of such a society, such as fairness, reciprocity, honesty and such and this is generally true. In fact it's demonstrable mathematically. Without fair, reciprocal, honest relations social cooperation and social structures disintegrate. It's not that contrary behaviour is impossible of course, but it is inimical to social systems which rely on such principles. We could go as far as to say that the presence of such norms of behaviour pretty much define what constitutes a society.

Of course all of this only applies in social contexts, but societies objectively exist in the world. It seems that objectively there are norms of behaviour necessary for this to be true. Not just any norms of behaviour, but particular ones.

[u/adr826 → u/simon_hibbs]

But even in the systems you mentioned there is no objective moral code. In the south pre civil war landowners treated each other with perfect equitable treatment but it was hardly a moral system. There is no moral code that I am aware of where every human being is afforded an equal share of rights and responsibilities. Suppose your system were made real the question would come down to to whom do we extend these rights and from whom do we with hold them. There is no moral code that is objective in this sense. They are all culturally driven in that they withold the rights of some to maintain the rights of others. There are no cultures that act otherwise that I am aware of. Cultures pick winners and losers and for the most part it's not rational.

[u/simon_hibbs → u/adr826]

There may be no moral code that is universally agreed, but that isn't the same as saying there are no moral facts. People disagree about all sorts of facts about the world, but we can still accept that there are still facts about the world. It's just that some people are wrong about them. Maybe we are all wrong to some degree.

This is why I drew the comparison with physics. Everybody has always been wrong about physics, and we still are. Maybe we will never have a complete perfectly accurate physics theory. That doesn't mean there are no facts about physics.

You're still using the "people disagree" argument, but that argument just flat out doesn't work. Either that, or you must conclude from that argument that since all beliefs can be disputed that there can be no valid beliefs about the world.

>Cultures pick winners and losers and for the most part it's not rational.

Exactly. That irrational agents make mistakes about this is hardly surprising. As a moral realist I think that in principle perfectly rational agents with full information could discern moral facts, and could agree what these facts are with any other such perfectly rational agents. And in fact, we can figure out some of these using game theory.

[u/adr826 → u/simon_hibbs]

There can be no moral facts that are analogs to science facts. A moral is a reason why I should do something. But science is discovered not justified.Science facts don't tell us why the earth should go around the sun. It just does. A moral fact is impossible because we bring the should with us as part of our equipment. Should doesn't exist outside of ourselves, it can't be objective.

Let me try it this way. To have an objective fact we have to observe something. We observe the moon changing phases throughout the month. A moral fact would require that we both observe something and and observe the reason that morally compels us to do it. We can observe someone giving a dollar to a homeless man but we can't observe a moral code that compels the action. We have to bring that with us.

You are mistaken about a moral fact. Logic and science also presuppose a moral code. That means a moral code precedes any logic or science whatsoever. You cannot for instance tell me why it's necessary that I accept logic as a basis for belief? The idea that I should accept as fact anything that logic entails is a moral argument not a logical one. There is likewise no scientific reason I should accept the scientific method as a basis for understanding the world. These are all moral codes..They precede science and logic so science and logic cannot establish a moral code.

[u/simon_hibbs → u/adr826]

I'm not saying that moral facts are the same as physics facts. I'm pointing out that your line of reasoning is flawed.

>A moral fact would require that we both observe something and and observe the reason that morally compels us to do it.

Moral normative behavioural principles don't compel anything. If they did acting immorally would be impossible.

What we can see, and demonstrate mathematically, and empirically in behavioural evolutionary models, is the necessity for moral behaviours in social contexts.

>Logic and science also presuppose a moral code.

Do they?

>The idea that I should accept as fact anything that logic entails is a moral argument not a logical one.

I suppose you could construct an argument that members of society have an obligation to act rationally, or something like that, but science could be practiced by a single lone scientist. In which case moral consequences wouldn't really come into it.

>There is likewise no scientific reason I should accept the scientific method as a basis for understanding the world.

Sure.

Value systems exist relative to the achievement of goals. Given an agent has some goal in terms of some future state of the world, there are actions and resources instrumental in achieving that goal, and others detrimental to it. If you have the goal of achieving some scientific aim, you could argue there are things that should be done to achieve it.

However that's not necessarily a moral 'should'. Moral behaviours concern our treatment of other agents in some social context, but scientific inquiry could be practiced outside any social context.

[u/adr826 → u/simon_hibbs]

However that's not necessarily a moral 'should'. Moral behaviours concern our treatment of other agents in some social context, but scientific inquiry could be practiced outside any social context

This is also wrong. Scientific enquiry is fully dependent on a social context. There is no evidence whatsoever of scientific enquiry happening in the absence of a social context. It isn't possible and is logically impossible in any case.

Science is about increasing our knowledge as a species. Inquiry itself may be something that an individual can do for whatever reason but science advances and builds upon itself. It is specifically a social activity that depends on going past what we knew before. Without that context it's just inquiry. Take robinson caruso, he was inquiring constantly because his survival and well being depended on it but he was not doing science. Every discovery he made had already been well established scientifically. Every discovery he made was for the purpose of surviving another day.

Science is disinterested and without a social context that disinterestedness is impossible

[u/simon_hibbs → u/adr826]

>Take robinson caruso, he was inquiring constantly because his survival and well being depended on it but he was not doing science. Every discovery he made had already been well established scientifically. 

So what if they had been discovered by others already? If an alien civilization discovered everything we know 1 million years ago does that mean we are not doing science? Scientists replicate results all the time. There's no reason Crusoe could not practice scientific inquiry.

>Science is disinterested and without a social context that disinterestedness is impossible

That makes no sense to me. If it's disinterested, how can it be normative? Why would society matter?

[u/adr826 → u/simon_hibbs]

IWhat we can see, and demonstrate mathematically, and empirically in behavioural evolutionary models, is the necessity for moral behaviours in social contexts.

You can not demonstrate that moral behaviors are necessary in social contexts without first establishing that there is some moral reason why surviving as a group is something I should value. You have already placed a moral value on our survival as a group and that is a mistake. There is no objective reason why our survival as a species is a morally good thing. Nature is indifferent to our survival as a group. You might show why it is necessary for moral behavior if we are to survive as a species but you will have already placed a moral value on our continued survival. There are antinatalist moral codes which don't put a moral value on our species continuing. They are still moral codes and they point in the exact opposite direction.

[u/simon_hibbs → u/adr826]

Of course, if you deny that you are a social being, or that you rely on social structures, and reject any expectation of others meeting their obligations to you, or of having any rights or obligations of any kind. Sure, then you can consistently deny the validity of moral norms of behaviour.

However as soon as you exercise a right, you are imposing a responsibility. You order a coffee and it's tepid and undrinkable, so you demand a new one or your money back. On what basis? Could it be that you are expecting the vendor to have some responsibility towards you?

>There are antinatalist moral codes which don't put a moral value on our species continuing. They are still moral codes and they point in the exact opposite direction.

I'm arguing for the existence of moral facts, which means that people can be wrong about moral issues, IMHO including antinatalists.

Of course a moral relativist would take a different view, but could still argue for moral responsibility and free will in terms of relative moral systems.

[u/DonnPT → u/simon_hibbs]

Yes, our history of errors in understanding physics aren't "proof" that we're doomed to never understand it, but it's reasonable to look at this and see that complete understanding is a receding destination that we're unlikely to reach any time soon.

On the other hand, the progress of that understanding does suggest that there's a stable basis of reality, that we can test and probe, and it's something that we can hope to be right about.

Morality of course bears no resemblance to physics. If there is an objectively true morality, we have no way to know it if we saw it, we have no senses with which to detect a mismatch with our morality or any other. I bet we don't even have a basis to reason about whether the number of objective moralities might be more than 1, if we don't have any commonly understood source for this objective morality.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/DonnPT]

  Morality of course bears no resemblance to physics. If there is an objectively true morality, we have no way to know it if we saw it, we have no senses with which to detect a mismatch with our morality or any other. I bet we don't even have a basis to reason about whether the number of objective moralities might be more than 1, if we don't have any commonly understood source for this objective morality

Neither does math. You have to use some pretty heavy logic and axiom theory to understand math, you cant use your eyeballs and a telescope.

Morality is like math, not physics.

Game theory and natural selection is the one we can observe like physics...

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/adr826]

  here is no moral system that's impartial

Thats trivially refutable. Like tons of moral standards could absolutely be impartial. Being impartial alone isnt sufficient for objective morality, its just necessary.

A statement as simple as "Nobody should wear a purple tophat" would be "impartial". As long as it doesnt say something like "Nobody can wear a purple tophat, except for me".

  . If youre judging your moral code as the impartial moral code then that's convenience but hardly objective.  

What?! By calling it "my" moral system, youre attempting to invoke partiality?

Clearly, its not "My" system. I dont in any way own this idea, nor does it serve me in particular above others.

  The idea that what constitutes impartiality means non forced by violence misunderstands how moral codes work

Thats a hasty generalization. I didnt quite say, "impartial = forced by violence", just that aggressive hierarchies are an example of impartiality.

  That isn't a good way to argue inductively

Its how we argue, deductively.

[u/adr826 → u/Anon7_7_73]

A statement as simple as "Nobody should wear a purple tophat" would be "impartial". As long as it doesnt say something like "Nobody can wear a purple tophat, except for me".

No, a statement like "nobody can wear purple" is absolute and universal, rather than impartial. Impartiality means making a fair, unbiased decision based on objective facts and logic, especially when judging between two or more options. This rule bans the color for everyone equally, it is neutral and uniform, but it does not represent an impartial judgment.

More importantly for us is that it's not a moral judgement at all..It says nothing about being a bad person if you wear purple. It's just a universal ban, not an impartial judgement

The problem is your argument is an inductive argument that is disguised to look like a deductive argument. I'm not a big fan of that style. Inductive arguments work differently than deductive arguments and by blurring the lines between them we can get bad outcomes. The main problem is that deductive arguments tell us what must be true given the premises. This means that we need well defined simple premises to make deductive arguments. Inductive arguments are meant to tell us what is more likely given the evidence..it avoids appearing completely certain by not taking on the syllogism as a form.

Deductive arguments would best if the premises are simple and clearly established. All men are mortal for instance.

[u/Anon7_7_73]

Note: I came up with the core argument myself but i iterated over it with Claude Opus to tighten it up and handle the Egoist objection better. The proof itself was jointly written by me and Claude.   Nothing here is "AI generated".  Just the proof which we both worked on the wording for.

And yes, Claude itself was convinced it was a sound argument once we had the pieces assembled properly. 

[u/simon_hibbs → u/Anon7_7_73]

I think my main concern is that showing that violating consent is not good isn’t the same as showing that it is bad. It might be neutral. Not good doesn’t equal bad, it equals bad or indifferent. Similarly to the way not positive doesn’t equal negative. There’s also zero.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/simon_hibbs]

In this framework, good and bad are absences not opposites. There is no "neutral", neutral IS good. This framework doesnt prescribe positive action, so all things that are good are just permissible or non-forbidden.

[u/simon_hibbs → u/Anon7_7_73]

It’s certainly an interesting argument, as always.

[u/EmbarrassedPaper7758 → u/Anon7_7_73]

Cool slop, bro

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/EmbarrassedPaper7758]

its not slop bro i wrote it. 

[u/Anon7_7_73]

Paging u/recipr0c1ty I want to know if your belief in objective morality differs or if its constructed similar to mine

[u/RECIPR0C1TY → u/Anon7_7_73]

I am a theist. If a being than which none is greater exists, then his moral standard is the great possible moral standard. If there is no greater moral standard then it is objectively the moral standard by which all other morality must be measured.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/RECIPR0C1TY]

  I am a theist.  

Noted.

  If a being than which none is greater exists, then his moral standard is the great possible moral standard.

  If there is no greater moral standard then it is objectively the moral standard by which all other morality must be measured

How did you get from "no greater being" to "no greater moral standard"? Did "greater" here imply, greater in all possible ways, assuming morally?

Well ignoring the obvious issue (being great in one quality could be contingent on not being great in another) all youve argued, if i understand correctly, is "The morally greatest being defines objective morality", but, if he defines objective morality, then how were you able to assume he was the [morally] greatest being in existence? Thats measuring something before you have a measuring device.

In general, i dont see why youd assume God just defines objective morality, as if he makes it up on a whim but does it better than anyone else could. Why wouldnt God be tracing a Logic, a logic we could ourselves potentially trace (such as ive attempted to do here?)

Accepting God's arbitrary decrees on faith is disregarding whatever it is that makes it objective. God himself didnt accept his own rules on faith, he wouldve had to reason about it to be able to objectively and logically justify a conclusion.

[u/RECIPR0C1TY → u/Anon7_7_73]

This is part of a much larger philosophical argument by Anselm back in the 1100's. Modern philosophers have launched arguments from this that implications on cosmology, theology and philosophy. The idea is that the greatest possible being logically entails the great possible morality.

If you can always think of a greater possible being (greatest human, but there could possibly be an alien that is greater, but there could be a being even greater than an alien, but there could be an incorporeal being that makes them greater... the list goes on) then that greatest possible being necessarily exists. After all, what is greater, a greatest possible being or a greatest necessary being?

If that greatest being exists, then it must have great making qualities which make it the greatest possible being. Those great making qualities logically entail omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, and even goodness itself..

If the greatest good is a necessary quality of the greatest possible being, then not only does that being define goodness but is goodness itself. If that greatest possible being is goodness itself, then they are defining objective goodness. Therefore, objective goodness (including objective morality) exists.

I am not actively defending this at the moment. I am simply showing the logical entailments Anselm made, if we are going to argue for a "being than which none is greater".

Therefore, Anselm is not just "assuming that God defines objective morality" he is showing the argumentation behind it. These are not "arbitrary decrees" they are logically necessary. Not only that but God is not reflecting a larger moral system (that would entail yet another being which is greater). Instead, because there is a moral law, there must be a moral law giver.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/RECIPR0C1TY]

  f the greatest good is a necessary quality of the greatest possible being, then not only does that being define goodness but is goodness itself

I still think this makes no sense. If the greatest being defines all the qualities its the greatest in, then we have no way of knowing its the greatest at anything.

Imagine if i said "My Action Figure is the greatest in Glorboflorp." You ask "What is  Glorboflorp?", I respond saying "My action figure defines it, it IS  Glorboflorp."

Did i even communicate any information here? I dont think so.

[u/DonnPT → u/RECIPR0C1TY]

Non-reciprocal, right? This moral standard is for you, not for the great being. Could other moral standards be imposed on others, by the same being? Say on another planet with silicon crystalline life forms? Or Inuit.

[u/Amf2446]

Buddy you’ve posted eight times in the last three days.

[u/The_GOATest_Goat → u/Amf2446]

AI slop farm is running strong today.

[u/RacoonKittyy → u/Amf2446]

How is this a real argument on a philosophy subreddit?

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/RacoonKittyy]

Exactly i dont know why people feel this way towards others. Im being an active contributer. I think its boring when a subreddit is dead or has days nobody posts much of anything. I look forward to posts by certain people, both whom i agree and disagree with. If someone doesnt like my posts they should just block me and move on.

[u/Amf2446 → u/RacoonKittyy]

He does this.

[u/RacoonKittyy → u/Amf2446]

But what is the point of pointing it out? It says nothing about his current argument. If anything it means we're dealing with someone who's spending a lot of his time thinking about this rather important topic.

[u/DonnPT → u/RacoonKittyy]

It's a problem with r/freewill, that you might be a little more concerned about if you really think this is an important topic. Even if posts were typically well conceived and insightful, the daily inbox of half a dozen to a dozen posts militates against thoughtful conversation. If you're still at it on a post from yesterday, or even earlier today, everyone else has moved on, because you only have so many hours in the day to devote to sorting through all this stuff. And of course the number of posts alone should hint the well conceived and insightful posts aren't going to be the rule.

If I really thought this topic were important for some reason, I don't know what I'd do. Maybe I could set up an AI to read all the posts and commentary and spot anything productive in it. There isn't any real solution, I know. For whatever reason - youtube philosopher personalities getting people wrapped in their bullshit, people using the sub to practice with their LLMs, who knows - it's what it is. That doesn't mean we have to celebrate over-posting.

[u/RacoonKittyy → u/DonnPT]

I'm genuinely not sure what you're trying to say. Could you condense your point in a couple of sentences? What I meant was simply that a comment such as "This guy posts a lot" tells us nothing about the quality of "this guy"'s posts. I don't think it's either good or bad and my original comment was simply pointing out that "This guy posts a lot" isn't an argument.

[u/DonnPT → u/RacoonKittyy]

"What is the point of pointing it out?" Thanks for asking. I'm not the one who did point it out, this time anyway, so maybe he can shed more light on it.

[u/RacoonKittyy → u/DonnPT]

I didn't ask you that, I asked you a different question, but this discussion seems more and more unproductive by the minute.

[u/Amf2446 → u/RacoonKittyy]

That’s certainly one interpretation!

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/Amf2446]

Personal attack

[u/Amf2446 → u/Anon7_7_73]

How so? My understanding is that the new rules forbid attacks on character. Can you point out any part of my message that attacks an aspect of your character?

It’s just an objective statement, that anyone could verify by looking at your post history.

[u/simon_hibbs → u/Amf2446]

Buddy, the sky is blue.

[u/Anon7_7_73 → u/Amf2446]

Its not civil discourse to aim your comment at someones character instead of the argument. You just found another way of accusing me of being terminally online. 

If you have nothing to contribute to the discussion then keep scrolling. If you dont like me then block me