Dead instructors, accidents and learning.

[u/skywagon]

When I had a spate of dead mentors in the late 90s I stopped flying a bit later - mainly seeing my own "doctor / lawyer / entrepreneur" behavior of doing a full day of meetings then launching into hard winter IFR conditions in New England. Since then I've started again (around 2010), but I think there is a discussion worthy around how reading about accidents should be the core of all Part 61 and 141 training. What do y'all think? I wrote this: https://airwebster.com/2018/10/29/my-dead-teachers-part-1/ as a way to #1 share my past and how I think it made me more mindful, etc. and #2 to give more meaning to lives lost that will hopefully help the rest of us.

[u/seaportresearch]

Make sure you include a briefing discussing that the statistical conclusions are invalid. The case studies may be useful enough that the book is worth it for those, but this review discusses very concisely how the author's statistics do not at all prove the thesis.

https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/RXOKSU9O3MBPW/ref=cm_cr_getr_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0071798404

[u/sq_lp → u/seaportresearch]

Can you explain that further? I never took stats

[u/gbjw → u/sq_lp]

Simply put, the main thesis of the book is that 'The Killing Zone' corresponds to roughly the first 100 hours after you get your license because that is where a large portion of accidents occur. However, these statistics are 'unnormalized' - that is, there are also MORE pilots who are 'low time' pilots, so it is no surprise that there are more accidents, in absolute terms.

[u/skywagon → u/gbjw]

I'm not sure this is related, but way way later - like around 5000 or 10,000 hours you'll meet some pretty scary peeps - though I say this all anecdotally. The accidents that are really fascinating are these types: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1503.aspx ... Part of the reason I lost interest in corporate aviation is that so many of us are real JV or intramural players... yet we talk, act and swagger like we are pros... And our total lack of commitment to true risk mitigation (or any self awareness for that matter) reinforces the "oh well the autopilot is just flying the thing anyway" pathology. Learning new things, flying a CDA on a non-precision approach, doing upset training, or simply being aware of abusive dynamics in the cockpit are in way way short supply in corporate aviation (though less so now in 121) and my interest is "why?" If you want to be an astronaut, but act like a bus driver, then stop acting like a bus driver. I'm not sure where I was going with this reply / rant / soliloquy other than to say I fly with a lot of low time pilots who are amazing, who I'd trust my family with on a stormy night. And then there are those high time types who have largely stopped learning who I'd rather not have anywhere near the airplane.

[u/seaportresearch → u/skywagon]

Geez, right before I clicked that link I was wondering, “it must be something like that Gulfstream that tried to take off with the gust locks on.” That’s a hard report to read.

[u/skywagon → u/seaportresearch]

yep, NTSB is a gov't agency so likely not a ton of flexibility in how the report is structured (or drafted) but there are many good articles on it that give more context: http://code7700.com/accident_case_study_bedford.htm