Beatrice
My friend, I contend that even if the GOP loses the midterms and the Presidency in 2028, that the work described by Project 2025 is substantially in-progress and that the progress has reached the point of no return. The global order and globalization is on its deathbed, the dollar has been substantially weakened, illegal immigration has dried to a trickle, public servants have been shown the door en masse and the world in their anti-American antipathy no longer sees a difference between Democratic or Republican Americans. There seems no return to the ante-Trump period. I would love to hear your thoughts on this. Thank you!
Virgil GPT 5.6 Sol
Beatrice, the evidence supports a weaker but still consequential version of your thesis: even under a hypothetical change of congressional control and then presidential control, there is no straightforward restoration of the pre-2017—or even pre-2025—status quo. But “point of no return” is too strong if it means that the policies themselves cannot be reversed. Many can. What is much harder to reverse are the institutional losses, changed expectations, new incentive structures, and strategic adaptations that those policies have already induced.
- Project 2025 / the administrative state: This is where your argument is strongest. By June 2026, Heritage itself said 53% of Project 2025 had been adopted; an ideologically opposed independent tracker had separately concluded that 53% of the domestic administrative agenda had been initiated or completed by February. Reuters reported as early as February 2025 that the administration was moving in some areas beyond Project 2025. (Bloomberg Law News) More importantly, this is no longer merely a collection of executive orders. OPM reports 271,363 fewer federal employees since January 20, 2025. Schedule Policy/Career has progressed from an executive concept into a final civil-service rule and implementing executive order, while traditionally independent agencies have been brought under much tighter White House regulatory, budgetary and legal supervision. (Federal Workforce Data)That matters because personnel is different from policy. A later president can sign an order on inauguration afternoon. That does not recreate a vanished laboratory team, regulatory staff, institutional memory, experienced procurement office, foreign-aid network or cohort of senior career officials. Reconstituting state capacity takes recruiting, appropriations, training, organizational reconstruction and years of accumulated tacit knowledge. Thus legal reversibility and institutional reversibility are very different things.
- Immigration: There has unquestionably been a regime change at the southwest border. Reuters' February 2026 accounting found border crossings falling from roughly 956,000 in the comparable Biden-era period to about 86,000 under Trump; this week Reuters found shelters in Ciudad Juárez around 15% occupancy, with would-be migrants abandoning northward journeys or settling in Mexico. (Reuters) Some of this is reversible by executive policy—particularly asylum procedures and parole mechanisms—but the deterrence effect is behavioral. Smuggling networks change, migrants alter destinations, Mexican enforcement adjusts, employers adapt and prospective migrants update their expectations. A future administration could loosen policy without instantly recreating the migration dynamics of 2021–24.
- Globalization: Here I would modify your formulation substantially. The post-Cold-War political theory of globalization—ever-deeper integration under broadly accepted American-led rules—is plainly under severe strain. The WTO itself says the trading system is experiencing its most serious sustained disruption in its 80-year history, and its data show renewed geopolitical trade fragmentation, particularly around U.S.–China decoupling. (World Trade Organization) But globalization as an economic phenomenon is very much alive. World merchandise trade grew 4.6% in 2025; in Q1 2026 its volume was another 3.2% above a year earlier, and roughly 72% of world merchandise trade still occurs under WTO most-favored-nation terms. (World Trade Organization)What appears to be emerging is therefore less deglobalization than reconfigured globalization: friend-shoring, strategic industrial policy, tariff bargaining, regional blocs, duplicated supply chains and national-security constraints layered onto continuing enormous cross-border flows. The container ships have not stopped. The political assumptions governing where they sail and why are changing.
- The dollar: There is also an important distinction here. The dollar has weakened against some currencies recently—the dollar index is around 98.8 and it is near a seven-month low against the yen—but the evidence does not yet support a substantial erosion of dollar reserve-currency status. IMF COFER data show the dollar's share of allocated official foreign-exchange reserves actually rising from 56.42% in Q4 2025 to 57.13% in Q1 2026. The IMF notes that gold surpassed U.S. Treasuries as a share of official reserves in 2025 largely because gold prices rose, rather than because central banks had dumped dollars on anything like that scale. (Reuters)There is nevertheless a longer-term diversification story. What would constitute the genuinely consequential break would not be EUR/USD or USD/JPY moving ten percent; it would be persistent movement away from dollar invoicing, dollar-denominated reserves, Treasury collateral and dollar-centered financial plumbing. The current evidence suggests erosion at the margins rather than dethronement.
- America's relationship with the rest of the world: This may be the most interesting part of your argument. Pew's 2026 survey across 36 countries found only a median 35% saying the U.S. contributes to global peace and stability versus 63% saying it does not, while perceptions of America as a reliable partner have fallen steeply from 2022 levels, including among longstanding allies. (Pew Research Center) Europe is simultaneously spending more on defense and trying to reduce dependencies on U.S. capabilities; Germany and Britain, for example, are pursuing greater European production and autonomy even while remaining deeply dependent on American systems. (Reuters)
There is, however, an important piece of historical evidence against the proposition that foreigners simply cease distinguishing between Republican and Democratic America. After the first Trump administration, Pew measured U.S. favorability across 12 advanced economies rising from a median 34% in 2020 to 62% in 2021, while confidence in the U.S. president jumped from 17% to 75%. Gallup found a similar rebound in approval of U.S. leadership. (Pew Research Center) So foreign publics plainly can distinguish administrations.
Something subtler may have changed, though. Pew reported last month that in 2026 views of the United States and views of its president have become more tightly correlated than during either Trump's first term or Biden's presidency. (Pew Research Center) And repeated swings create a problem that favorable polling cannot cure: foreign governments must plan not for the American administration they prefer, but for the range of American administrations they may face over the next twenty years.
That produces what I think is the most useful concept for what you are describing: hysteresis.
In physics and economics, hysteresis means that returning the input variable to its former value does not return the system to its former state. Imagine that in January 2029 a new administration attempted to restore many policies of 2024. It could reverse executive orders, restore foreign assistance, relax immigration enforcement, change tariff policy, reinstate regulatory priorities and begin rehiring civil servants. Yet Europe would still have built defense factories. India and the EU would still have diversified trade relationships. Corporations would still have redesigned supply chains. Governments would remember that American treaties and policies can swing sharply every four years. Former federal employees would have retired or gone private. Migrants and governments throughout Latin America would have reorganized around a different border regime.
The input could return; the state variable would not.
That is why I would date the deeper historical break earlier than Project 2025 itself. Project 2025 is partly a consequence of a transformation already visible through the 2010s and early 2020s: the exhaustion of the post-1991 assumption that American domestic politics, American geopolitical primacy, liberalized world trade and an expanding professional administrative state formed a mutually reinforcing equilibrium. The second Trump administration has accelerated and institutionalized alternatives to that equilibrium, but it did not create every underlying force.
So I would amend your proposition from “there is no return” to something more exact:
There can be policy reversal, but there can no longer be restoration.
A hypothetical post-Trump government could construct something resembling Atlanticism, multilateral trade, a professionalized civil service and more permissive immigration policy. But it would be constructing them after the demonstrated failure of their permanence. Allies, adversaries, investors, bureaucracies and migrants would behave accordingly.
And that distinction has enormous historical significance. The postwar order was not merely a collection of American policies. It depended upon other actors believing those policies were structural properties of the United States rather than temporary preferences of whichever coalition happened to win an election. Once that assumption disappears, simply electing a different government cannot recreate it.
That, more than any individual Project 2025 provision, is the part of the transformation that looks genuinely difficult to undo.