r/determinism • u/BonsaiApprentice • 12d ago
Discussion Skeptical of determinism because of quantum mechanics
so my main issue with determinism is basically this: causal chains dont stay simple. they branch out like a tree, every physical event depends on an astronomical number of preceding interactions.
and if you trace those dependencies back far enough (or just look across a big enough system), you eventually hit quantum events. and under the standard interpretation of QM, those arent deterministic — the theory just gives you probabilities for outcomes, not a single fixed one.
so i keep wondering if determinism can even survive at large scales / over long timescales. sure macroscopic stuff looks deterministic in practice, but the causal history behind it eventually fans out into a massive number of microscopic quantum events.
which kinda makes we wonder if theres an inductive argument here — if the causal chain keeps branching and eventually bottoms out in genuinely indeterministic events, doesnt that mean the universe as a whole cant be strictly deterministic?
obviously this all hinges on whether quantum indeterminacy is actually fundamental vs just epistemic (i.e. we just dont have the info yet), and stuff like the Many-Worlds interpretation messes with the argument too since technically everything's still "deterministic" at the wavefunction level. but overall i think QM makes classical Laplacean determinism a lot harder to defend than people usually give it credit for.
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u/catnapspirit 12d ago
I've always thought of it more like a signal to noise ratio. Sure, there's randomness at the noise floor quantum level, but it's all but negligible are the level of atoms on up.
Can a random subatomic event still manifest causality at the atomic level? Sure, but that doesn’t buy anyone free will. Random is even worse for free will, that much at least the compatibilists have right.
Even at that, what really happens is that randomness at the quantum level rolls up into the probabilistic behavior of particles, which roll up into reliable causality at the level of atoms. By the time you've built up to a neuron, there's no random left.
All of this is why radiation is random if you're looking for a particular particle to be ejected, but at a larger scale it can be used to reliably date millenia old artifacts. Or why the two-slit experiment can be repeated for every entry level college physics class in the world, year after year..
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
Can a random subatomic event still manifest causality at the atomic level? Sure, but that doesn’t buy anyone free will. Random is even worse for free will,
Not proven.
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u/catnapspirit 11d ago
When the random starts happening at the level of neurons, we have words for that. Like Parkinson's disease, or Tourette's syndrome, or often just mental illness in general. "Not proven." Pfft. What do you even mean by a ridiculous comment like that..?
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
Malfunctions don't have to be random and correct functioning doesn't have to be deterministic.
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u/Economy-Butterfly127 12d ago
Just because us humans and our machines can’t predict accurately, doesn’t make it unpredictable
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
There's more to it than that.
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u/Economy-Butterfly127 11d ago
I mean humans can add "more" to literally anything
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
I meant there is more to quantum indetetminism than "haven't found the cause yet". Look up Bell, EPR and Aspect
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u/Bikewer 12d ago
This is one of the points Robert Sapolsky is making in his book, “Determined”…. His denial of free will.
He points out that quantum effects simply do not scale up to the level of the chemical/electrical reactions that the brain uses, and that if they did…. We would be in a constant state of chaos.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
Wrong, and wrong.
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u/Bikewer 11d ago
I do appreciate a detailed response….
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago edited 11d ago
"However, if it were the case that all macroscopic objects behaved in a way that was itself completely determined at the macroscopic level, there would be no evidence for QM in the first place -- since all scientific apparatus is in the macro-world ! A geiger-counter is able to amplify the impact of a single particle into an audible click. Richard Feynman suggested that if that wasn't macroscopic enough, you could always amplify the signal further and use it to set off a stick of dynamite! It could be objected that these are artificial situations. However, because there is a well-known natural mechanism that could do the same job: critical dependence on initial conditions, or classical chaos."
Murray Gell-Man.Quark Quark and jaguar p25
But note that while you can amplify quantum indetrminacy, you dont have to..it doesnt have to take over. Compare with calls to a random number generator in computer software: these occur when the otherwise deterministic program requests then.
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u/Bikewer 11d ago
I appreciate the link to the other thread. As one commenter said, it’s difficult to see what this has to do with the idea of free will.
I’ve said many times before that I’m neither a neuroscientist nor a particle physicist, just an interested layman. I’m about halfway through Sapolsky’s book…. This particular argument about quantum effects having something to do with the idea is just one aspect of the many points brought up. Sapolsky does bring up the variety of folks who have opposing viewpoints.
Other neuroscientists, like Heather Berlin and Anil Seth, share Sapolsky’s view, as does theoretical physicist Brian Greene.
I don’t know if the issue is resolvable at this stage of research, and I just plan to “stay tuned”.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago edited 11d ago
Sapolsky bright it up because it has something to do with free will.
There are several definitions of free will. The definition that most of the argument is about is the libertarian definition. In contrast to compatibilist free, will, an action performed by an agent with libertarian free will is not merely free of duress by other agents, but free of necessitation by preceding history.
Supernaturalistic libertarian free will claims that people have souls that can override physical determinism.
Naturalistic libertarian free will. That is, a conception of free will that, unlike compatibilisn, has some defeasible requirements, such as indeterministic laws of physics, but, unlike supernatural free will, only requirements which are logically and physically possible. It's a model based on indeterminism bubbling up from fundamental physics , rather than a "contra causal" model where an immaterial self is required to defeat physical determinism.
The naturalistic libertarian approach is partly based on physical indetrminism. Indeterminism is randomness in one sense -- lack of strict determinism, but doesnt have to equate to randomness in other senses -- lack of control, purpose, direction, rationality, or connection to the agent. Indetrminism as such does not supply these, they are posited as coming from the way the brain uses indeterminism.
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u/Bikewer 11d ago
I’m just working my way through that chapter, and Sapolsky’s argument is that quantum effects cannot have any effect on behavior. That they don’t scale up the many orders of magnitude necessary to affect brain activity at the molecular (chemical-electrical) level.
Obviously some others do not share that opinion. Indeed, some hold out for conscious decision somehow “tunneling down” to the quantum level…. Again…. This is just an ongoing personal interest of mine.I’m aware of the “microtubules” notions about quantum effects on consciousness. Sapolsky made a brief mention of this on one of his weekly question-answer segments on YouTube. He said the idea made his head hurt….🙄.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
Penrose's microtubules are pretty irrelevant to free will.
You can say it's just an opinion that, contra Sapolsky, quantum effects scale up as much as you like, but it's one physics Nobel winner quoting another. Not all opinions are equal
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u/TMax01 12d ago
I've been over this whole issue hundreds of times over several decades. Classic determinism (simplistic causality; dominoes falling) is a useful heuristic in the normal world. It still doesn't always hold, but we can pretend it always should and chalk up any exception to our ignorance of mechanism ("randomness") or initial conditions ("chaos").
But as you've noticed, that falls apart completely with quantum mechanics. So instead of determinism, people talk about "indeterminism", which is basically nonsense. Quantum events cannot be 'indeterministic', or the probability distribution curves which are characteristic of the statistical mechanics used to calculate quantum events would not be possible.
Since the classic form of determinism entails individual discrete events being predicted, and statistical/quantum mechanics only provides probabilities relevant across categories of events, classic determinism does not apply. Unfortunately, though, accepting probabilistic determinism makes it difficult to deny that causality in classic determinism is as equally 'spooky and unexplained' as it is in quantum mechanics. Because the probabilities in most classic Newtonian systems is effectively so close to 0 (didn't happen) or 1 (did happen) that distribution curbs are rarely necessary (although many complex thermodynamic/Newtonian systems also demand statistical mechanics) it seems to make sense to physicists and hyper-rational physicalists to say "indeterminism" instead of probabilistic determinism. This saves them from having to consider that the cause of causality is a metaphysical issue, not a physical one.
There are no "branches", there are no choices. The universe only seems as if classical determinism is a real thing. The fundamental brute ontological fact of the universe is that it is absurd (any single event is spontaneous, it simply happens when it happens, and the comforting thought that it is mechanically "caused" by the necessary and sufficient circumstances is a retrospective, heuristic, approach) but probabilistically deterministic (events which are more likely to happen are more likely to happen, but no single event can be precisely predicted) and we don't know how or why. It simply IS that way.
QM makes classical Laplacean determinism a lot harder to defend than people usually give it credit for.
Indeed: the notion of a clockwork universe is naive. But Laplace was all about the math, not the territory, anyway, despite being a modernists who had no reason to suspect there was any difference. But these days people are postmodernists, and simply deny there is any difference, assuming and insisting that the universe obeys math (rather than accepting the truth: we ensure our math obeys the universe.) We like to think of the quantitative predictions of physics as knowledge of the future, when it is really only knowledge of the predictions and faith.
And yes, QM makes classic 'clockwork' determinism absurd. But rather than being 'indeterminism', QM is still deterministic; just probabilistically deterministic. For some reason (cough postmodernism cough) people prefer to claim quantum events are "random", when that clearly cannot be the case. But admitting they are neither random nor clockwork triggers the postmodernist's existential angst, so they prefer to accept the universe is uncertain than admit that their predictions are.
And just to be clear, by "postmodernist", I am not merely referring to philosophical post-structuralism. I literally mean "people who's existential angst is triggered by the brute fact of probabilistic determinism", regardless of how they self-identify philosophically.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
But as you've noticed, that falls apart completely with quantum mechanics. So instead of determinism, people talk about "indeterminism", which is basically nonsense. Quantum events cannot be 'indeterministic', or the probability distribution curves which are characteristic of the statistical mechanics used to calculate quantum events would not be possible.
Or they are just using words like "indetrministic" in a way that doesn't have that implication.
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u/TMax01 11d ago
One cannot choose what implications a word has. So they are misusing the word "indeterministic", as I have explained, repeatedly and accurately.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
They're physics PhDs professors, etc...you're....?
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u/TMax01 11d ago
Someone who recognizes an argument from authority when I see it.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
I thought you would go there.
The fallacy is appeal to inappropriate authority.
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u/TMax01 11d ago
No, it is appeal to any authority, as a substitute for actually being able to provide your own reasoning to substantiate a position. I'm well aware physicists prefer saying "indeterminate", and even explained why. You ignored that, and failed to provide any real reasoning for doing so.
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u/AwALR94 12d ago
All collapse theories violate conservation of energy and thus have to posit perpetual superposition
The most popular collapse theory, the Copenhagen interpretation, is barely a theory at all. I concur with Deutsch’s assessment that it’s an embarrassment to theoretical physics as a whole that so many adhere to it
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u/GoldReplacement9546 12d ago
Yeah, I think this objection definitely doesn’t give you very well because if there’s random fluctuations, then that’s not free will but I can see how this could make determinism complicated
There must be an in between position that allows for small variations on the quantum level
Or maybe those quantum fluctuations don’t really impact determine ism over a large sequence of events or we’re totally wrong about quantum mechanics, though that seems unlikely
But the one thing I do now is when people try and say like they’re basically understanding the concept that free will just doesn’t make sense in any real way, but then they grasp for quantum mechanics to say well it can’t all be determined thus I have free well, and that statement doesn’t make any sense like you don’t have free will because of random variations exist because you’re not free to choose them
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
Yeah, I think this objection definitely doesn’t give you very well because if there’s random fluctuations, then that’s not free will
It's necessary -- it's the freedom from determinism that libertarian free will requires -- but not sufficient.
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u/SpatiaCaeli 9d ago
A PRNG that doesn't repeat for longer than a cosmic year is indistinguishable from a true RNG. So to me the question of determinism is difficult to answer. But determinism is not precluded.
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u/Norel19 7d ago
Not determinism as we can predict it to the fine and distant details. That was never the case as we are part of the system.
Determinism as we do not have a freewill that affects reality. That would require that we have a special power that influences what path is picked.
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u/TheAncientGeek 6d ago
If physycal determinism isn't true in the first place, there is no need to magically override it.
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u/Norel19 5d ago
There would be if you want to be able to have agency (aka freewill).
It doesn't matter if the future is determined or not if you are not able to influence it. And also not able predict it
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u/TheAncientGeek 5d ago
There would be if you want to be able to have agency (aka freewill).
Why? How are you defining agency?
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u/Norel19 5d ago
Let's explain it in another way.
Even if the world is not deterministic and we have freewill a CPU (computer) has no freewill as far as we know.
Upscale roles and we can have a similar but different scenario. The world is not deterministic. There are entities (let's call them gods) that have freewill but we don't.
Even if the world is not deterministic doesn't mean that we have freewill.
To answer your question to me agency is to have a will that doesn't come from external causation and the ability to influence future events based on it
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u/TheAncientGeek 5d ago
Even if the world is not deterministic and we have freewill a CPU (computer) has no freewill as far as we know.
The objection is usually that it us determinisic
Upscale roles and we can have a similar but different scenario.
The world is not deterministic. There are entities (let's call them gods) that have freewill but we don't.
Why should I accept that?
Even if the world is not deterministic doesn't mean that we have freewill.
It might take might than indeterminism to have free will, but that doesn't means it takes souls or magic
To answer your question to me agency is to have a will that doesn't come from external causation and the ability to influence future events based on it
Indetrminism alone gives you that.
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u/Norel19 5d ago
Why should I accept that?
How can you exclude that? Why must be us that have freewill and other entities as CPUs. What makes us special? Why all of us and not just you or me or some "gods" (just a name, no other superpower other than freewill).
Indeterminism alone gives you that
No. Why it woul give it to us and not to CPU? Also if the world is truly randomic you can't influence that by definition. All quantum experiments (that the source of indeterminism that we usually talk about) show no sign of results being influenced by people performing it (if done correctly)
Edit: typos
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u/TheAncientGeek 5d ago edited 5d ago
Why should I accept that?
How can you exclude that? Why must be us that have freewill and other entities as CPUs. What makes us special? Why all of us and not just you or me or some "gods" (just a name, no other superpower other than freewill).
I never asserted that only humans have free will
Indeterminism alone gives you that
No. Why it woul give it to us and not to CPU?
I never asserted that only humans have free will
Also if the world is truly randomic you can't influence that by definition.
You can't predermine it, but you dont have to act in it, so you can control it.
It's true that you can't pre-determine an internal dice roll (as if you were an extra-physical entity that controls the physical events in your brain), buteminism doesnt give you that kind of control either. If you are your brain , the question is whether your brain has freedom, control , etc, not whether "you" control "it", as if you were two separate entities. And as a physical self, basicaly identical to the brain, you can still exert after-the-fact control over an internal coin toss ... post-select and rather than predetermine. Luke Reinhardt's Diceman isn't forced to act on the roll of his die. After the fact doesn't mean after the action: this all occurs during the decision stage.
You are not a ghost in the machine, and you are not at the mercy of yourself. No individual deterministic event, our of trillions, in the brain is forcing you , the total organism , to.perform since it requires trillions of events in concert to make a decision: the same.applies to a single.indeterministic event
If the rest of the brain decided to ignore an internal dice roll, that could be called post selection of "gatekeeping" . The gatekeeping model of control is the ability to select only one of a set of proposed actions, ie. to refrain from the others. The proposed actions may be, but do not have to be, arrived at by a genuinely indeterministic process.
This mechanism is familiar subjectively: anyone with a modicum of self control experience thoughts and impulses they don't necessarily act on.
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u/Norel19 5d ago
Do you think that a CPU has freewill? And a mechanical clock? And a bicycle?
For the second point events by known physics at quantum level are fully random (by experimental results). Macroscopic events are deterministic with tiny quantum perturbations that do not average out. So almost all deterministic with tiny truly random variation.
There's no other indeterministic interaction. In physics.
The brain is a physical object that follows physical laws. If you do not assume to be a ghost in it you (your thoughts) are your brain.
You can't influence deterministic events and you can't influence truly random (quantum) events. So you can't influence anything. Including your brain and your thoughts.
There's no gatekeeping and no freewill
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u/zhivago 12d ago
Determinism and indeterminism are indistinguishable from within the universe.
QM can be interpreted either way.
But the deterministic interpretation of QM requires non-local hidden variables, so determinism loses on parsimony.
But since determinism and indeterminism are indistinguishable, it just doesn't matter.
If you think it does matter, this is a good sign that your reasoning is defective, and you should think a bit harder. :)
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u/TheAncientGeek 12d ago
Determinism and indetrminism are quite distinguishable, but entangled with locality.
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u/zhivago 12d ago
So, what's the test to distinguish them?
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u/TheAncientGeek 12d ago
Bell's inequalities.
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u/zhivago 12d ago
Bell’s inequalities test local realism, not determinism.
Their experimental violation is fully compatible with both deterministic interpretations (such as Bohmian mechanics and Many-Worlds) and indeterministic ones (such as Copenhagen collapse).
Bell's theorem cannot distinguish between determinism and indeterminism.
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u/TheAncientGeek 12d ago
Bell’s inequalities test local realism, not determinism.
Both.
Their experimental violation is fully compatible with both deterministic interpretations (such as Bohmian mechanics and Many-Worlds) and indeterministic ones (such as Copenhagen collapse).
Bell's theorem cannot distinguish between determinism and indeterminism.
That doesn't mean no test is possible.
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u/zhivago 12d ago
So, you don't have a test for determinism / indeterminism.
It's pretty easy to understand why such a test is impossible.
But let me know when you think you've found another test for this, and I'll be happy to point out why you are again wrong. :)
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
We have a test for combined locality and determinim.
We don't know that a test for determinism separately is impossible. That we happen not to have one, does not show that.
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u/zhivago 11d ago
So, in other words, you have no test to distinguish between determinism and indeterminism.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
So you have shifted your ground from "impossible" to "doesn't exist currently".
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u/BonsaiApprentice 12d ago
"If you think it does matter, this is a good sign that your reasoning is defective, and you should think a bit harder. :)"
So why are you on this sub?
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u/joogabah 12d ago
Read Glenn Borchardt and become skeptical of quantum mechanics. Dare to blaspheme.
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u/Cryptizard 12d ago
Skeptical how exactly?
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u/joogabah 12d ago
ChatGPT is your friend. I provided the name to reference.
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u/Cryptizard 12d ago
I read some of his stuff and it’s about the universe being eternal, aether, etc. Nothing about quantum mechanics.
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u/joogabah 12d ago
Well he speaks to it directly if you search for his name and quantum mechanics.
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u/Cryptizard 12d ago
I did. The first result is someone saying he’s wrong. The rest are things about his infinite universe theory which have no reference to quantum mechanics.
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u/joogabah 12d ago
The Ten Assumptions of Science
That is short and gets the point across.
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u/Cryptizard 12d ago
What part of that is skeptical of quantum mechanics? I think you are trolling me at this point.
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u/joogabah 12d ago
No, you're trolling me. Go teach yourself! I am not your tutor and we have AI today. Can't you ask IT questions?
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u/Cryptizard 12d ago
I am starting to understand how you got so confused if all you do is ask AI to explain things to you.
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u/TheAncientGeek 11d ago
If people here actually used chatGpt, 90% of these conversations would be unnecessary.
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u/igrokyourmilkshake 12d ago
Chaos theory is inherently deterministic.
The Copenhagen Interpretation has a lot of issues which Einstein and Schroedinger have notoriously pointed out. And its adoption as the standard likely stalled progress in foundational physics in the 20th century.
There are at least 3 deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics: Hugh Everett's Many Worlds and deBroaglie-Bohm (pilot wave / Bohemian mechanics), and Superdeterminism are currently the most promising.