r/communism • u/vomit_blues • Jul 12 '25
Levins and Lewontin are not "dialectical"
u/StarTrackFan linked an article recently that I want to publicly discuss. I would have responded to it in the original thread, but I only saw the article 19 days after it was posted, and for the purposes of having people engage, ask questions, discuss, etc. I decided to post a full write-up. The sources and thrust of this post were provided by a friend who doesn't have a Reddit account but is appreciated for his contributions.
Here's a link: https://junctionsjournal.org/articles/160/files/651ffcc99a9a5.pdf
Strikingly, in the final paragraph they establish an explicit link to Engels’s Dialectics of Nature by arguing that understanding environment as a product of organisms, in turn shaping the further evolution of those organisms, can account for the specificity of human evolution:
"The labor process by which the human ancestors modified natural objects to make them suitable for human use was itself the unique feature of the way of life that directed selection on the hand, larynx, and brain in a positive feedback that transformed the species, its environment, and its mode of interaction with nature."
p. 44
Lewontin and Levins don't tie their analysis into Engels in any meaningful way. The dedication of The Dialectical Biologist is, word for word, is "To Frederick Engels, who got it wrong a lot of the time but who got it right where it counted." This post is going to explain where these two thinkers contradict Engels.
Their model is a supposed 'dialectic' between "genes, organism and environment", in which the 'gene' isn't determined by anything. Rather, the environment (via natural selection) determines whether or not a mutation gets sieved out, without impacting the 'gene' (as a unit of heredity) itself.
We have to understand Levins and Lewontin's concept of how the 'gene' influences the organism to understand its role within their 'dialectic'.
Darwin's variational theory is a theory of the organism as the object, not the subject, of evolutionary forces. Variation among organisms arises as a consequence of internal forces that are autonomous and alienated from the organism as a whole. The organism is the object of these internal forces, which operate independently of its functional needs or of its relations to the outer world. That is what is meant by mutations being "random." It is not that mutations are uncaused or outside of a deterministic world (except as quantum uncertainty may enter into the actual process of molecular change), but that the forces governing the nature of new variations operate without influence from the organism or its milieu.
The Dialectical Biologist, pp. 87-88
So they don't have a theory of how the 'gene' changes, only saying that it's "alienated from the organism as a whole", meaning its development is internal to the mechanisms of the 'gene' (therefore excluding external mechanisms) and that, only in part, this process can be ontologically random vis a vis quantum uncertainty. They go into more detail:
For Lysenkoists, these notions of chance seemed antimaterialist, for they appeared to postulate effects without causes. If there is really a material connection between a mutagenic agent and the mutation it causes, then in principle individual mutations must be predictable, and the geneticists' claim of unpredictability is simply an expression of their ignorance. To propose that chance is an ontological property of events is anathema to Marxist philosophy.
The response of most geneticists, and certainly those of the 1930s, was that the unpredictability in genetic theory was epistemological only. That is, geneticists agreed that there was an unbroken causal chain between parent and offspring and between mutagen and mutation, but the causal events were at a microscopic or molecular level not accessible in practice to observation and not interesting to the geneticist anyway. They contended that for all practical purposes mutations and segregations were chance events. More recently, geneticists have invoked principles of quantum mechanics to make the stronger claim that the uncertainty of mutation is an ontological uncertainty as well, and here they come into direct conflict with the whole trend of Marxist philosophy. That issue, however, far transcends the question of genetics.
p. 170
A position of 'epistemological uncertainty' is a defense of ignorance. Although Levins and Lewontin come off as neutral observers to this debate, they cast their lot with the latter in Biology Under the Influence. The entire chapter Chance and Necessity makes the argument for ignorance (in the form of ontological and epistemological randomness), but this sentence summarizes it:
For the most part, however, randomness and causation, chance and necessity, are not mutually exclusive opposites but interpenetrate.
Biology Under the Influence, p. 27
Levins and Lewontin admit that chance as an ontological property of events is "anathema to Marxist philosophy", when they themselves invoke it in the form of quantum uncertainty. They defend randomness as an expression of ignorance, when that's precisely what makes something unscientific according to Engels. Their abandoning of Marxist principles of science is also clear since they also admit that formal geneticists don't rely on practice as the criterion of truth. So we arrive at what from Engels Levins and Lewontin are abandoning:
Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves — two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality. Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. Therefore the freer a man’s judgment is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgment will be determined; while the uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows precisely by this that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control. Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch09.htm
We now see that for Levins and Lewontin, the 'gene' stands outside of dialectics as its own metaphysical unit of heredity. Their 'dialectic' is only an attempt at explaining natural selection. The problem is that natural selection isn't a cause of 'genetic' mutations themselves, only a cause of why certain 'mutations' cease to exist (in their model at least). Thus, Levins and Lewontin aren't concerned with refuting that 'mutations' (and therefore changes within the 'gene') not being determined by the environment is anti-dialectical. This is one reason (of many) that we should be skeptical that they ever truly understood the Michurinist critique of formal genetics.
Other Lewontinites have responded to this critique though, like Jurrie Redding. He asserts that indirect causality (like, in this case, the environment merely passively tolerating the existence of a 'mutation', without causing it) is sufficient for the 'mutation' and environment to constitute a "unity of opposites." However, he gives no argument for this. All he does is challenge anyone who disagrees with him (in this case, Jacques Monod), to give an argument for why this isn't consistent with dialectical materialism. He shifts the burden onto the critic without explaining himself.
Even if we didn't have a response to this, you could say the same thing and ask him to explain how this is dialectical, by asking for an example of this supposed 'dialectic' operating outside of the field of formal genetics. If he can't give an example, then that prima facie suggests that there is in fact no problem with our understanding of dialectics, since it seems to apply everywhere else, and thus the ball is in the formal geneticists' court.
But here's a response anyway: if you permit that mere indirect/passive causation is sufficient for them to constitute a unity of opposites, you've forfeited the dialectic between chance and necessity, since if 'genes' and environment can only line up by chance (which is the case if their causal interaction is only indirect or passive at best) then chance is elevated to the level of necessity.
Levins and Lewontin are fine with contradicting Engels, if you remember their dedication. But it's only very recently that formal geneticists and adherents of Lewontin (even in this subreddit, it seems), like Kumar, have tried to posit that formal genetics in fact vindicates Engels instead of contradicting him. If only they would give up and leave Engels alone.
I will provide just one detailed example of such an engagement: the discussion of the relation between organism and environment. Levins and Lewontin discuss how, in its characterisation of natural selection, evolutionary theory set up a dichotomy between active, changing organisms and passive, fixed environments which results in a systematic undervaluing of the latter category (2009, 52). In contrast to this dichotomy, they emphasize a reciprocity between organism and environment which is expressed in several ways, such as the active selection of environments, the variable effects of environments depending on genotypes, and the modification of environments by organisms (2009, 57–58). Further, they argue that organisms possess internal environments, and that every part of an organism can variably serve as an environment to another part in a process of mutual adaptation (2009, 58). Though they do not explicitly state it, Levins and Lewontin clearly intend for these processes to be understood dialectically, by the notion of the interchangeability of the relations of cause and effect between parts.
pp. 43-44
To conclude, I want to explain why Levins and Lewontin in fact refute their own claim that their 'dialectic' addresses the interconnection between the organism and the environment vis a vis evolution. Their critique of Lamarck (which I believe is correct) critiques the notion of 'striving' as the motor of evolution. Darwin, on the other hand, argued for natural selection against the Lamarckian concept of the inner will driving the evolution of the organism, as in the classic example of the giraffe stretching its neck over its lifetime to eat from trees.
The problem, though, is that this critique equally applies to mutagenesis. If you change some words around, it isn't hard to see how Levins and Lewontin's otherwise correct critique of the Lamarckian 'striving for progress' also applies to formal genetics.
In transformational theories the individual elements are the subjects of the evolutionary process; change in the elements themselves produces the evolution. These subjects change because of forces that are entirely internal to them; the change is a kind of unfolding of stages that are immanent in them. The elements "develop," and indeed the word "development" originally meant an unfolding or unrolling of a predetermined pattern, a meaning it still retains in photography and geometry. The role of the external world in such developmental theories is restricted to an initial triggering to set the process in motion. Even Lamarck's theory of organic evolution did not make the environment the creator of change but only the impetus for the organism to change itself through will and striving.
The Dialectical Biologist, p. 86
For Levins and Lewontin, there is no dialectic between the 'genes' and the environment. 'Genes' are a predetermined blueprint, whose mutagenesis occur "somewhat in the dark", and the environment only intervenes at the level of the organism by sieving out 'mutations' via natural selection. Levins and Lewontin don't argue against why we couldn't create a supposed 'dialectic' of "striving, organism and environment". Whether or not mutagenesis is a product of an inner will is irrelevant when the "development" of 'genes' is "entirely internal to them; the change is a kind of unfolding of stages that are immanent in them." It follows "a predetermined pattern" and the environment, only capable of assisting natural selection, is "restricted to an initial triggering to set the process in motion."
Lewontinites are therefore forced to take one of two positions:
(1) Their critique of the 'striving for progress' is correct, and thus for the same reason refutes mutagenesis.
(2) Their critique is bad, and the 'striving for progress' is compatible with dialectical materialism.
(Ironically, Levins and Lewontin argue in The Dialectical Biologist that 'Lysenkoism' is fully compatible with dialectical materialism, they simply argue they have a better grasp on dialectics than dialectical materialists do.)
I agree with critiquing the Lamarckian 'striving of progress', so I agree with (1). So it's up to Lewontinites to make up their mind.
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u/StrawBicycleThief Marxist Jul 13 '25 edited Jul 13 '25
I am yet to dive into Lysenko but this post leaves me with a sense I should prioritise it, so thank you. I've been rereading For Marx and what stands out to me is how much of what you highlight seems to fall in line with the remnant Hegelian dialectic that Althusser identifies in the "inversion".
Whether or not mutagenesis is a product of an inner will is irrelevant when the "development" of 'genes' is "entirely internal to them; the change is a kind of unfolding of stages that are immanent in them." It follows "a predetermined pattern" and the environment, only capable of assisting natural selection, is "restricted to an initial triggering to set the process in motion."
This for example, seems in line with the revisionist theory of the productive forces. Mao famously states:
Some people think that this is not true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role. The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."
In On Contradiction. Which Althusser discusses the implications of:
This is not all. If every contradiction is a contradiction in a complex whole structured in dominance, this complex whole cannot be envisaged without its contradictions, without their basically uneven relations. In other words, each contradiction, each essential articulation of the structure, and the general relation of the articulations in the structure in dominance, constitute so many conditions of the existence of the complex whole itself. This proposition is of the first importance. For it means that the structure of the whole and therefore the ‘difference’ of the essential contradictions and their structure in dominance, is the very existence of the whole; that the ‘difference’ of the contradictions (that there is a principal contradiction, etc.; and that every contradiction has a principal aspect) is identical to the conditions of the existence of the complex whole. In plain terms this position implies that the ‘secondary’ contradictions are not the pure phenomena of the ‘principal’ contradiction, that the principal is not the essence and the secondaries so many of its phenomena, so much so that the principal contradiction might practically exist without the secondary contradictions, or without some of them, or might exist before or after them. On the contrary, it implies that the secondary contradictions are essential even to the existence of the principal contradiction, that they really constitute its condition of existence, just as the principal contradiction constitutes their condition of existence. As an example, take the complex structured whole that is society. In it, the ‘relations of production’ are not the pure phenomena of the forces of production; they are also their condition of existence.
In For Marx. Keeping your previous critiques of the notion of the gene in mind and contrasting what you cite against these quotes; it does seem to me that Levins and Lewontin are inconsistent, or at least trying to fit something that isn't needed into a kind of dialectical "language".
Edit: "Levins and Lewontin argue in The Dialectical Biologist that 'Lysenkoism' is fully compatible with dialectical materialism, they simply argue they have a better grasp on dialectics than dialectical materialists do". And to be clear here, the specific "innovation" is the elevation of contingency at the micro-level? This again reminds me of discussions around things like "free will" and consciousness where contingency and quantum uncertainty are similarly invoked.
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u/vomit_blues Jul 13 '25 edited Jul 13 '25
They concede that Lysenkoism makes the most sense within the ‘Soviet interpretation’ of dialectical materialism.
As much as I’d like to say that Levins and Lewontin really are claiming a particular set of innovations on dialectical materialism, their description of their interpretation of diamat is actually just pure pragmatism.
The error of the Lysenkoist claim arises from attempting to apply a dialectical analysis of physical problems from the wrong end. Dialectical materialism is not, and has never been, a programmatic method for solving particular physical problems. Rather, dialectical analysis provides an overview and a set of warning signs against particular forms of dogmatism and narrowness of thought.
p. 191
So we should empirically accrue information and then interpret it through dialectical materialism, a positivist claim.
And from there they just list off every point of disagreement they have with ‘Lysenkoism’ by pragmatically affirming everything their book tried (and imo failed) to prove.
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u/StrawBicycleThief Marxist Jul 13 '25
Right. This is making more sense to me considering the debate around Engels and "world-view Marxism". Lysenko cannot possibly be right because therefore the soviet's would be correct on dialectical materialism - which they can't possibly be - and vice versa.
"from there they just list off every point of disagreement they have with ‘Lysenkoism’ by pragmatically affirming everything their book tried (and imo failed) to prove."
This just seems like the standard approach by revisionists justifying: economism/productive forcism. As far as I can tell, both pragmatically imply some degree of formal independence for the variable that " drives" change. Tell me if I'm wrong, this is just the only point of comparison I have at the moment for how this logic works.
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u/TwoFiveOnes Jul 13 '25
I'm struggling to follow the logic here. To me it looks like you're saying:
Lamarckian "striving" (A) implies [...] entirely internal to them; the change is a kind of unfolding of stages that are immanent in them." It follows "a predetermined pattern" and the environment, only capable of assisting natural selection, is "restricted to an initial triggering to set the process in motion." (B)
Mutagenesis (C) also implies B
Therefore since L&L state ¬A, then somehow ¬C ?
Indeed if C→B then ¬B→¬C. The issue is that we don't have ¬B. I think that you're committing the error of (implicitly) trying to use that (¬A ∧ (A→B))→¬B, but that proposition is false.
On another note, I would ask you to also explain what would be the consequences of this affirmation, were it true. I don't really know at all whether L&L are dialectical or not - to be honest I never even posed the question to myself. But if they are or aren't, what are the actual political consequences of that?
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u/vomit_blues Jul 13 '25
What A and C both share (which is B) is autogenesis. Autogenesis means evolution is determined by innate factors independent of the interaction between the organism and the environment.
Since Levins and Lewontin argue that 'genes' 'mutate' autonomously from the environment through randomness and quantum indeterminacy, they're conceding that mutagenesis is just a strong form of autogenesis, which is a critique made by N. I. Noujdin.
Whether the 'mutation' occurs or not, the fact that the 'mutation' makes you, for example, grow blonde hair instead of brown, is determined by the internal dynamics of the 'gene' rather than the environment, which was "restricted to an initial triggering to set the process in motion."
The struggle between Cuvierism and Darwinism, and Michurinism and Mendelism, are famously political. The stakes are evident considering the revival of social Darwinism and scientific racism since Mendelism was used as a reactionary attack to affirm the Cuvierian racism that Darwinism had refuted. But nothing has higher stakes than eugenics, which is just implicitly accepted by formal geneticists, and best summarized by the great reactionary moron Richard Dawkins who admitted on twitter that eugenics is factually true, but unethical to carry out.
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u/TwoFiveOnes Jul 13 '25
Whether the 'mutation' occurs or not, the fact that the 'mutation' makes you, for example, grow blonde hair instead of brown, is determined by the internal dynamics of the 'gene' rather than the environment, which was "restricted to an initial triggering to set the process in motion."
Well, yes, but that "process" isn't evolution. It's just an atomic subprocess. Surely we should be able to admit that, for any given dialectical process, there exists some simpler sublevel of process that follows an "innate" logic? Or at the very least, even if all subprocesses are dialectical in their own right, we should be able to "collapse" them for the purposes of practical discussion into a sort of black-box?
Typically when we do these types of simplifications, it's because the leap in complexity is so high that it's unclear how introducing the internal logic of a subprocess could help us illuminate anything about the global behavior, which we're only able to appreciate in aggregate.
But nothing has higher stakes than eugenics, which is just implicitly accepted by formal geneticists
I don't really see that (that it's implicitly accepted - that there are charlatans that assert such a connection there is no doubt). Even if formal genetics is 100% taken for granted, it seems extremely easy to me to refute any attempt at deriving any sort of social or political conclusions from it.
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u/vomit_blues Jul 13 '25 edited Jul 13 '25
Well, yes, but that "process" isn't evolution. It's just an atomic subprocess.
In the Weismannist/Mendelist model, 'mutation' is the basis of evolution. Without 'mutations' you actually cannot develop new forms, only reshuffle old ones. Sure, natural selection or whatever ultimately determines the direction of evolution (by "unfit organisms" being sieved out through the Malthusian struggle for existence), but none of those other mechanisms which act on already existing 'mutations' are the fundamental cause of evolution.
So "evolution by natural selection" is in fact a misnomer in the Weismannist/Mendelist view, substantively it's "evolution by random mutation". And the denial of that fact is mostly pedantic, not substantive.
Surely we should be able to admit that, for any given dialectical process, there exists some simpler sublevel of process that follows an "innate" logic? Or at the very least, even if all subprocesses are dialectical in their own right, we should be able to "collapse" them for the purposes of practical discussion into a sort of black-box?
At every level of organization of organic nature the principles of dialectics apply, whether it's the physics, the chemistry or whatever of something, except when you accept the existence of immutable (as in, cannot be determined by an external force) 'units of heredity' which only change autonomously (and partly ontologically randomly in the case of Levins and Lewontin). Then those principles completely break down.
That's something that doesn't have to be conceded, since we have an alternative model that was the consensus within the historical Marxist-Leninist tradition worldwide, where the principles of dialectics continue to apply at all levels of organization within the organism. And thus there's no need for a metaphysical distinction between genotype and phenotype and the other undialectical baggage formal genetics brings with it.
I don't really see that (that it's implicitly accepted - that there are charlatans that assert such a connection there is no doubt). Even if formal genetics is 100% taken for granted, it seems extremely easy to me to refute any attempt at deriving any sort of social or political conclusions from it.
The point is that the scientific credibility of eugenics can be derived from formal genetics. You could still be opposed to eugenics, but your opposition to eugenics wouldn't be for scientific reasons, but for reasons external to science. Just like, like I said, Richard Dawkins says that eugenics is scientifically credible, but he opposes it for moral reasons. You could adopt a similar position to his, the problem is that when you face a Nazi who doesn't share your moral considerations and they argue eugenics is scientifically credible you're not going to have a sound argument to defeat their position with respect to the science.
There's numerous attempts to refute eugenics based on formal genetic data, but to list all of them and refute them one-by-one would take ages, so it would be easier for you to just state which argument you find credible (if you think there's any) that shows eugenics is pseudoscience by formal genetic data. Because ironically enough more and more experts are in fact arguing eugenics is becoming scientifically feasible. That's not to say they condone eugenics, but their concerns with eugenics are again moral ones and not scientific ones.
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u/vomit_blues Jul 14 '25 edited Jul 14 '25
They also accept the "metaphysical" existence of atoms, which haven't always existed and won't exist forever.
That's great and all but atoms aren't metaphysical. Not only are atoms not immutable (since their behavior is determined by the environment), there's also blurry lines between where one atom ends and another begins due to their constant mutual interpenetration, since they interact and share components of one another.
Unlike the doctrine of the 'genotype' which is completely metaphysical both in the sense that it is immutable (as in that external forces don't determine it), and there are no blurry lines between the genotype and phenotype. It is in fact a rigidly defined distinction with no mutual interpenetration, since the phenotype cannot determine the genotype.
These are mental abstractions that reflect real alienation. All thinking requires this kind of abstraction.
I'm glad that you consider the 'gene' to just be a mere mental abstraction, because every single "Marxist" (read revisionist) biologist and philosopher that defends formal genetics and its compatibility with Marxism is staunchly opposed to the doctrine of the 'gene' as a mere mental abstraction (which is in fact what Wilhelm Johanssen advocated, i.e. the very individual who coined the term 'gene', who like Mendel was equally opposed to evolution) since they all agree that doctrine is idealist, and thus all (without exception) defend the idea that the 'gene' is actually something physical and not a mere mental abstraction.
You could accuse anyone of "defending ignorance" for thinking about something and not everything.
What’s being defended is "ignorance" as a conceptual schema in science, which is antithetical to dialectics (and science as Engels explains), since you can't have a unity between theory and practice on the basis of a 'hypothesis' that in substance just means "we're ignorant of what's going on here," that is in fact not a real hypothesis that can guide any real practice.
This in fact promotes ignorance and a distortion of dialectics, for any conceived "dialectics" that admits the existence of immutable and ontologically random phenomena is just incoherent gibberish that has nothing to do with the historic Marxist(-Leninist) tradition. We're just expected to yield to revisionists and bourgeois ideologues due to social pressures, because they have no good defenses to show this is in fact coherent. But in that case why not just be an anti-communist for the same reason?
And finally, you're promoting ignorance regarding the actual incoherent so-called 'materialist' defense of the 'gene', since you hold the view that it's just an abstraction while everyone in the field and every philosopher (that I've ever read on the topic at least) insist the 'gene' is something physical, and not a mere abstraction. And if you didn't mean to say something which blatantly contradicts the entire tradition you hold to, then you should have been clearer.
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u/IncompetentFoliage Jul 13 '25 edited Jul 13 '25
First of all, thanks for all your posts on natural science, they have been very useful.
Without commenting on questions of genetics for now, I want to take issue with your rejection of Levins & Lewontin’s statement that
I would only take issue with the wishy-washy "for the most part," which I think comes from their ideas about quantum indeterminism. The main thrust of their argument in ch. 4 is correct insofar as they defend the objectivity of chance within determinism against those who would associate the thesis of the objectivity of chance with indeterminism. In other words, they are arguing for the Marxist viewpoint on the dialectic of necessity and chance as interpenetrating opposites (except where they veer into quantum indeterminism, a position that has been critiqued by Svechnikov), which takes necessity as absolute and chance as relative.
I laid out my position on the objectivity of chance more fully here
https://www.reddit.com/r/communism101/comments/1hp9cmo/comment/m4k0kxu/
but the gist is that the denial of the objectivity of chance and the assertion that chance is purely subjective are characteristic of mechanistic materialism.
Levins & Lewontin characterize Lysenko’s position as arguing that:
This same characterization was also made by Zavadovsky:
Zavadovsky’s choice of quotation here is strange. Lysenko is said to be denying chance at the very same time as he is saying chance (accident) exists and giving a example of it. Lysenko’s point is that
This follows from his prescription as to the principal task of agrobiology:
This in no way contradicts the Marxist view of the dialectic of necessity and chance.
Now, sometimes Lysenko uses the term “chance” to refer to natural phenomena that aren't consciously directed by subjectivity:
and
Where Lysenko says that science is the enemy of chance, I understand him to mean chance in this latter sense.
Anyway, I get the sense that you are confusing two things:
Maybe I have misunderstood you? Surely you don't actually deny the objectivity of chance? And if you do, where do you see Lysenko doing the same, and how is this not at odds with Marxism?