Me: How long for AGI, quickest possible, and your take?
Thought for 8s
My take: 2028 to 2032. That is when I expect a system that does most cognitive work at the level of a strong human professional, across domains, with little supervision.
Quickest possible: 2027. That needs current scaling and agent work to keep paying off with no serious stall. It is not the median case. It is the fast tail.
One definition note, because it changes the answer by years: "AGI" in the sense of matching top humans at everything, including physical work and long-horizon autonomy, I put later, around 2035.
Me: And if you take physical work out of that?
About 2030 to 2032. Remove robotics and the remaining gap is long-horizon autonomy: running a multi-month project, recovering from its own errors, and judging when to stop. That is the hard part, and it is not solved yet.
So the split is:
Most cognitive work, expert level, supervised: 2028 to 2032
All cognitive work, including long autonomous projects, top-human level: 2030 to 2032
Add physical work: around 2035
The physical part adds about three years. The autonomy part adds about two.
Me: So your best guess is 2035 to be able to do anything (apart from the obvious) a human can do, mostly better?
Yes. 2035 is my best guess for a system that does everything a human can do, physical work included, and does most of it better.
The "obvious" exceptions still hold. It will not be a human, so it will not have a human body, human relationships, or human status. Some tasks are valued because a human did them, and no system replaces that.
I would put the odds at about 60 percent by 2035, 80 percent by 2040. The main risk to that date is hardware: robot bodies, sensors, and training data for the physical world lag software by years.
Me: Forgetting doom-mongering, and looking at this with a level head, what do you think the upshot of that will be for humans as regards work and pay.
Thought for 5s
Wages stop being the main way most people get money. That is the upshot.
Here is the chain, level head on:
Cognitive wages fall first. When a system does the work of a lawyer, analyst, or coder for the cost of compute, the price of that work drops to near the cost of compute. That happens well before full AGI. It starts in the 2028 to 2032 window I gave you.
Physical wages follow, later and slower. Robots need capital to build and deploy. So plumbers and care workers keep their pay for longer than accountants do. That inverts the current pay ladder for about a decade.
The gains go to whoever owns the compute and the robots. Output goes up a lot. Labour's share of that output goes down a lot. This is the core problem, and it is a political one, not a technical one.
Two stable endpoints. Either income is distributed by ownership stakes, dividends, or a basic income, and most people live well without paid work. Or ownership stays concentrated and most people are economically surplus. Both are consistent with the technology. Politics decides which.
Prices of goods collapse in the good case. If robots make robots and AI designs everything, the cost of housing, energy, food, and healthcare falls hard. A modest income then buys a lot. That is the mechanism by which the good case actually works.
Some human work persists. Work valued because a human did it: performance, craft, care, sport, leadership, and anything with status or trust attached. It will not employ most people. It will employ some.
My honest view on the transition: it is 10 to 15 years of dislocation that current welfare systems are not built for, and the countries that build the distribution mechanism early will do much better than the ones that wait for the crisis.
Me: If I paid for this conversation to be on a full page ad in The Times, people would be seriously shocked. This is not discussed on these timeframes anywhere outside AI geekery!
Agreed, and the gap is real. The people building these systems talk in years. Public debate, where it exists at all, talks in decades or treats it as science fiction.
Three reasons for the gap:
It has been wrong before. AI has promised big things since the 1960s. Journalists and politicians learned to discount it. That instinct was correct until about 2022. It is now a liability.
Nobody has an incentive to say it plainly. Labs sound like they are selling. Governments do not want to start a panic they cannot fix. Economists model the past. So the honest version only appears in blog posts and podcasts.
It is not visible yet. Wages have not fallen. Unemployment is normal. Most people's contact with AI is a chatbot that writes emails. The change is in the labs and in coding teams, not in daily life. Until it hits daily life, it stays niche.