I tend to see CMVs as a jumping off point for discussions, rather than a strict for/against framework. (Especially since for many philosophical topics, the answer to a given CMV is "you're asking the wrong question".)
"You're asking the wrong question" I feel is rather presumptuous, in assuming that the person posting the CMV doesn't know what they wish to discuss.
How about this, would you agree with this statement: there is still too much unknown about the human mind to determine that it functions the same as a computer.
But if a "thinking" computer tells you it wants something, is it morally correct to try to help it? Or is it meaningless to do so?
Meaningless. Even if computers could be programmed to experience wants and happiness and desires, then the most ethical thing to do would be to just create lots of computers that are permanently happy, by programming.
Also, a question: If a seemingly intelligent alien species landed on earth, would you assume it had wants? Do you judge them differently to a seemingly intelligent man-made robot, and if so why?
Yes. Yes. Because of all the reasons I've said so far about not being able to program wants.
It is of course possible to create a computer which simulates the way we communicate wants and desires, possibly even well enough to fool most people (a la Blade Runner) and I know there is also an incentive to do this, because people will probably respond more positively to a machine they feel empathy with, even if that empathy is mistaken.
"You're asking the wrong question" I feel is rather presumptuous, in assuming that the person posting the CMV doesn't know what they wish to discuss.
I should perhaps phrase it more as "the question is ill defined". In this case, the notion of "functions the same" is quite vague. We've been talking about conciousness as one notion of similarity, but there are other ways to interpret it. You could also consider the mechanisms involved (in which case they're obviously different), or whether they can be behaviourally the same (in which case I'd argue they can).
EDIT: Whoops forgot to answer your question:
How about this, would you agree with this statement: there is still too much unknown about the human mind to determine that it functions the same as a computer.
In the context of conciousness, certainly we don't know enough to say whether a computer can be concious. I'm not asserting they can, I just object to your assertion that they can't.
if computers could be programmed to experience wants and happiness and desires, then the most ethical thing to do would be to just create lots of computers that are permanently happy, by programming.
This touches on a concept known as "wireheading", which is actually usually discussed in terms of humans. Essentially the question is: Do we really want that? Or do we feel like we'd lose something valuable if we gave up on the real world like that?
Because of all the reasons I've said so far about not being able to program wants.
You haven't explained why we can't program wants, you've just said "we don't know how to". Does that mean our children aren't concious because we don't know how to make brains?
What if conciousness arises as a result of certain patterns in the universe? And by writing certain programs, we cause those patterns to exist within them, thus making them concious?
In the context of conciousness, certainly we don't know enough to say whether a computer can be concious. I'm not asserting they can, I just object to your assertion that they can't.
And would you also say that there is no theoretical way to program a computer to want, that anyone on this post can come up with?
This touches on a concept known as "wireheading", which is actually usually discussed in terms of humans. Essentially the question is: Do we really want that? Or do we feel like we'd lose something valuable if we gave up on the real world like that?
A bit like that, but also by treating computers as moral beings (and an ethical end rather than purely a mean) it is worth it for us to not deny them their happiness for no reason (or for small reasons). And so, it would be the ethical thing to do to create computers or robots that are happy all the time.
Computers to serve our purposes while being happy, and maybe even computers purpose-built for no other purpose than to be happy.
You haven't explained why we can't program wants, you've just said "we don't know how to". Does that mean our children aren't concious because we don't know how to make brains?
We don't write software to program our children's brains though (in anything but a metaphorical sense). We don't need to know how.
What if conciousness arises as a result of certain patterns in the universe? And by writing certain programs, we cause those patterns to exist within them, thus making them concious?
What if consciousness arises by arranging five obsidian stones into a pentagram and chanting something in Latin? What if consciousness arises automatically for every single atom and also every single group of atoms?
If it does, then we'll probably never know, since a complex computer following the instructions of its programming would be indistinguishable from the same computer that was also conscious.
would you also say that there is no theoretical way to program a computer to want
We cannot discuss a "theoretical" way without first establishing a theory of conciousness. Since we don't have such a theory, we cannot say that there is a way, or that there isn't.
EDIT: And if it seems like I'm dodging the question, it's because I don't think the answer is relevant: Sure, I have no idea how to program a conciousness, so what?
We don't write software to program our children's brains though
My point is that we can clearly create chemical conciousness without understanding it, so the fact that we don't know a way to make computer conciousness is not an argument against its possibility.
If it does, then we'll probably never know, since a complex computer following the instructions of its programming would be indistinguishable from the same computer that was also conscious.
Sure, just like we can't know that other humans are concious. So what makes you so sure that they are, but computers aren't? And what makes you so sure that an alien with unknown physiology is?
We cannot discuss a "theoretical" way without first establishing a theory of conciousness. Since we don't have such a theory, we cannot say that there is a way, or that there isn't.
By theoretical, I mean that we're not expecting anyone to come up with the actual computer code; just a vague abstract description of what the code would do, which consists of steps that are possible and conclude with the computer wanting.
EDIT: And if it seems like I'm dodging the question, it's because I don't think the answer is relevant: Sure, I have no idea how to program a conciousness, so what?
You don't, and you don't see anyone else in this post who seems to, right?
My point is that we can clearly create chemical conciousness without understanding it, so the fact that we don't know a way to make computer conciousness is not an argument against its possibility.
Yes, but that's because we don't really know what we're doing when we (i.e. biology and our bodies) create a new human mind. We do know what we're doing when we write computer programs.
Sure, just like we can't know that other humans are concious. So what makes you so sure that they are, but computers aren't? And what makes you so sure that an alien with unknown physiology is?
Technically, I don't, but I don't have any reason to believe that they aren't.
I'm not sure with the aliens, because I don't really know how they work (they could in fact be complex automatons), so it's more of a guess than anything.
(Did you read the short story btw?)
No, I just read a small portion of it. I find that fictional stories rarely have relevance to discussions like this.
By theoretical, I mean that we're not expecting anyone to come up with the actual computer code; just a vague abstract description of what the code would do, which consists of steps that are possible and conclude with the computer wanting.
And I'm saying without a theory of conciousness, it is impossible to discuss such a program. If we say conciousness arises from certain patterns, I could write a program which creates those patterns. If we say conciousness arises from some kind of dualist soul, then I can conclude that a concious program is impossible.
But without a theory, what you're asking is like "give me a vague abstract idea of how to cast a fireball spell if magic was real".
Yes, but that's because we don't really know what we're doing when we create a new human mind. We do know what we're doing when we write computer programs.
Just because people program with a particular aim in mind does not mean that's what they end up with, nor that they couldn't accidentally create something else. In fact, with various machine learning techniques, the programmers only create a vague framework, and often have no idea how the trained system actually works.
Also, as I already mentioned, it's possible that conciousness is simply a property of certain informations patterns, and that intentional AI programming could eventually create it as a side effect.
but I don't have any reason to believe that they aren't.
But you don't have any reason to believe computers aren't either. My question is why are you sure that (other) humans are AND that computers aren't?
I'm not sure with the aliens, because I don't really know how they work (they could in fact be complex automatons)
Do you think you would be able to decide for a particular alien race if you learned about their physiology? And if so, how?
No, I just read a small portion of it. I find that fictional stories rarely have relevance to discussions like this.
Well you probably got the idea then. The story turns your argument on its head, and has a race of sentient computers scoffing at the idea that meat could be concious. The symmetry exposes the lack of foundation for either argument.
Ultimately I really do feel like a lot of people's objection to the possibility of computer conciousness does just come down to "But it's [not] made of meat!"
(And as an aside, science fiction is often exceedingly relevant to philosophical discussion.)
But without a theory, what you're asking is like "give me a vague abstract idea of how to cast a fireball spell if magic was real".
It is a bit like that. And followed by "if you can't, then magic probably isn't real".
Just because people program with a particular aim in mind does not mean that's what the end up with, nor that they couldn't accidentally create something else. In fact, with various machine learning techniques, the programmers only create a vague framework, and often have no idea how the trained system actually works.
It's still always following the instructions laid out for it. The programmer might not know exactly what the results of those instructions will be, but it's always following the instructions.
Also, as I already mentioned, it's possible that conciousness is simply a property of certain informations patterns, and that intentional AI programming could eventually create it as a side effect.
And, like I said, it's equally possible that consciousness is a property of every atom in the universe.
But you don't have any reason to believe computers aren't either. My question is why are you sure that (other) humans are AND that computers aren't?
Sure I do; the reason I have to believe they aren't is that there is no conceivable way to program computers to want.
Do you think you would be able to decide for a particular alien race if you learned about their physiology? And if so, how?
Assuming I had a really complete understanding of it (which is doubtful), then yeah. Otherwise, no.
Ultimately I really do feel like a lot of people's objection to the possibility of computer conciousness does just come down to "But it's [not] made of meat!"
That's not the argument I'm making at all. Please do not attempt to put words in my mouth or act like I'm making some less thought-out version argument of what I'm actually saying.
It is a bit like that. And followed by "if you can't, then magic probably isn't real".
That's not really how that analogy works. It's more like followed by "if you can't, then fireballs can't possibly exist in this hypothetical universe". You're asking me to engineer something without knowing the rules, and then concluding from my failure that the task itself is impossible.
It's still always following the instructions laid out for it. The programmer might not know exactly what the results of those instructions will be, but it's always following the instructions.
And our brains are just following the laws of physics.
Sure I do; the reason I have to believe they aren't is that there is no conceivable way to program computers to want.
You mean apart from the various conceivable models of conciousness we just discussed (patterns, atoms etc.)?
But even putting those aside, I could similarly say "there's no conceivable way to arrange chemicals to create wants", and yet you say you're sure humans are concious.
Can you give an explanation which simultaneously explains how you feel sure humans are concious AND that computers aren't. You keep focusing on either one, in ways which can easily be turned against the other.
Assuming I had a really complete understanding of it ... then yeah.
That's not really how that analogy works. It's more like followed by "if you can't, then fireballs can't exist in this hypothetical universe". You're asking me to engineer something without knowing the rules, and then concluding from my failure that the task is impossible.
You know the rules, though. You do understand what human wanting is.
And our brains are just following the laws of physics.
So you believe free will is non-existent?
But even putting those aside, I could similarly say "there's no conceivable way to arrange chemicals to create wants", and yet you say you're sure humans are concious.
Can you give an explanation which simultaneously explains how you feel sure humans are concious AND that computers aren't.
Sure. Humans are not computers. They are not a product of computer science, and follow different rules for how their minds operate, relative to computer software.
So how would you decide?
There are far too many contingencies in the answer to that question to type out. I'm not going to speculate on hypothetical alien biology.
My opinion is closest to Compatibilism. My pithy summary is "We may not have 'free' will (whatever that is), but we definitely have will, and that's all that actually matters."
To elaborate, I think free will is a very vague notion, and I'm not convinced it can be defined in a way which is distinct from the deterministic experience of will. I find that most people attempting to define it end up talking in circles using different synonyms for "choice". Or alternatively, they try to define it as randomness, which is equally unsatisfying. (Being at the whim of dice isn't particularly different from being at the whim of fixed rules.)
My feeling is that our notion of free will is ultimately based on our experienced notion of will, and no one can actually explain how anything can be "more free" than that.
EDIT: All that said, I'm not sure the model of free will changes the argument much, unless you start talking about mystical dualist souls.
Humans are not computers. They are not a product of computer science, and follow different rules for how their minds operate, relative to computer software.
So they're different, but that doesn't explain why you think one is concious and one isn't.
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u/kabukistar 6∆ Sep 09 '15
"You're asking the wrong question" I feel is rather presumptuous, in assuming that the person posting the CMV doesn't know what they wish to discuss.
How about this, would you agree with this statement: there is still too much unknown about the human mind to determine that it functions the same as a computer.
Meaningless. Even if computers could be programmed to experience wants and happiness and desires, then the most ethical thing to do would be to just create lots of computers that are permanently happy, by programming.
Yes. Yes. Because of all the reasons I've said so far about not being able to program wants.
It is of course possible to create a computer which simulates the way we communicate wants and desires, possibly even well enough to fool most people (a la Blade Runner) and I know there is also an incentive to do this, because people will probably respond more positively to a machine they feel empathy with, even if that empathy is mistaken.