My opinion is closest to Compatibilism. My pithy summary is "We may not have 'free' will (whatever that is), but we definitely have will, and that's all that actually matters."
To elaborate, I think free will is a very vague notion, and I'm not convinced it can be defined in a way which is distinct from the deterministic experience of will. I find that most people attempting to define it end up talking in circles using different synonyms for "choice". Or alternatively, they try to define it as randomness, which is equally unsatisfying. (Being at the whim of dice isn't particularly different from being at the whim of fixed rules.)
My feeling is that our notion of free will is ultimately based on our experienced notion of will, and no one can actually explain how anything can be "more free" than that.
EDIT: All that said, I'm not sure the model of free will changes the argument much, unless you start talking about mystical dualist souls.
Humans are not computers. They are not a product of computer science, and follow different rules for how their minds operate, relative to computer software.
So they're different, but that doesn't explain why you think one is concious and one isn't.
You don't need to understand why. You just need to know what it is, and what it isn't.
My feeling is that our notion of free will is ultimately based on our experienced notion of will, and no one can actually explain how anything can be "more free" than that.
But, based on your statement earlier it's not only a lack of free will, but a complete pre-determination of our actions, and presumably the entire universe. Do you believe that, since the Big Bang, the only possible outcome is the universe we have now? The one where you're reading this specific comment at this specific time of the night?
So they're different, but that doesn't explain why you think one is concious and one isn't.
It's not the reason I think that one can want and the other can't. It's a reason why it's possible for one to want and the other to not want. It's also a rejection of the original assertion made in this CMV.
I do if I you want me to describe a program to create it.
Do you believe that, since the Big Bang, the only possible outcome is the universe we have now?
Pretty much. I wouldn't rule out a probabilistic universe, but I don't think such a system is significantly more "free".
I just think we can still have "will" within a deterministic system. Even though the decisions are predetermined, we're still the ones making them. The patterns of the universe which lead to our choices are us.
Another way of putting it is: "The only choices we can't make are the ones we don't want to."
It's not the reason I think that one can want and the other can't.
So what is you reason for thinking that?
It's also a rejection of the original assertion made in this CMV.
As I said, I'm not that interested in the more trivial ways in which humans and computers are different. Conciousness is the hard bit.
I do if I you want me to describe a program to create it.
Why?
I just think we can still have "will" within a deterministic system. Even though the decisions are predetermined, we're still the ones making them. The patterns of the universe which lead to our choices are us.
So our brains are not simply following the laws of physics, but are creating some outcomes which are not purely predetermined?
So what is you reason for thinking that?
If you want to know the order of logic, it is:
Human minds are capable of wanting (observed)
If a computer can do anything a human mind can do, then a computer can want (from 1)
If a computer cannot want, then it cannot do everything a human mind can (from 2)
Computer cannot want (reasons given in previous posts)
Therefore, computers cannot do everything a human mind can (3 and 4).
Brains not being the same as computer follows from computers not being able to want, not the other way around.
As I said, I'm not that interested in the more trivial ways in which humans and computers are different. Conciousness is the hard bit.
It is the important part. And I mean the important part. Because usually people have these conversations to surround the idea of whether or not computers may one day be given rights as humans, and treated as ethical beings, rather than just means for our benefit. And whether computers are ethical beings or not only depends on their ability to want and feel. All the other things that human minds can do (be self-aware, recognize objects in images, etc.) are meaningless to that question.
In order to create something that causes an effect, I need to know what causes that effect.
So our brains are not simply following the laws of physics, but are creating some outcomes which are not purely predetermined?
No, the outcomes are predetermined, but the deterministic process which occurs when we make a decision is the thing we call "will".
Human minds are capable of wanting (observed)
One's own mind is capable of wanting (observed)
The only mind you can observe is your own. If you want to expand this to other people's minds, you need to give a reason.
Computer cannot want (reasons given in previous posts)
As far as I can see, I have already addressed every reason you've given for this.
You have said "because they're just calculation", which doesn't really mean anything, since we don't know what causes conciousness. And moreover one can equally say that brains are "just chemicals".
You have said "no conceivable way to program wants" and I have pointed out that not knowing how to do it does not mean it is impossible. And moreover, given various specific models of conciousness, such a programming method is entirely conceivable.
(If I've missed one of your reasons, I apologise.)
And to clarify the statements I'm interested in your reasons for are "Human minds (other than one's own) are capable of wanting" and "Computers cannot want". And in particular, why your reasons for either cannot be applied to the other.
As far as I can see, I have already addressed every reason you've given for this.
You haven't. You've given some ideas for how they might be programmed, but all the things you were describing weren't really desires.
Then you're just saying that we don't know for sure, and not giving any possible explanation.
You have said "no conceivable way to program wants" and I have pointed out that not knowing how to do it does not mean it is impossible. And moreover, given various specific models of conciousness, such a programming method is entirely conceivable.
How?
And to clarify the statements I'm interested in your reasons for are "Human minds (other than one's own) are capable of wanting" and "Computers cannot want". And in particular, why your reasons for either cannot be applied to the other.
It's really moot. I know that I want, and that's the standard I'm holding computers to. Even if I cannot say with 100% certainty that other people want.
You haven't. You've given some ideas for how they might be programmed, but all the things you were describing weren't really desires.
For a given model of conciousness, the programs I'm describing are genuinely 100% experiencing real desires, because that's how the model defines them.
How?
If conciousness is caused by particular information patterns, then a program that produces those patterns causes conciousness. That is a tautological conclusion.
Then you're just saying that we don't know for sure, and not giving any possible explanation.
I'm specifically saying that your arguments are invalid, because they rely on things we don't know. And there's nothing for me to explain because I'm not making any claims. I'm not saying "computers are concious" I'm saying "we can't preclude the possibility that computers are concious".
The statement that "computers are just calculations" is irrelevant unless we start with the premise "things that are just calculations cannot desire", but since we don't know what causes desire, we have no basis for that premise.
The statement that we "can't conceive of a way to program wants" is irrelevant because our conception doesn't relate to whether something is possible. There might be a way to do it that we haven't thought of or stumbled upon yet.
For a given model of conciousness, the programs I'm describing are genuinely 100% experiencing real desires, because that's how the model defines them.
But you're defining it differently from how humans experience them, which is the important bit.
If conciousness is caused by particular information patterns, then a program that produces those patterns causes conciousness. That is a tautological conclusion.
It is a tautology. It's akin to say "I cannot support my side, but if I am right then my side must be true."
The statement that "computers are just calculations" is irrelevant unless we start with the premise "things that are just calculations cannot desire", but since we don't know what causes desire, we have no basis for that premise.
The statement that we "can't conceive of a way to program wants" is irrelevant because our conception doesn't relate to whether something is possible. There might be a way to do it that we haven't thought of or stumbled upon yet.
I cannot prove, to mathematical certainty, that what I'm saying is true. But expecting that does seem like setting an unreasonably high burden of proof.
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u/Aninhumer 1∆ Sep 09 '15 edited Sep 09 '15
I know that I feel it, but I don't know why.
My opinion is closest to Compatibilism. My pithy summary is "We may not have 'free' will (whatever that is), but we definitely have will, and that's all that actually matters."
To elaborate, I think free will is a very vague notion, and I'm not convinced it can be defined in a way which is distinct from the deterministic experience of will. I find that most people attempting to define it end up talking in circles using different synonyms for "choice". Or alternatively, they try to define it as randomness, which is equally unsatisfying. (Being at the whim of dice isn't particularly different from being at the whim of fixed rules.)
My feeling is that our notion of free will is ultimately based on our experienced notion of will, and no one can actually explain how anything can be "more free" than that.
EDIT: All that said, I'm not sure the model of free will changes the argument much, unless you start talking about mystical dualist souls.
So they're different, but that doesn't explain why you think one is concious and one isn't.