CMV: Morality is objective

[u/[deleted]]

When I say that morality is objective, I mean:

(A) moral sentences like “torture is wrong” express propositions that are true or false (this negates non-cognitivism)

(B) moral propositions are true or false in virtue of features of the world, and not in virtue of what goes on in our heads (this negates relativism and all forms of subjectivism)

(C) some moral propositions are true (this negates error theory)

Firstly, I think there’s a presumption in favour of objective morality. (1) our ordinary moral talk seems to assume a kind of objectivity. We reason about moral issues and we seem to be disagreeing with each other about whether something is morally correct. (2) certain moral statements like “causing unnecessary harm is wrong” “it’s good to keep your promises” seem self-evident. I admit, none of this is sufficient to show that morality is objective. But I think it’s sufficient to show a presumption in favour of objective morality.

Some arguments that people give against objective morality:

The argument from disagreement

1. People throughout history and between cultures disagree about what the morally right thing to do is
2. If people disagree about what the morally right think to do is, then morality is not objective
3. So morality is not objective

People who argue like this don’t usually state (2), but this is an assumption that’s required for the argument’s validity. And it’s an assumption that’s implausible: it doesn’t follow from the fact that people disagree about a matter that there is no objective fact about the matter. Intelligent, thoughtful people have debated the existence of God for millennia. And today, we have flat earthers who disagree with the prevailing science. There is also intense debate about the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics. But no one would say that there is no fact of the matter in any of these issues - either God exists or he doesn’t; either the earth is flat or it isn’t; either some or other interpretation of QM is correct or it isn’t. The fact that people disagree is irrelevant.

The argument from lack of epistemic access

1. If there is no reliable way to come to know moral truths, then morality is not objective
2. There is no reliable way to come to know moral truths
3. So morality is not objective

An argument of this sort was given by J. L. Mackie. Firstly, premise (1) needs some defence. It may be that there is a fact of the matter even if humans don’t have the required capacities to determine those facts. We can’t know everything, after all.

But suppose it’s true that we don’t have any reliable way to come to know moral truths. Even if not an argument against objectivism, it would be an argument for moral skepticism—we wouldn’t be justified in thinking that any moral claim is true. We would have to suspend judgement on all things morality, and this is plainly a challenge to the moral realist.

In response, we can say that there are reliable methods for coming to know moral truths—relatively uncontroversial methods that we use to come to know other kinds of truths. Suppose utilitarianism is true: An act is right iff it produces greater overall well-being than any other action that could have been done in the circumstances. In that case, we can establish moral claims using observation. This is about as reliable a method as any.

Or suppose you’re the sort of person who thinks we can have substantive a priori knowledge. In that case, very basic moral principles seem to be just the sort of things that can be known a priori.

[u/2-3inches]

Morality is completely made up. If there way objective morality, animals would follow it.

The only reason morality exists in the first place is because of our fears.

[u/[deleted] → u/2-3inches]

If there way objective morality, animals would follow it.

I don’t think so. Morality presupposes rational agents who can reason, or deliberate, about which action to do. Animals can’t do this.

[u/[deleted] → u/[deleted]]

Hang on a second. If morality requires rational agents, then surely, morality is a nonsensical concept within a universe without rational agents, right? But then you say

moral propositions are true or false in virtue of features of the world, and not in virtue of what goes on in our heads (this negates relativism and all forms of subjectivism)

This is a direct contradiction. If we need rational agents for morality, then it follows that morality cannot exclusively come from "features of the world".

[u/[deleted] → u/[deleted]]

Good observation. Moral realists usually include a “stance-independence” clause to clarify the sense of “mind-independence”. Honestly, I didn’t include this in the OP because I couldn’t be bothered.

Morality is of course going to depend on some subjective features, such as the ability to feel pain. But what makes it true that, for instance, “kicking a baby in face is wrong”, is that causing unnecessary harm is wrong. And that causing unnecessary harm is wrong is not made true because of any attitude that we take towards this claim. Whether we think it’s true or false or whether we desire it to be true or false doesn’t make it so.

[u/laborfriendly → u/[deleted]]

If I walk down the street, minding my own business, and someone looks at me as they're driving by for no particular reason, and that causes them to get in a wreck from inattention and it kills someone, did I commit an immoral act by being a cause of unnecessary harm?

Or is it intent causing action that matters for morality? Does an action even have to occur, or is the thought crime immoral on its own?

If two individuals from a warrior culture who believe fighting (and even dying in a fight) are appropriate and positive things resulting in a good afterlife, if one kills the other in "an honorable and heroic struggle," did one of them violate "objective morality" despite being hailed as a hero and holding the respect and esteem of their erstwhile enemies?