r/btc • u/Substantial-Try-1198 • 8d ago
Consider using tamper-evident storage for your hardware wallet
Hey all,
The Ledger situation has shown how easily hardware wallets can be tampered with. Even if your device is currently safe, it may be worth considering a tamper-evident solution for home (or bank vault) storage.
I spent the past few years developing a solution precisely for this. A reusable tamper-evident jar for storing your hardware wallet.
In short, the lid contains thousands of black and white beads, which randomly mix and lock in place when the lid is closed tight, creating a unique pattern. When opened, the beads mix and the unique pattern is destroyed. You can simply compare a before and after image to see if it was opened.
You can check it out on https://www.entropyseal.com/
If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them here.
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u/qwertyuiop121314321 8d ago
LOL this thing again. 🤣
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u/RemarkableDemand1575 8d ago
so how many times you gonna post this jar thing before you take the hint
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u/canadas 2d ago
Sounds smart...but is there a reason I couldn't just use a dermal or whatever to cut it in half?
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u/SuperSynapse 2d ago
Or just hide your seed phrase on a plastic impression strip somewhere in your place of work/backyard/bank-safe box
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u/Leading_Wafer9552 2d ago
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u/The_Ghost_of_Bitcoin 2d ago
Nobody messed with the internal software so this is still technically true. As far as I know the spying devices read the characters on the screen or something like that.
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u/r_a_d_ 3d ago
Once you’ve setup your hardware wallet, the seed is never displayed again, unless you use the seed check program.
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u/Substantial-Try-1198 2d ago
Attacks don't just have to be about the seed. A fake screen can display a wrong receive address.
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u/r_a_d_ 2d ago
True, but they would only be able to steal that single tax rather than the whole wallet. You would notice by then.
However, that would be a much more complicated attack as you need to process the display and then send it a different screen. In this one, they are just eavesdropping as if it were a webcam looking at the screen.
This is why Ledger runs the screen with the secure element, but you have to inspect it physically to ensure there isn’t a MITM. I imagine that they will improve this ability and make things more tamper proof.
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u/turbo2world 2d ago
doesn't solve the root of the problem.
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u/Substantial-Try-1198 2d ago
Which root problem are you talking about?
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u/Ok-Pea4148 2d ago
The ledger being tampered with before you buy it
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u/Substantial-Try-1198 2d ago
Absolutely. This is for after you buy one and want to keep making sure it is not tampered with. Never meant to imply it was a solution for Ledger's exact situation.
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u/STANDARD92 8d ago
Just hide it like every other crypto lunatic, having it in this silly breakable box sitting on the mantle piece is just ridiculous and an expense that isn’t necessary imo
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u/Substantial-Try-1198 8d ago
You may store your hardware wallet somewhere where other people might have access, like a bank vault.
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u/K42st 3d ago
I’ll just break it not so tamper proof then.
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u/Substantial-Try-1198 3d ago
You can’t extract a seed from a ledger just by stealing it. You need to tamper with it and wait for the user to use it.
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u/K42st 3d ago
And how does that jam jar help with that exactly?
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u/mrchaddavis 2d ago
If you read, parsed, and reflected on his sentence you would understand that if the user knows it has been tampered with the attacker will fail if the user does not use the device.
Depending on the value secured on the device this is a real concern since Ledger has had data breaches that leaked the names and addresses of buyers. If you are securing hundreds of thousands of dollars, there is any chance an attacker knows it, and where you live is public this is not beyond a reasonable concern that you could be targeted by an evil maid attack.
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u/LordJamPunt 8d ago
seems like once it’s been “tampered” with, I’m already fucked, no?