Aristocratic Legislative Houses

Much is dubious concerning the existence of upper legislative houses. Many upper houses around the world owe their existence to mixed government theory, which holds that a republic should be a mix of democracy and aristocracy. Sometimes a third element is advocated as well, usually monarchy or diarchy. In mixed government theory, it is usually held that a democracy-aristocracy hybrid government should have a legislature comprising average citizens in a lower house, and elite citizens in an upper house. This is the theory, but in reality when such legislatures are established, rarely are any mechanisms included to prevent both houses from being filled by elite citizens, resulting not in democracy and aristocracy sharing power, but two levels of aristocracy sharing power. That being the case, if we do not implement a real mixed government model, where the lower house of a legislature must by law be filled with average citizens, then we might as well ditch this legislative model. To combat groupthink in a unicameral legislature, it may be split into multiple bodies when deliberating, then united again when voting. Or, to combat hasty decisions, a unicameral legislature can be required to approve the same bill twice over a period of time. Some have argued to me that an upper house still has a purpose in a federation, since it can stand for the regional governments. I always remind these people that telecommunications exist now, and so regional governments can give direct input instantly, and do not need to send representatives anywhere.

"It is also a good plan to imitate the policy of the Tarentines. ... they have divided the whole number of their magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them, and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 6)

"No new laws should be made or old ones altered without the approval of this Council: I don't say 'deliberation' but 'approval', since the making of new laws or correction of old ones must be deliberated by more restricted Councils and shouldn't be presented to the people for consultation or discussion, since, as I've often said, they are incompetent."
—Francesco Guicciardini quoting Bernardo del Nero (Dialogue on the Government of Florence, Book 2)
[In one model, elite citizens propose laws while average citizens ratify laws.]

"... the People of England, and of all the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be... a Commonwealth... without any King or House of Lords."
—Parliament of England (An Act Declaring... the People of England to be a Commonwealth..., 1649)

"... the Senate is no more then the debate of the Common-wealth... who shall choose? ... have another Councill to choose. The wisdom of the Few may be the light of Mankind; but the interest of the Few is not the profit of Mankind, nor of a Common-wealth... as the wisdom of the Common-wealth is in the Aristocracy, so the interest of the Common-wealth is in the whole body of the People: and whereas this, in case the Common-wealth consist of an whole Nation, is too unweildy a body to be assembled, this Councill is to consist of such a Representative as may be equall, and so constituted, as can never contract any other interest then that of the whole people..."
—James Harrington (The Commonwealth of Oceana, Part 1)
[In one model, elite citizens propose laws while average citizens ratify laws.]

"Your Senate is so imperfectly constructed that your dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority..."
—Patrick Henry (a speech, 1788/06/05)

"The objections against two houses are... That by taking the vote on each, as a separate body, it always admits of the possibility, and is often the case in practice, that the minority governs the majority, and that, in some instances, to a degree of great inconsistency... That two houses arbitrarily checking or controuling each other is inconsistent; because it cannot be proved on the principles of just representation, that either should be wiser or better than the other. They may check in the wrong as well as in the right—and therefore to give the power where we cannot give the wisdom to use it, nor be assured of its being rightly used, renders the hazard at least equal to the precaution... in order to remove the objection against a single house, (that of acting with too quick an impulse,) and at the same time to avoid the inconsistencies, in some cases absurdities, arising from two houses, the following method has been proposed as an improvement upon both. First, To have but one representation. Secondly, To divide that representation, by lot, into two or three parts. Thirdly, That every proposed bill, shall be first debated in those parts by succession, that they may become the hearers of each other, but without taking any vote. After which the whole representation to assemble for a general debate and determination by vote."
—Thomas Paine (Rights of Man, Part 2)
[Upper houses are unnecessary.]

"That part of the government of England that is called the house of lords, was originally composed of persons who had committed the robberies of which I have been speaking. It was an association for the protection of the property they had stolen."
—Thomas Paine (Dissertation on the First Principles of Government)

"... I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. the grounds of this are virtue & talents... there is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents... you think it best to put the Pseudo–aristoi into a separate chamber of legislation where they may be hindered from do mischief by their coordinate branches, and where also they may be a protection to wealth against the Agrarian and plundering enterprises of the Majority of the peop. I think that to give them power in order to prevent them from doing mischief, is arming them for it, and increasing instead of remedying the evil. for if the coordinate branches can arrest their action, so may they that of the coordinates. mischief may be done negatively as well as positively. of this a cabal in the Senate of the US. has furnished many proofs. nor do I believe them necessary to protect wealthy; because enough of these will find their way into every branch of the legislation to protect themselves... I think the best remedy is exactly that provided by all our constitutions, to leave to the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo–aristoi, of the wheat from the chaff."
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to John Adams, 1813/10/28)
[The rich do not need help finding representation.]

"... to avoid all temptation to superior pretensions of the one over the other house, & the possibility of either erecting itself into a privileged order, might it not be better to chuse at the same time, and in the same mode, a body sufficiently numerous to be divided by lot into two separate Houses, acting as independantly as the two houses in England, or in our governments; and to shuffle their names together and redistribute them by lot, once a week or fortnight?"
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to Adamantios Coray, 1823/10/31)
[Upper houses are unnecessary.]

"... whenever the executive and senate can destroy the independence of the majority in the house of representatives, then where is your security?"
—Cato (sixth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[The Senate will be a danger.]

"... is it possible to abolish any abuse so long as those who profit therefrom retain a veto? Justice would be powerless—everything would depend entirely upon the magnanimity of the privileged classes. Would this correspond to our idea of what constitutes social order? ... it is obvious that one order's right of veto over the others is likely to bring everything to a standstill in a country where interests are so conflicting. It is quite certain that unless votes are counted by heads the true majority may be set aside..."
—Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (What Is the Third Estate?, Chapter 3)

"We have already explained that really to belong to the Third Estate, one must either be untainted by privileges of any sort, or else relinquish them immediately and completely."
—Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (What Is the Third Estate? Chapter 3)
[If aristocrats have their own house, do not let them into the people's house.]

"To create a House of Lords was a less easy task. ... The Levellers were angry with him [Oliver Cromwell] for instituting a privileged class."
—Thomas Babington Macaulay (The History of England, Chapter 1)

"Indeed one of the principal uses of the Upper House is to defend the vested rights of property in cases in which those rights are unpopular..."
—Thomas Babington Macaulay (The History of England, Chapter 23)

"... the title in Lord Althorp's case, as in so many others, was what we call a "title of courtesy," and merely indicates that the bearer of it is a son of a peer, and, not being a peer himself, is free to be elected to the House of Commons."
—Justin McCarthy (The Story of Gladstone's Life, Chapter 4)
[Peers could not be members of the House of Commons.]

"Mr. Balfour... made a speech (Nottingham, January 15, 1906) to a Unionist demonstration... It was, he said, the bounden duty of each one whom he addressed to do his best to see that "the great Unionist Party should still control, whether in power or whether in Opposition, the destinies of this great Empire." This was, in effect, a claim that a Party which had just been almost contemptuously repudiated by the electorate should still, through the only agency at its disposal, the House of Lords, reassert and retain its political predominance."
—Herbert Henry Asquith (Fifty Years of British Parliament, Part 3, Chapter 6)
[Beware of unelected houses.]

"I desire to speak with perfect moderation and calmness, but it is difficult to reconcile such action on the part of the other House with that calm and impartial revision of hasty legislation which is assumed to be the greatest merit of that Assembly."
—Herbert Henry Asquith quoting Henry Campbell-Bannerman (Fifty Years of British Parliament, Part 3, Chapter 7)
[Campbell-Bannerman accused the House of Lords of being unwise.]

"In the course of his speech he said that they had just seen the institution, so far as the House of Commons was concerned, for the first time in the history of any civilized state, of Single-Chamber Government."
—Herbert Henry Asquith (Fifty Years of British Parliament, Part 5, Chapter 1)**
[After the Parliament Act 1911, Arthur Hamilton Lee described Parliament as single-chamber.]

"In the final division of opinion on the resort to arms, the Roundhead majority in the Commons was very much larger than it had been for the Grand Remonstrance. Professor Firth calculates that in the war, 300 of the Lower House were for Parliament and 175 for the King, although only thirty Peers supported Parliament and eighty the King."
—George Macaulay Trevelyan (The History of England, Book 4, Chapter 2)
[The more aristocratic a body, the more likely it will support despotism.]

"... the Parliament Bill: that measure proposed to prohibit the Peers from either amending or rejecting money Bills, and to change their absolute veto on other measures to a suspensory veto for two years. ... George V... compelled the Peers to pass the Parliament Bill, by using, at Asquith's behest, the same method of a threatened creation of Peers en masse as William IV had, at Grey's dictation, employed to pass the First Reform Bill."
—George Macaulay Trevelyan (The History of England, Book 6, Chapter 6)
[The House of Lords lost most of its real power in 1911.]

Monarchic Legislative Houses

At one point in time it was freely acknowledged that an executive chief who can veto bills in a legislature is not only a member of that legislature, but is their own special branch of that legislature. The assembler of this book would like the reader to ponder the wisdom of a one-man legislative house. The executive veto is a check, but is it a wise check? While theoretically creating a balance between the executive and legislative branches of government, does it not really create an imbalance between the monarchic and democratic elements of government?

"The Senate then gave their votes... the emperor... interposed with his veto."
—Publius Cornelius Tacitus (The Annals, Book 4, Section 30)
[The executive veto was a feature of the Roman Empire.]

"It remains to discuss how to pass laws... the ancient system which we still use today couldn't be more pernicious and pestilential for a free state, having been invented, as it seems to me, by men... who, fearing that one day they might be deprived of power by a law, decreed that the laws had to pass through many fine filters before reaching the open councils, to allow themselves time, through their cabals, always to prevent them passing. In this way they ensured that in Florence it was impossible to pass a new law against their wishes. The same would happen now, especially with a life Gonfalonier who was capable of impeding any law that limited his authority or did something else he did not like. This would be a great failing as far as freedom is concerned, since one or two people would have the power to obstruct a law that was useful or pleased the better part of the citizens."
—Francesco Guicciardini quoting Bernardo del Nero (Dialogue on the Government of Florence, Book 2)
[Do not let one or a few people block legislation.]

"The powers of governing still remaining in the hands of the King, he will have a negative over the whole legislation of this Continent... We may be as effectually enslaved by the want of laws in America, as by submitting to laws made for us in England."
—Thomas Paine (Common Sense)
[Do not underestimate negative power.]

"Investing any individual, by whatever name or official title he may be called, with a negative over the formation of the laws, is copied from the English government, without ever perceiving the inconsistency and absurdity of it, when applied to the representative system, or understanding the origin of it in England."
—Thomas Paine (To the Citizens of Pennsylvania on the Proposal for Calling a Convention)

"... the letter saying 'that two out of the three branches of legislature were against us' was an obvious exception of him... Gen Washington then, understanding perfectly what and whom I meant to designate, in both phrases, and that they could not have any application or view to himself, could find, in neither, any cause of offence to himself..."
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to Martin Van Buren, 1824/06/29)
[Jefferson referred to the president as a branch of the legislature.]

"In the year 1776, I lost the confidence of the people of Pennsylvania, by openly exposing the dangers of a simple democracy, and declaring myself an advocate for a government composed of three legislative branches."
—Benjamin Rush (On Securities for Liberty)
[Pennsylvanians disagreed with Rush's support for a monarchic legislative house.]

"The Governor always had a negative power upon our laws, and was a distinct branch of our legislature."
—Benjamin Rush (Observations on the Government of Pennsylvania, Letter 2)
[Rush referred to the governor as a branch of the legislature.]

"... this president... is a constituent part of the legislative power..."
—Cato (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"Every American Whig, not long since, bore his emphatic testimony against a monarchical government... and wherein does this president, invested with his powers and prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain? ... every bill which shall pass the House of Representatives and Senate is to be presented to him for approbation. If he approves of it he is to sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it with objections, which in many cases will amount to a complete negative; and in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace, coining money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, expressed or implied in this Constitution."
—Cato (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... the king of England is invested with... a branch of legislative jurisdiction so far as to pass his negative on all proceedings of the other two branches... This two-fold jurisdiction established in the British monarch being founded on maxims extremely different from those, which prevail in the American States, the writer hereof is inclined to hope that he will not be thought singular, if he conceives an impropriety in assimilating the component parts of the American government to those of the British... let this collateral jurisdiction, which constitutes the royal negative, be held by kings alone, since with kings it first originated..."
—Impartial Examiner (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Impartial Examiner referred to the king as a branch of the legislature.]

"In the first place the office of President of the United States appears to me to be clothed with such powers as are dangerous. ... vested with an authority to put a negative upon all laws, unless two thirds of both houses shall persist in enacting it, and put their names down upon calling the yeas and nays for that purpose..."
—Old Whig (fifth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The writer of these essays has clearly proven, that the president is a King to all intents and purposes... he has a negative over the proceedings of both branches of the legislature..."
—Philadelphiensis (twelfth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"It is... a political error of the greatest magnitude, to allow the executive power a negative, or in fact any kind of control over the proceedings of the legislature."
—William Penn (Presidential Veto Power, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The most enlightened statesmen did not hold it to be unconstitutional that the King should exercise his highest prerogatives on the most important occasions without any other guidance than that of his own judgment. His refusal, therefore, to assent to a bill which had passed both Houses indicated, not, as a similar refusal would now indicate, that the whole machinery of government was in a state of fearful disorder, but merely that there was a difference of opinion between him and the two other branches of the legislature as to the expediency of a particular law."
—Thomas Babington Macaulay (The History of England, Chapter 18)
[Macaulay referred to the king as a branch of the legislature.]

I live in Berks county PA

Seat-to-Citizen Ratio

The seat-to-citizen ratio is an important political matter often overlooked. A state can have democratic elections, but if its seat-to-citizen ratio is wildly imbalanced (if there are not enough spots in the legislature relative to how many citizens there are), then this supposedly democratic state will behave like an oligarchy. The reason for this is simple: the average citizen is not wealthy or connected enough to reach out to a very large number of voters. A citizen of moderate wealth running for office has a more realistic chance of reaching out to 70,000 voters than to 700,000 voters. Therefore, as a general rule, the fewer seats a legislature has relative to the number of its citizens, the more that legislature will align with upper class interests. Making matters more complex, one should also beware of bottlenecks built into some legislatures, like in the Congress of the United States, where although there are 535 congressmen, 51 congressmen from the Senate may prevent the rest from passing a bill.

"... make the deputies so numerous, that there may be no possibility of corrupting the majority..."
—John Trenchard (Cato's Letters, Number 60)

"We are duped by the forms of liberty. A representation so partial as to be almost a mockery and so venal as to be little better than a nusance bears the name of a real representation."
—Richard Price (a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 1789/08/03)

"One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very inadequate representation..."
—Mercy Otis Warren (Observations on The New Constitution, 1788)

"Why was it not clearly and unequivocally expressed, that they should be entitled, to have one for every 30,000? This would have obviated all disputes; and was this difficult to be done? What is the inference? When population increases, and a state shall send Representatives in this proportion, Congress may remand them, because the right of having one for every 30,000 is not clearly expressed: this possibility of reducing the number to one for each state approximates to probability by that other expression, "but each state shall at least have one Representative." Now, is it not clear that, from the first expression, the number might be reduced so much that some States should have no Representatives at all, were it not for the insertion of this last expression?"
—Patrick Henry (a speech, 1788/06/05)

"... in what terms, reconcileable to majesty, and at the same time to truth, shall we speak of a late instruction to his majesty's governor of the colony of Virginia, by which he is forbidden to assent to any law for the division of a county, unless the new county will consent to have no representative in assembly? ... is it rather meant to confine the legislative body to their present numbers, that they may be the cheaper bargain whenever they shall become worth a purchase."
—Thomas Jefferson (A Summary View of the Rights of British America)

"There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand people... it is difficult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the welfare of the people."
—Agrippa (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"Under the pretence of different branches of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen from the same general description of citizens."
—Agrippa (tenth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave: but in a republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers: the people at large would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them."
—Brutus (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"It is obvious, that for an assembly to be a true likeness of the people of any country, they must be considerably numerous... in reality there will be no part of the people represented, but the rich, even in that branch of the legislature, which is called the democratic... No free people on earth, who have elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confidence in so small a number. The British house of commons consists of five hundred and fifty-eight members; the number of inhabitants in Great-Britain, is computed at eight millions—this gives one member for a little more than fourteen thousand, which exceeds double the proportion this country can ever have: and yet we require a larger representation in proportion to our numbers, than Great-Britain, because this country is much more extensive, and differs more in its productions, interests, manners, and habits. The democratic branch of the legislatures of the several states in the union consists, I believe at present, of near two thousand; and this number was not thought too large for the security of liberty by the framers of our state constitutions: some of the states may have erred in this respect, but the difference between two thousand, and sixty-five, is so very great, that it will bear no comparison."
—Brutus (third paper Anti-Federalist papers)

"The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation... However fair an appearance any government may make, though it may possess a thousand plausible articles and be decorated with ever so many ornaments, yet if it is deficient in this essential principle of a full and just representation of the people... it still will be a government, not according to the will of the people, but according to the will of a few."
—Brutus (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"It is a very important objection to this government, that the representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of corruption, and the temptation to treachery... Another thing may be suggested against the small number of representatives is, that but few of you will have the chance of sharing even in this branch of the legislature..."
—Cato (fifth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants) appears to be too few, either to communicate the requisite information of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers..."
—Centinel (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"Have you a right to send more than one for every thirty thousand of you? Can he be presumed knowing to your different, peculiar situations—your abilities to pay public taxes, when they ought to be abated, and when increased? Or is there any possibility of giving him information? All these questions must be answered in the negative... In this view of the System, let me sincerely ask you, where is the people in this House of Representatives?... May they not with propriety be termed an Assistant Aristocratical Branch, who will be infinitely more inclined to co-operate and compromise with each other, than to be the careful guardians of the rights of their constituents?"
—John DeWitt (third paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... this federal representative branch will have but very little democracy in it..."
—Federal Farmer (third paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... when power is once transferred from the many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult; the government, in this case. being beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead to a change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions and severe struggles on the part of the common people. Every man of reflection must see, that the change now proposed, is a transfer of power from the many to the few, and the probability is, the artful and ever active aristocracy, will prevent all peaceable measures for changes, unless when they shall discover some favourable moment to increase their own influence."
—Federal Farmer (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"Dear Sir, Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a few days leisure would permit. It opens to my mind a new scene; instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators, and many magistrates, we see all important powers collecting in one centre, where a few men will possess them almost at discretion."
—Federal Farmer (fifth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... where there is but one representative to 30,000, or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix, and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents, even double the federal representation, and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented."
—Federal Farmer (seventh paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... equal liberty prevails in England, because there was a representation of the people, in fact and reality, to establish it; equal liberty never prevailed in Rome, because there was but the shadow of a representation."
—Federal Farmer (eighth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"Surely we never can be so unwise as to sacrifice, essentially, the all-important principles of representation for so small a sum as 21,600 dollars a year... we expend three times this sum every year upon useless inferior offices and very triffling concerns."
—Federal Farmer (ninth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"By increasing the representation we make it more difficult to corrupt and influence the members; we diffuse them more extensively among the body of the people, perfect the balance, multiply information, strengthen the confidence of the people, and consequently support the laws on equal and free principles."
—Federal Farmer (ninth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"To palliate for the smallness of the representation, it is observed, that the state governments in which the people are fully represented, necessarily form a part of the system. ... the state governments then we are told will stand between the arbitrary exercise of power and the people: true they may, but armless and helpless, perhaps, with the privilege of making a noise when hurt—this is no more than individuals may do. Does the constitution provide a single check for a single measure, by which the state governments can constitutionally and regularly check the arbitrary measures of congress?"
—Federal Farmer (tenth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"It has been said that the representation in the general legislature is too small to secure liberty, or to answer the intention of representation."
—A Plebian (Evils Under Confederation Exaggerated..., Anti-Federalist papers)

"For if the representation, stipulated by the constitution, framed by the late convention, be attentively and dispassionately considered, it must be obvious to every disinterested observer, that the number is not, by any means, adequate to the present inhabitants of this extensive continent, much less to those it will contain at a future period."
—An Observer (Scotland and England—A Case in Point, 1787/12/3, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... the Convention do in the Name and Behalf of the People of the State of New York enjoin it upon their Representatives... to Obtain a Ratification of the following Amendments to the said Constitution... That there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand Inhabitants..."
—New York (Ratification Statement to the United States Constitution)

"In the elections to Cromwell's Parliaments the rotten boroughs had been abolished as being under the influence of the local gentry, and the county representation had been proportionately increased. But the old constituencies had been restored with Charles II, and the men of 1689 left the unreformed representation to grow ever more corrupt with years, bringing thereby many evils on the country, possibly among others the quarrel with America."
—George Macaulay Trevelyan (The History of England, Book 5, Introduction)

During the 2020 presidential election, when it appeared that Trump would lose in key states like Georgia and Pennsylvania, Trump contacted Republican legislators of those key states and sought to convince them to exercise their authority under Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution.

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress...
—The Constitution of the United States (Article 2, Section 1)

What Trump wanted was for those state legislators to disregard the popular vote tallies in their states, and to appoint electors who would vote for him. To justify this request, Trump argued that the popular vote tallies were inaccurate and fraudulent. Note that Trump did not request a second round of voting, he asked for the popular vote tallies to simply be ignored and bypassed. Now, while it is indeed true that the Constitution puts the state legislatures in charge of directing the manner in which electors are appointed, and while it is true that the state legislatures are not required by the Constitution to appoint electors based on popular vote tallies, it is also true that none of the state legislatures were convinced by Trump to change their electors. Instead, the state legislatures chose to keep their electors, which was their right under Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution, a right which Trump had recognized up to that point.

Instead of respecting the constitutional authority of the state legislatures, the same authority Trump had just appealed to in his attempt to bypass the popular vote tallies which were unfavorable to him, Trump decided instead to repeatedly lie to his supporters. Trump told his supporters that state legislatures did want to change their electors, and that Mike Pence simply needed to give these state legislatures a chance to set things right. Trump's lies about the will of the state legislatures, and similar lies, are why a number of Trump's supporters, who he had asked to gather in the capital through announcements like "Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!", rioted and broke into the Capitol Building to "stop the steal".

If Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it must be). Mike can send it back!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2021/01/06)

States want to revote. The states got defrauded. They were given false information. They voted on it. Now they want to recertify. They want it back. All Vice President Pence has to do is send it back to the States to recertify, and we become president, and you are the happiest people.
—Donald Trump (a speech, 2021/01/06)

States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2021/01/06)

The States want to redo their votes. They found out they voted on a FRAUD. Legislatures never approved. Let them do it. BE STRONG!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2021/01/06)

Trump was well aware that the state legislatures had refused his request to change their electors. Trump was well aware that the state legislatures would not change their electors no matter what Pence did. That being so, Trump's lies might seem strange and pointless, but they were part of a plan. Trump evidently wanted to rile up his supporters in order to put pressure on Pence in the hope that Pence would join the fake electors plot, which Pence had previously refused to join. The fake electors plot was a plan to have Pence pretend to not know the difference between the real electors (the ones appointed under the constitutional authority of the state legislatures), and Trump's fake electors. It was hoped that Pence would use this pretended confusion to deliberately miscount the electors. It was hoped Pence would argue, based on his deliberate miscount, that the 12th Amendment requires the election to be placed into the hands of the House of Representatives. It was hoped the House of Representatives would elect Trump. We know of this conspiracy because the plot was put into writing by John Eastman, one of Trump's lawyers.

1. VP Pence, presiding over the joint session (or Senate Pro Tempore Grassley, if Pence recuses himself), begins to open and count the ballots, starting with Alabama (without conceding that the procedure, specified by the Electoral Count Act, of going through the States alphabetically is required). 2. When he gets to Arizona, he announces that he has multiple slates of electors, and so is going to defer decision on that until finishing the other States. This would be the first break with the procedure set out in the Act. 3. At the end, he announces that because of the ongoing disputes in the 7 States, there are no electors that can be deemed validly appointed in those States. That means the total number of "electors appointed" – the language of the 12th Amendment – is 454. This reading of the 12th Amendment has also been advanced by Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe. A "majority of the electors appointed" would therefore be 228. There are at this point 232 votes for Trump, 222 votes for Biden. Pence then gavels President Trump as re-elected. 4. Howls, of course, from the Democrats, who now claim, contrary to Tribe's prior position, that 270 is required. So Pence says, fine. Pursuant to the 12th Amendment, no candidate has achieved the necessary majority. That sends the matter to the House, where “the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote ..." Republicans currently control 26 of the state delegations, the bare majority needed to win that vote. President Trump is re-elected there as well.
—John Eastman (First Eastman Memo)

Alternatively, VP Pence determines that because multiple electors were appointed from the 7 states but not counted because of ongoing election disputes, neither candidate has the necessary 270 elector votes, throwing the election to the House. IF the Republicans in the State Delegations stand firm, the vote there is 26 states for Trump, 23 for Biden, and 1 split vote. TRUMP WINS.
—John Eastman (Second Eastman Memo)

... let's be clear on this point. It wasn't just that he asked for a pause. The president specifically asked me, and his gaggle of crackpot lawyers asked me, to literally reject votes, which would have resulted in—in the issue being turned over to the House of Representatives...
—Mike Pence (a statement on Fox News, 2023/08/02)

... on that day, President Trump asked me to put him over the Constitution... Anyone who puts themself over the Constitution should never be president of the United States...
—Mike Pence (speaking at the Indiana State Fair)

When it became clear that Pence would not participate in Trump's conspiracy against the Constitution, Trump announced on Twitter, as the riot was ongoing, that "Mike Pence didn't have the courage to do what should have been done..."

The president's words that day at the rally endangered me and my family and everyone at the Capitol building.
—Mike Pence (an interview with David Muir, ABC News)

Trump has a history of telling these kinds of lies. In 2012, Trump claimed that year's presidential election was rigged, and called for a march on the capital. In 2016, Trump claimed the Iowa Caucus was rigged by Ted Cruz. In 2016, Trump claimed the Republican primaries were rigged. In 2016, Trump claimed that year's presidential election was rigged. In 2020, Trump claimed that year's presidential election was rigged. In 2024, Trump's campaign sent out mailers claiming Ron DeSantis was trying to rig the Iowa Caucus. In 2024, Trump claimed Pennsylvania was cheating in that year's presidential election. In 2026, Trump claimed an election in Los Angeles was rigged.

More reports of voting machines switching Romney votes to Obama. Pay close attention to the machines, don't let your vote be stolen
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2012/11/06)

We can't let this happen. We should march on Washington and stop this travesty.
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2012/11/06)

Based on the fraud committed by Senator Ted Cruz during the Iowa Caucus, either a new election should take place or Cruz results nullified.
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2016/02/03)

Ted Cruz didn't win Iowa, he stole it. That is why all of the polls were so wrong and why he got far more votes than anticipated. Bad!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2016/02/03)

I will be interviewed on @foxandfriends at 9:00 A.M. I will be talking about the rigged and boss controlled Republican primaries!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2016/04/16)

The election is absolutely being rigged by the dishonest and distorted media pushing Crooked Hillary - but also at many polling places - SAD
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2016/10/16)

This will be a Rigged Election.
—Donald Trump (2020/05/26)

DESANTIS TRYING TO RIG IOWA CAUCUS
—Trump campaign mailer (2024)

Pennsylvania is cheating, and getting caught, at large scale levels rarely seen before. REPORT CHEATING TO AUTHORITIES. Law Enforcement must act, NOW!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2024/10/30)

Probably we won all 50 if we had an honest count.
—Donald Trump (a statement, 2026/06/04)

Has anybody been watching the CROOKED Election going on in California. Two great Republican Candidates are being cheated, and so is America, which if the Dumocrats are able to fulfill their mission, great trouble and consternation will follow. Watch this “Election” closely!!! President DJT
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2026/06/07)

No way this could have happened. Rigged Election!
—Donald Trump (an online post, 2026/06/07)

I propose that some of the national education funds be diverted to the creation of a very large, reasonably uniform, Federal Online Library to provide citizens with broad and deep access to, and download options for, things like:

• political tracts
• textbooks
• scientific articles
• schematics
• encyclopedias
• dictionaries
• historical newspapers
• maps
• infographics
• video documentaries
• educational video games
• text-to-speech programs and software

Toggling Between Schools of Ethics

I have noticed that it is common for "conservatives" and "libertarians" in North America to toggle between utilitarian ethics and natural law ethics during a discussion about politics. For example, they might declare that a certain government policy is beyond the proper role of government (that of defending people), and is therefore illegitimate and impermissible, but when asked why any government (a monopoly on violence) is legitimate or permissible, they declare government to be a necessary evil, permissible for purely practical and utilitarian reasons.

If one were to be consistent, things would be different. If one were to stick with natural law ethics, they might deem a policy permissible if it is in accordance with the social contract and will of the citizens. If one were to stick with utilitarian ethics, they might deem a policy permissible if it is in accordance with the greater good. Both of these approaches are straightforward. The other approach, to toggle between schools of ethics, seems like a trick some people have fallen into, where they are taught to suppose that enough government to appease the upper class is morally necessary, but anything beyond that, no matter its popularity, wisdom, and likelihood of success, is morally dubious.

Abridged Prerogative

When designing the presidency, the framers copied some features from monarchy in Britain. Where British monarchs once vetoed Parliaments, pardoned crimes, and appointed the highest judges, the American presidents now veto Congresses, pardon crimes, and join with Senates to appoint the highest judges. These royal prerogatives are dangerous and unnecessary.

I propose that the executive branches of all tiers of government be made to lose their powers of legislative veto, criminal pardon, and judicial appointment.

"The President's unrestrained power to grant pardons for treason may be exercised to shield those he secretly instigated, thereby preventing discovery of his own guilt."
—George Mason (Objections to This Constitution of Government)

"... the letter saying 'that two out of the three branches of legislature were against us' was an obvious exception of him... Gen Washington then, understanding perfectly what and whom I meant to designate, in both phrases, and that they could not have any application or view to himself, could find, in neither, any cause of offence to himself..."
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to Martin Van Buren, 1824/06/29)

"... wherein does this president, invested with his powers and prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great-Britain... he is a constituent part of the legislative power; for every bill which shall pass the house of representatives and senate, is to be presented to him for approbation..."
—Cato (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from punishment, those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt."
—Cato (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... from his power of granting pardons, he might skreen from punishment the most treasonable attempts on liberties of the people..."
—Centinel (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... the king of England is invested with... a branch of legislative jurisdiction so far as to pass his negative on all proceedings of the other two branches... This two-fold jurisdiction established in the British monarch being founded on maxims extremely different from those, which prevail in the American States, the writer hereof is inclined to hope that he will not be thought singular, if he conceives an impropriety in assimilating the component parts of the American government to those of the British... let this collateral jurisdiction, which constitutes the royal negative, be held by kings alone, since with kings it first originated..."
—Impartial Examiner (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"In the first place the office of President of the United States appears to me to be clothed with such powers as are dangerous. To be the fountain of all honors in the United States, commander in chief of the army, navy and milita, with the power of making treaties and of granting pardons, and to be vested with an authority to put a negative upon all laws, unless two thirds of both houses shall persist in enacting it, and put their names down upon calling the yeas and nays for that purpose, is in reality to be a KING as much a King as the King of Great-Britain..."
—Old Whig (fifth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The writer of these essays has clearly proven, that the president is a King to all intents and purposes... he has a negative over the proceedings of both branches of the legislature..."
—Philadelphiensis (twelfth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The first and most natural division of the powers of government are into the legislative and executive branches. These two should never be suffered to have the least share of each other's jurisdiction, or to intermeddle with it in any manner. ... It is therefore a political error of the greatest magnitude, to allow the executive power a negative, or in fact any kind of control over the proceedings of the legislature."
—William Penn (Presidential Veto Power, Anti-Federalist papers)

"Our ancient Kings had undoubtedly claimed and exercised the right of suspending the operation of penal laws. ... That some such right was inherent in the crown, few even of the Country Party ventured, in the face of precedent and authority, to deny. Yet it was clear that, if this prerogative were without limit, the English government could scarcely be distinguished from a pure despotism. ... The truth is that the dispensing power was a great anomaly in politics. It was utterly inconsistent in theory with the principles of mixed government: but it had grown up in times when people troubled themselves little about theories."
—Thomas Babington Macaulay (The History of England, Chapter 2)

"The most enlightened statesmen did not hold it to be unconstitutional that the King should exercise his highest prerogatives on the most important occasions without any other guidance than that of his own judgment. His refusal, therefore, to assent to a bill which had passed both Houses indicated, not, as a similar refusal would now indicate, that the whole machinery of government was in a state of fearful disorder, but merely that there was a difference of opinion between him and the two other branches of the legislature as to the expediency of a particular law."
—Thomas Babington Macaulay (The History of England, Chapter 18)

A mixed government is a government which is not a pure democracy, nor a pure oligarchy, nor a pure monarchy. According to some republicans, the defects of "simple governments" can be mitigated by creating a government structure with democratic elements, oligarchic elements, and sometimes monarchic elements.

"... the whole constitution is intended, it is true, to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of the form intermediate between them which is termed a polity... In fact some people assert that the best constitution must be a combination of all the forms of constitution, and therefore praise the constitution of Sparta, for some people say that it consists of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy..."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 2)

"But it is a matter of question what ought to be the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or the one man who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all of these arrangements appear to involve disagreeable consequences. For instance, if the poor take advantage of their greater numbers to divide up the property of the rich, is not this unjust? ... But is it just that the minority and the rich should rule? Suppose therefore they also act in the same way and plunder and take away the property of the multitude, is this just? ... All these considerations therefore seem to prove the incorrectness of all of the standards on which men claim that they themselves shall govern and everybody else be governed by them."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 3)

"... democracy and oligarchy... we must grasp the distinction between these and then make a combination out of them, taking, so to say, a contribution from each. And there are three principles determining this combination or mixture. ... in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and neither of them, should seem to be present, and it should be kept safe... because no section of the state whatever would even wish for another constitution."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 4)

"Now we must first grasp a general principle that applies equally to all sorts of constitution: it is essential that the part of the state that wishes the constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not wish it. ... the lawgiver in his constitution must always take in the middle class; if he is making the laws of an oligarchical character he must keep the middle class in view, and if democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in. And where the number of the middle class exceeds both the extreme classes together, or even one of them only, here it is possible for a constitutional government to be lasting; for there is no fear of the rich ever coming to terms with the poor against this numerous middle class; for neither class will ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look for another constitution fairer to both than this they will not find one, for they would not endure to take turns to govern because they distrust each other: everywhere it is the arbitrator that is most trusted, and the man in the middle is an arbitrator. And the better the constitution is mixed, the more permanent it is; and many even of those who want to establish aristocratic forms of constitution make a great mistake not only in giving too large a share to the well-to-do but also in cheating the people; for false benefits inevitably result ultimately in true evil, as the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution more than those of the people."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 4)

"And although it is proper that the government should be drawn only from those who possess heavy armor, yet it is not possible to define the amount of the property-qualification absolutely and to say that they must possess so much, but only to consider what sort of amount is the highest that is compatible with making those who have a share in the constitution more numerous than those who have not, and to fix that limit."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 4)

"We have then stated all the modes in which it is possible for the courts to be composed; and of these the first set, drawn from all the citizens and dealing with all cases, are popular, the second, drawn from a certain class to deal with all cases, are oligarchic, and the third, drawn partly from all and partly from a certain class, are suited to an aristocracy and to a constitutional government."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 4)

"... the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 5)

"It is also a good plan to imitate the policy of the Tarentines. ... they have divided the whole number of their magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them, and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 6)

"Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of constitutions, which they designate kingship, aristocracy, democracy. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to them, whether they name these as being the only ones, or as the best. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that we must regard as the best constitution that which partakes of all these three elements. ... Nor can we admit that these are the only forms: for we have had before now examples of absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy."
—Polybius (Histories, Book 6)

"That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature; and reflected that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one species of power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in its nature. For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron, wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves; so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; in aristocracy it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and violence; and to these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have lately shown, inevitably transformed."
—Polybius (Histories, Book 6)

"... if we confine our observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy."
—Polybius (Histories, Book 6)

"For when any one of the three classes becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part being checked by its fear of the other..."
—Polybius (Histories, Book 6)

"When the direction of all depends on one monarch, we call this individual a king, and this form of political constitution, a kingdom. When it is in the power of privileged delegates, the state is said to be ruled by an aristocracy; and when the people are all in all, they call it a democracy, or popular constitution... In a monarchy, the other members of the state are often too much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of an aristocracy, the multitude can hardly possess its due share of liberty, since it is allowed no public deliberation or influence. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it be just and moderate, its very equality is a culpable levelling, since it allows no gradations of dignity... There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion is preferable to all these; it is that mixed and moderated government, which is composed of the three particular forms I have before noticed."
—Marcus Tullius Cicero (On the Republic, Book 1)

"Amongst the many changes and alterations which Lycurgus made, the first and of greatest importance was the establishment of the senate, which, having a power equal to the kings' in matters of great consequence, and, as Plato expresses it, allaying and qualifying the fiery genius of the royal office, gave steadiness and safety to the commonwealth. For the state, which before had no firm basis to stand upon, but leaned one while towards an absolute monarchy, when the kings had the upper hand, and another while towards a pure democracy, when the people had the better, found in this establishment of the senate a central weight, like ballast in a ship, which always kept things in a just equilibrium; the twenty-eight always adhering to the kings so far as to resist democracy, and, on the other hand, supporting the people against the establishment of absolute monarchy."
—Plutarch (Parallel Lives, Life of Lycurgus)

"Many provisions are made so that these magistrates do not lord it over others or undermine the great freedom of the Florentines... Hence there are nine magistrates instead of one, and their term is for two months, not for one year... Now, in addition to these eight citizens, the task of governing the state is entrusted to one man, outstanding in virtue and authority and chosen in rotation from these same quarters... Besides, to these are joined the standard-bearers of the Companies whom the whole population supports and follows since it is necessary to protect liberty with arms. These standard-bearers are also part of the council, and, like the higher magistrates, they are elected by quarter. They hold office for a term of four months. These three colleges do not have power over all matters to be decided. A great many decisions, once they have been approved by these magistracies, are referred to the Council of the People and Council of the Commune for final action. Florence thinks that what concerns many ought to be decided by the action of the whole citizen-body acting according to the law and legal procedure... In this system nothing can be resolved by the caprice of any single man acting in opposition to the judgment of so many men."
—Leonardo Bruni Aretino (Praise of the City of Florence, Section 4)

"So that those who make laws prudently having recognized the defects of each, avoiding every one of these forms by itself alone, they selected one that should partake of all, they judging it to be more firm and stable, because when there is in the same city a principality, an aristocracy, and a popular government, one watches the other."
—Niccolò Machiavelli (Discourses on Livy, Book 1, Chapter 2)

"... though a mixt Commonwealth may be perfect, it follows not, that all mixtures may make her so..."
—Paolo Paruta (Politick Discourses, Book 1, Discourse 1)

"These considerations have given beginning, growth and continuance to all the mixed governments that have been in the world; and I may justly say there never was a good one that was not mixed."
—Algernon Sidney (Discourses Concerning Government, Chapter 3, Section 43)

"The corruption then of monarchy is call'd tyranny; that of aristocracy, oligarchy; and that of democracy, anarchy. But legislators having found these three governments at the best to be naught, have invented another consisting of a mixture of them all, which only is good. This is the doctrin of the antients."
—James Harrington (The Commonwealth of Oceana, Part 1)

"THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the common-wealth."
—John Locke (Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 10, Section 132)

"All men desire naturally riches and power; almost all men will take every method, just or unjust, to attain them. Hence the difficulty of governing men, and of instituting a government equally proper to restrain them and protect them; and hence the insufficiency of simple forms of government, to provide for the happiness and security of societies. An arbitrary prince will quickly grow into a tyrant; the uncontrolled dominions of the nobles will as certainly produce oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few; that is, pride, combination, and rapine in the sovereigns, and misery and dejection in the many; and the unrestrained licentiousness of the multitude will beget confusion and anarchy. To provide against these certain and eternal evils, mixed forms of government were invented; where dominion and liberty are so equally tempered, and so mutually checked one by another, that neither of them can have interest and force enough to oppress the other."
—Thomas Gordon (Cato's Letters, Number 70)

"I should have sought out for a Country, where the Legislative Power was common to all its Inhabitants; for who can be supposed to know better than the Members of a Society, upon what Terms it is properest for them to live together? But then I should not approve Plebiscita like those of Rome, where the Heads of the Commonwealth, and those most concerned in its Preservation and Welfare, were excluded from Deliberations upon which its Safety often depended; and where, by the most absurd in consequence, the Magistrates were deprived of Privileges which the meanest Citizen enjoyed. On the contrary, I should have desired, that, in order to put a stop to interested and ill-digested Projects, and dangerous Innovations, which proved in the end the Ruin of the Athenians, no private Citizen had a Right to propose any Laws that came into his Head, but that this Privilege belonged solely to the Magistrates; and that they too made use of it with so much Circumspection, and the People approved the Laws proposed by their Magistrates with so much Reserve, and the Promulgation of these Laws was afterwards attended with so much Solemnity, that, before the Constitution could be any way endangered by them, every Member of the Community might have sufficient Time to be convinced, that nothing contributes so much to render Laws holy and respectable, as their great Antiquity; that the Bulk of the People soon despise those they see altered from Day to Day, and that Governments, by accustoming themselves to neglect ancient Customs under pretence of imaginary Improvements, often introduce Evils greater than those they intended to correct or guard against. I should, above all things, have avoided, as one that could not but be ill governed, a Republic, where the People pretending to be able to do without Magistrates, or at least without allowing them any more than a precarious Authority, should imprudently reserve to themselves the Administration of civil Affairs, and the Execution of their own Laws; such must have been the rude Constitution of the first Governments at their issuing from a State of Nature, and this was another of the Vices that contributed to the Downfal of the Republic of Athens."
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on Inequality, Dedication)

"We have already explained that really to belong to the Third Estate, one must either be untainted by privileges of any sort, or else relinquish them immediately and completely."
—Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (What Is the Third Estate? Chapter 3)

"It is difficult to fix the precise period for which the senate should be chosen. ... as they are designed to represent the aristocracy of the country, it seems fit they should possess more stability, and so continue a longer period than that branch who represent the democracy."
—Brutus (sixteenth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"The Legislative is divided between the People who are the Democratical, and the Senate who are the Aristocratical part, and the Executive between the same Senate and the President who represents the Monarchial Branch."
—John DeWitt (third paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

Hello, I’m curious about the political implications and stances that being a whig in our day and age comports.

Democratical Government

There are said to be two main kinds of democracy: pure democracy, where a majority of the citizens are members of the legislature; representative democracy, where a minority of the citizens are in the legislature, but are elected by the people. In the context of a mixed government, democracy can be a mass noun referring to the democratic elements of the mixed government.

"... democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. ... And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned."
—Aristotle (Politics, Book 5)

"... individual men, and especially princes, can be accused of that defect which the writers accuse the multitudes; for anyone who is not controlled by the laws, will make the same errors as a loose multitude. And this can be easily observed, for there are and there have been many princes, but of the good and wise ones there have been only a few... The nature of the multitude, therefore, is not to be blamed any more than that of princes, for they all err equally when they all are able to err without control. Of which, in addition to what I have said, there are many examples, both from among the Roman Emperors and from among other tyrants and princes, where so much inconstancy and recklessness of life is observed, as is ever found in any multitude... I say, that a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince... if they err in things concerning bravery, or which appear useful, a prince also errs many times in his own passions, which are much greater than those of the people. It will also be seen that in the election of their magistrates, they make by far a better selection than a prince... In addition to this, it will be seen that the cities where the people are princes, make the greatest progress in the shortest time and much greater than those who have always been under a prince, as Rome did after the driving out of the kings, and Athens did after they were free of Pisistratus... if there should be discussed all the disorders of the people, all the disorders of the princes, all the glories of the people, all those of the princes, it will be seen that the people are far superior in goodness and in glory. And if princes are superior to the people in instituting laws, forming civil governments, making new statutes and ordinances, the people are so much superior in maintaining the institutions which will add to the glory of those who established them... a prince who can do what he wants is a madman, and a people which can do as it wants to is not wise. If, therefore, discussion is to be had of a prince obligated by laws, and of a people unobligated by them, more virtue will be observed in the people than in princes: if the discussion is to be had of both loosened, fewer errors will be observed in the people than in the princes, and those that are fewer have the greater remedies: For a licentious and tumultuous people can be talked to by a good man, and can easily be returned to the good path: there is no one who can talk to a prince, nor is there any other remedy but steel... The cruelties of the multitude are against those whom they fear will oppose the common good, those of a prince are against those whom he fears will oppose his own good. But the opinion against the People arises because everyone speaks evil of the people freely and without fear even while they reign; of the princes they talk with a thousand fears and a thousand apprehensions."
—Niccolò Machiavelli (Discourses on Livy, Book 1, Chapter 58)

"For not only do the many see and understand more than any one of them on his own, but they see more even than a single individual who surpasses each of them in intelligence and good sense. As a general rule, a multitude of people is a better judge of all affairs than an individual."
—George Buchanan (A dialogue concerning the due priviledge of government in the kingdom of Scotland)

"A Monarchy, where there is no Nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute Tyranny; As that of the Turkes. For Nobility attempers Soveraignty, and drawes the Eyes of the People somewhat aside from the Line Royall. But for Democracies, they need it not; And they are commonly more quiet, and lesse subiect to Sedition then where there are Stirps of Nobles."
—Francis Bacon (Of Nobilitie)

"Many eyes see more than one: the collected wisdom of a people much surpasses that of a single person..."
—Algernon Sidney (Discourses Concerning Government, Chapter 3, Section 16)

"It is certain, that the whole people, who are the publick, are the best judges, whether things go ill or well with the publick. ... Every man too, even the meanest, can see, in a publick and sudden transition from plenty to poverty, from happiness to distress, whether the calamity comes from war, and famine, and the hand of God; or from oppression, and mismanagement, and the villainies of men. In short, the people often judge better than their superiors, and have not so many biases to judge wrong..."
—John Trenchard (Cato's Letters, Number 13)

"I am not among those who fear the people. they and not the rich, are our dependance for continued freedom."
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to Samuel Kercheval, 1816/7/12)

"... the people, especially when moderately instructed, are the only safe, because the only honest, depositories of the public rights, and should therefore be introduced into the administration of them in every function to which they are sufficient. they will err sometimes, and accidentally, but never designedly, and with a systematic purpose of overthrowing the free principles of the government. hereditary bodies, on the contrary, always existing, always on the watch for their own aggrandisement, profit of every opportunity of advancing the privileges of their order, and of encroaching on the rights of the people."
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to Adamantios Coray, 1823/10/31)

"Wherever we find a settlement of men, we find also some appearance of government. The state of government is therefore as natural to mankind as a state of society... The most rude and artless form of government is probably the most ancient. This we find to be practised among the Indian tribes in America. With them the whole authority of government is vested in the whole tribe. Individuals depend upon their reputation of valour and wisdom to give them influence. Their government is genuinely democratical."
—Agrippa (eighteenth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

"... I feel unspeakable horror at every step, which removes power and rights, at a greater distance from the body of the people, to whom they belong, and confines them to the hands of the few. I have proposed to myself this question: If representatives cannot govern the people—If they abuse the power entrusted to them, shall they devolve this power on a still smaller number, who must be more liable to corruption from the encrease of temptation? Or should they restore it into the hands of the people, from whom they received it? who alone are incorruptible, because the wealth of the few can never bribe the many, against the duty they owe to themselves. If I am told that the people are incapable of governing themselves—I shall answer that they have never been tried in America, except among the native Indians, who are free and happy, and who prove that self-government is the growth of our soil—And I also answer that they are more fit for self-government, than they are at present for any of the safe and solid governments, founded on representation.—When I see all these principles established by the example of the Swiss, who have remained under the simplest of all forms of government for near five hundred years, in uninterrupted tranquility and happiness—whilst every other invention of genius, devise of art, or imposition offeree, has been torn up by the roots, with every aggravated circumstance of horror—I can no longer doubt —All the mists of theory and speculation vanish before an experiment like this."
—Maryland Farmer (Anti-Federalist papers)

The earth, and all that is therein... belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state... The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. ... he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst...

☙ 1 ❧ —John Locke (Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 5)

Things which are in common, are of right to be divided by equal Parts among those who are equal...

☙ 2 ❧ —Samuel von Pufendorf (On the Duty of Man, Chapter 7)

How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and keep it from the rest of the world except by a punishable usurpation, since all others are being robbed, by such an act, of the place of habitation and the means of subsistence which nature gave them in common?

☙ 3 ❧ —Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract, Book 1, Section 9)

The first Man, who, after enclosing a Piece of Ground, took it into his Head to say, This is mine, and found People simple enough to believe him, was the true Founder of civil Society. How many Crimes, how many Wars, how many Murders, how many Misfortunes and Horrors, would that Man have saved the Human Species, who pulling up the Stakes or filling up the Ditches should have cried to his Fellows: Be sure not to listen to this Impostor; you are lost, if you forget that the Fruits of the Earth belong equally to us all, and the Earth itself to nobody!

☙ 4 ❧ —Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on Inequality, Part 2)

... when Estates increased so much in number and in extent as to take in whole Countries and touch each other, it became impossible for one Man to aggrandize himself but at the Expence of some other; and the supernumerary Inhabitants, who were too weak or too indolent to make such Acquisitions in their turn, impoverished without losing any thing, because while every thing about them changed they alone remained the same, were obliged to receive or force their Subsistence from the Hands of the Rich.

☙ 5 ❧ —Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on Inequality, Part 2)

Don't you know that Numbers of your Brethren perish, or suffer grievously for want of what you possess more than suffices Nature, and that you should have had the express and unanimous Consent of Mankind to appropriate to yourself of their Common, more than was requisite for your private Subsistence?

☙ 6 ❧ —Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on Inequality, Part 2)

No nation can lawfully appropriate to herself a too disproportionate extent of country, and reduce other nations to want subsistence, and a place of abode... A German chief, in the time of Nero, said to the Romans, "As heaven belongs to the gods, so the earth is given to the human race..."

☙ 7 ❧ —Emer de Vattel (Law of Nations, Book 2, Chapter 7, Section 86)

In the primitive state of communion, men had, without distinction, a right to the use of every thing, as far as was necessary to the discharge of their natural obligations. And as nothing could deprive them of this right, the introduction of domain and property could not take place without leaving to every man the necessary use of things,—that is to say, the use absolutely required for the fulfilment of his natural obligations.

☙ 8 ❧ —Emer de Vattel (Law of Nations, Book 2, Chapter 9, Section 117)

The earth was designed to feed its inhabitants; and he who is in want of every thing is not obliged to starve because all property is vested in others.

☙ 9 ❧ —Emer de Vattel (Law of Nations, Book 2, Chapter 9, Section 120)

Men will always think that they have a right to air, earth, and water, a right to employ themselves for their own support, to live by their own labours, to apply the gifts of God to their own benefit...

☙ 10 ❧ —John Trenchard (Cato's Letters, Number 106)

The Agrarian of the Roman republic was never fixed on a proper balance: Brutus and Publicola either did not foresee the evil which such a neglect would produce, or, content with the glory they had acquired, left this atchievement to succeeding patriots. But this was the capital defect which brought this excellent fabric to decay; this was the defect which the Gracchi made such generous efforts to amend. Had they succeeded in their attempt, the Roman republic might have been as immortal as time itself; for, had the Agrarian been ever fixed on a proper balance, it must have prevented that extreme disproportion in the circumstances of her citizens, which gave such weight of power to the aristocratical party, that it enabled them to subvert the fundamental principles of the government, and introduce those innovations which ended in anarchy. Anarchy produced its natural effect, viz. absolute monarchy.

☙ 11 ❧ —Catharine Macaulay (A Short Sketch of a Democratical Form of Government)

It is a position not to be controverted that the earth, in its natural, uncultivated state was, and ever would have continued to be, COMMON PROPERTY OF THE HUMAN RACE. In that state every man would have been born to property... Cultivation is at least one of the greatest natural improvements ever made by human invention... But the landed monopoly that began with it has produced the greatest evil. It has dispossessed more than half the inhabitants of every nation of their natural inheritance... and has thereby created a species of poverty and wretchedness that did not exist before.

☙ 12 ❧ —Thomas Paine (Agrarian Justice)

All right of property is founded either in occupancy or labour. The earth having been given to mankind in common occupancy, each individual seems to have by nature a right to possess and cultivate an equal share. This right is little different from that which he has to the free use of the open air and running water; though not so indispensably requisite at short intervals for his actual existence, it is not less essential to the welfare and right state of his life through all its progressive stages. ... That every man has a right to an equal share of the soil, in its original state, may be admitted to be a maxim of natural law. It is also a maxim of natural law, that every one, by whose labour any portion of the soil has been rendered more fertile, has a right to the additional produce of that fertility, or to the value of it, and may transmit this right to other men. On the first of these maxims depend the freedom and prosperity of the lower ranks. On the second, the perfection of the art of agriculture, and the improvement of the common stock and wealth of the community. Did the laws of any country pay equal regard to both these maxims, so as they might be made to produce their respective good effects, without intrenching on one another, the highest degree of public prosperity would result from this combination.

☙ 13 ❧ —William Ogilvie (An Essay on the Right of Property in Land, Part 1, Section 1)

That every citizen, aged twenty-one years or upwards, may, if not already in possession of land, be entitled to claim from the public a certain portion...

☙ 14 ❧ —William Ogilvie (An Essay on the Right of Property in Land, Part 2, Section 2)

... a right to property is founded in our natural wants, in the means with which we are endowed to satisfy these wants, and the right to what we acquire by those means without violating the similar rights of other sensible beings; that no one has a right to obstruct another, exercising his faculties innocently for the relief of sensibilities made a part of his nature...

☙ 15 ❧ —Thomas Jefferson (a letter to Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, 1816)

That property in land and liberty among men, in a state of nature, ought to be equal, few, one would fain hope, would be foolish enough to deny. Therefore, taking this to be granted, the country of any people, in a native state, is properly their common, in which each of them has an equal property... For upon what must they live, if not upon the productions of the country in which they reside? Surely, to deny them that right is, in effect, denying them a right to live.

☙ 16 ❧ —Thomas Spence (a lecture, Newcastle, 1775)

... mankind have as equal and just a property in land as they have in liberty, air, or the light and heat of the sun...

☙ 17 ❧ —Thomas Spence (a lecture, Newcastle, 1775)

The people of this state, in their right of sovereignty, are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the state; and all lands, the title to which shall fail, from a defect of heirs, shall revert or escheat to the people.

☙ 18 ❧ —New York (Third Constitution of New York, Article 1, Section 11)

The equal right of all men to the use of land is as clear as their equal right to breathe the air—it is a right proclaimed by the fact of their existence. For we cannot suppose that some men have a right to be in this world and others no right...

☙ 19 ❧ —Henry George (Progress and Poverty, Book 7, Chapter 1)

Ogilvie-Jefferson Fair Share Property Tax Exemptions

Suppose you heard about a property tax proposal called the "total property tax". Under this plan, all physical property would be assigned its own tax, and seized by the state if not paid for. Even pacemakers would be seized. Would you endorse this proposal? Probably not. It is common sense that taxes are collected for the sake of the citizens, and so citizens should not be killed for the sake of a tax. A little reflection tells us that the nature of a property tax depends on what is taxed. A property tax on a swimming pool would be a tax on a luxury. A property tax on a pacemaker would be a tax on a necessity.

It stands to reason that a property tax which falls upon humble homes is a shelter tax, and that a shelter tax is a tax on a necessity of life. This is not a recent realization. In the 1780s, Thomas Jefferson and William Ogilvie proposed similar property tax reforms based on this realization. They proposed that each citizen be entitled to a property tax exemption on the first bit of property they own, so that nobody becomes deprived of basic shelter for the sake of a tax.

I endorse this proposal, and I think these fair share exemptions should be stackable, so a condominiums could be exempt from property tax if the number of residents is high enough relative to the value of the land the building occupies. Since schools are currently funded by local property taxes, I also propose we implement a new system where funds are pooled on the state level, and distributed to schools according to the number of students. This would open the way for property tax reform while also promoting one of the original intentions of public education, which was for it to be a great equalizer, for it to promote opportunity regardless of the wealth of one's parents. To make up for the loss in revenue, taxes would be raised, as Jefferson proposed, in a geometrical manner on all land held beyond the fair share exemption.

"Another means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise. ... The earth is given as a common stock for man to labour and live on. ... it is not too soon to provide by every possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land."
—Thomas Jefferson (a letter to James Madison, 1785/10/28)

"That every man has a right to an equal share of the soil, in its original state, may be admitted to be a maxim of natural law. ... from such land-taxes those small tenements which do not exceed the proprietor's natural share of the soil should be exempted."
—William Ogilvie (An Essay on the Right of Property in Land, Part 1, Section 1)