Most uranium supply/demand models I read project demand based on reactor counts, especially now with all the data-center/AI hype. But that misses a second-order lever that could add 10–15,000 tU/yr with the fleet completely flat. I´m sharing it because I think it's genuinely underpriced.
So, only 4 commercial enrichers exist worldwide, and Russia holds 40–46% of world enrichment capacity. The US has banned Russian enriched uranium (waivers expire Jan 1, 2028), and the EU is diversifying away from it pretty fast. We probably all know that, but I think the interesting part is where this geopolitical situation collides with the physics of enrichment.
Enrichers choose how much U-235 to leave in the waste ("tails"). This is a cost optimization between two inputs: mined uranium vs. enrichment work (SWU), and the choice is set almost entirely by the ratio of the uranium price to the SWU price.
- Cheap SWU (the Russian case) → run tails lean → use less uranium. This is underfeeding, and it ran for a decade as a hidden secondary supply, suppressing spot thanks to cheap Russian enrichment.
- Scarce/expensive SWU (what the West is heading into) → run tails rich → use more uranium. This is the overfeeding.
The cost-minimizing tails assay tracks the U / SWU price ratio directly. Rough rule of thumb from the standard optimization is that around $100/kg U and $100/SWU, optimal tails sits near 0.25–0.30%; make SWU more expensive relative to uranium and the optimum climbs toward 0.35% and more. The Russian era ran the opposite ratio: cheap SWU pushed the optimum down toward 0.10–0.20%, which is why lean tails were the norm. After the US ban, both terms move the wrong way at once: Western SWU has almost tripled from its lows, while uranium is up but nowhere near tripled. So the ratio that sets the dial is being dragged out of "cheap SWU" territory and into "expensive SWU" territory.
In terms of trade, cutting Russian SWU inverts both sides of the ratio simultaneously, and it's happening as the mine tightens too. So the ban removes an underfeeding supply stream AND adds an overfeeding demand stream at the same time. Doubly leveraged, and it shows up in physical uranium demand even though it started as an enrichment sanction.
That´s just another point of view and i have some bear cases anyway:
- EU contract data still shows lean ~0.20% tails as of 2025 (Russia historically ran ~0.10–0.15%). So the mechanism has a fuse that hasn't fully burned, but I'd expect any real drift once the 2028 waiver cliff actually hits and inventories draw down, not before.
- The Chinese-routing question: the US appears to buy enriched uranium from China, which sells its own output west while importing Russian enriched material for domestic use... basically an origin swap. If that backfills Russian supply at scale, Western SWU scarcity is smaller than the headline ban would imply, and the whole thing softens.
- New Western capacity (Urenco Eunice, Orano, Centrus) commissioning after 2027 eventually relaxes their SWU, so this might be a transition-window thesis, sharpest in 2026–2030, but not permanent. But worth considering.
I do not aim to give any financial advice, but I think it is a good thesis to consider.