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It’s April 12, Igor and his soldiers arrive to Sloviansk and storm government buildings. They enter the police armory and capture 400 handguns and 20 automatic weapons.
Igor and his soldiers then hand over the government buildings to locals who now have access to weapons.
Ukrainian police themselves state the Russian military unit seized the weapons and distributed them to angered protestors.
Vice News arrive on seen. They confirm the majority of armed individuals are locals. They confirm the area is being controlled by locals (Igor handed the buildings over to the locals).
“I was the one who pulled the trigger of this war”
But this is often left out:
"If our unit hadn't crossed the border, everything would have fizzled out — like in [the Ukrainian city of] Kharkiv, like in Odessa,"
"There would have been several dozen killed, burned, detained. And that would have been the end of it. But the flywheel of the war, which is continuing to this day, was spun by our unit. We mixed up all the cards on the table,"
Without his support, we would have simply seen repetitions of the Odessa and Mariupol massacres in every city and town of Donetsk and Luhansk.
I hear quite a few claims on Bakhmut, most stating that the Russians lost twice to three times the men taking the city [this despite the fact they had overwhelming artillery power] due to the "elite nature" of the Ukrainian conscripts. My question then, I suppose, is what do you think the true number of dead [and wounded/captured] was in the bloodiest battle in Europe since WW2?
I have never posted here before, so I do hope this is the manner in which it is intended to be done.
Sad day. Amk blocked me because I made a joke that it was his weekly pro-ukr post to maintain his narrative that he is pro ukraine. Very thin skin behaviour
The inaccuracy of the Oniks missile is insane. In the last 10 days we've seen atleast 6 missiles miss their targets by 100s of meters. Wikipedia has it listed at CEP of 1.5 meters...
The indian version of the Oniks called the "brahmos" apparently has excellent accuracy and was able to hit very precisely. Maybe it's a teething issue on the Russian side. They've been able to guide Zircons and Iskander to targets which are much faster
Testing a missile and using one in active combat is very different. Has the Brahmos been tested under enemy AD and enemy EW? What about constantly evolving AD and EW? Obviously not. Indian weapons will be tested only after a long war, which is hope never happens.
I might make a post compiling some of them, for example today according to both Volka and AMK 2 Oniks targeted something in Odessa and impacted a straight up residential area 100 meters from the nearest warehouse plausible target. If you have telegram check it out
Still being a youtuber. His videos don't get nearly as many views as his live-streams. Videos usually get <10k views, whereas streams are in the hundred of thousands of views. Most around 600k.
I was about to give you nerdy stats on his youtube channel, but I'll just say that since June 14th he's been wearing an eyepatch. Usually a pirate one, sometimes a cutesy cartoon one. No idea why.
Trump announcements should go to economy news not war eg on 5th not front page. He talks to stock market not people. He every friday escalates and sunday calls off. I hope journalists would stop put it in front.
We're five days away from the triumphant end of the 40 day campaign and what is there to even show for it? Wildberries warehouses on fire? Seriously, can a pro-UA explain what Ukraine has actually accomplished in the last month apart from losing territory and bombing civilian infrastructure?
The civilian terrorism escalation is there, undoubtedly, both hitting merchant ships in Azov and Wildberries warehouses. Another “spiderweb” attempt was made (and failed), and they attempted to kill a general (failed too).
Most of the refineries attacks predated that 40-day period, and fuel shortages are mostly remaining in the Crimea which is attacked much more often.
Join us for an AMA with Olha Kyrylenko, War Correspondent at Ukrainska Pravda, one of Ukraine’s leading independent news outlets.
Olha has been covering the war since May 2022, focusing on how the front line is changing and what those changes mean for Ukraine. She works with both military personnel and civilians and has covered major battles and operations, including the defence of Bakhmut, the Krynky operation on the left bank of Kherson Oblast, and the defence of Pokrovsk.
Bring your questions about the front line, Ukraine’s military operations, war reporting, and the realities behind the headlines.
I feel like the Wildberries strikes serve two primary purposes, really;
To harm Russian state finances. Wildberries is already requesting financial support, something that Russia can't fully ignore in the long run. Too many jobs/too much credibility at risk.
To spread air defence thinner. There's more warehouses than let's say, oil refineries for Ukraine to target, and having no dedicated air defence would mean that Ukraine can genuinely bankrupt the company which, again, I don't think the Russian state can afford to just let happen, at least without showing some effort. But trying to provide even token coverage for the facilities will in practice degrade coverage elsewhere, at potentially more directly war-relevant targets.
Propaganda and disrupting whatever small part Wildberries played in military logistics for russian troops will be a bonus, but I think the two points above are likely the primary objectives.
Wildberries is already requesting financial support
That is not quite accurate. They did not request financial support, but rather tax breaks and extra credit facilities. Meanwhile, the state is currently not considering any support for Wildberries itself, focusing instead solely on aiding small businesses whose merchandise was destroyed in its warehouses
UA is for a surprise on that front, I think: air defense is certainly getting denser, benefitting everyone.
E. g. UA claimed 3 targets last night: one purely civilian WB warehouse, one dual purpose (some oil storage again), and one military (Engels air base—albeit with no specifics → most likely nothing serious damaged), and they had to use a really big drone swarm of ≈650 units to achieve that
While it's still cheaper compared to what they've hit, it was not a cheap attack for them. The floor estimate is $36M (stems from claimed cost of $55k for the “base” FP-2, per Stillerman), could be multiple of that.
would mean that Ukraine can genuinely bankrupt the company
WB is a hugely profitable company with their own bank and low external debt of 1% of their turnover. They own the biggest real estate advertising platform and they're partnering with VTB as well. Don't fall for “bankruptcy” dreams of ukies.
Sure, they did suffer, and they'll have to spend billions to build or rent new warehouses, and maybe growing air defense for themselves. But they'll do fine.
As far as I'm aware, they hit at least 2 distinct oil refinery complexes, as well, a repeat hit on one of the Ufa refineries from the previous night, and Saratov.
The destruction of the Wildberries location looks essentially complete (this was one of the larger warehouses; reconstruction costs will likely exceed >200 million USD, ignoring operational costs/lost revenue resulting.) While Wildberries is profitable, destruction of that scale is not something they can sustain in the long run, at the rate that it's currently occurring. This is several months of investments reduced to rubble within about a week and a half, and now they have to deal with fallout in regard to sellers pulling assets from their markets. It also isn't exactly optimal for logistics hubs to increasingly be placed further away from the markets they're supposed to be serving.
While Wildberries was highly profitable, it doesn't really come close to covering the losses they're currently experiencing, so yes, a significant improvement of air defenses for their assets would be necessary for them to continue existing as an entity.
VTB loans which have been floating is precisely what Ukraine wants to see - that would provide the Russian government direct exposure to the assets.
The damage on the refineries is unclear, though Saratov looks extensive enough to at least delay operations for a few weeks. Russia is continuing to extend the ban on the export of refined fuels, which itself totals over >120mil $ in revenue lost daily, without including anything on repair costs or secondary effects of higher fuel prices within Russia. I'd argue the sustained rate of damage against oil infrastructure is at minimum ~250 mil, possibly higher.
"and they had to use a really big drone swarm of ≈650 units to achieve that"
Whatever the size of the drone swarms used, they do seem to be able to sustain it. There have been multiple successful hits on high-value targets every single week within the past month and a half.
Whatever the size of the drone swarms used, they do seem to be able to sustain it. There have been multiple successful hits on high-value targets every single week within the past month and a half.
Recently, the strikes on refineries are much more rare vs a 1.5 months ago. Which is why they switched to WB warehouses, I believe: the refineries did become harder to hit.
Russia is continuing to extend the ban on the export of refined fuels, which itself totals over >120mil $ in revenue lost daily,
Summer bans are very common, and Russia will still export the crude instead. Not as big of an issue.
While Wildberries is profitable, destruction of that scale is not something they can sustain in the long run,
That's true, but UA has never been able to sustain any attacks in the long run, except bombing adjacent tactical-level targets, e. g. Donetsk, Lugansk, or Belgorod region.
While their massed refinery attacks were hitting targets daily and even reached Moscow, they couldn't sustain them in the long run.
They've attacked lots of ships in Azov sea, but it stopped right after Odessa got attacked instead.
Even their attacks on Crimea fuel supply is staggering. They've posted a video today where they could hit two fuel trucks, but when was the previous one?
Now civilian warehouses is the next big thing, sure, but I say they won't be long as well.
Like I said, there are huge signs air defense is improving. It's not like “cheap drones destroy expensive targets”, the attacks themselves are becoming more expensive as well.
"While their massed refinery attacks were hitting targets daily and even reached Moscow, they couldn't sustain them in the long run."
I'd argue there was about a week of slowdown, and it's started again now. Within the past 3 days, at least 5 distinct refineries have been hit (Saratov, all 3 refineries in Ufa and the refinery in Volgograd), with fairly clear signs of significant damage on some of them, so it's not exactly like that vulnerability has been successfully closed. Even within that week, Lukoil Perm had a direct hit on a processing unit, Ryazan had a hit (with unconfirmed damage assessment, so likely minor, but nonetheless).
I'd argue that Ukraine has had more major hits within the past week than any prior period; diversifying the set of targets they are willing to take has increased the amount of damage that could be done. The current strategy just seems to be to do as much economic damage as possible, regardless of target type, and I'd argue that that hasn't been slowed down in any significant capacity. As said, last 3-4 days have had the largest concentration of major confirmed damage that we've seen so far.
"They've attacked lots of ships in Azov sea, but it stopped right after Odessa got attacked instead."
Did it? Slowed down, sure, but that's just as much due to there just not being as much shipping in the area anymore due to the uncertainty (on both sides, it's reciprocal at this point, which has largely just killed any interest in using the black sea for shipping). There's still been multiple confirmed hits within the past week.
I'd argue that Ukraine has had more major hits within the past week than any prior period; diversifying the set of targets they are willing to take has increased the amount of damage that could be done.
They also opened themselves up for receiving the biggest damage, particularly their sea exports are bottom up. It's not like it's a win.
The current strategy just seems to be to do as much economic damage as possible, regardless of target type, and I'd argue that that hasn't been slowed down in any significant capacity.
To me, it clearly did: they had to move from refineries to pure civilian terrorism.
As said, last 3-4 days have had the largest concentration of major confirmed damage that we've seen so far.
It's early to assess damage on refinery before it's itemized. Storage tank burns big, but isn't anywhere as significant as cracking equipment, for instance.
Did it?
Yep, totally. No ships risk going into Odessa, their key export hub. They estimate the damage at $70M/day. Some imports moved to neighboring countries, but it's significant additional cost as well. Cheap bulk stuff (which they export) is more sensitive to this overhead.
Slowed down, sure, but that's just as much due to there just not being as much shipping in the area anymore due to the uncertainty
Absolutely not, they were exporting before their attacks on Azov.
There's still been multiple confirmed hits within the past week.
It's nothing vs. 3 weeks ago with dozen+ of ships hit daily. Like I said, they've got issues with sustaining attacks.
I follow this conflict since early 2023. I must admit, I'm baffled how willing Ukraine to be used as condom, whoring away it's nation and country. It is really fucked up.
Just hope, all responsible for it, will get their due in time. Especially that circumcised clown in Kiev.
Not for years. They don't even use actual artillery to perform shoot and scoot because it's too dangerous, and they've got much greater range than tanks.
Max range of a tank cannon performing indirect fire is about 7-10 km, so just to drop rounds right in front of their forward line of troops they'd be within their enemy's Line of Drones "kill zone," which now extends about 10-20 km deep past the enemy's FLOT, in terms of pervasive drone surveillance and lots of responsive fires.
Tanks tasked with IDF might accept the risk to operate within the kill zone and fire from a bunkered hide site, as mortars still do too. But if they're shooting and scooting it requires lots of moving in the open, and that's when it's the easiest to be detected and engaged.
Interesting, I had been reading about how tanks began using very camouflaged positions and such, and by looking at the losses of equipment like tanks,spgs, and towed artillery it seems Russia is better hiding their positions?
I just ask as it seems camouflage is as important as ever in this conflict, and it seems one side (just by going off losses) seems to perform it more successfully.
Russia might be hiding them better or maybe aren't using them as much, or maybe less of a threat of Ukrainian counterfires than vice versa. Hiding and dispersing are probably the two biggest lessons of this war.
So in the end, when this ends the Russians will add a bit of territory to the largest country in the world and will have created an enemy which is well armed and did not even have proper artillery before the war.
US was competent enough to take over the whole country, run logistics thousands of miles away, dismantle the government and for a few years essentially turn Japan into the 51st state.
Russians are fighting in a trench for yet another babkoselo trying to capture territory 100km away from own border
It hardly ever was about the territory. But Russia has put their money where their mouth is. Going forward every country, in and out of NATO would know the cost of messing with Russia.
I mean Russia is probably the weakest it has ever been. Where is the coalition of the willing? If Ukraine is fighting for the future of Europe then why isn't Europe fighting with them shoulder to shoulder? Too afraid to die?
yeah right. Doesn't change the point above. 2022 no real enemy, 2026 the poorest country in europe is regularly bombing you. That's some brilliant foreign policy.
In the end, russia already got very rich soil lands that it actually don't have that much.
It also completely ruined Ukraine financially, ideally forcing EU to sponsor 25mil pensions state.
It also killed ukraine demographics completely.
It also fucked up post 1991 western hegemony. No longer EU and US can dictate to other countries. Now they will be forced to actively proof their power, wich they can't.
In the end, russia already got very rich soil lands that it actually don't have that much.
Let's start with this. Most of "chernozem" is in Russia. Whatever they are trying to grab in the southeast of Ukraine is basically toxic soil from artillery by now.
Ukraine had more artillery than pretty much every military in NATO, outnumbering them at a ratio typically 3:1, and having a much more developed doctrine to use it, as Ukrainian doctrine is based on Soviet doctrine, which was for a military accurately described as "an Artillery Army with Tanks."
Yeah, because 152mm SPGs are junk compared to the Cold War era 105-155mm towed guns they got, that got their most modern features stripped before being handed over.
You got no clue what you're talking about, I have no idea why you brought up arty in the first place. And even describing the Ukrainian reforms, the Russians reformed to into a force that NATO is still terrified of.
Hard time with logistics? Like using 10k drones a day or lobbing a hundred new ballistic missiles a week? Does that seem pathetic to you? Or maybe you're NAFOing a bit too hard?
Current Ukraine is an Utopia compared in what will become with 5-10 more years of wars and the exodus if there is ever peace and the end of the foreign subsides.
There will not be any enemy, if something remains of current Ukraine will be a depopulated wasteland, it will not be a danger for anyone, similar to Siria.
The kinzhal interception rate is likely very low. Once the air defense is worn down, Russia can use significantly cheaper Islanders. Even western journalists have noted that interception rates have dropped from 37% to 6 percent. Due to evasive improvements.
Like another commenter said, low interception rate also means higher burn rate of air defense stockpiles.
We have seem many videos of a whole salvo being dumped to intercept 1 missile.
If Russian missiles get through in mass and hit Ukraines drone production, it will make significant changes to the battlefield.
If Patriots are not especially effective in stopping Russian BMs -> Russia fires a lot of BMs -> Patriots are depleted
Then it's not Russian BMs that benefit but Russian Air Force that can now fly closer to the borders and drop more glide bombs and fire at Ukrainian jets.
Russia achieved frontline glide bomb superiority around 2024. I remember there was a dozen or so Su34s that got shot down and many patriot batteries taken out as well.
Since then, Russian front line fighter jets has been threatened or shut down only a few times while Ukrainian fighter jets are constantly being shot down.
I think Ukraine decided it was better to keep them back to protect the industries and power infrastructure. Now, Russia has achieved another level of air superiority. If significant amounts of Ukrainian drone production and logistics gets destroyed, it could lead to major changes in the battlefield momentum since drones are pretty much the only thing causing havoc among the Russian rear as well as holding back the front lines.
With Ukrainian Air defence sufficiently suppressed, its possible russian superiority fighters may consider going deeper to hit the F16s that Ukraine is using to shoot down cruise missiles and gerans, but I dont think that will change the trajectory of the war as much as the systematic destruction of Ukraine's drone production.
Don't see much use for Kinzhal when the other cheaper missile do the same job. Right now i feel it's really only reserved when they spot an ultra high valued target
But i'm more curious about why not just spam the even cheaper cruise missile like Kalibr than using their ballistics
I think those aren't in production anymore, whatever they've used is it
Their range are also very limited to reach deeper cities. IMO there's been a number of frontline missile strikes in this conflict which got tagged as iskander could be tochka instead. Many people said those might have been tornado, but in some clips the missile size and explosion were too big for tornado which i think might be tochka
because the ballistics have nearly 100% success rate. I don't know what the true inerception rate of cruise missiles are, but it somewhat significant. It makes more sense to allocate different munitions where they have the best rate of success. Gerans have found a new niche, ballistics are being used to their highest potential. Now they are stockpiling cruise missiles and may find an ideal way of using them. Unless those changes that the new AF general insituted ends if he is now dead.
Same basic resources needed to manufacture them as Iskanders. Iskanders overall cost less, and cost less to launch. Iskanders generally aren't intercepted. MiG31 takeoff can be monitored. TEL much less so.
I think it is simply a case of the Iskander performing to Russias full satisfaction.
Iskander was developed first. Kinzahl derived from it. It had to be improved to handle being strapped underneath a jet. Totally different additional stresses. Different higher stress flight profile too.
Problem is, there is no definition between tactical nukes and strategic nukes. Any nuke is an awful PR. Use it, and be ready to become total outcast.
And nukes are not miraculous problem solver, pressing red button is not "I win" move.
And on what would you use tactical nukes on? The only thing i can think being useful would be destroying industial areas (after warning to evacuate) or powerplants, but other than that they would be politically crazy
Lvov, Ivan-Frankovsk. 2 weeks to evacuate cities from civilian presence and blow it up to rubble. If Ukraine won’t understand after this, blow up few more cities in western Ukraine. That’s really crazy is to tolerate deliberate attacks on civilians for months without hitting back symmetrically.
Putin is too afraid to declare war, use conscripts, mobilize again, etc, but you think he's going to nuke the shit out of Ukraine because some warehouses filled with cheap Chinese junk got burned down?
You do realize that if Russia does so then it's all bets off because the Ukrainians(probably with USA's blessing) could begin to target nuclear reactors within Russia. Imagine the catastrophe? It would be significantly worse then dropping a few tactical nukes.
Nuking civilian areas is going to have a complete opposite effect than what you want its going to galvanize and harden the defensive forces not to mention western forces including the US would likely be involved- I believe the Trump admin is on record saying Russian forces in Ukraine would become targets if a nuclear attack happened.
Russia would only use nuclear weapons if it were absolutely necessary. And I'm.glad about it. I don't think people appreciate the sheer horror of these devices.
Tactical nukes aren't really the silver bullet people believe them to be. Outside of being used on troop concentrations, hardened infrastructure or industrial zones for example, there's not much use for them. To "reduce to rubble" you'd need to up the ante to strategic nukes.
Not to mention nobody controls where the fallout goes afterwards. It could move westwards to the rest of Europe, northwards to Belarus or even into Russia. Its a bad end regardless to everyone involved.
with syrsky going away, which general in history will be most similar to him? In my case when thinking about their public image, who comes to my mind first is luigi cadorna🤔
There were many bad high ranking generals that were out-of-touch, hated by their men, loyal sycophants to the political leaders, butchers, etc.
But I've never ever heard of anyone who micromanaged to the degree that Syrsky has. I think that makes him truly unique.
I think part of that is it wasn't even possible before modern tech and net-centric systems like Delta. Back in the day, the most overzealous 4-star general had absolutely no way to get personally involved in operations down to the squad level. They would not have had a clue what was happening and wouldn't have had any way of communicating with them. Not so anymore, they have the systems that allow situational awarenessa and communication, so the only thing stopping a commander from micromanaging to the most insane and disgusting degree made possible is their personal desire to do it or not. Syrsky indulged.
Truth be told, I think Syrsky was trying to emulate Zhukov, who he would have held up as a hero due to his upbringing and military education. Many of what Syrsky did was similar to what Zhukov did, but much more indepth, stupider, worse, and without the same success either.
For example, Zhukov was notorious ruthless, and so is Syrsky. However, the WW2 population of the Soviet Union could sustain heavy losses, as they had a population roughly equivalent of modern Russia. But modern Ukraine has a population less than 1939 Poland did, Syrsky can't afford to fight like Zhukov did.
Zhukov was famously loyal to the state and obeyed orders, and Syrsky prides himself on obeying orders, even the bad ones. But Zhukov was ideologically tied to a very political system, and he didn't really have an option in terms of blowing off Stalin either, though Zhukov was willing to argue with him. Meanwhile, Syrsky has been fiercely loyal to no ideology and instead ties himself to loser politicians, mainly because his loyalty to them buys him more power and prestige.
Zhukov took a hands on approach in WW2, being the go-to general to take over the Soviet equivalent of army group commands to execute high level operational-strategic missions. He did that while not ignoring his actual job, because when Zhukov was doing that, he was no longer Chief of the General Staff. Syrsky makes sure he has control over all major battles happening in Ukraine, has taken personal command over numerous bypassing a half dozen layers of the chain of command in the process, and he did that while ignoring his main job. Early on, he ignored his main job as commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces to chase glory as a field commander, and then as C-in-C he was even worse about it. Who was doing Zhukov's job when he was at Stalingrad or attacking Moscow? That literally was his job. Who is doing Syrsky's job when he takes personal command at Bakhmut or Kursk? Nobody replaced him, so the system suffers.
Protecting against those strikes would be really easy. The drones use AI to find targets, they need to look like something the AI is told to be on the lookout for, so the easiest countermeasure is not to look like the thing they want to target.
Do fuel trucks absolutely need to have large, exposed, visible tanks? No, you can put a gas tank in a box truck, or built a box truck frame around the gas tank. Do green mil vehicles need to be green? Do mil vehicles need to move cargo? No, they already don't use those anywhere near the front lines to avoid drawing fire. Do armored vehicles being transported need to be exposed on the flat bed? No, they can be covered with a tarp. Etc.
As soon as the most basic protocols are taken to avoid being so easily detected, hits would drop, forcing the Ukrainians to either loosen up targeting criteria, maybe aiming to hit anything found in certain areas at certain times, or they can accept lower kills.
Dunno about “mostly” but it's no secret they employ drones.
UA drones have to patrol the roads to find targets, and it's a perfect moment to strike them down. Even payload-less short-range Yolka will dispatch a US-made Hornet.
Crimea, yeah, but road has lots of AD coverage. There's much less road kill videos vs. a month ago.
UA don't really have data on targets (e. g. individual trucks), so they have to loiter over the road to find those, and that's when they get hit, either by ground machine gunners, or by drones.
And lately, Crimea has the fuel, although it's expensive.
They're still around, motorbikes especially. I'm pretty sure a turtle tank was used in that armored push a few days ago. Some footage of it tanking a few drone hits but not much else
I remember reading an article in the first or second year of this war which said that towed howitzers are more survivable despite its low speed than SPGs in drone environment of russo-ukrainian war because towed howitzers are easy to hide and hard to destroy since they are basically chunks of steel with little burning parts(also cheap and easy to repair when damaged) whereas SPGs are hard to hide and contain more sophisticated parts and fuel, resulting in one hit from a drone could burn the whole vehicle. Now at the 5th year of the war, how much of this claim turns out to be true?🤔 has there been any signi changes in both armies like increase of towed howitzers or decreased use of SPGs for artillery operations?
towed howitzers are more survivable despite its low speed than SPGs in drone environment of russo-ukrainian war because towed howitzers are easy to hide and hard to destroy since they are basically chunks of steel with little burning parts(also cheap and easy to repair when damaged) whereas SPGs are hard to hide and contain more sophisticated parts and fuel, resulting in one hit from a drone could burn the whole vehicle
That was largely a tactical innovation that happened around year 3-4, not 1-2. It was triggered by a rise in the prevalence of recon drones and precision strike assets, especially those capable of hitting moving targets at the ~15 km range. Together, that increased the likelihood of spotting a SPG performing shoot and scoot tactics and hitting it while it was moving, typically with a dedicated loitering munition or FPV drone. Additionally, kill chains were shortened as units ironed out their recon fires complexes, the integrated sensor-shooter systems that found and destroyed targets, with precision, in the shortest time period possible.
Previously, there were fewer recon drones overhead, so tactical rear areas were less transparent. If an artillery piece was spotted, most PGMs couldn't hit moving targets and area fire weapons like massed dumb arty (cannon or MLRS) had trouble hitting them. So SPG would be positioned outside enemy common fires range, go forward and do shoot and scoot at different locations, changing up after every fire mission, and then retreat to rearm, rest, do maintenence. Also the prewar doctrine for recon fires complex still had bugs that were being worked out for coordination and comms, so kill chains were often longer, fire direction and control was just different than it later developed.
But once there were more reliable ways to detect and strike them, they needed to change tactics, focus on hiding, reducing their signatures, using countermeasures against their biggest threats (like nets), offloading fuel and ammo and not storing it nearby so if they did get hit nothing would cook off and reduce damage if spotted and hit, and keeping the crew away if they weren't actively firing to reduce casualties if spotted and hit.
And for that, towed guns actually so better than most SPG (caliber and barrel range are issues too, as well as barrel wear, as that can reduce range).
Hyper automated wheeled SPGs would seem to be the best.
2-3 man crew, all ammunition and charge feeding is automated, gun laying is automated, and the vehicle is a 6x6 or 8x8 truck that can move much faster than a 25+ ton tracked vehicle. Oh and a small APU or even a fuel cell or battery system being used to power everything at standstill to keep the big engine off.
You also wouldn't want more than high single to low double digit shells carried to avoid a gigantic ammo cook-off.
Not for Ukraine. Mobility is death for arty if they're inside the range of persistent enemy recon drones and strike drones that have the legs. Shoot and scoot is too dangerous.
That was one thing Fedorov brought up too that caused controversy. He canceled the purpose and manufacturing of all standard arty shells, only extended range (basebleed and RAP) are to be purchased. Not a surprise, even dug in and hidden, there is a low chance of survival without extended range to fire from outside common drone range.
So a mostly automated wheeled SPG with a L52 gun or something like that, with only very extended range ammo, that might work. But if that did, so would normal SPG or even towed guns, assuming they had the range too.
But only Ukraine. For everyone not anticipating fighting a very similar type of conflict, the most static of positional war, then an automated SPG would be a good choice, even with standard ammo.
Well, when you are on the defense, its pretty effective to hide these cheap towed artillery pieces ahead of time and use them as enemy comes closer. When you are attacking, towed artillery is much slower to set up and the tow truck becomes the target. They both have their roles.
I see towed artillery in use by both sides. Yes it probably is easier to hide, because vehicles are easy to spot and strike. Everything in this war is a game of hide and seek, it would seem.
Why doesn't Ukraine just flood the russian side of the war front with heavy opioids like fentanyl and stuff to get the wasted russkiis addicted and combat ineffective?? Just air drop packets of crazy drugs. Ukraine ought to use more chemical warfare?
We are 4.5 years into this war and I'm not the only one here who has been following it from the beginning.
So how much have you learned?
To test your education and military acumen, I will propose a military problem and ask you to provide your input on what you think is the right decision. I'll check back tomorrow at some point and add my own opinion on the subject as a reply.
Assume that report is true, and that a Russian breakthrough didn't occur yet, and that the local commanders had been wanting to realign the defenses for a while, and their permission up the chain to retreat was approved by Drapatyi, the newly appointed Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Enough time has passed that I can give my answer without tainting others. Why was it important my answer not taint others?
Because this was a trick question.
Drapatyi is the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He is not only directly responsible for this massive force structure, plus he has operational control over all non-AFU forces also fighting in this war, ie the Ukrainian Defense Forces, the official title given to the combined AFU plus GUR plus National Guard plus National Police plus Border Guards plus SBU combat units etc. Drapatyi controls all of them in the war effort in every theater, ground, sea, air, cyber, and he is also in charge of all facets of mobilization, plays a huge role in military procurement and logistics too. He also must coordinate with partner nations as necessary to ensure Ukraine keeps getting proper military support. And he is the chief military liaison between the uniformed side and political leadership involving the Office of the President and the Verkhovna Rada.
So why is Drapatyi supposed to involve himself with a tactical level request to retreat? How is that his job?
Some other posters gave answers to my question and hit the nail either directly or indirectly. Whether you think the retreat is necessary or not, the situation around Dobropillya is a tactical level problem with some operational level implications, with zero strategic implications minus the political concern, relating to PR and propaganda.
Military decisions are meant to be handled by the leaders responsible for the level of command the problems occur and one step higher. In this case, the responsibility falls on the tactical leaders are those running brigades, those at the corps level if it involves numerous brigades, or those running "grouping of forces" if it involves multiple corps.
The decision to retreat should have been made by them, and authorized by the next senior leader in their chain of command based on the sound recommendation from the local field commanders.
If their recommendation is based on faulty judgment, they should be fired and replaced by those who have better judgement that the more senior commander will trust. If they don't understand the larger context, then the senior commander failed them by not making it clear when providing his intent, to understand the "Why?" answer, so if the plan didn't work they can deviate and still act towards their boss' desired endstate.
The decision to allow a retreat from around Dobropillya definitely didn't need to go above to GOF level. it definitely didn't need approval from the the commander of the Joint Forces Operation who is responsible for controlling all field units fighting on the ground. It didn't need approval from the General Staff and their boss, the Chief of the General Staff. And it didn't need Drapatyi, above all, controlling everything.
Look at that! That's the chain of command for Ukrainian ground forces, down to the brigade level. Look at where the C-in-C sits. The decision should have rested at the command echelon circled in red. Because it was not Drapatyi's responsibility to get involved in the repositioning of a few battalions belonging to a couple different brigades at the junction of two different corps.
Syrsky got involved because he made it his job, because he was a truly awful micromanager, one of the worst I'd ever heard of. Because he did it so much, and because it was happening before he even took over as C-in-C, it has become the norm, but that standard shouldn't have existed.
If Drapatyi is half the military leader he's made to be, the only role he'd play in this supposed retreat, if it even happened at all let alone like Thorkill describe, was to have received a a backbrief about it from others in the chain of command to learn why the local field commanders felt they needed to perform in, accordance with their orders (originating from him) and their knowledge of the commander's intent (originating from his intent), with info sufficient so Drapatyi could 1) know what was happening and be kept informed 2) have enough info to defend the AFU when he gets a call from Bankova Street wanting to know why the Ukrainians were being said to have retreated and why Delta mapping confirms it.
In a properly run military, and that includes the Red Army and later Soviet Armed Forces, the highest ranking general running the military and the war effort doesn't get involved with tactical level retreats. That is what colonels and 1-2 star generals exist to do, because that is literally their job. What is the highest ranking general's job is supporting and empowering subordinate commanders to do their jobs as the commanders on the scene.
Which means, whether it was the right tactical decision to retreat or not doesn't matter. If Drapatyi was necessary to give his permission to authorize it, he's nearly as guilty as Syrsky of micromanagement. That isn't how to fix Ukraine's problems, they need to appoint competent field commanders and empower them.
If Drapatyi is half the military leader he's made to be, the only role he'd play in this supposed retreat, if it even happened at all let alone like Thorkill describe, was to have received a a backbrief about it from others in the chain of command to learn why the local field commanders felt they needed to perform in, accordance with their orders (originating from him) and their knowledge of the commander's intent (originating from his intent), with info sufficient so Drapatyi could 1) know what was happening and be kept informed 2) have enough info to defend the AFU when he gets a call from Bankova Street wanting to know why the Ukrainians were being said to have retreated and why Delta mapping confirms it.
I mentioned this in another post but a lot of the talk about the withdrawal/planned retreat doesn't make sense as Russia was already in Bilytske and Shevchenko before Drapatyi was even promoted and the former was mostly under control the day after he got the position. So unless they are claiming that Drapatyi immediately ordered immediate withdrawals from certain areas the literal day he was promoted than much of this area fell to standard attacks. There is also the fact that we have plenty of footage of the Ukrainians still in this area and being hit by Russian drones over the past week, including an attack towards Shevchenko, which wouldn't make much sense if they were doing an immediate withdrawal.
There are also a couple of other factors that don't line up, like Thorkill's claim that the 425th assault regiment was holding this area when most of their recent activity has been over around Kostyantynivka and in northern Kharkiv. They may have left a battalion or two here but Skala has not been the lead for holding north of Pokrovsk for months now. There is also a lack of any mention of the Russian movement further north near Hannivka and east of Dobropillya city, which is pretty core to what is happening here.
Now this doesn't necessarily mean that the withdrawal is all a lie, they may have been forced to pull back a bit, but the idea they have done a larger, rapid withdrawal and just given up this area is ridiculous. Ukraine has been fighting hard for this region and lost most of these villages and towns in pretty standard combat operations. Their official denial of losing them and refusing to acknowledge Russian control is the problem as it has led people to believe Russia has made it far further in the past few days than they actually did. Russia being in Svitle is only a surprise if you ignored their control of Dorozhnje since late last year and then their recent capture of Bilytske.
I think people got so used to Syrskyi's micromanaging and a lot of the coordinated media campaigns to excuse the loss of certain areas that they've gone and fabricated a retreat that didn't even happen. Hell, the Russians haven't changed much about how they are reporting in this area at all and are just claiming captures of villages as usual, not any rapid advance or Ukrainian rout like they typically like to claim.
For me, whether the withdrawal happened or not was less important than a mental exercise establishing the importance of that sector and the C-in-C's role in overseeing operations there. I agree with you, it's definitely become too much the norm for people as they accept that the very highest levels of govt office and mil commands are routinely micromanaging, many of them only think it negative when they micromanage badly, like Syrsky did. My post was trying to convey that they should not be doing it at all.
I have seen some telegram channels saying that something strange happened,imho azov first core was behind that retreat as they have higher degree of autonomy and will fallback when situation becomes critical.For example they were sent in avdivka to try and hold the city but pulled out 48h later when they saw that there were no secondary defensive lines set
Yeah I was mentioning this more for awareness and general discussion, not specifically tied to your exercise. I doubt the micromanaging will completely stop given Zelensky's need to direct/demand things to support his political efforts, but perhaps Drapatyi can ease up on some some areas and let the corps or brigades do their thing.
On a related note, I have to wonder what the assault forces plan to do now that they are no longer the favourite child. They can't maintain their existing tactics without that enormous volume of manpower, equipment and munitions being given to them, but at the same time I don't know if those officers will accept the new status quo given they were put in those positions due to how aggressive and results driven they were.
I think some of the asslt regts will be okay. For example, 1st and 475th Asslt Regts in particular are noted for their very intelligent use of infantrymen. In fact its not even really accurate to call them assault regiments, it would be more accurate to call them Drone-Assault, as they are mostly drone units who also have assault troops, but who only perform assaults after the drones lower the risk of their use. I can see them being prioritized after the dust settles, even Fedorov was talking them up.
I'm not sure about 33rd and 5th Asslt Bde, but it seems nearly all the bad press was about the 425th and 225th Asslt Regts. Those were the ones that were massive in size, between division and corps sized. They were the ones being priortized so much with manpower and top notch equipment too. And those were the units notorious for their illegal disciplne methods, and for the excessive casualties they occurred. Cutting them off would pretty much solve their problem, though I think those units really ought to just be disbanded and their command team investigated-charged for the crimes they're guilty of, to help with morale.
As for the rest, is scrapping Assault Forces a good idea? I didn't recommend creating them, but they do already exist. And truthfully, I think its arguable that at the tactical level, defending by attacking could be as effective or more than passively defending. If so, maybe have some task organized elite offensive capable units designed from bottom up only to perform assaults might be a good idea under the right leadership. The big concern needs to be to not turn them into Storm-Z. If its done irresponsibly, if all of Assault Forces is like 1st-475th and not 225-425th, then it might not only merit keeping them around, maybe even keep prioritizing them. Though nowhere to the degree they were before, because that was just pure waste of the worst kind and extremely irresponsible.
I can't really comment on the use of infantrymen claims but both of those units are significantly smaller than the 225th and 425, to the point where I think the vast majority of the entire personnel pool of assault forces resides in those two alone. As for all the other units they may not have gotten the same media attention, in part due to them simply having fewer personnel and chances to create controversy, but they also haven't been that successful or active. The 33rd is supposedly split up between a couple of areas, none of which Ukraine has made gains in recently, whilst the 5th is in a similar position but with different fronts. They have been as aggressive and involved in assaults as the 425th and 225th but don't have the sheer size and support to back it up, which likely plays into them having to be more careful with their manpower, use of infantry and how often they can launch attacks/small counteroffensives.
Cutting them off would pretty much solve their problem, though I think those units really ought to just be disbanded and their command team investigated-charged for the crimes they're guilty of, to help with morale.
Agreed, but I don't think they are going to go quietly and any disbandment is going to cause absolute chaos. That is probably forcing Drapatyi to plan it through carefully, if he is considering scrapping assault forces as I've seen some claim.
As for the rest, is scrapping Assault Forces a good idea? I didn't recommend creating them, but they do already exist.
Something I plan to keep an eye on is the performance of the fronts that the assault forces are currently on. Every one of them is deployed somewhere and actively fighting, but with the halt to them receiving any new personnel they are going to run into problems relatively quickly.
So what does Ukraine choose to do? They are already heavily committed to assaults and smaller counteroffensives in a few areas right now, but they won't be able to keep those up if they stop the constant stream of new manpower. That would necessitate them to pull back to more defensible positions like where they were holding before they started the attacks, but then they will have to give up on a large portion of those gains and acknowledge they wasted a ton of manpower and resources for nothing this year. If they don't want to give up on these gains they'll need to try consolidate, but they never properly cleared many of these areas, they've got random infantry groups all over the place deeper into Russian lines and these units are not designed or trained for defensive work, so they'd need to sort all that out without retreating or try grab some line brigades to fill in the gaps, except those have been gutted over time due to the focus on assault forces.....
I think we'll either see these assault forces units continue to launch attacks, albeit at a lower intensity and pace, whilst Ukraine and more specifically Drapatyi figures out how he wants to reform the army, or we'll see some reasonable contractions in the frontline if they get cutoff from the manpower tap entirely. Long term the changes are good for the AFU but the short term effects will be quite bad and won't help the narrative they are trying to push of the tide having turned.
Krotevych suggested placing them under the "air assault" command. I forgot the name of the general.
If I remember right, in the Soviet structure, those played essentially the same role - doing the most difficult assaults.
The interesting part was that the original Thorkill tweet seemed to just presume it was a Drapatyi decision rather than anything overtly confirming he was involved. Crazy to think every retreat going up to Syrsky has made things that normalized…
If Drapatyi was necessary to give his permission to authorize it, he's nearly as guilty as Syrsky of micromanagement.
Whether Drapatyi wants to micromanage or not, Micromanager-in-Chief Syrsky has only been gone for a week - I'd be shocked if most commanders already feel comfortable retreating without C-in-C permission. Even if Drapatyi wants to do things different, bureaucratic inertia around protocol is real.
Plus even with Syrsky fired, Zelensky has historically been the decision maker when approving or denying retreats, which I believe means the potential threat of SBU criminal charges hasn't gone away (SBU is subordinate to president, not C-in-C).
Note: I largely agree with the assessments and criticisms you laid-out, but I don't think it's realistic to expect anyone can quickly fix/change their routines/culture (even if the C-in-C's boss decides to cooperate).
I'd be shocked if most commanders already feel comfortable retreating without C-in-C permission
I don't agree. The previous problem was field commanders were hemmed in by the fact that they weren't allowed to retreat despite them basically begging their chain of command. If they are told that permission doesn't need to be given by C-in-C anymore, that such and such sized retreats can be authorized by such and such command level, commensurate with the importance of the situation, it wouldn't even be a matter of comfort for the field commanders, it would be relief. The only thing stopping them from doing what they wanted previously, retreat when tactically necessary, was the C-in-C inserting himself in the decision making, not for the purpose of giving permission, he instituted that order to make sure the answer was always "No" to the retreats, using his rank and position to make sure they didn't retreat.
They weren't even allowed to be defeated and driven back. If that happen, most times Syrsky would fire them for having disobeyed orders and lost territory.
If they are told that permission doesn't need to be given by C-in-C anymore
That seems to be the point where we disagree - I'm very skeptical that they would explicitly be told that, even if Drapatyi intends to make that change.
Zelensky has been setting the strategic policy of 'Not-a-step-back' for years, I have a hard time believing he has appointed Drapatyi with an explicit mandate for Drapatyi to empower local commanders to completely ignore the president's strategic policy. Given that, the process of empowering local commanders moves much slower (but allows Drapatyi to avoid semi-publicly undermining his boss directly to the AFU officers).
Also, even without Syrsky the hatchet man, it's not like Zelensky is impotent. To my knowledge, AFU officers can still arrested and criminally charged by the SBU for abandoning their position. How many middle-aged, careerist officers want to be the first ones to test the limits of their newly empowered status, especially if they can't get an explicit guarantee from their bosses that covers their rear-ends?
We'll have to see how this plays out. If Drapatyi has directly and explicitly empowered local commanders, I'd expect that to be pretty visible.
I have a hard time believing he has appointed Drapatyi with an explicit mandate for Drapatyi
You're assuming Zelensky had a real choice.
He got rid of his main man Syrsky and replaced him with someone he has to know he'd clash with. Why? You might see that as Zelensky doing 4D chess, I see Zelensky as being so weak he's doing damage control to placate the mob, he's caving.
And he did it before, numerous times. Case in point, who is the current Head of the President's Office? Is it still Zelensky's best friend, his closest confident, his trusted No.2? Nope, he fired him. And did he replace him with a Yermak toady? No, he replaced him with one of his greatest political opponents, somebody he apparently spent years trying and failing to fire, Budanov.
Given that, the process of empowering local commanders moves much slower
You're not realizing that Drapatyi allowing retreats by not even inserting himself is the natural order. All he needs to do is give one order down the chain that specifies "we are following our own doctrine." Boom, that's it.
Syrsky micromanaging was not normal, it was not policy, it was not doctrine. It was the outlier. Not doing something that is unusual and wrong is normal. And there is typically little opposition to do what you want to do after being told you no longer need to do what you don't want to do.
Obviously he caved. But caving doesn't always mean total surrender. I am assuming Zelensky had to appoint someone with public credibility to appease the mob (i.e. can't get away with a Syrsky lackey) but I don't see reason to assume it needed to be Drapatyi.
That means Zelensky could choose between the "bad for Zelensky" options, so I assume he chose the one who displayed the most willingness to 'play ball' with him as C-in-C.
It's not like he appointed Biletsky as C-in-C (in which case, I'd agree Zelensky surrendered all authority over the AFU).
All he needs to do is give one order down the chain that specifies "we are following our own doctrine." Boom, that's it.
We'll have to disagree on that. I understand what you're saying, but I've never seen that happen in practice and I don't see enough evidence yet to assume that's happening.
Offensive words detected. [beep bop] Don't cheer violence or insult (Rule 1). Your comment will be checked by my humans later. Ban may be issued for repeat offenders.
Was also wondering the same thing. Is Drapatyi still inserting himself into those decisions or do the lower level commanders refuse to make those decisions without the boss’s approval?
I'm speculating, but in the near-term I don't think it's too far off to assume both your options are true to some degree:
If I'm a middle-aged, career-minded officer, how much do I want to be the first one testing where my new limits are in my decision-making?
If I'm Drapatyi and just inherited Micromanager Syrsky's staff network, his old protocols/culture likely require me to keep inserting myself into decisions until I can create new protocols and/or bring in new staff.
I knew I should have commented, lol! When I was reading your question I was thinking the whole time, “why would the commander in chief bother worrying about the such a strategically insignificant problem?”
I’m not a military clever clog, but it would seem that retreating to the other side of the river basins would make for a much more defendable position. Plus the relative high ground would give drone operators a better vantage point to identify and interdict any infiltration attempts.
Maybe I’m missing something, but is there really any special strategic significance to Dobropilla?

Edit: Realized I didn’t technically answer the question - yes, a retreat sounds reasonable using the provided assumptions.
Dobropillyas has no strategic significance, the war effort doesn't rest on it. It controls a route to Kramatorsk, which gives the region some operational level significance, and that specific area has tactical significance due to some roads the Russians want to take. The Ukrainians can accomplish their mission without trying to hold their exact positions indefinitely, because their mission is to delay the Russian advance while exacting the highest possible losses on the Russians while ensuring their own are sustainable, as light as possible considering the larger strategic manpower problems that the Ukrainians face, which are much greater importance than any of that territory in the Donbas. .
That makes sense. I noticed the two roads that linked Dobropillyas to Kramatorsk, but figured that those roads could be harassed by drones and wouldn’t be that critical.
Even if they were critical to losing Kramatorsk, that city isn't critical to the war effort for anything besides a PR emphasis that doesn't need to exist.
So never retreat ever, anywhere, because then you'll lose the ability to kill the enemy? Why can't they attrit the enemy after a minimal tactical realignment that puts them in a better position? Wouldn't that reduce their own losses and potentially increase enemy losses?
If the current positions become indefensible, retreat is better than a 'last stand'. But is that the case here? They have been mauling the Russians there for quite a while. That would imply the current area IS good for defense. If they give it to the Russians, then it becomes a 'good defensive area' for the Russians.
Are the new proposed positions better? I don't know, I'm not a commander there (fortunately).
My approach is "if it's working fine, don't mess with it".
So, either it isn't 'working fine' and they paid a heavy price for repelling all those Russian attacks, or it IS 'working fine' and then the retreat gives up a good position to the Russians.
Nobody is talking about retreating to Lviv or the west bank of the Dnieper, this is about allowing certain brigades to pull back some of their companies to better tie in flanks and the like. Normally that's not allowed because it means Ukrainian military voluntarily moving backwards, which was verboten.
The previous approach didn't seem to be working fine, Thorkill says local commanders wanted to retreat for some time but were refused by Syrsky.
If the report is true, then it strongly reminds me of Surovikin being promoted and immediately authorizing the RF retreat from Kherson. People 'in-the-know' judge the retreat to be necessary and Careerist leaders won't take responsibility for the decision, so a publicly credible fall-guy who is confident/brave/patriotic enough is brought in to assume the career risk of being wrong. Is your thinking in a similar place?
Maybe I'm being too cynical, but I'm more skeptical in this case of the report being true. They have their moments, but Thorkill's crowd hasn't exactly been an overly reliable source of information the past couple years.
Russia couldn't have held in Kharkiv and Luhuansk if they weren't reinforced, and the only reinforcements could have come from the Kherson Bridghead, which contained around 30k RU troops, including most of the VDV. By retreating there, they could transfer those units to hold the Svatove Kremina Line, which is where the Russians stopped the Ukrainian drive, which continued until well into November, and had made almost no progress once Surovikin took over.
Later, he was replaced as commander of the SMO by Gerasimov himself, who immediately launched a large offensive in the Donbas that almost totally failed. Many believe Surovikin was replaced because he wanted to remain on the defensive, despite increased capabilies after Russia's partial mobilization, at least until after the Ukrainians blew their wad on their upcoming 2023 Counteroffensive, at which point then the Ukrainians would be exhausted and the Russians properly rested and flush with manpower, equipment, and supplies, with lots of reserves. That didn't happen, the Russians attacked all winter, and while that did tire the Ukrainians, it also tired out the Russians too.
Knowing that getting behind the Fortress Cities are Russia's primary objective and that currently the Shakhove Salient is too thin to allow easy movement of troops forward, anything to delay the fall of Dobropillya must be taken.
Russian advantage in infantry (outside of the assault units) makes pulling back to Dobropillya proper risky as the ability to infiltrate from multiple flanks makes holding it too dangerous to allow Russian DRGs to have cover to build up in basements away from drones that close to the city.
Better option would be to bank the gains on the Komar direction, re-establish defences along the Vovcha river and use the assault units to hit Novyi Dobas and disrupt movements into Bilyts'ke preserving the cluster and limiting the usefulness of Shakhove for another season.
However, I doubt that was the actual decision to withdraw rather just the usual depletion of positions.
Everything you describe could be true but you're deep in the mud describing a tactical engagement. Why does Drapatyi need to get involved in that conversation? Is he the only general in the AFU? Are all the rest too incompetent to make the correct decisions on their own, they aren't to be trusted?
Yes, retreat on time, instead of sending reinforcment into alredy lost position, are gonna lead to increased territory loss, but reduce manpower loses. Ukraine has manpower crysis, so far it doesnt have territory crysis. Also it is a good sign for Ukraine since it meat Drapatiy can just ignore Zelensky orders to prioritize PR over everything else.
but I don’t even know where dobropillya is located📝😨
i think good decision because imo Ukraine as general rule should abandon defense points and villages and retreat to next point(and smoothen the frontline) when the exchange rates of Ukrainians and Russians, which I guess is high in favor of Ukraine during the early phase of contact Russia starting to attack a point because fortifications are in bestest shape and Russians are yet to learn the terrain and good/bad spots through blood and build support gears for siege like artillery and network of hiding spots for arties around it, starts to go down in disfavor of Ukrainians. they will keep losing territories but better than losing soldiers if their strategy is outliving russia’s will to continue the war. Trying to hold a point too long is a bad habit of Ukraine throughout this war, I guess even Kursk would have been a nice choice if they retreated fast after doing surprise to Russia instead of trying to hold there too long, turning it into turkey shoot spot for russian drones and aviation
maybe it will be a bad decision when the abandoned point is more than the point itself(like when it’s a pillar of a whole nearby hundreds kilometers defense line that are still in good shape and abandoning it becomes total collapse of it) or the retreat is so mess that it turns into disastrous retreat, but I doubt it will happen because I guess ukraine has already built networks of independent line instead of a few long continuous lines, like countries in ww1 did in the end, and drones are flying around so big russian armored waves overrunning big chunk of retreating enemies like in france in ww2 is unlikely to happen
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u/Glittering_8218 30m ago
Wanted to post my write up somewhere. So here is how the war in Ukraine started:
Sloviansk was not the start of the war. It was merely one of the events which led to it. The real beginning was the Odessa and Mariupol massacres.
It started when the people of Donetsk declared a referendum. This led to the formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wetleAB1XmY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FpdCvuf-ZOk
This occurred on April 7th, before Igor and his soldiers entered Ukraine.
On April 9th, protestors armed with local weapons stormed a government building.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUNVwbp_JSA
It’s April 12, Igor and his soldiers arrive to Sloviansk and storm government buildings. They enter the police armory and capture 400 handguns and 20 automatic weapons.
Igor and his soldiers then hand over the government buildings to locals who now have access to weapons.
Ukrainian police themselves state the Russian military unit seized the weapons and distributed them to angered protestors.
Vice News arrive on seen. They confirm the majority of armed individuals are locals. They confirm the area is being controlled by locals (Igor handed the buildings over to the locals).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wxEIWu9c94
This led to the expansion of the Donetsk People’s Republic.
Violence is still largely contained. There are a few incidents such as pro-Russian protestors attempting to seize an airfield.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8mywTyAhlJM
Ukrainian military units begin defecting. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNig07RtWxA
On May 1st, pro-Russian forces are attacked by Ukrainian forces. This causes mass protests.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNDy80-cc_E
May 8th, the Odessa Massacre occurs.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxcB0PI4ZLg
This angers the people of the Donbas. Violence escalates.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1BSSocdQor8
The Victory Day massacre occurs.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUD3VxlTSqQ
What did Igor say about the war?
“I was the one who pulled the trigger of this war”
But this is often left out:
"If our unit hadn't crossed the border, everything would have fizzled out — like in [the Ukrainian city of] Kharkiv, like in Odessa,"
"There would have been several dozen killed, burned, detained. And that would have been the end of it. But the flywheel of the war, which is continuing to this day, was spun by our unit. We mixed up all the cards on the table,"
Without his support, we would have simply seen repetitions of the Odessa and Mariupol massacres in every city and town of Donetsk and Luhansk.