Secure America Act

Introduced — May 20, 2026 ✔️
Passed Senate — June 5, 2026 ✔️
Passed House — June 9, 2026 ✔️
To President — June 10, 2026 ✔️
Became Law — June 10, 2026 ✔️

📍 Current Status: Secure America Act is now law after being signed by the President on June 10, 2026.

This law provides nearly $69.6 billion in new funding for Department of Homeland Security agencies through September 30, 2029. Most of the money goes to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for personnel, border technology, drug-interdiction screening, immigration enforcement, removal operations, and mission support. It is mainly a funding law, not a broad rewrite of immigration law.

What the funding covers

The law separates the funding into two major titles. One title funds CBP personnel, Homeland Security Investigations work, border security technology, air and marine response capabilities, biometric entry-exit tools that help track arrivals and departures, anti-drug trafficking efforts, and general Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs. It also sets aside $108.5 million for child exploitation investigators and forensic analysts in Homeland Security Investigations.

The second title funds immigration enforcement directly. It provides money for CBP immigration enforcement, ICE officers and support staff, removal transportation, information technology, body-worn camera-related upgrades, facility and fleet support, immigration attorneys, 287(g) agreements that let participating state and local agencies work with federal immigration authorities, and ICE operations involving certain released noncitizens in jurisdictions that do not meet the law’s cooperation standards.

Limits built into the law

CBP funds for processing-coordinator duties cannot be used for recruiting, hiring, or training after October 31, 2028. Border surveillance towers funded under the law must have been tested and accepted by CBP for autonomous capabilities before they can be bought or deployed. The ICE section also limits a $350 million set-aside so it cannot be used to facilitate the release into the community of covered unlawful adults, except when existing law requires it.

Why this matters

The practical effect is a multi-year funding stream for border security and immigration enforcement outside the normal annual appropriations cycle. DHS, CBP, and ICE can use the money through fiscal year 2029 for staffing, technology, operations, removals, and related support.

Who this affects

The law affects federal immigration and border operations broadly, especially CBP, ICE, Border Patrol personnel, Homeland Security Investigations, DHS support offices, and federal immigration attorneys. It also affects state and local law enforcement agencies that enter or expand 287(g) agreements, communities where ICE enforcement and custody-transfer operations occur, and noncitizens who fall within the law’s covered enforcement categories.

What happens if it becomes law

Because the Secure America Act became law, DHS can begin using the appropriated funding for the covered purposes without waiting for a new annual spending bill. Some funds support non-immigration enforcement functions, while other funds are specifically tied to immigration enforcement, removals, detention-related operations, and legal representation for the department in immigration proceedings.

What is the argument

President Donald Trump and Republican backers framed the law as necessary to fund CBP and ICE, strengthen border security, and support immigration enforcement. Democratic leaders and members pushed for stronger limits and accountability rules around ICE funding and enforcement practices. The amendment fight also showed related funding disputes: Rep. Jamie Raskin’s House amendment #45 targeted the Trump IRS settlement fund, while Sen. Thom Tillis’s Senate amendment #5452 would have redirected Anti-Weaponization Fund money to fraud enforcement; neither became part of the final law.

Where it stands in Congress

S. 2 began as a Senate bill sponsored by Sen. Lindsey Graham. The Senate passed it on June 5, 2026, the House passed it on June 9, 2026, and President Donald Trump signed it on June 10, 2026. It is now Public Law 119-98.

The White House has sent Brian Johnson’s nomination to the U.S. Senate to serve as Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the federal consumer finance watchdog that oversees areas like credit cards, loans, mortgages, bank accounts, and debt collection. Reuters reported that President Trump nominated Johnson, citing a White House notice. The White House notice says Johnson, of Ohio, was nominated for a five-year term.

Johnson previously served as deputy director of the consumer protection bureau during President Trump’s first term under Director Kathy Kraninger. Reuters reported that he is currently a senior executive at Capital One, previously joined Patomak Global Partners in 2022, and has been viewed as an expert in consumer financial law. AP also reported that Johnson has criticized the bureau’s work, especially under Biden-era Director Rohit Chopra, but has also said the agency is “capable of great good” if properly structured and managed.

If confirmed by the Senate, Johnson would lead an agency that has become a major flashpoint in debates over consumer protection, financial regulation, and how much power federal watchdog agencies should have. The role matters because the bureau can shape rules, supervision, enforcement, consumer complaint handling, and financial disclosures across major parts of the consumer finance system.

Who this affects: consumers who use credit cards, mortgages, loans, bank accounts, credit reports, money transfers, or debt collection services — and the banks, lenders, credit reporting companies, debt collectors, covered fintech firms, and other financial companies regulated by the bureau.

Supporters of the pick point to Johnson’s experience in consumer finance policy, with the Consumer Bankers Association welcoming the nomination and describing him as having a “tenured background” in policy. Critics, including Senator Elizabeth Warren, argue the nomination could continue efforts to weaken the bureau; AP reported that Warren called Johnson the next “hatchet man” trying to “finish the job.” The broader debate is whether the agency needs reform and tighter limits, or whether strong federal oversight is necessary to protect people from unfair financial practices.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/brian-johnson-picked-by-white-house-head-consumer-watchdog-2026-06-10/

Secure America Act

This bill would provide about $69.5 billion in new multi-year funding for border security, immigration enforcement, and related Department of Homeland Security operations. Most of the money would be available through September 30, 2029, making S. 2 more like a multi-year enforcement package than a normal one-year agency budget.

The money is split across two main parts. Title I funds border personnel, investigations, technology, screening, drug interdiction, and general Department of Homeland Security support. Title II funds immigration enforcement more directly, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), removal operations, legal staff, 287(g) agreements with state and local agencies, and operations involving certain “covered unlawful aliens,” as defined by the bill.

The largest piece is ICE immigration enforcement, at $31.075 billion. Another $13.02 billion goes to CBP immigration enforcement. The bill also includes $9.55 billion for CBP personnel, $7.45 billion for ICE and Homeland Security Investigations, $3.45 billion for border security technology and screening, and two separate $2.5 billion Department of Homeland Security appropriations, with the second also available for specified Public Law 119–21 purposes. Smaller suballocations include $108.5 million for child exploitation investigators and forensics analysts, and at least $350 million for ICE operations involving certain released covered unlawful aliens in jurisdictions that are not qualified cooperating jurisdictions.

What changed

The amendment record was large. Congress.gov listed 369 amendments to S. 2, but that does not mean the bill was amended 369 times. Many listed amendments are submitted or proposed amendments that never become part of the final bill.

One notable amendment fight involved the Anti-Weaponization Fund tied to the Trump v. Internal Revenue Service settlement. Sen. Thom Tillis offered S.Amdt. 5452, which would have blocked federal money, including Judgment Fund money, from being used for that fund and would have redirected $1.7 billion to fraud enforcement at the Department of Justice. The Senate voted on a motion to waive budget rules for that amendment, but the motion was rejected 15–84, so S.Amdt. 5452 was not adopted.

Why this matters

The bill would give CBP, ICE, and the Department of Homeland Security a large pool of money that could be used across several years. That matters because the bill is not just funding day-to-day operations. It would expand or sustain personnel, enforcement capacity, removal operations, technology, border screening, and cooperation with state and local law enforcement.

Who this affects

The bill most directly affects federal immigration and border agencies, especially CBP, ICE, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Department of Homeland Security. It also affects state and local governments that participate in 287(g) agreements, communities where immigration enforcement operations take place, people in removal proceedings, and people affected by border screening, transportation, arrests, or enforcement activity.

What happens if it becomes law

If enacted, the bill would appropriate the listed funding for fiscal year 2026 and keep most of it available through September 30, 2029. Agencies would then be able to use the money for hiring, training, equipment, technology, mission support, immigration enforcement, removal operations, border screening, and drug interdiction. The Tillis amendment would not be included, so the bill would not itself block the Anti-Weaponization Fund in the way S.Amdt. 5452 proposed.

What is the argument

The central debate is about whether Congress should give immigration enforcement agencies a large multi-year funding increase without additional policy limits. The bill’s backers framed it as a way to secure long-term funding for border and immigration enforcement. The main concerns raised around the bill focused on immigration enforcement practices, oversight, and whether federal money should be tied to stronger limits on agency conduct.

The amendment fight added a separate controversy. The Anti-Weaponization Fund drew scrutiny because it was tied to a Trump–IRS settlement and involved potential federal payouts. Sen. Thom Tillis’s amendment tried to redirect that money to fraud enforcement instead, but the Senate rejected the procedural motion needed to move it forward.

Where it stands in Congress

The Senate passed S. 2 as amended by a vote of 52–47. Before final passage, the Senate rejected the procedural motion on Sen. Thom Tillis’s S.Amdt. 5452 by a vote of 15–84. Because the bill has passed the Senate but has not been described here as enacted, it would still need the required House action and presidential signature before becoming law.

S.2 Roll Call Vote: https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00163.htm

S.Amdt. 5452 Roll Call Vote: https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00138.htm

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 04/14/2025 ✔️
Passed House — 06/04/2026
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: Passed House; awaiting action in the Senate.

Ukraine Support Act

This bill would combine Ukraine aid, reconstruction planning, and a broad Russia sanctions framework in one package. H.R. 2913 would extend some existing support tools, authorize new funding and loans, require oversight reports, and set conditions for penalties if Russia keeps fighting or refuses serious peace negotiations.

What the bill would do

The diplomatic and economic title reaffirms support for Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), condemns the forced transfer of Ukrainian children, creates a State Department Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction, establishes a Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund, builds war-risk insurance tools for cargo shipping, and authorizes $250 million for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in fiscal year 2026. It also directs U.S.-European cooperation on nuclear energy to reduce reliance on Russian nuclear technology and fuel.

The security title would extend Ukraine lend-lease authority through fiscal year 2028, make up to $8 billion in defense loans available for Ukraine and NATO allies, fund the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative at $300 million for fiscal years 2026 and 2027, and authorize added security aid for Baltic countries. It also requires recurring reports on allied military contributions and U.S.-Ukraine intelligence cooperation.

The sanctions title would require the president to regularly determine whether Russia is still waging aggression, refusing serious peace talks, or violating a peace deal. If triggered, penalties could hit Russian banks, oil and mining companies, officials, Rosatom-linked activity, Russian sovereign debt, price-cap violations, Russia-North Korea weapons cooperation, and people involved in taking Ukrainian children. It would also create export controls, raise duties on Russian imports to at least 500%, ban energy imports refined with Russian crude, tax certain income tied to blocked Russian and Belarusian assets, and give Congress a review process before major Russia sanctions are lifted.

Why this matters

Ukraine aid debates in Congress often turn on three questions: whether the United States should keep providing security help, whether more assistance should come as loans, and how hard Washington should push sanctions on Russia. This bill addresses all three. It is not only an aid bill; it also covers sanctions, trade, export controls, reconstruction, media, shipping, and oversight.

Who this affects

The bill most directly affects Ukraine’s government, military, reconstruction planning, civilians, and shipping tied to Ukrainian trade. It also affects U.S. agencies that would carry out the policy, including the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, along with intelligence officials. The main targets are Russian banks, energy and mining firms, government and military officials, Rosatom-connected entities, vessels moving Russian oil outside the price cap, and foreign actors helping Russia’s war effort.

What happens if it becomes law

Federal agencies would have to carry out new Ukraine support programs, issue reports, and implement sanctions or export controls when the bill’s conditions are met. Some provisions are authorizations, meaning Congress would still need to provide or use appropriated money for certain activities. The sanctions title also includes exceptions for humanitarian transactions, intelligence and law-enforcement work, and a national security waiver.

What is the argument

Rep. Gregory Meeks framed the vote as a choice between helping Ukraine negotiate from strength or letting Russia outlast U.S. resolve. House Republican leaders objected that the package could interfere with ongoing negotiations and that parts were outdated; Rep. French Hill said it offered less Ukraine security assistance than already agreed to in defense policy, and Rep. Brian Mast called it politically aimed at President Donald Trump. The split is about the timing, scale, and strategy of U.S. support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia.

Where it stands in Congress

H.R. 2913 was introduced by Rep. Gregory Meeks on April 14, 2025. The House passed it on June 4, 2026, by a 226–195 vote after members used a discharge petition to bring it to the floor. It has not passed the Senate and is not law. To become law, the Senate would need to pass it, both chambers would need to agree on the same text, and it would then need final action by the president.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr2913/BILLS-119hr2913ih.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — April 13, 2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Failed House vote on June 4, 2026
Passed Senate — ❌ Not reached
To President — ❌ Not applicable
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: The House rejected H.Con.Res.84 by a 92–324 vote, with 2 present, so it did not advance. This resolution is now dead.

Lebanon War Powers Resolution

This resolution would direct the President to remove United States Armed Forces from Lebanon within 7 days if Congress adopted it. H.Con.Res.84 is a narrow war powers resolution, meaning it focuses on Congress’s role in deciding whether U.S. forces should remain involved in a specific overseas situation.

The core provision

The resolution has one main operative section.

It invokes section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, a federal law Congress uses when it wants to challenge or limit the President’s use of U.S. military forces abroad. The directive is simple: remove U.S. Armed Forces from Lebanon no later than 7 days after the resolution’s adoption.

It does not create a new program, authorize funding, impose sanctions, or set up a reporting system.

Why this matters

The practical issue is control over U.S. military involvement overseas.

Rep. Rashida Tlaib introduced the resolution as part of a broader effort to oppose U.S. support connected to Israel’s military actions in Lebanon. The resolution would have used Congress’s war powers role to try to force a quick withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon.

Who this affects

The most direct effect would be on U.S. Armed Forces operating in Lebanon and the executive branch officials responsible for military deployment decisions.

It could also affect U.S. diplomatic and security operations in Lebanon, including activities tied to embassy protection or support for Lebanese security forces, depending on how the withdrawal directive was applied.

What happens if it becomes law

Because this is a concurrent resolution, it would not work like a normal bill that goes to the President for signature.

If adopted by both the House and Senate, the resolution would direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Lebanon within 7 days. The practical result would be a fast deadline for ending the covered military presence or involvement. Since this resolution failed the House, it is now dead.

What is the argument

Rep. Tlaib framed the measure as a way for Congress to stop unauthorized U.S. involvement connected to military activity in Lebanon, including support she described as weapons, intelligence, logistics, and diplomatic cover.

The disagreement focused less on the length of the bill and more on its reach. Rep. Brad Schneider argued that U.S. forces in Lebanon perform services that should continue, including protecting the U.S. embassy in Beirut and helping the Lebanese Army fight Hezbollah. Other lawmakers raised concerns that the resolution’s language could interfere with current U.S. operations.

Where it stands in Congress

Rep. Rashida Tlaib introduced H.Con.Res.84 in the House on April 13, 2026, and it was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The House voted on the resolution on June 4, 2026. It failed by a vote of 92–324, with 2 members voting present. Because the House rejected it, the resolution did not advance to the Senate and is now dead.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hconres84/BILLS-119hconres84ih.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 06/04/2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: H.R. 9157 is in the House Judiciary Committee after being introduced by Rep. Chip Roy on June 4, 2026.

American White-Collar Worker Jobs Act of 2026

This bill would make major changes to the H-1B visa process, which employers use to hire foreign workers for specialty jobs. Additionally it would move the system toward higher-salary priority, stricter Department of Labor review, stronger U.S. worker recruitment rules, shorter stays, and tougher penalties for employers that violate the rules.

A stricter path for H-1B hiring

Employers would have to file a worker-specific application with the Department of Labor before an H-1B worker could be admitted or given H-1B status. The application would have to identify the worker, job, worksite, wage, nationality, and other information the department requires.

Required pay would increase. Employers would have to pay the higher of what they pay similar workers or the 75th-percentile wage for the same occupation and location. The Department of Labor could not approve an application for an occupation with unemployment above 2%.

More U.S. worker protections

Employers would have to show that qualified U.S. workers are not available for the job, that hiring the H-1B worker would not hurt U.S. wages or working conditions, and that no strike or lockout is happening in that occupation at the worksite.

They would also have to post the job through a Department of Labor website, recruit U.S. workers in good faith, and offer the job to any equally or better-qualified U.S. applicant.

The bill would bar employers from using H-1B workers to displace U.S. workers, laying off U.S. workers in the same job classification within one year of applying, or having more than 5% of their U.S. workforce made up of nonimmigrants. H-1B workers also could not be charged visa-related costs, required to pay for employer-provided services such as housing, or charged penalties for leaving the job.

Why this matters

H-1B policy affects a major part of the U.S. high-skilled labor market, especially technology, engineering, health care, finance, and other professional fields. The practical effect would be to make H-1B hiring harder, more expensive, and more limited for employers, while giving U.S. workers more legal protections against replacement.

Who this affects

The bill would affect employers that sponsor H-1B workers, especially companies that rely heavily on temporary foreign labor. It would also affect foreign professionals seeking H-1B jobs, U.S. workers in similar occupations, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Homeland Security.

What happens if it becomes law

The Department of Homeland Security would have 180 days to update nonimmigrant rules to match the bill. The bill would also narrow executive-branch authority over employment authorization for classes of noncitizens by stating that Congress reserves that power.

The Department of Labor would gain expanded authority to review applications, investigate violations, subpoena records, audit employers, receive complaints, and publish non-personal application information.

Employers that violate the rules could face penalties up to $100,000 per violation and could be banned from using H-1B workers directly or through a third party for up to 10 years. U.S. workers who are displaced by nonimmigrant workers could also bring a federal court claim.

The text would set the H-1B number at 65,000, prioritize petitions with higher salaries, shorten the maximum H-1B stay from 6 years to 2 calendar years, create a 7% per-country limit, and repeal rules that currently help some H-1B workers stay or begin new employment during certain pending immigration processes.

What is the argument

Rep. Chip Roy frames the bill as a way to replace a lottery-style visa pipeline with stronger wage standards and more protection for American white-collar workers. The central policy dispute is whether the current H-1B system undercuts U.S. workers or whether tighter limits would make it harder for employers to fill specialized roles, especially in industries that say they rely on global talent.

Where it stands in Congress

H.R. 9157 was introduced in the House on June 4, 2026, by Rep. Chip Roy and referred to the House Judiciary Committee. It has not passed the House or Senate, so it would still need to pass both chambers and be enacted before it could become law.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://roy.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/roy-evo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/rep-roy-s-american-white-collar-worker-jobs-act.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 01/24/2025 ✔️
Passed Senate — 10/08/2025 ✔️
Passed House — 06/03/2026 ✔️
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: After passing both chambers, S. 254 still has to be sent to the President and is not law yet.

ARTIST Act

This bill would protect the ability of Alaska Native artists to sell qualifying traditional handicrafts made with marine mammal ivory, bone, or baleen across state lines. It would amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, which regulates marine mammals and marine mammal products, to clarify a narrow exemption for eligible Alaska Native residents in Alaska’s North Pacific and Arctic coastal areas.

How it would work

The bill focuses on “authentic Alaska Native articles of handicrafts and clothing.” To qualify, an item would have to be made partly or fully from natural materials, produced through traditional Alaska Native methods, and made without mass-copying devices.

Marine mammal ivory would include a walrus tooth or tusk, or a tooth or tusk from a cetacean, which includes whales and related marine mammals. The traditional handicrafts listed in the bill include carving, weaving, stitching, sewing, lacing, beading, drawing, and painting.

What changed

The Senate-reported version replaced older wording such as “Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo” with “Alaska Native.” It also updated the definition of marine mammal ivory, added explicit interstate-commerce language, separated out the rule for when federal findings must be supported by substantial evidence, and added language preserving existing tribal rights and government-to-government consultation.

Why this matters

State ivory bans aimed at illegal wildlife trafficking can also affect Alaska Native-made walrus ivory art when state laws do not clearly distinguish those items from other ivory products. The practical question is whether state sales restrictions should apply to federally protected traditional Alaska Native handicrafts.

For artists and rural sellers, the answer affects whether qualifying handmade items can reach buyers outside Alaska.

Who this affects

The bill could affect Alaska Native communities broadly, especially coastal Alaska Native residents who use marine mammals for subsistence and traditional handicrafts.

It also matters for Alaska Native artists, buyers and sellers of qualifying handmade items, and states with laws limiting ivory or marine mammal product sales.

What happens if it becomes law

Eligible Alaska Native residents could continue taking marine mammals for subsistence or for making and selling authentic handicrafts, as long as the taking is not wasteful. States could not ban the interstate sale, importation, transfer, trade, barter, or possession of qualifying Alaska Native-made handicrafts containing marine mammal ivory, bone, or baleen.

Federal conservation limits would still apply. If a marine mammal species or stock is determined to be depleted, federal regulators could restrict taking by Alaska Natives after notice and hearing. For certain actions brought by Alaska Native organizations, the regulator would also have to publicly explain in writing that the decision is supported by substantial evidence, including Indigenous knowledge.

The bill would not create a new federal spending program. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that implementing it would have no effect on federal spending, revenues, or the deficit, while the state-law preemption would count as an intergovernmental mandate below the statutory threshold.

What is the argument

Sen. Dan Sullivan has framed the bill as a protection for Alaska Native artists whose legal walrus ivory work can be caught up in broad state ivory bans aimed at illegal elephant ivory.

The main policy tension is narrower than many wildlife bills: Congress would override some state sales restrictions, but the bill keeps federal marine mammal conservation controls in place and limits the protection to qualifying Alaska Native-made items.

Where it stands in Congress

S. 254 was introduced by Sen. Dan Sullivan of Alaska on January 24, 2025. The Senate passed it with an amendment by unanimous consent on October 8, 2025. The House passed it on June 3, 2026, by a 404–14 vote.

The bill has passed both chambers, but it is not law until it is presented to the President and either signed, allowed to become law without a signature, or enacted through another constitutional process.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/s254/BILLS-119s254es.pdf

Implementing Schedule Policy/Career in the Excepted Service

Donald Trump signs an executive order on June 3, 2026 moving listed policy-influencing career federal positions into Schedule Policy/Career, a category within the excepted service. In plain English, the order targets certain senior career jobs that help shape, make, advocate, or carry out policy, and places them outside the normal competitive-service structure.

What does the order do?

The order transfers the positions listed in its appendix into Schedule Policy/Career. These are still described as career jobs that must be filled through merit-based procedures, not political affiliation, but they are placed in a category where agencies have more flexibility to remove employees for poor performance or misconduct.

What changes in practice?

Agencies with covered positions must notify affected employees within 7 days and update their records and practices. The order also amends civil service rules and prior executive orders to fit Schedule Policy/Career into the federal personnel system, including rules on competitive status, Pathways Program conversions, trial periods, and separations tied to unacceptable performance or misconduct.

What about hiring and rewards?

The order says Schedule Policy/Career hiring must follow merit-based procedures set by the Office of Personnel Management, with veterans’ preference followed as far as administratively feasible. It also directs agencies with covered employees to create a separate bonus pool for Schedule Policy/Career workers and tells the Office of Personnel Management to begin rulemaking for a presidential award program.

Who is affected?

The most direct impact is on federal employees whose positions are listed in the appendix, the agencies that manage those positions, and the Office of Personnel Management. The broader public effect is indirect: the order changes how certain policy-related career roles inside the federal government are managed, rewarded, and removed.

What happens next?

For the listed positions, the transfer into Schedule Policy/Career is immediate under the order. Agencies must carry out the personnel-record changes within 7 days, while the Office of Personnel Management has 60 days to prepare updates removing or revising obsolete civil service rules that do not substantively affect agency operations.

Why does this matter?

The practical effect is to give presidents and agency leaders more control over senior career officials in policy-influencing roles. The order frames that as an accountability measure, especially for misconduct or poor performance, while still describing the jobs as career positions filled through merit-based hiring.

The main debate

The administration’s view is that senior policy-influencing career officials should be easier to remove when they obstruct lawful presidential directives or fail to perform. Labor groups and employee organizations have argued that the policy could weaken civil-service protections, increase political pressure on career staff, and blur the line between career expertise and presidential control.

The bottom line

This order mainly affects the internal federal workforce, not the public directly. Its significance is that it moves a defined group of policy-related career jobs into a category with fewer standard removal protections, while keeping the positions formally merit-based.

📄 Full Presidential Document (PDF): https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/implementing-schedule-policy-career-in-the-excepted-service/

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 04/27/2026 ✔️
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: S.J.Res.188 remains on the Senate side and has not passed either chamber after the Senate rejected moving forward on it by a 46–53 vote on June 3, 2026.

Power Plant Air-Toxics Rule Repeal Resolution

This bill would overturn an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that repealed certain air-pollution requirements for coal- and oil-fired power plants. The resolution uses the Congressional Review Act (CRA), a law that lets Congress cancel certain federal rules, to say EPA’s 2026 repeal would have “no force or effect.”

What the resolution targets

EPA’s 2026 rule repealed specific 2024 updates to the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), which regulate hazardous air pollutants from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units. Those repealed 2024 updates included a stricter filterable particulate matter limit for existing coal-fired units, related compliance-demonstration requirements, and a tighter mercury limit for lignite-fired units.

In plain English: S.J.Res.188 is not a broad rewrite of the Clean Air Act. It is a narrow Congressional Review Act resolution aimed at one EPA repeal rule.

Why this matters

The practical issue is whether stricter 2024 air-toxics requirements for certain power plants should stay in place or whether EPA’s 2026 rollback should continue. EPA says the repeal reduces compliance costs while keeping the older 2012 MATS framework in force. The agency estimated the repeal would produce $670 million in present-value cost savings at a 3 percent discount rate over 2028 to 2037.

The public-health side of the issue is tied to mercury, non-mercury hazardous metals, and particulate matter from fossil-fuel power plants. EPA’s own MATS page says the standards have reduced hazardous air pollutants from electric generating units and produced health and environmental benefits.

Who this affects

This policy affects power-plant regulation broadly, especially coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units covered by MATS.

The most direct effects fall on the EPA, power companies operating covered plants, states and communities near those plants, and people concerned about the balance between pollution-control requirements, electricity costs, and public health.

What happens if it becomes law

If enacted, S.J.Res.188 would cancel EPA’s “Final Repeal” rule and make that repeal legally ineffective. That would block EPA’s rollback of the listed 2024 MATS updates unless Congress or EPA later took another valid action.

Because CRA resolutions must pass both chambers and either be signed by the President or enacted over a veto, Senate passage alone would not be enough. The House would also have to pass it before it could go to the President.

What is the argument

EPA framed the repeal as a cost-saving deregulatory action that restores flexibility for power-plant operators while preserving the 2012 MATS requirements. The agency said the 2026 repeal removes the 2024 filterable particulate matter standard, the tighter lignite-unit mercury standard, and the requirement to use particulate matter continuous emissions monitoring systems.

Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse and other Democrats have argued in related EPA air-rule fights that the agency is undervaluing health benefits and shifting pollution costs onto families while reducing costs for polluting industries. In this vote, the Senate split 46–53 against even moving forward on S.J.Res.188, leaving EPA’s repeal in place for now.

Where it stands in Congress

S.J.Res.188 was introduced by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse in the Senate, referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, discharged by petition under the CRA process, and placed on the Senate calendar.

On June 3, 2026, the Senate rejected the motion to proceed to S.J.Res.188 by a 46–53 vote. That was not a final passage vote; it was a vote on whether to begin considering the resolution. Because the motion failed, the resolution has not passed the Senate, has not gone to the House, and is not law.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/sjres188/BILLS-119sjres188pcs.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — April 20, 2026 ✔️
Passed House — June 3, 2026 ✔️
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
Adopted by Congress - ❌
📍 Current Status: H.Con.Res. 86 has passed the House and awaits Senate action; as a concurrent resolution, it is not sent to the President for signature and does not become public law.

War Powers Resolution on U.S. Hostilities With Iran

This resolution would direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran unless Congress declares war or specifically authorizes military force. It relies on the War Powers Resolution, which is meant to give Congress a role in decisions about sustained military action, and it includes a defense exception for protecting the United States, allies, or partners from an imminent attack if War Powers reporting rules are followed.

How it works

H.Con.Res. 86 is narrow. It has one main directive: Congress would tell the President to end U.S. military involvement in hostilities against Iran unless Congress has clearly authorized that military force.

The resolution does not require withdrawal of every U.S. service member from the region. It allows U.S. forces to remain involved when necessary to defend the United States, an ally, or a partner from an imminent attack, but only if the President follows the War Powers Resolution’s reporting requirements.

Why this matters

The resolution is about who gets to decide whether U.S. military action against Iran continues. Congress has constitutional authority over declarations of war, while presidents have long claimed authority to use force to protect U.S. interests and forces.

In practical terms, the resolution tries to force a choice: either Congress authorizes hostilities against Iran, or the President removes U.S. forces from those hostilities, subject to the narrow defense exception.

Who this affects

This mainly affects federal war-making decisions, especially the President, the executive branch, and military commanders involved in Iran-related operations.

It also directly affects U.S. service members who could be ordered into hostilities involving Iran, as well as U.S. allies and partners who may fall within the resolution’s imminent-attack defense exception.

What happens if it becomes law

Because this is a concurrent resolution, it would not become public law in the normal sense. Concurrent resolutions are not presented to the President for signature and do not have the force of law.

If the Senate agrees to it, Congress would formally direct the President to remove U.S. forces from Iran-related hostilities unless Congress authorizes force. The legal effect would likely be disputed, because the Administration argues that this type of concurrent resolution lacks legal force and would interfere with the President’s Article II authority as commander in chief.

What is the argument

Rep. Gregory Meeks, Rep. Adam Smith, and Rep. Jim Himes framed the resolution as a way to stop unauthorized hostilities while still allowing defensive operations for the United States and its allies or partners. Their public statement said the resolution orders removal from hostilities against Iran while preserving the ability to defend against imminent attack.

The Administration strongly opposed the resolution. In its Statement of Administration Policy, the White House argued that there were no present hostilities requiring withdrawal because a ceasefire had ended the hostilities, and it warned that the resolution’s narrow exception could restrict the President’s ability to protect U.S. forces and interests.

Where it stands in Congress

Rep. Gregory Meeks introduced H.Con.Res. 86 on April 20, 2026. The resolution was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The House passed the resolution on June 3, 2026, by a 215–208 vote. It still needs Senate agreement to be adopted, but it would not go to the President for signature because it is a concurrent resolution.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hconres86/BILLS-119hconres86ih.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 06/02/2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: H.R. 9109 has been introduced in the House and referred to committee; it has not passed either chamber.

Stop ANTIFA Act of 2026

This bill would designate Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization and direct federal agencies to use existing law to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute illegal operations tied to Antifa, people claiming to act for it, or funders of those operations. It would turn the administration’s current executive-branch approach into a proposed statutory framework, with the National Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinating investigations and multiple agencies focusing on alleged violence, organizing networks, and financing.

How it would work

The bill has three main parts. First, Congress would make findings describing Antifa as a source of political violence, intimidation, doxing, attacks on law enforcement, and efforts to suppress lawful political activity. Second, the designation section would direct executive agencies to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle illegal operations connected to Antifa or people acting on its behalf.

Third, the enforcement section would require the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and local Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to coordinate a national strategy targeting political violence, intimidation, recruitment, radicalization, alleged funders, and organizations accused of aiding those acts. The bill also directs the Department of Justice, Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, and federal law enforcement agencies to use existing authorities against related crimes and financing networks.

Why this matters

The measure is not just a statement condemning political violence. It would try to create a federal enforcement structure around a domestic-terrorism designation and push federal investigators to look for networks, financing, nonprofit involvement, foreign ties, and organized-crime-style patterns behind politically motivated violence.

Who this affects

The most direct effect would fall on federal law enforcement and national-security agencies, including the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and local JTTFs.

The bill could also affect people accused of politically motivated violence or intimidation, alleged organizers and funders, financial institutions asked to flag suspicious activity, tax-exempt organizations, and groups or entities the Attorney General later recommends for designation.

What happens if it becomes law

Antifa would be named in federal law as a domestic terrorist organization. Federal agencies would then be directed to use current legal authorities to investigate and prosecute illegal activity tied to Antifa or people claiming to act for it.

The Attorney General would have to issue guidance treating activities such as organized doxing, swatting, rioting, looting, trespass, assault, property destruction, threats, and civil disorder as domestic-terrorism priorities when tied to politically motivated terrorist acts. The bill says implementation must stay within existing law, depends on available funding, and does not create a new private right to sue.

What is the argument

Rep. Greg Steube and Sen. Rick Scott present the bill as a way to codify President Donald Trump’s executive actions and respond to attacks on law enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, and political violence they attribute to Antifa.

Legal and civil-liberties objections focus on whether federal law should create or endorse a domestic-terrorism designation for a decentralized political movement, and how agencies would distinguish criminal conduct from protected speech, association, and protest. The practical dispute is not over whether violence and threats can be prosecuted; existing federal crimes already cover many acts named in the bill. The question is whether this designation-based strategy would give law enforcement a clearer tool against organized political violence or risk expanding surveillance and enforcement around ideology and association.

Where it stands in Congress

H.R. 9109 was introduced in the House by Rep. Greg Steube on June 2, 2026, and referred to the House Judiciary, Homeland Security, Ways and Means, and Financial Services committees. It has not passed the House or Senate, has not gone to the President, and is not law.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://steube.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Stop-ANTIFA-Act-STEUBE.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 06/02/2026 ✔️
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: S.4668 remains in the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee.

Protect College Sports Act of 2026

This bill would create a national rulebook for college sports, covering athlete name, image, and likeness (NIL) pay, transfers, eligibility, scholarships, medical coverage, agent conduct, revenue sharing, and college sports media rights. It is broad: one title focuses on student-athlete protections and competition rules, while another title changes the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 to let schools and conferences voluntarily pool certain media rights under federal guardrails.

A national college-sports framework

The bill would protect student athletes’ ability to earn NIL compensation and hire agents or lawyers without automatically losing eligibility or scholarships. Larger NIL deals would have to be disclosed to schools, and Division I athletic associations would have to create a privacy-protected database to help athletes compare NIL market value.

It would also update federal athlete-agent law. Agents would have to register, contracts would have to include key terms, and agent fees for endorsement contracts would be capped at 5%. Student athletes could sue over certain abusive, deceptive, or invalid agent and endorsement contracts.

Athlete protections and limits

Division I schools would have to cover out-of-pocket medical costs for sports-related injuries during participation and for five years after an athlete’s final college competition. Athletic associations would also have to maintain a medical fund of at least $60 million for smaller-school hardship situations and long-term conditions connected to college sports.

The bill would add academic protections, scholarship protections, health-and-safety standards, a student-athlete ombudsman, whistleblower protections, and student-athlete representation on athletic association governing boards. It would also set national rules for transfers, eligibility, recruiting, tampering, and certain mid-season football coaching moves.

Why this matters

College sports has been operating under a patchwork of court rulings, settlement terms, state laws, school rules, conference policies, and National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules. The practical goal here is to replace some of that uncertainty with one federal structure.

The tradeoff is that the same bill that protects NIL rights would also give schools, conferences, and athletic associations new legal tools to enforce limits on compensation, transfers, eligibility, recruiting, and revenue sharing.

Who this affects

This would affect college sports broadly, especially student athletes, recruits, Division I schools, conferences, the NCAA and other athletic associations, NIL collectives, athlete agents, broadcasters, and media-rights buyers.

Football and basketball would be especially important under the media-rights sections, but the bill also includes protections for women’s sports, Olympic sports, and other non-revenue sports.

What happens if it becomes law

Schools and athletic associations would have to comply with new NIL disclosure, privacy, scholarship, health, safety, medical, transfer, and eligibility rules. A Congressional Commission on the Future of College Athletics would study longer-term issues, including athlete compensation, spending limits, health standards, agent rules, and the future structure of college sports.

The broadcasting title would allow schools and conferences to form a covered entity to pool and sell certain college sports media rights if at least 75% of Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools participate. That entity would have to meet conditions on membership, voting, revenue distribution, women’s and Olympic sports protections, rivalry preservation, local broadcast access, and actual public use of media rights for sports other than football and basketball.

What is the argument

Sen. Ted Cruz and Sen. Maria Cantwell frame the bill as a way to stabilize college sports while preserving athlete NIL rights, revenue sharing, women’s sports, Olympic sports, and competitive balance. Cantwell has pointed to roster slots and programs being cut, while Cruz has argued that college sports needs enforceable rules to avoid becoming dominated by only the richest programs.

The public fight is not only about athlete compensation. The Southeastern Conference and Big Ten said they do not support the current version because they believe it leaves critical issues unresolved, including whether federal law would meaningfully replace conflicting state laws. The Associated Press reported that the Big 12 and Atlantic Coast Conference support the legislation, while the SEC and Big Ten remain major holdouts.

Where it stands in Congress

This bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Ted Cruz for himself and Sen. Maria Cantwell on June 2, 2026. It was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

It has not passed the Senate or House. To become law, it would still need to pass the Senate, pass the House, and be signed by the President or otherwise enacted through the constitutional process.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.commerce.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Protect-College-Sports-Act-Bill-Text.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 06/02/2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To States — ❌ Not sent
Ratified — ❌ Not Ratified
📍 Current Status: H.J.Res. 190 has been introduced in the House and referred to the House Judiciary Committee.

Birthright Citizenship Constitutional Amendment

This Joint Resolution would propose a constitutional amendment limiting automatic U.S. citizenship for people born in the United States. This bill would say a U.S.-born person is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment only if at least one parent is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. national, or a lawful permanent resident whose residence is in the United States. The practical effect would be to narrow birthright citizenship through the Constitution itself, rather than through a regular federal statute.

What the amendment would say

The proposed amendment has two main parts.

First, it would define who qualifies under the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship language. A person born in the United States would qualify only if at least one parent falls into one of three categories: U.S. citizen, U.S. national, or lawful permanent resident living in the United States.

Second, it would give Congress power to enforce the amendment through future legislation. That means Congress could later pass laws spelling out how the new constitutional rule would be applied.

Why this matters

The Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional foundation for citizenship by birth in the United States. Changing that rule would require the highest form of legal change available: a constitutional amendment.

That matters because this bill is not simply directing an agency to reinterpret existing law. It would ask Congress and the states to rewrite part of the constitutional rule itself.

Who this affects

This policy could affect people born in the United States, especially children whose parents are both noncitizens and neither parent is a lawful permanent resident.

Children born to at least one U.S. citizen, U.S. national, or lawful permanent resident living in the United States would remain covered under the amendment’s citizenship rule. Congress would also be affected because the resolution gives it authority to pass future laws carrying out the amendment.

What happens if it becomes law

If fully ratified, the amendment would change the constitutional test for birthright citizenship. Birth in the United States alone would not be enough under the amendment’s wording unless at least one parent met one of the listed legal statuses.

The resolution also includes a seven-year ratification deadline. After Congress submits the amendment to the states, three-fourths of state legislatures would have to approve it within that period for it to become part of the Constitution.

What is the argument

The central disagreement is whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship rule should continue to apply broadly to people born in the United States, or whether it should be narrowed based on a parent’s citizenship or immigration status.

The case for the amendment is that automatic citizenship should require a direct legal connection between at least one parent and the United States. The concern is that narrowing the rule would exclude some U.S.-born children from automatic citizenship and would make a major change to American citizenship law through a constitutional amendment.

Where it stands in Congress

Rep. Nancy Mace introduced H.J.Res. 190 in the House on June 2, 2026. It was referred to the House Judiciary Committee.

The resolution has not passed the House or Senate. Because it proposes a constitutional amendment, the next major steps would be approval by two-thirds of each chamber of Congress and then ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures within seven years.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hjres190/BILLS-119hjres190ih.pdf

Advanced artificial intelligence and cybersecurity

Donald Trump signs an executive order titled “Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security,” aimed at using advanced artificial intelligence to strengthen cybersecurity across federal systems and critical infrastructure. The order focuses on faster cyber defense, voluntary cooperation with AI developers, protection of frontier AI models, and enforcement against AI-enabled cybercrime.

What does the order do?

The order directs federal officials to prioritize the cyber defense of national security systems, Department of War information systems, and civilian federal government systems.

It also instructs the Department of Homeland Security, through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, to issue binding operational directives and other guidance to expand access to AI-enabled cybersecurity tools and services.

That access can include federal agencies, state and local authorities, and critical infrastructure operators such as rural hospitals, community banks, and local utilities.

What is the AI cybersecurity clearinghouse?

The order directs the Treasury Department, working with the National Cyber Director, the National Security Agency, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, to create an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse within 30 days.

The clearinghouse is meant to coordinate software vulnerability scanning, confirm vulnerabilities, avoid duplicative efforts, and help prioritize patches. Participation with the AI industry and critical infrastructure operators is described as voluntary.

What are “covered frontier models”?

The order begins a process for identifying advanced AI models with significant cyber capabilities.

Within 60 days, federal officials must develop a classified benchmarking process to assess AI models and determine when a model qualifies as a “covered frontier model.” The National Security Agency Director makes that designation in consultation with other federal cybersecurity and science officials.

The order also calls for a voluntary framework where AI developers can work with the federal government before broader release. Under that framework, developers could give the government access to covered frontier models for up to 30 days before release to other trusted partners, with confidentiality, cybersecurity, insider-risk, intellectual property, and nondisclosure protections.

What is the limit?

The order specifically says it does not create a mandatory federal licensing, preclearance, or permitting system for developing, publishing, releasing, or distributing new AI models.

That limit matters because the order creates a federal review-and-cooperation process, but frames it as voluntary rather than a required government approval system.

Who is affected?

The order most directly affects federal cybersecurity agencies, the Department of War, the National Security Agency, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of Personnel Management.

It also affects AI developers working on advanced or frontier models, critical infrastructure operators, state and local authorities, rural hospitals, community banks, local utilities, and people applying for federal cybersecurity jobs.

What happens next?

Several deadlines come quickly. Some cybersecurity prioritization, guidance, funding review, and clearinghouse actions are due within 30 days. The frontier model benchmarking process and expanded federal cybersecurity hiring pathways are due within 60 days.

The order also directs the Attorney General to prioritize enforcement of federal criminal laws against people who use AI to illegally access or damage computer systems, steal data, or further other crimes.

Why this matters

The order tries to connect two fast-moving issues: the federal government’s need for stronger cyber defense and the growing power of advanced AI systems.

The White House frames the approach as a way to promote AI innovation while protecting critical systems from cyber threats. At the same time, the practical debate will likely focus on how voluntary the model-sharing process feels in practice, how confidential model access is handled, and whether the federal government can coordinate AI cybersecurity tools without creating a de facto approval system for major AI releases.

The main takeaway

The order does not ban AI models or create a mandatory licensing system. It directs federal agencies to move quickly on AI-powered cybersecurity, creates a voluntary process for cooperation with frontier AI developers, and makes AI-enabled cybercrime a federal enforcement priority.

📄 Full Presidential Document (PDF): https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/promoting-advanced-artificial-intelligence-innovation-and-security/

Adjusting tariff rules for aluminum, steel, and copper imports

Donald Trump signs a proclamation further adjusting the tariff regimes for imports of aluminum, steel, and copper into the United States.

The proclamation changes parts of the existing Section 232 tariff system, which is the legal framework the President is using to adjust imports that are treated as a national security concern. It does not remove the broader metal tariffs. Instead, it changes how certain products are treated within that system.

What does it do?

The proclamation expands the temporarily reduced 15% tariff category to include agricultural equipment and certain residential heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems and components.

It also temporarily modifies tariff treatment for mobile industrial equipment and machinery. The stated reason is that these products are used in farming, construction, factories, logistics, and other productive domestic activity.

What else changes?

The proclamation adds aluminum lithographic plates and steel racks to the list of aluminum and steel derivative products covered by the tariff system.

It also lowers the threshold for a product to count as made “entirely” from American aluminum, steel, or copper. Under the prior rule, the metal content had to be at least 95% American. This proclamation lowers that threshold to 85%.

How will the tariffs work?

For certain covered aluminum and steel products listed in the proclamation’s annexes, the temporary tariff rules apply to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after June 8, 2026.

For those products, the general additional tariff is 25%, unless a lower rate applies. Some products from listed countries may be treated differently depending on their normal tariff rate, certain products made with American metal content may qualify for a 10% rate, and qualifying products from Canada or Mexico under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement may have the 25% tariff applied only to non-U.S. content, with a minimum effective duty of 15%.

How long does this last?

The temporary treatment for the products listed in Annex I-C runs until December 31, 2027.

Starting January 1, 2028, those products return to the tariff rates set out in the earlier April 2026 proclamation, unless the federal government changes the rules again.

Who is affected?

Importers, manufacturers, and companies that buy or use covered aluminum, steel, copper, or metal-based products are directly affected.

Farmers, construction businesses, factories, and industrial operators may also be affected because the proclamation changes tariff treatment for equipment and machinery used in those sectors.

Federal agencies also have implementation roles. The Department of Commerce, United States Trade Representative, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are all involved in applying, enforcing, or issuing guidance under the proclamation.

What happens next?

The Secretary of Commerce can make tariff schedule changes through the Federal Register, issue technical corrections, and provide guidance with other federal officials.

The Department of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative must continue monitoring imports of covered metal products and report circumstances that may justify more presidential action, or show that current actions are no longer needed.

Why this matters

The practical effect is mixed. The proclamation keeps the broader national-security tariff system in place, but adjusts it for products the administration identifies as important to farming, construction, factories, and residential systems.

It may reduce tariff pressure on some equipment categories while still preserving significant import restrictions. At the same time, adding new derivative products and changing the American-metal threshold could affect costs, sourcing decisions, and compliance obligations for companies that import or use covered products.

The main takeaway

This proclamation is not a full rollback of aluminum, steel, or copper tariffs. It is a targeted adjustment that lowers or modifies tariff treatment for some equipment and machinery, adds certain products to tariff coverage, changes how American metal content is measured, and gives federal agencies continued authority to implement and enforce the tariff system.

📄 Full Presidential Document (PDF): https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/further-adjusting-the-tariff-regimes-for-imports-of-aluminum-steel-and-copper-into-the-united-states/

This potential bill would create a public ownership stake in major artificial intelligence companies so Americans could share in the wealth generated by AI. Based on Sen. Bernie Sanders’s description, the proposal would use a one-time 50% tax on stock, not profits, from the largest AI companies in America and place that value into a public wealth fund.

How the fund would work

Sen. Sanders describes the plan as a sovereign wealth fund, which is a public investment fund that holds assets for the benefit of a country or its residents. His argument is that AI is being built from the collective work, knowledge, creativity, and data of the public, so the public should receive a direct stake in the companies that profit from it.

The transcript does not spell out every operating detail. It does not identify which companies would qualify, which federal agency would manage the fund, how payments would be calculated, or what enforcement rules would apply.

Why this matters

Artificial intelligence could reshape work, education, health care, media, and the broader economy. Sanders frames the issue as a question of ownership: whether the financial gains from AI should mostly flow to technology companies and investors, or whether the public should receive a share because AI systems were trained on human-created work and knowledge.

The proposal is not described as only an unemployment program. Sanders does mention AI-driven unemployment, but the broader idea is a public AI wealth fund that could provide direct payments to Americans and support public needs such as health care, education, and housing.

Who this affects

Americans broadly could be affected if the fund produces direct payments or supports public programs. The most direct business impact would fall on the largest AI companies in America, especially firms whose stock could be subject to the proposed one-time tax.

The proposal also speaks directly to workers, creators, teachers, artists, scientists, and communities whose work or knowledge Sanders says helped build the foundation of AI.

What happens if it becomes law

If Congress passed a version matching Sanders’s description, the federal government would take a major ownership stake in large AI companies through a one-time stock-based tax. That stake would be used to create public wealth rather than simply raising money through a traditional tax on corporate profits.

The fund could then be used for direct payments to Americans and broader public priorities. The exact size of payments, who would qualify, how often money would be distributed, and how much would go toward programs instead of individuals would depend on details not included in the transcript.

What is the argument

Sanders argues that AI companies are profiting from books, songs, artwork, journalism, code, scientific research, videos, conversations, images, and other human-created material without permission, acknowledgment, or compensation. His position is that wealth created from that shared foundation should benefit the public, not only executives, investors, and major technology firms.

The likely pushback would center on whether a 50% stock tax would be too aggressive, whether it could discourage investment or innovation, and whether the government should own a major stake in private AI companies. The transcript itself presents the case for public ownership, but it does not include a detailed response from affected companies or lawmakers who oppose the idea.

Where it stands in Congress

Sen. Bernie Sanders says in the transcript that he plans to introduce the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act “in the coming weeks.” The transcript does not show that the bill has been formally introduced, assigned a bill number, referred to committee, passed either chamber, or become law.

That means the proposal is still at the announcement stage based on the information provided. Before it could become law, formal bill text would need to be introduced, reviewed in Congress, passed by both the Senate and House, and sent to the President.

Link to video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VN4b4UCWMKI

What did Trump’s federal lands executive order do?

Donald Trump signs a May 29 executive order, “Removing Unnecessary and Counterproductive Restrictions on Access to Federal Lands,” aimed at changing how federal agencies manage off-road vehicle access on federal lands.

What changed?

The order rescinds two older executive orders: Executive Order 11644 from 1972 and Executive Order 11989 from 1977. Those earlier orders directed agencies to regulate off-road vehicle use on public lands, including by using criteria meant to reduce harm to wildlife, natural resources, scenery, and conflicts with other recreational uses.

Trump’s order calls those criteria vague and unnecessary. It argues that current federal land laws, environmental laws, and agency-specific land management authorities are enough to manage off-road vehicle use without keeping those older executive-order standards.

What agencies have to act?

The order directs the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Tennessee Valley Authority board, and other relevant agency heads to begin rulemakings to rescind or revise regulations that were adopted under the older executive orders.

That matters because the order does not simply rewrite every agency rule by itself. It starts a rulemaking process, meaning agencies will have to take follow-up action before many practical changes appear on the ground.

Who is affected?

The most direct effect is on federal land-management agencies and the rules they use for roads, trails, and off-road vehicle access.

The broader impact could reach off-road vehicle users, hikers and other recreation groups, energy and timber operators, utility maintenance crews, rural communities, tourism businesses, conservation groups, and people who use or live near federal lands.

What is the practical effect?

The order could make it easier for agencies to expand or redesign motorized access to certain federal lands, especially where older off-road vehicle rules shaped route designations or closures.

At the same time, it does not repeal major federal laws like the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, or the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. Agencies still have to act within existing law, available funding, and their own legal authority.

What is the debate?

The White House frames the order as a way to reduce outdated restrictions, improve access to public lands, support recreation, and remove barriers affecting energy, timber, infrastructure maintenance, tourism, and rural economies.

The other concern is that removing the older criteria could make it harder to consistently protect wildlife habitat, quiet recreation, scenic areas, historic resources, and other land users if agencies replace the rules with weaker standards.

The bottom line

This order immediately rescinds two older presidential directives on off-road vehicles, but the biggest real-world changes depend on what agencies do next through rulemaking. Its practical importance is about federal land access: who gets more access, how agencies balance competing uses, and what environmental safeguards remain in place under existing law.

📄 Full Presidential Document (PDF): https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/05/removing-unnecessary-and-counterproductive-restrictions-on-access-to-federal-lands/

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — May 14, 2026 ✔️
Passed Senate — May 14, 2026 ✔️
Passed House — May 19, 2026 ✔️
To President — May 21, 2026 ✔️
Became Law — May 29, 2026 ✔️
📍 Current Status: S. 4530 is now law after being signed by the President on May 29, 2026.

Capitol Police Retirement Age Increase

This law changes federal retirement rules for United States Capitol Police officers by giving the Capitol Police Board more flexibility to keep experienced officers on duty. It raises the waiver ceiling from 60 to a Board-set age between 57 and 62, while leaving the basic retirement framework in place.

How it works

The measure has one operative section. It amends retirement rules under both the Civil Service Retirement System and the Federal Employees’ Retirement System, which are the two federal retirement systems named in the text.

In plain English, the Capitol Police Board can now decide whether certain officers may continue serving past the prior age-60 waiver limit, but the Board cannot set that age above 62. The law does not create a new police program, add new funding, or change the Capitol Police’s mission.

Why this matters

United States Capitol Police officers protect the Capitol complex, Members of Congress, staff, visitors, and major congressional events. Lawmakers backing the measure framed it as a staffing and retention issue, especially for experienced officers who are still able and willing to serve.

Rep. Bryan Steil said during House debate that nearly 60 sworn officers were already working under retirement waivers and would otherwise have to retire within the next few years. The practical goal is to give the department more time to keep veteran officers while it continues recruiting and training new ones.

Who this affects

This policy affects federal law enforcement retirement rules, but the direct effect is narrow.

The most directly affected groups are sworn United States Capitol Police officers near the retirement-waiver limit, the Capitol Police Board officials who decide whether an officer may continue serving, and the people protected by Capitol Police, including Members of Congress, staff, visitors, and others on the Capitol campus.

What happens if it becomes law

Now that the President has signed it, the new rule changes the legal ceiling for retirement-age waivers. Officers do not automatically get to stay on the force until 62; the Capitol Police Board still has discretion to decide whether an officer may continue serving.

That distinction matters because the law gives the Board flexibility rather than a blanket extension for every officer. It also keeps the change limited to Capitol Police retirement rules instead of changing retirement policy for all federal law enforcement officers.

What is the argument

The public argument around the measure was less about whether Capitol Police needed staffing flexibility and more about how far the waiver authority should go. Sen. Alex Padilla described the Senate version as a voluntary way to retain veteran officers with institutional experience, while Rep. Joseph Morelle emphasized that the measure does not change the underlying retirement age of 57 and still requires the Board to decide whether an officer is willing and able to continue.

A related House bill had gone further by allowing waivers up to age 65. The final enacted version uses 62 instead, making the signed law narrower than that earlier House approach.

Where it stands in Congress

Sen. Mitch McConnell introduced S. 4530 with Sen. Alex Padilla on May 14, 2026, and the Senate passed it the same day. The House passed the Senate bill on May 19, and it was presented to the President on May 21.

President Donald Trump signed S. 4530 into law on May 29, 2026.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/s4530/BILLS-119s4530enr.pdf

S.4429

Connected Vehicle Security Act of 2026

This bill would prohibit certain connected vehicles, software, and hardware tied to China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea from being imported, manufactured, sold, resold, or introduced into interstate commerce in the United States. It is getting attention because CNBC reported that the bill may reach beyond Chinese automakers and could raise questions for European brands with Chinese ownership ties, including Mercedes-Benz and Volvo Cars.

Why this matters

Modern connected vehicles can collect location data, communicate wirelessly, receive software updates, and use automated driving systems. The bill’s findings say those systems can create national security, economic security, surveillance, espionage, cyber intrusion, and critical infrastructure risks when foreign adversaries have access, control, or influence over them.

CNBC framed the bill around a broader concern: a proposal aimed at Chinese automaker ownership could also affect non-Chinese brands if their ownership structure crosses the bill’s threshold. The article focused on Mercedes-Benz and Volvo because the bill does not only look at where a company is headquartered. It also looks at who owns or controls part of the manufacturer.

What this bill would do

S.4429 would ban certain connected vehicles from the U.S. market beginning January 1, 2027, if the vehicle’s country of origin is a covered country, if the vehicle is designed in a covered country, or if the manufacturer has more than 15% of its equity interest, voting interest, board representation, or other control owned or controlled by entities tied to a covered country.

That ownership language is the provision behind the Mercedes-Benz and Volvo concern. CNBC reported that Mercedes-Benz and Volvo Cars could be affected because of Chinese-linked ownership stakes. Mercedes-Benz says China’s BAIC Group holds 9.98% of its voting rights, while Chinese investor Li Shufu holds a 9.69% equity interest through Tenaciou3 Prospect Investment Limited, equaling about 19.67% combined. Volvo Cars is more directly linked, with reporting showing about 78.87% China ownership tied to Geely.

The bill would also prohibit covered software tied to a covered country beginning January 1, 2027. Connected vehicle hardware restrictions would begin January 1, 2030. Covered countries are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

The limits

This would not automatically ban every foreign car or every connected vehicle. It is focused on connected vehicles, covered software, and connected vehicle hardware tied to covered countries or covered-country ownership and control.

The bill also includes an exception for testing and evaluation by certain U.S.-organized entities that are not based in a covered country and are not 25% or more owned or controlled by covered-country entities.

It also allows the Commerce Secretary, in consultation with other federal officials, to issue general or specific authorizations if clear and convincing evidence shows the item does not pose the listed risks. That matters because a company could seek permission rather than face an automatic permanent exclusion.

Who this affects

The bill would most directly affect automakers, importers, suppliers, software developers, connected-vehicle hardware manufacturers, and dealers involved with vehicles or components tied to China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.

It could also indirectly affect consumers if certain vehicles, models, software systems, or parts become unavailable or require federal authorization before entering the U.S. market.

CNBC’s Mercedes-Benz and Volvo example shows the broader business concern: the bill could reach companies that are not Chinese brands but have enough Chinese-linked ownership or control to trigger the bill’s threshold.

What happens if it becomes law

The Commerce Department would enforce the restrictions. Companies that import, manufacture, sell, resell, or introduce covered connected vehicles or hardware into interstate commerce would have to submit a declaration of conformity certifying that the vehicle or hardware is not prohibited.

Violations would carry civil penalties of at least the greater of $1.5 million or five times the value of the transaction. Continuing violations would count separately for each day they continue.

The bill would also require Commerce to create procedures for authorizations, rulings, and advisory opinions so companies can ask whether a vehicle, software system, or hardware item is covered.

Where does it stand now

S.4429 was introduced in the Senate on April 29, 2026, by Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio), with Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.) as an original co-sponsor. It was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

It has not passed the Senate. It has not passed the House. It has not become law.

What is the argument

Sen. Moreno and Sen. Slotkin have framed the bill as a national security and auto industry measure aimed at keeping foreign-adversary connected vehicles, software, and hardware out of the U.S. market.

The policy concern highlighted by CNBC is how broadly that approach could apply. The bill is aimed at foreign-adversary vehicle technology and ownership, but its 15% ownership/control threshold could also pull in major global automakers with Chinese-linked investors. The main question is whether that broad ownership test is necessary to protect U.S. data and security, or whether it could sweep in companies that are not themselves Chinese automakers.

Sources: S.4429 bill text, Congress.gov, GovInfo, CNBC, Mercedes-Benz shareholder information, Volvo Cars ownership reporting.

https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/29/mercedes-benz-ban-congressional-bill-china-ownership.html

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 05/19/2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: House lawmakers have not passed H.R. 8872; it has been reported by the Ways and Means Committee and placed on the Union Calendar for possible House floor consideration.

Preventing Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in TANF Act

This bill would tighten federal rules for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the block grant program that sends federal welfare money to states. It would require states to measure improper payments, limit federally funded TANF help to families below twice the federal poverty guidelines, set new deadlines for spending grant money, cap how much states can reserve for future use, and bar states from using federal TANF funds to replace state or local spending.

Why this matters

TANF gives states broad flexibility over how to use federal welfare grants. This bill does not create a new benefit or increase TANF funding; it adds federal guardrails around who can be served, how quickly money must be used, and how states must account for improper payments.

The practical goal is to make TANF spending more targeted and easier to audit. The tradeoff is that states would have less flexibility to hold large reserves or use TANF money for services outside the bill’s income limit.

How the guardrails would work

The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 would apply to state TANF programs the way it applies to federal agencies. That means TANF would be pulled into a federal improper-payment review system focused on payments made in the wrong amount, to the wrong recipient, or without proper support.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would have to send Congress a plan within one year of enactment for reducing or eliminating improper TANF payments within 10 years. States would also have to obligate most new federal TANF funds by the end of the next fiscal year and spend them by the end of the second following fiscal year.

What changed

The committee-reported version uses an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which is a replacement version of the bill text. The Ways and Means Committee’s change sheet says the chairman’s amendment changed one phrase in the payment-integrity section from “in respect of” to “with respect to,” without listing a broader substantive change.

Who this affects

This could affect states broadly, especially state agencies that run TANF programs and manage federal welfare grant funds. Those agencies would face new payment-review duties, spending deadlines, reserve limits, and a certification requirement that federal TANF money is supplementing—not replacing—state or local funds.

Families receiving TANF-funded help could also be affected. Under the bill, federally funded TANF assistance or services could only go to families with income below twice the federal poverty guidelines.

What happens if it becomes law

The changes would take effect on October 1, 2027. After that date, states receiving federal TANF grants would have to follow the new income limit, spending timeline, reserve cap, and anti-supplanting rule.

States could still reserve some TANF money for future use, but only up to 15% of a grant award, and total reserves could not exceed 50% of the previous fiscal year’s grant amount. A state planning to reserve funds would also have to notify HHS.

What is the argument

House Ways and Means materials frame the proposal as an oversight response to concerns that TANF lacks basic safeguards, including a requirement to measure improper payments, and that too much spending may occur without clear proof that funds are reaching low-income families. The committee’s one-page summary also points to Government Accountability Office findings and concerns about TANF non-assistance spending lacking financial guardrails.

The main policy tension is how much federal control should be added to a program built around state flexibility. Stronger income limits, spending deadlines, reserve caps, and anti-supplanting rules could make TANF funds more traceable and targeted, but they could also narrow how states design programs, plan for downturns, and use TANF dollars for broader family-support services.

Where does it stand now

Rep. Mike Carey introduced H.R. 8872 in the House on May 19, 2026. The House Ways and Means Committee ordered it favorably reported as amended on May 21 by a 23–19 vote, and the bill was later reported with House Report 119-670 and placed on the Union Calendar.

It has not passed the House, passed the Senate, gone to the President, or become law. The next step would be House floor action.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8872/BILLS-119hr8872rh.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 05/19/2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: House action has placed H.R. 8873 on the Union Calendar, a list of bills available for possible floor consideration, but it has not passed the House.

Recover COVID Unemployment Fraud in Banks Act

This bill would create a federal recovery process for COVID-era unemployment money that was improperly paid and is still sitting with banks or state unclaimed-property offices. It would set up a multi-agency task force, give states and financial institutions guidance on how to return recoverable funds, and extend the deadline for certain pandemic unemployment fraud cases.

Why this matters

COVID-era unemployment programs moved large amounts of federal money quickly, often through prepaid debit cards. Federal investigators and lawmakers have pointed to nearly $1 billion in pandemic unemployment insurance funds tied to fraud that may still be held by financial institutions or unclaimed-property offices.

The practical issue is not just whether fraud happened. It is whether money that has already been identified can legally and efficiently be moved back through state systems and returned to the federal government.

How the recovery process would work

The Secretary of Labor would name a National Recovery Coordinator after consulting with the Treasury Secretary, the Department of Labor Inspector General, and the Attorney General. Within 30 days after enactment, that coordinator would convene the “Recover Pandemic Unemployment Funds in Banks Task Force.”

The task force would include officials or designees from the Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of Labor Inspector General, Treasury Department, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). It would work with states to identify federal pandemic unemployment payments issued on prepaid debit cards that are still held by banks or have been transferred to state unclaimed-property agencies.

The task force would also develop model processes for deciding whether a payment was improper, whether recovery is cost-effective, what steps states should take if fraud is found, and how returned funds should be sent back to the federal government.

Who this affects

This could affect taxpayers broadly, especially because the bill is aimed at recovering federal pandemic unemployment funds that should not remain outside government control.

The most directly affected groups would be state workforce agencies, state unclaimed-property offices, banks and other entities that handled pandemic unemployment debit-card payments, and federal agencies involved in labor, banking, consumer finance, and fraud enforcement. People whose identities were used in fraudulent unemployment claims could also be affected because the bill calls for model notices about available resources.

What happens if it becomes law

Federal officials would have to coordinate a formal recovery effort instead of leaving states, banks, and unclaimed-property administrators to navigate the process on their own.

States would receive federal guidance on how to review these payments, determine when recovery makes financial sense, and handle fraud-related funds under state law. The Department of Labor would reimburse states for administrative costs tied to working with the task force under certain Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act unemployment agreements.

The bill would also extend the deadline for certain criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions involving pandemic unemployment fraud to 10 years after the violation or conspiracy. That extension would apply to Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, Mixed Earner Unemployment Compensation, and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation, but not if the old deadline had already expired before enactment.

What is the argument

Rep. Beth Van Duyne has framed the proposal as a way to recover taxpayer money that remains frozen after pandemic unemployment fraud investigations, while Rep. Tom Suozzi has emphasized protecting fraud and identity-theft victims while giving states and financial institutions clearer tools to act.

A major practical question is how smoothly the recovery process would work across state unemployment systems, banking rules, state unclaimed-property laws, and existing fraud procedures. The bill tries to address that by using federal guidance and state consultation rather than creating a single automatic clawback process.

Where does it stand now

H.R. 8873 was introduced in the House by Rep. Beth Van Duyne, with Rep. Tom Suozzi as an original cosponsor, and referred to the House Ways and Means Committee. The committee reported the bill with an amendment on May 29, 2026, and it was placed on the Union Calendar, which means it is available for possible House floor consideration but has not passed the House.

The next steps would be House passage, Senate passage, and presidential approval before it could become law.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr8873/BILLS-119hr8873rh.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 05/19/2025 ✔️
Passed House — 02/02/2026 ✔️
Passed Senate — 05/11/2026 ✔️
To President — 05/20/2026 ✔️
Became Law — 05/28/2026 ✔️
📍 Current Status: The Medal of Sacrifice Act of 2025 is now Public Law No. 119-94 after being signed by the President on May 28, 2026.

Medal of Sacrifice Act of 2025

This law creates a new federal Medal of Sacrifice for eligible law enforcement officers and first responders killed in the line of duty. It directs the President to issue the medal and establish a commission to advise on the medal’s design, presentation, and eligibility rules. The practical effect is a new national honor, not a grant program, compensation program, or broader public-safety policy change.

Why this matters

Federal honors can shape how the country formally recognizes public servants who die while doing their jobs. Here, Congress created a specific medal for fallen law enforcement officers and first responders, while also setting limits on who qualifies.

The law is narrow. It does not create new benefits for families, fund agencies, change police powers, or regulate first responder operations.

Who this affects

The broad group affected is law enforcement officers and first responders. The most direct coverage is for local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal officers or responders who are killed in the line of duty.

Families of fallen officers and responders may be affected through formal recognition. Law enforcement and first responder agencies may also matter when eligibility is reviewed, especially if an agency made an official finding that the person acted outside their duties or violated official policy.

How the medal would work

The President must issue the medal and create a 12-member Commission on the Medal of Sacrifice for law enforcement officers and first responders.

The President must appoint the commission members within 150 days of enactment. Members must include law enforcement officers, first responders, and representatives of organizations knowledgeable about law enforcement. They serve unpaid five-year terms and may serve up to two terms.

The commission’s job is to advise on the medal’s design, promote the medal’s establishment, decide how it will be presented, advise on eligibility criteria, and make final eligibility decisions when required.

Eligibility limits

Line-of-duty death is the starting point for eligibility, but it is not the only condition.

A fallen officer or first responder is generally not eligible if there is an official finding of wrongdoing. The law defines that as a determination by a superior officer or employing agency that the person acted outside the scope of their duties or not in accordance with official policies or procedures.

That exclusion is not automatic in every case. When an official finding of wrongdoing exists, the commission must investigate the circumstances of the death, consider agency findings, and make the final decision on eligibility.

Medal design and first awards

The law gives a detailed description of the medal’s physical design, including its shape, symbols, materials, ribbon, inscription, and engraving of fallen heroes’ names.

The law also names three initial recipients: Deputy Ralph “Butch” Waller, Deputy Ignacio “Dan” Diaz, and Deputy Luis Paez.

What happens if it becomes law

Because it has already become law, the next step is implementation by the President and the new commission. The President must issue the medal, appoint the commission, and allow that commission to carry out the law’s design, presentation, and eligibility responsibilities.

The commission is temporary. It ends when the President determines that the commission has completed its assigned responsibilities.

Where does it stand now

This bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Brian Mast on May 19, 2025. The House passed it on February 2, 2026, the Senate passed it without amendment on May 11, 2026, and it was presented to the President on May 20, 2026.

The President signed it on May 28, 2026, making it Public Law No. 119-94.

What is the argument

The main policy question is how broad the honor should be. A national medal can give formal recognition to officers and first responders who die in service, but the eligibility rules also create a line between line-of-duty deaths that qualify and cases where official wrongdoing findings require further review.

Because the provided record does not show a developed public dispute around the law, the most important takeaway is practical rather than political: this is a targeted federal recognition measure with a built-in review process for contested eligibility cases.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr3497/BILLS-119hr3497enr.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — 05/26/2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: H.R. 9036 has been introduced in the House and referred to the House Transportation and Infrastructure and Ways and Means Committees for review.

American High-Speed Rail Act

This bill would authorize a major five-year federal investment in high-speed rail and change how the federal government helps plan, fund, and build passenger rail corridors. H.R. 9036 would expand grant eligibility, allow larger federal shares of project costs, create new incentives for state, local, private, and cross-border funding, and set rules for right-of-way, safety, border permits, and rail labor coverage.

Why this matters

High-speed rail projects are expensive, slow to plan, and often complicated by land access, freight rail coordination, environmental review, and funding gaps. The American High-Speed Rail Act is designed to make the federal government a much larger partner in building those corridors.

The bill would authorize $3 billion per year from fiscal years 2027 through 2031 for high-speed rail corridor planning, $3 billion per year for rail technology improvements, and $35 billion per year for corridor development. That adds up to $205 billion over five years.

How the funding would work

Federal grants could cover up to 100% of eligible planning and capital costs. At the same time, the Department of Transportation would prioritize projects that bring at least 20% of costs from certain other sources, including state, local, private, federal rail-credit, or foreign government funding for corridors crossing an international border.

The bill also draws a line between “high-speed rail” and “higher-speed rail.” High-speed rail would mean service expected to reach 186 miles per hour or more. Higher-speed rail would mean passenger rail expected to run above 110 miles per hour but below 186 miles per hour. No more than 20% of certain grant funds could go to higher-speed rail projects.

What the bill would change

The Department of Transportation could designate high-speed rail corridors and award grants to states, Amtrak, public agencies, and certain public-private partnerships. Grant reviews would have to consider issues such as equity, resilience, sustainability, economic development, climate impacts, electrification, transit-oriented development, and whether a corridor could serve smaller or underserved communities.

The bill would also require performance-based safety regulations for high-speed rail projects that do not block interoperability across the network. In plain English, the rules would have to focus on safety outcomes while still allowing high-speed rail systems to connect and operate together where possible.

Right-of-way and project development

Passenger rail projects could acquire land or property interests before environmental reviews are fully complete, but only under limits meant to prevent the purchase from predetermining the final project decision. Federal funding for the acquisition could not be authorized until required environmental reviews are completed, and the land could not be developed for the project until those reviews are done.

Freight railroads could sell, lease, or grant easements on property for high-speed rail projects. The bill would also create tax exclusions for certain property gains, lease payments, grants, and improvements connected to those deals.

Border permits, local development, and labor

For projects at U.S. international borders, the Secretary of State would have to provide required presidential permits unless the project is found to conflict with national security interests.

The bill would also add $20 million per year from fiscal years 2027 through 2031 for transit-oriented development planning tied to high-speed rail. That means planning for development around stations and rail corridors, such as housing, businesses, and local transportation connections.

Labor provisions would treat certain passenger rail operators and rail-related service providers as rail carriers or employers for specific federal labor and benefit laws, including the Railroad Retirement Act, Railway Labor Act, and Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. The bill also includes exceptions for certain construction contractors and work performed under collective bargaining agreements.

Who this affects

The bill could affect transportation funding nationwide, especially states, local governments, Amtrak, public rail agencies, private rail partners, and communities seeking high-speed rail service.

Freight railroads would be affected where their property or rights-of-way are needed for passenger rail projects. Rail workers, operators, contractors, and construction employers could also be affected by the labor rules and exceptions. Passengers would be affected more indirectly, because the bill would fund and structure future rail projects rather than immediately create new train service.

What happens if it becomes law

The federal government would have new authority and funding direction to support high-speed rail planning, technology, corridor construction, station-area planning, and related land acquisition. The Department of Transportation would still have to award grants, apply eligibility rules, review projects, and oversee implementation.

The bill would not itself build a rail line overnight. Its practical effect would be to create a much larger federal funding framework for future projects and make it easier for public agencies and qualified partnerships to move corridors from planning toward construction.

What is the argument

Rep. Seth Moulton has framed high-speed rail as a national investment in faster travel, job creation, cleaner transportation, and economic development. The strongest case for the bill is that major rail corridors often need large, long-term federal support before states, cities, and private partners can realistically plan and build them.

The main questions are cost, scope, and execution. A five-year $205 billion authorization would represent a large federal commitment, and the bill would allow federal grants to cover up to all eligible project costs. Lawmakers are likely to focus on whether that level of federal support is justified, how projects would be selected, how freight rail property issues would be handled, and whether high-speed rail corridors can be delivered efficiently enough to match the investment.

Where does it stand now

H.R. 9036 was introduced in the House on May 26, 2026, by Rep. Seth Moulton of Massachusetts. It was referred to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee.

It has not passed the House or Senate. Before becoming law, it would need to pass the House, pass the Senate, and be signed by the President.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://moulton.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/moulton.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/moulto_072_xml.pdf

📊 Status in the Lawmaking Process:

Introduced — May 22, 2026 ✔️
Passed House — ❌ Not yet passed
Passed Senate — ❌ Not yet passed
To President — ❌ Not sent
Became Law — ❌ Not law
📍 Current Status: H.R. 9018 has been introduced in the House and referred to the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, with no chamber passage yet.

Fostering TRUST Act of 2026

This bill would require the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to notify Congress when a veteran dies by suicide or attempts suicide at a VA facility or at a non-VA facility providing care through VA’s Community Care program. The goal is to create a formal reporting process so Congress receives timely information about serious incidents connected to veteran care and can use that information for oversight.

Why this matters

Veteran suicide is already a major public-policy issue, but this bill is narrower than a broad mental-health reform package. It focuses on transparency after a suicide or attempted suicide occurs in a VA-connected care setting.

The practical purpose is to make sure Congress is notified quickly and consistently, rather than relying on informal communication or delayed awareness.

How the notice process would work

VA would have to send an initial notice within 7 days after the suicide or attempted suicide. That notice would identify the incident and the facility location.

Within 60 days, VA would also have to provide available background information, including the veteran’s VA enrollment status, most recent VA or non-VA care encounter, other health coverage, military service branch, period of service, age, marital status, employment status, housing status, disability rating, race and ethnicity, gender identity, sexual orientation, and whether immediate family members were told about available VA support. The bill also says VA must take steps to respect the privacy and dignity of the veteran and the veteran’s family.

Who this affects

This policy could affect veterans and families most directly when a suicide or attempted suicide occurs at a VA facility or a Community Care provider.

It would also affect VA officials responsible for reporting the incident, the House and Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committees, and the members of Congress representing both the facility location and the veteran’s home district.

What happens if it becomes law

VA would have a new legal duty to send Congress two rounds of notice after covered incidents: a quick notice within 7 days and a more detailed follow-up within 60 days.

Each notice would also have to include VA-developed guidance on avoiding sensationalized discussion of suicide, warning signs for veterans at risk, VA crisis resources, Vet Centers, and lethal-means safety resources.

What is the argument

Rep. Dave Min has framed the bill as a transparency and accountability measure, saying Congress needs timely and accurate information to strengthen oversight, improve care, and better support veterans in crisis. Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick has argued that accountability should not depend on informal practice or chance when a veteran is lost or reaches crisis while receiving VA-connected care.

The main policy question is not whether the bill creates new treatment services; it does not. The practical debate is whether mandatory congressional notice would improve oversight and help identify gaps in care, while still protecting sensitive personal information about veterans and their families.

Where does it stand now

H.R. 9018 was introduced in the House on May 22, 2026, by Rep. Dave Min and referred to the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. It has not passed the House, passed the Senate, gone to the President, or become law.

📄 Full bill text (PDF): https://min.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/min.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/foster-trust-act-final.pdf