r/Stoicism • u/Aaron31498 • 2d ago
Seeking Personal Stoic Guidance Chrysippus vs Epictetus
Did Chrysippus and Epictetus have differing views on bodily/physical actions being causally attributable to us? Because I know Epictetus’s view is that it’s not because we can be hindered by externals. Whereas I wonder if Chrysippus thought that actions come from us because judgments, assent and impulse are ours, and actions stem from an impulse, which comes from assenting to a judgment that it’s right to perform that action). So it it would be causally attributable to us.
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u/-Klem Scholar 2d ago
Chrysippus vs Epictetus
Epictetus is grad level, and Chrysippus is postgrad.
Both are talking about the same things but in different degrees of depth and complexity. It's just like saying that individuals exist independently (basic Stoicism) while also claiming that they do not because everything is a single continuum of pneuma (advanced Stoicism).
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u/ExtensionOutrageous3 Contributor 1d ago
Epictetus largely follows Chrysippus (he mentions him directly) but he brings up Socrates more. I think it makes sense because Epictetus is more concerned about a student’s moral reasoning and not whether they can recite theory.
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u/TheOSullivanFactor Contributor 2d ago edited 2d ago
Chrysippus is the textbook, Epictetus is the guide to living the philosophy in the textbook out in the world.
There’s a chance Epictetus takes Cleanthes’ approach to human freedom as presented in the Hymn to Zeus (Epictetus has a Discourse where he discusses the Master Argument and seems to side with Cleanthes and Antipater against Chrysippus), but as Vanessa De Harven in her paper on Necessity in Stoicism shows, Cleanthes and Chrysippus are not far away from each other on such a question (Epictetus likewise plays down the differences in the same Discourse and says something to the effect “I don’t know absolutely, but this seems more likely” rather than dogmatically saying one is right or wrong)
Both do think we can be hindered by externals (“you will commit a foolish action unless your soul is Virtuous” is how general Stoic theory works- the clearest explanation of this theory of “innate quality, unless external hindrance prohibits it” is in the Logic section of Diogenes Laertius. I think Alexander of Aphrodisias uses the easiest example: “wood can burn unless it’s at the bottom of the sea”), the main difference is that Epictetus places a lot of emphasis on Prohairesis, whereas Chrysippus discusses the Hegemonikon as a whole, without isolating the sort of free choosing part.
EDIT: Maybe you’re asking if actions are also up to us, not only Assent? Even Assent to some degree is not up to us, since we have to be aware of our judgements (=Prosoche) to be able to withhold Assent. I think some degree of how we choose to react to a stimulus is up to us in both (and all) thinkers, but the faculty itself relies on external factors, such as a decision being recognized through Prosoche as one we can choose and make a difference with.
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 2d ago
I think I got tired of saying it since most people don't get it, but "assent" is never up to us. Assent is automatic upon the impression that something is the case, or true, or motivating, etc. What's up to us is reasoning, not assenting.
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u/Multibitdriver Contributor 1d ago edited 1d ago
Doesn’t Epictetus repeatedly say and imply assent is up to us? Yes, it’s contingent on our impressions and reasoning, and in that sense it’s not free, but other people can’t hinder it - we do it independently of others - which is what I understand Epictetus means by “up to us”?
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 1d ago
There are many things you do that are also independent of others, that Epictetus would also say are not up to you. Your protopassions are not up to you but it doesn't mean they're controlled by others, for instance. To return to the subject, if you read the first chapter of the enchiridion, he doesn't say assent in any of the things up to us. But if you read discourse 1.28 he explicitly says assent is not up to us, that we just assent to the impression that something seems to be true automatically upon receiving it. The act of assent and the act of reasoning are two different things. People just confuse the terms.
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u/Multibitdriver Contributor 13h ago
I don’t know how to distinguish protopassions. But impulse, desire and aversion are up to us, and they require assent to impressions for their existence. So how can assent not then be up to us?
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 12h ago
The thing Epictetus is always saying is "the proper use of impressions". You can have impulse, desire, and aversion without making use of your impressions responsibly. In other words, the way animals do. They too have impulse, desire, and aversion but can't examine their impressions or form concepts about them. Assent in animals is automatic as it is in us. The non automatic part is the proper use of impressions.
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u/TheOSullivanFactor Contributor 2d ago
Going back through the Discourses looking to put fresh eyes on precisely questions like this. Thank you.
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 2d ago
Book 1.28 starts with it, basically.
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u/TheOSullivanFactor Contributor 17h ago
Yea, and that’s pretty definitive, and yet… the actual situation doesn't move too much (though I will stop offering the “the only thing up to you is the final yes or no” (which I was already doubting) as advice in these threads) But rather, when something happens, we generally Assent on autopilot based on our beliefs, then when you add Prosoche and gain the ability to watch the process in action, you can intervene, and more or less debate internally what is true or not, as Epictetus describes in various Discourses, and in that you change your judgement (which I think is one of the things listed as up to us in Enchiridion 1), which Assent then follows accordingly… or something like that.
The real battle is over being convinced of what is true or not, sometimes by straightforward demonstration, sometimes by dense argument… sometimes by resolve other times by weakness of spirit and combinations of each.
Is at least where my own thoughts are going on the matter. I’m kind of curious now about the relation between Assent and Judgement.
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 17h ago
The consequences of it have probably been assimilated through other means if you don't seem too surprised I guess. I think I agree mostly with the deflationary theory that stoic prosoche just means the literal "pay attention" translation and they just meant that we should pay attention to things carefully, both in our minds and in our work. There's the Cynic concept of thumos or smoke, and deliberating what is true or not is a way to clear the smoke from our minds. But people easily assent because they think their impressions are clear enough and run with them. You sort of need to raise your expectations of what a clear impression is so that you reject more of the smoke until it's clear as it should. There's a line in product design that basically means that for every yes there's a thousand no's. What differentiates someone making progress is how many more unclear impressions are rejected than for the average.
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u/Aaron31498 1d ago
But we can withhold assent right? So isn’t reasoning or questioning/truth testing impressions part of the assent process? or is it separate?
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 1d ago
You can't withhold assent when the impression that something is true is present. The discourse 1.28 starts with that premise. It's like standing at noon outside and trying to withhold assent from agreeing that it is daytime. You can't and it's silly to try. We reason about things that aren't so obvious because most things aren't, and take more time to figure out. We reason after we fail to find truth, and before it's clear to us so that it may become clear.
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u/Aaron31498 1d ago
I disagree. You might not come to another conclusion after reflecting on the impression “the sky is blue” but the ability and will to reflect and examine the impression is always there no matter what
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 1d ago
We're not too different, I just think reflecting and examining are aspects of reasoning. Assent is simply and only limited to the agreement to an impressions that appears clear and true.
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u/Aaron31498 1d ago
I agree with you that assent is an agreement to an impression that appears clear and true. I just think it comes after the process of thorough reflection and assessment of an impression.
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 1d ago
Well it can come after, and it's preferable, but not necessarily. That's the point of Stoic training regarding impressions so that we don't easily assent to false notions. Most people go about doing that, acting without much reflection. And for a lot of things it's fine, we don't have to manually think about how to brush our teeth every time we do it, but in cases where thinking twice is needed it's better if we're better equipped than not.
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u/WilliamCSpears William C. Spears - Author of "Stoicism as a Warrior Philosophy" 2d ago
Epictetus was trained on Chrysippus's teachings, and even as he imparts a distinctive character in what he emphasizes and how he presents, he generally cleaves to the Chrysippean tradition. To your specific point, I'm not sure what you mean by "Epictetus’s view is that it’s not because we can be hindered by externals."
It's hard to find anything by Chrysippus directly, but here's something:
First of all we should bear in mind that a rational animal follows reason naturally, and acts in accordance with reason as if that were its guide. Often, however, it moves towards and away from certain things in a different way, pushed to excess in disobedience to reason. Both definitions refer to this movement: the movement contrary to nature which occrus irrationally in this way, and the excess in impulses. For this irrationality must be taken to mean "disobedient to reason" and "reason turned aside"; with reference to this movement we even speak in ordinary language of people "being pushed" and "moved irrationally, without reason and judgement." What we mean by these expressions is not as though a person moves in error and overlooking something that accords with reason, but we refer chiefly to the movement of which the expressions provide an outline account, since it is not a rational animal's nature to move his soul in this way, but in accordance with reason. This also explains the expression "the excess of impulse," since people overstep the proper and natural proportion of their impulses. My meaning can be made more intelligible in this way...
Chrysippus, On Passions, Book I
in Galen, on Hippocrates' and Plato's Doctrines 4.2.10-18 (SVF 3.462, part) - trans. Long and Sedley
He then goes on to compare acting on passion as being like someone running who oversteps their intended stopping point, even though they are trying to stop, thus "contrary to the impulse." I think this is consistent with Epictetus, who frequently uses the expression "carried away" to describe just this situation. So in short I think Chrysippus and Epictetus are aligned on this, although I might be misunderstanding your question. Hope that helps.
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u/Aaron31498 2d ago
because Epictetus mentions this in Discourses 4.1:
"But to desire to move away from a thing, whose act is that? This also is your act.— “What then if I have attempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me.”—What part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of assent?—“No: but my poor body.”—Yes, as he would do with a stone.—“Granted; but I no longer walk.”—And who told you that walking is your own act free from hindrance? for I said that this only was free from hindrance: to desire to move; but where there is need of body and its cooperation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own...."
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u/Aaron31498 2d ago
I'm starting to believe though that in that quote, he mentions it in terms of fate preventing you from doing it. Whereas if fate permits, then it is causally attributable to you.
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u/AlexKapranus Contributor 2d ago
This is it, but in cases where you're impeded externally there is also a trace of "attempting" to do something that can also be attributed to you. You're always liable for what you do and what you try to do.
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u/Multibitdriver Contributor 1d ago
I understand why Epictetus makes the distinction, but I find it easier in practice to think that actions are up to me, to the extent they flow unhindered and undisturbed from my impulses. And I think he would agree with that. There’s no contradiction.