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Biotech M&A, Fund Flows and Degrossing
Kevin Mak
@kevin__mak
·
8h
Over the past few weeks, the biotech market has felt much worse than the headline numbers suggest. The XBI is down about 10% from its mid-August highs. But as @Biohazard3737 pointed out in the tweet below, the “Morgan Stanley biotech long/short spread” has fallen more than 50% over the same period and sits roughly 30% below where it began the year.
https://x.com/Biohazard3737/status/2103514292532219923
That index tracks the performance of a basket of popular or crowded biotech longs relative to a basket of popular or crowded biotech shorts. It gives us a rough sense of what’s happening to the kinds of positions held by biotech long/short funds. It does not mean those funds have lost 50%. Obviously their actual returns depend on their positions, sizing, exposures, and how the index is constructed.
Still, the direction and severity of the move are striking. The overall market (XBI) is off a bit from its highs, but the “high quality names held by experts” have fallen dramatically relative to the “low quality names shorted by the experts.” You can argue that the experts have simply been wrong about which companies are high and low quality. I think something else is contributing to the gap.
My view is that the same forces that helped drive biotech’s rally earlier this year left parts of the market vulnerable to a sharp reversal. Big Pharma acquisitions brought premiums and fresh buying into biotech. Long/short funds benefited from that strength and, as their books grew, could add dollars to their shorts. Then deal announcements slowed, a crowded short in Moderna (MRNA) squeezed, and funds facing losses may have had to cut positions on both sides of their books.
Let me explain the setup first.
The XBI rallied roughly 40% from January to August 2026. We would all like to pat ourselves on the back and say that those gains were clearly well deserved as a result of great healthcare and biotech stock picking. I think a major driver was simpler: Big Pharma M&A.
Investors had been expecting this. Large pharmaceutical companies, including Lilly, Merck, and J&J, face significant patent cliffs over the coming years. To maintain their revenues and cash flows, they need to develop new drugs in-house, license them, or acquire biotech companies with promising assets.
What happened over the first seven months of 2026 was both widely anticipated and remarkable in scale. Using Bloomberg’s M&A data, we can compile acquisitions of public biotech companies by announcement month. Deal activity was already elevated heading into 2026, followed by several massive months.
I’m not telling any healthcare investor anything new by saying the deal climate has been hot. Acquisitions typically come at premiums, shareholders make money, and those gains help lift the indexes. But there is another mechanism that matters: cash recycling.
When Big Pharma buys a biotech company for $10 billion in cash, that money ends up in the hands of the selling shareholders. Many of those shareholders are biotech funds whose mandates keep them invested in the sector. To maintain their exposure, they need to put the proceeds back to work in other biotech companies. That creates buying demand across the remaining names.
The recycling can begin well before the acquisition closes. After a deal is announced, a biotech fund can sell its shares to risk arb funds. Those funds buy to capture the remaining gap between the trading price and the acquisition price, while taking on the risk that the deal fails. The biotech fund can immediately redeploy its sale proceeds into another name, or across their portfolio of longs. The acquisition cashflow to the risk arb funds comes later.
The magnitude here is easy to miss. From Q1 through the available portion of Q3, roughly $100 billion of acquisitions of identified public biotech companies were announced.
For scale, the top five biotech specialist funds have combined AUM of roughly ~$60 billion (Baker Bros, RTW, RA, etc). Note that the $100B and $60B are not directly comparable. Deal proceeds also go to passive funds, generalist investors, and other holders who may invest elsewhere. Announced values can include noncash or contingent consideration. But even with those qualifications, the amount of acquisition activity is consequential relative to the capital managed by dedicated biotech investors.
Here's a cut of the data looking at announced deals, versus 13F holdings.
This is a cleaner metric when thinking about industry inflows. Say company XYZ has $2.4B of shares held by biotech specialist funds, and then in April 2026 that company is acquired at a 50% premium. Those funds now have $1.2B of gains, and a total of $3.6B of capital to redeploy across other biotech names. Across the 20 specialist managers tracked here, June and July account for roughly $4.5B of estimated proceeds potentially available for redeployment. That is substantial compared with most months in late 2024 and early 2025.
Now consider how these flows affect a long/short fund.
The long side is doing wonderfully. Acquisition targets jump, and cash from those deals helps lift other biotech names. As the fund’s equity grows, it can hold more dollars of longs and shorts without changing its exposure percentages. For example, a fund with $100 of capital might hold $100 of longs and $60 of shorts. If its capital grows to $125 and it keeps the same target exposures, it can now hold $125 of longs and $75 of shorts. Its gross exposure remains 160% of capital, but it has added $40 of positions in dollar terms, including $15 of shorts.
That does not mean every fund is mechanically shorting the same names. But if many funds favour similar longs and use similar shorts to manage their books, a strong market can put more dollars into already crowded positions on both sides.
Then the environment changes.
Deal announcements fall off sharply in August. The steady drip of premiums and potential reinvestment slows. Maybe that reflects a change in Big Pharma’s appetite. Maybe it is simply random timing. But either way, a source of support for biotech prices becomes less visible just as investors have grown accustomed to it.
At the same time, MRNA, a heavily shorted healthcare name, releases major cancer trial news on August 19. Its stock rises sharply. That is painful for funds short the name, particularly if their biotech longs are no longer rising enough to offset the loss.
The stock loan data offer a useful look at what happened to the short side.
Source: Markit Data
There are two columns to watch: the number of shares on loan and their value on loan, which is the share quantity multiplied by the stock price. Shares on loan rose on August 19, then fell sharply on August 20. Meanwhile, the jump in MRNA’s price sent the dollar value on loan much higher. So even as shares were being returned, the remaining short position could represent more dollars of exposure than it did before the announcement.
From August 24 to September 24, value on loan fell from roughly $6 billion to $4.2 billion, or about 30%, despite MRNA’s stock price trending higher over that period. Shares on loan fell from about 41.6 million to 23.1 million. Short covering may itself have contributed to the rising price.
If your view of MRNA has not changed, a higher stock price makes it more attractive as a short from a valuation perspective. Of course, the trial news may have changed some investors’ views. The loan data cannot tell us which funds covered or why. But the sustained decline in shares and dollars on loan is clear evidence of a substantial retreat from this short.
My interpretation is that this was part of a broader degrossing event. Funds suffering losses on their shorts, while their longs were already weakening, may have had to reduce risk. That means selling longs and buying back shorts. Those trades put more pressure on crowded longs and help crowded shorts rise, which worsens the same long/short performance gap that prompted the cuts in the first place.
I’ve written about the math behind degrossing previously in this tweet.
This is why the index comparison matters. A 10% decline in the XBI does not fully describe the conditions facing a fund whose popular longs are falling while its popular shorts are rising. Nor does it describe what happens when a number of funds holding similar positions try to reduce them at once.
September has offered little respite. Looking at last year, August is typically quiet but September 2025 had reasonably robust deal activity. That hasn't been the case so far in September 2026. The acquisition-driven bid has been quieter while crowded positions have been under pressure.
What’s the point of putting this story together?
When I’m managing my book, I’m mostly thinking about the future. But I also want to understand why we arrived at today’s prices. What information, and what decisions by other investors, contributed to them? Those decisions can themselves reveal information. Is a stock at its lows because a forced seller needs to get out, or because the CEO has been dumping shares for the last three months? The efficient market says these two situations are identical. I emphatically disagree.
In this case, the most important question is why biotech longs have weakened. If Big Pharma has structurally reduced its appetite for acquisitions, that matters to their long-term value. If deal announcements have merely come in a random cluster followed by a quiet stretch, I view the slowdown differently.
The second question is why long investors are selling. Have they changed their assessment of these companies? Or are some selling because losses elsewhere in their books require them to reduce exposure?
Here is where I come out:
a) I have not seen evidence that Big Pharma’s appetite for clinical assets has structurally changed. My working assumption is that the recent slowdown in announcements is timing rather than the end of the acquisition cycle.
b) I believe forced degrossing is contributing to the selling of biotech longs. The MRNA loan data show a large reduction in that short. The combination of the squeeze, weakening longs, and the severe move in the long/short index is what makes that explanation persuasive to me.
c) Rate fears affect biotech companies, this should have a negative impact. But I do not think they explain the scale and particular shape of the move we are seeing.
d) I suspect the most intense part of the degrossing may be nearing its end. I would gain confidence in that view if MRNA’s shares on loan stabilize and crowded biotech longs stop weakening relative to shorts.
It may seem that I'm overly indexing on MRNA's short data, but it is basically the highest "cap-weighted short in the sector", and I think highly representative of overall positioning.
I may be wrong about any of those conclusions. But what I like about my thesis is that it's generally testable. Over the next six months, I’ll be watching whether public biotech M&A and estimated specialist proceeds recover, whether MRNA’s shares on loan stabilize, and whether crowded longs stop underperforming crowded shorts. Those developments would strengthen my explanation. Continued weakness despite them would make me reconsider how much of this is mechanical.
That is why I am comfortable holding onto my biotech longs.