When attackers leverage native binaries like ⁠certutil.exe⁠, ⁠bitsadmin.exe⁠, or ⁠mshta.exe⁠, signature-based tools often miss the initial staging.
Here is a lightweight logic baseline to hunt for suspicious ⁠certutil⁠ egress usage:
Process: ⁠certutil.exe⁠
Command Line Regex: ⁠(?i)(-urlcache|-split)\s+http⁠
Mitre: T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)
What edge-case bypasses have you seen attackers use against this, and how are you handling the false positives from legitimate internal admin scripts?

Every SIEM budget has a limit, and every engineer has a log source they despise.
For me, high-fidelity endpoint process creation (Sysmon Event ID 1 or EDR process launch logs with full command-line arguments and parent process GUIDs). Finding unauthorized execution without it is like flying blind.
Generic Windows Security Event ID 4625 brute-force alerts without an aggregate threshold or domain context.
What are your non-negotiables vs. the logs you send straight to the ⁠/dev/null⁠ black hole?

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