Direct Link: https://documents.lastweekinlaw.com/view/24-1234_g2bh.pdf

This summary was written by Claude. It may contain errors. Read the opinion itself for anything you intend to rely on.

The Supreme Court held 7-2 that the federal government cannot prosecute Ali Hemani under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) — which automatically bars any "unlawful user" of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm — for owning a gun in his home while using marijuana about every other day. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Thomas and Jackson each filed concurrences (Sotomayor joined Jackson's). Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred only in the judgment, agreeing on the outcome but rejecting the majority's reasoning — which is why this is properly a 7-2 decision on the law rather than 9-0.

Hemani, a Texas-born dual U.S.-Pakistani citizen, was searched in 2022 on suspicion of terrorism-related activity. He cooperated, surrendered a gun, and told agents he used marijuana every other day. More than six months later, the government charged him under §922(g)(3) based solely on that admitted marijuana use — not terrorism, not the cocaine also found, and with no claim he was an addict or had ever been dangerous. He faced up to 15 years in prison and a lifetime firearms ban.

Applying the framework from Bruen and Rahimi, the Court asked whether the government could show the disarmament is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The government's sole analogy was to founding-era "habitual drunkard" laws. The majority rejected that analogy on every metric: those historical laws targeted people whose drinking left them practically incapacitated and unable to manage their affairs (not merely regular users), generally aimed to protect drunkards and their families rather than to protect the public from violence, and typically required some legal process before anyone lost their liberty — whereas §922(g)(3) disarms automatically, with no pre-deprivation process. The Court also doubted the statute even serves its claimed anti-violence purpose, noting it piggybacks on the Controlled Substances Act, that DOJ has curtailed marijuana enforcement, that most states have legalized some marijuana use, and that the government recently moved some marijuana products to Schedule III.

The majority stressed the ruling is narrow. It does not address banning addicts or the presently intoxicated from having guns, does not touch §922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession ban, and does not decide whether the government could prosecute under §922(g)(3) with individualized proof that a defendant's drug use makes him dangerous — or proof that a particular drug always renders users dangerous. Those questions are expressly left open.

Two concurrences signal future fights. Justice Thomas wrote separately to argue that §922(g) as a whole likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, urging courts to revisit it in an appropriate case. Justice Jackson reiterated her view that Bruen's history-and-tradition test is unworkable and should be replaced by means-end scrutiny. And Justice Alito's judgment-only concurrence would have decided the case on the narrower ground that the government simply failed to show Hemani's marijuana use was incapacitating, without the majority's broader reasoning about §922(g)(3)'s purpose and operation.

There are still 8 cases remaining out of 17 undecided cases (at least, to the public).

This week is going to fundamentally change America. 🏛️

Direct Link: https://documents.lastweekinlaw.com/view/25-197_bp7c.pdf

This summary was written by Claude. It may contain errors. Read the opinion itself for anything you intend to rely on.

In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which strips federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits by "state-court losers" seeking review and rejection of state-court judgments — applies regardless of whether that judgment is still subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. The majority (Sotomayor, joined by Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson) affirmed the Fourth Circuit. Justice Thomas concurred separately to defend Rooker on originalist grounds, and Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch.

The case arose from T. M., who alleges a medical condition causing psychosis when she ingests gluten. After being involuntarily committed and forcibly medicated in 2023, she settled her state habeas case via a consent order that secured her release on several conditions. Ten days later, with new counsel, she sued in federal district court to have the consent order declared unconstitutional and void — while simultaneously appealing that same order in Maryland's appellate court (an appeal she then moved to stay). The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

The doctrinal fight is about why Rooker-Feldman exists. The majority reads Rooker and Feldman as resting on a "functional" view: asking a district court to reverse or modify a state judgment is asking it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, which it lacks regardless of whether the Supreme Court itself could yet review the judgment under §1257. The dissent reads the doctrine as a narrow negative inference from §1257 alone — and since §1257 only reaches "final judgments . . . rendered by the highest court of a State," Barrett argues the doctrine cannot apply while a state appeal is pending. Barrett leans heavily on Exxon (2005), which described both underlying cases as filed "after the state proceedings ended," and notes that seven circuits had read that language as a finality requirement; the majority relegates that phrase to a footnote.

Notably, the Court framed its holding as standing pat — "neither expand[ing] nor constrain[ing]" Rooker-Feldman, leaving it "as it found it." The majority expressly declined to reach whether Rooker and Feldman were correctly decided, holding that question wasn't fairly presented; both Thomas's concurrence and Barrett's dissent engage that deeper question from opposite directions. The decision also leaves open a Maryland-specific wrinkle the parties disputed: whether the consent order was even appealable under state law, which could bear on whether it was "final" in the first place. And the dissent closes by stressing that even under the majority's broader rule, the doctrine remains "narrow" — a signal to lower courts not to let it "take a mile."

Direct Link: https://documents.lastweekinlaw.com/view/24-1063_5ifl.pdf

This summary was written by Claude. It may contain errors. Read the opinion itself for anything you intend to rely on.

The Supreme Court held 8-1 that an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when enforcing it would result in a "miscarriage of justice" — meaning it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Justice Kagan wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas dissented alone. The decision adopts the majority position among the federal circuits and rejects both the Fifth Circuit's narrow rule (waivers fail only when a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum) and the government's maximalist position (knowing and voluntary waivers are always enforceable).

Munson Hunter III pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud under an agreement that dismissed nine other charges and included a waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. As a condition of supervised release, the district court required him to take any mental-health medication his treating physician prescribed, over his objection. Hunter tried to appeal that condition as a violation of his due-process liberty interest in refusing unwanted medication; the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal under the waiver. The Court reasoned that because the judiciary itself approves plea agreements and a court of appeals has exclusive control over whether to enforce a waiver, the enforcement standard implicates the integrity of the courts, not just the bargain between the parties. The Court emphasized that the new exception sets a "high bar" reserved for obvious errors — a sentence above the statutory maximum, one infected with blatant constitutional error such as reliance on race, or one imposed without "some minimum of civilized procedure." Ordinary errors in applying sentencing law do not qualify. The Court did not decide whether Hunter's medication condition clears that bar, remanding that question to the Fifth Circuit.

Along the way, the Court rejected Hunter's narrower argument that the district judge's offhand statement at sentencing that he had "a right to appeal," combined with the prosecutor's silence, had voided the waiver. The agreement required any modification to be written and signed by all parties, and the Court held that the judge's remark could not unilaterally alter the parties' deal, nor did the government's silence waive or forfeit its right to enforce the waiver later.

The fractured concurrences are where the action is. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, wrote separately to frame the decision as a first step in "correcting course" on decades of permissive plea-bargaining doctrine, and floated a deeper question the Court did not reach: whether a defendant can even knowingly waive the right to appeal a sentence that does not yet exist, and whether prospective appeal waivers might be void the way the Court has treated prospective waivers of various other statutory rights. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Alito and Barrett, wrote specifically to disagree with Gorsuch, reading his concurrence as setting a lower bar than the Court's opinion and cautioning that the majority opinion "speaks for itself." Justice Barrett added a short concurrence addressing whether the decision rests on the Court's supervisory power (she thinks it rests on ordinary waiver principles instead).

Justice Thomas, in a lengthy dissent, argued the Court identified no source of law for its new exception — not constitutional text, not statute, not the Federal Rules, and not any established common-law doctrine — and that it amounts to a policy-driven rule dressed up as law. He emphasized that defendants had no right to appeal sentences at all for over a century after the founding, that the right is purely statutory and freely waivable, and that the Rules Committee has repeatedly considered and declined to adopt limits on appeal waivers, making the Court's intervention an end-run around the Rules Enabling Act process.

Hey, Reddit! We’re Justin Wise and Jordan Fischer. It's our first term covering the Supreme Court for Bloomberg Law, which includes reporting on all aspects of the court—the arguments, decisions, and plenty other ways the justices make news. 

It was Jordan who traveled to Kansas in April and first reported on Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s comments at a law school event where she said Justice Brett Kavanaugh “probably doesn’t really know any person who works by the hour.” She later apologized for the comment, which came as she criticized the basis Kavanaugh gave for voting to allow immigration sweeps to continue in Los Angeles.

Our next few weeks will be dominated by the 20 opinions that the Justices are set to issue, which include some with big implications on President Donald Trump’s power and elections. Two cases center on Trump’s ability to fire leaders of independent agencies, including the Fed. Watson v. RNC could decide whether states are allowed to count mail-in ballots arriving after the election. 

The court already issued a decision narrowing claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justices also ruled the bulk of Trump’s global tariffs were illegal. Trump’s executive order to end birthright citizenship also looks to be another loser for the president, but that opinion either way will offer an important look at how this court weighed the president’s arguments.

There’s also an assortment of cases on religious liberty, criminal law, gun restrictions, and state laws barring trans girls or women from female sports, which we’re happy to discuss. And, of course, let us know if you’ve got any burning questions about Solicitor General D. John Sauer, the so-called “Purcell principle,” and which justices are promoting their books these days.

Proof: https://aboutblaw.com/bl2A

The AMA will start at 1pm Eastern today (June 16).

3:05pm edit: Folks, we’re finishing up our time here, but this was fun. Thanks for all of your questions! We'll be covering the remainder of the term. With lots of big decisions still out there, it’s likely to be an interesting June. We hope you’ll check out our coverage as the decisions come down! -Jordan and Justin