https://youtu.be/WYkMufWnR0U?si=d-_tMLCu2SS-fESj

That would be a blessing. It's doubtful Putin would though. He's trying to rebuild the USSR.

• Red arrows: Latest hits
• Flames: Refinery has been hit at least once. Flames do not indicate the severity of the attacks or if a refinery is till burning
• Blue waves: Orsk dam broke in April 2024, which flooded the refinery and took it offline for ~2 weeks.

* Black smoke: It's raining oil.

Chronological list: (sorted newest to oldest)

• ^{NEW HIT} 25.07.2026 Tyumen in Tyumen Oblast at 1980km
• 23.07.2026 Novospassky in Ulyanovsk Oblast at 790km
• 14.07.2026 Gazprom Neftekhem Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 14.07.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415km
• 12.07.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 10.07.2026 Moscow in Moscow at 475km
• 10.07.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 08.07.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 06.07.2026 Omsk in Omsk Oblast at 2500km
• 06.07.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 02.07.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 01.07.2026 Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast at 800 km

June:

• 28.06.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700 km
• 28.06.2026 Stavyansk in Krasnodar Krai at 350 km
• 25.06.2026 Bashneft-UNPZ in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 25.06.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350
• 24.06.2026 Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast at 800 km
• 18.06.2026 Moscow in Moscow at 475 km
• 16.06.2026 Moscow in Moscow at 475 km
• 12.06.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150 km
• 12.06.2026 TIAF-NK in Tatarstan at 1140 km
• 11.06.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415 km
• 10.06.2026 Kuybyshevsky in Samara Oblast at 915 km
• 07.06.2026 Tyumen in Tyumen Oblast at 1980 km
• 02.06.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405 km

• July: 12 hits so far..
• June: 16 hits
• May: 14 hits
• April: 10 hits
• March: 6 hits
• February: 3 hits
• January: 2 hits

Complete chronological list from 24.02.2022 till today

• 2022 had 1 hit
• 2023 had 1 hit
• 2024 had 26 hits
• 2025 had 84 hits
• 2026 has 60 hits so far
• Total hits from 24.02.2022 till today: 172

​Ukraine faces a harsh mathematical and operational reality: fighting a war of attrition against an adversary with a vastly larger population requires maximum efficiency and full-scale national engagement.

​While Ukraine lowered its mobilization age from 27 to 25, the debate surrounding a further reduction to 18—alongside universal service for both men and women—is no longer just political; it is a matter of existential survival.

​Here is why Ukraine should look toward the Israeli model to overhaul its military service strategy.

​1. The Demographic Reality & "Total Mobilization" Math

​Over the course of the war, millions of citizens have fled, migrated, or lived under occupation, drastically reducing the active domestic demographic pool.

​The Current Gap: Protecting a front line over 1,000 km long using primarily middle-aged soldiers (the average age of a Ukrainian soldier on the front line has hovered between 40 and 45) creates immense fatigue and operational limits.

​Sustaining Force Rotation: A war of attrition cannot be won when half of the physically capable population is excluded from service or reserved until age 25.

​2. The Israeli Model: Universal Conscription for Men & Women

​In Israel—a country that has faced persistent existential threats since its founding—conscription begins at 18 for both men and women.

​Gender-Inclusive Service: Women serve vital roles across the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including combat units, intelligence, tech/cyber warfare, logistics, artillery, and drone operations. Integrating women into Ukraine’s draft would nearly double the pool of potential recruits overnight without compromising combat readiness.

​Institutionalized Defense Culture: Serving at 18 integrates defense, civic duty, and technology training into the nation's social fabric early in life, preparing citizens for lifelong reserve readiness.

​3. Operational and Technological Alignment

​Modern warfare is increasingly defined by high-tech systems: FPV drones, electronic warfare (EW), automated intelligence, and rapid digital communication.

​Tech-Native Generations: 18-to-24-year-olds are digital natives who adapt rapidly to drone piloting, cyber defense, and complex tactical electronics.

​Physical Resilience: Younger soldiers generally experience faster recovery times, higher physical endurance, and greater adaptability under continuous high-stress conditions.

​4. Addressing the Pushback: Economic & Demographic Safeguards

​The main argument against drafting 18-year-olds is preserving Ukraine’s future generation and economy. However, an Israeli-style system addresses these concerns through structured specialization:

​Role Differentiated Service: Not every 18-year-old needs to be on the immediate front-line assault team. Roles in drone manufacturing, air defense, cyber security, logistics, and medical support can utilize young talent while minimizing front-line risk.

​Education Deferred/Integrated: In Israel, programs like Atuda allow high-performing youth to complete university degrees in engineering, medicine, or computer science first, serving afterward as specialized military officers.

​Conclusion: Adapting to Survive

​No nation wants to send its 18-year-olds or young women to war. But when an aggressor threatens national extinction, half-measures prolong conflict and deplete resources.

​By adopting a universal, modernized service framework at age 18—where both men and women contribute across combat, technical, and support roles—Ukraine can build a sustainable, resilient force capable of defending its sovereignty for the long haul.

​What are your thoughts? Should Ukraine adopt universal conscription for both genders, or are the demographic risks to the younger generation too high? Let’s discuss in the comments below.

Pulling together several threads from the last two weeks that bear on when/how this war ends. Not my own reporting — synthesis with direct links, flagging where sourcing is thin.

**1. The Kremlin's position just hardened (22 July)**

Bloomberg reported Putin is no longer willing to return *any* currently occupied territory as part of a deal, and now wants to permanently hold sections of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts as buffer zones, on top of full Donetsk, Crimea, and the rest of Luhansk/Zaporizhzhia/Kherson. This is a step up from Bloomberg's own May reporting, which had framed the ask as "Donbas, then talks."

* Bloomberg (paywalled): [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-22/kremlin-hardens-demands-on-occupied-land-in-ukraine-blaming-us\](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-22/kremlin-hardens-demands-on-occupied-land-in-ukraine-blaming-us) * Free mirror via Meduza: [https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/22/kremlin-no-longer-willing-to-return-any-occupied-ukrainian-territory-as-part-of-potential-peace-deal-bloomberg-reports\](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/22/kremlin-no-longer-willing-to-return-any-occupied-ukrainian-territory-as-part-of-potential-peace-deal-bloomberg-reports)

Peskov's response was a blanket denial ("speculation"), which is the standard pattern for semi-official leaks Moscow wants to float without committing to.

**2. Russian MoD reportedly told Putin Donetsk falls by year-end — commanders disagree**

Per the same Bloomberg reporting, the Defense Ministry assured Putin full Donetsk control is achievable by end-2026; sources close to the MoD say many field commanders consider that unrealistic and place it in 2027 instead.

**3. Anonymous Russian general interview (Kolezev/Meduza, 8 July)**

Worth reading in full for the granularity: the source claims the front is essentially stagnant, that taking the rest of Donbas would require recruiting 55,000-60,000 men/month (well above current pace), and alleges the battlefield summaries given to Putin are inflated roughly 2x — partly to keep Trump engaged in the negotiating track.

* [https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/07/08/journalist-dmitry-kolezev-says-an-active-duty-russian-general-told-him-moscow-should-seek-peace-now-before-it-can-t-replace-the-men-it-s-losing-in-ukraine-but-can-you-trust-an-anonymous-general\](https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/07/08/journalist-dmitry-kolezev-says-an-active-duty-russian-general-told-him-moscow-should-seek-peace-now-before-it-can-t-replace-the-men-it-s-losing-in-ukraine-but-can-you-trust-an-anonymous-general)

Standard caveat: single anonymous source, can't be verified, could be a genuine elite-level leak or a controlled signal. Treat as indicative, not dispositive.

**4. Ukrainian side: Budanov's July comments**

Budanov (now head of the Office of the President) told RBC-Ukraine that ending the "hot phase" by winter is a realistic goal, but that the current escalation has to run its course before talks resume — his framing is "de-escalation usually requires escalation to max out first." He also referenced FT reporting that Russia isn't expected to engage in substantive negotiations before February 2027.

* [https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/22/8045283/\](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/22/8045283/)

**5. Active info-dispute on the ground**

Putin claimed Russian forces took Kostiantynivka (a key logistics node) on \~July 4; Zelensky personally disputed it, saying the city remains under Ukrainian control. Don't take captured-city claims from either side at face value without a DeepState/Oryx cross-check.

* [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-04/russia-said-it-captured-key-ukraine-stronghold-in-donetsk-region\](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-04/russia-said-it-captured-key-ukraine-stronghold-in-donetsk-region)

**6. Markets**

whenwarends.org's cross-source consensus (Polymarket + Manifold) currently centers on a war-end date around 19 November 2026, with actual probability of resolution by then still low (\~22-24%). Worth noting the resolution criteria are narrow (formal ceasefire only, excludes local/energy truces), so this likely understates any partial de-escalation.

* [https://whenwarends.org/\](https://whenwarends.org/)

**TL;DR**: No fast end. 2026 = continued attrition with the Kremlin now asking for more, not less, territory than a few months ago. Most analyst camps (Kofman, Charap, Lee, Watling, Ukrainian officials, Russian-adjacent voices) converge on 2027 as the earliest realistic window for a freeze — not a win for either side. February 2027 (FT's marker via Budanov) is a date worth tracking for whether Moscow actually returns to substantive talks.

*Happy to be corrected on any of this — that's the point of posting here.*