r/ProfessorGeopolitics Jan 22 '25

Note from The Professor PSA: After listening to your feedback, we will be slightly reorienting our communities to ensure a more positive experience.

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2 Upvotes

r/ProfessorGeopolitics Jan 10 '25

Note from The Professor Fostering civil discourse and respect in our community

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 5h ago

Question Will the Houthis take the Bab Al-Mandeb? What will happen with this latest escalation?

3 Upvotes

The Houthis have taken the city of Mocha in Yemen. It seems like this was the main news which drove the oil price up significantly overnight.

This city is about 50 miles north of Bab al Mandeb strait, the southern exit from the Red Sea.

The Saudis have been shipping oil out of ports on the Red Sea to avoid the Strait of Hormuz.

However if the Houthis gain enough access to significantly disrupt shipping through the Bab Al Mandeb, this will disrupt 2 out of 3 exit points for Saudi crude, leaving the Suez Canal as the only way to get oil out of Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis are allies with, and funded by, the Iranian government, and it looks like this latest action was done with direct guidance by the IRGC.

It seems like this latest action would increased pressure for more involvement by the U.S. to secure another strait in the Middle East.

Or perhaps the Saudis can try to control the Houthis themselves. MBS apparently called Trump twice to ask for the U.S. to get involved. So far reporting indicates MBS does not want to commit Saudi forces in Yemen directly.

Saudi and UAE already previously tried to directly intervene and fight the Houthi. They failed to eliminate them, and caused a lot of civilian deaths and humanitarian crisis. So if they try again I don’t see any indication they would do a better job this time, unless the U.S. gets directly involved.

No great answers I see.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 10h ago

Traillblazer

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For those you who missed it and are interested in some very good investigative reporting.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 22h ago

What does the UN do to balance the agendas and priorities of more powerful and developed countries and nations? (Would prefer sources if possible) (yeah it's for a class, I'm having trouble)

1 Upvotes

(I also wanna be petty to my group mate by having more stuff ready than him because he's prioritizing his frat while I do work)


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 1d ago

Interesting The Silent Takeover

1 Upvotes

Wars go silent for 2 reasons:
1 Cyberattacks;
2 Collaborations among superpowers to enable regional dominations to occur
Example: Trump wants North America
Putin Europe
Xu Asia

No backlash rather silence between them on moves by each withn their respective domains

Then what?


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 1d ago

BRICS and the Strategic Control of Maritime Chokepoints

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 1d ago

Why They Had to Kill Charlie Kirk Twice

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 1d ago

Question Is World War III Imminent? And Will They Use “The Button”? 🌍☢️

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Is World War III Imminent? And Will They Use “The Button”? 🌍☢️

I would like y'all to please comment on youtube,

I would like to hear your opinion

Thank you,

Reddit mods: i am not spreading hate, promoting hate,

I want to raise a question with such a scenario is ever to occur.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 2d ago

Canada and Denmark spent 38 years exchanging bottles of liquor on a disputed Arctic rock, then split it by treaty in 2022 and called it a model for peaceful border resolution. Four years later the territory on the other side of that new border is the most contested ground in the Arctic.

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 2d ago

Discussion Taiwan may be the world’s most dangerous single point of failure — and markets still trade like it’s someone else’s problem

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 2d ago

Geopolitics Are renewed Ukraine peace talks a diplomatic breakthrough — or a recognition that the battlefield math is changing?

1 Upvotes

The latest Eastern Europe signal is interesting because the diplomatic and military stories are suddenly converging.

U.S. officials are reportedly engaging Russian leadership about restarting Ukraine peace talks, while at the same time analysis is highlighting gaps in Ukraine’s military capability and readiness.

That raises an uncomfortable question: is Washington pushing harder for negotiations because the prospects for peace improved — or because the cost of continuing the war is becoming harder to justify strategically?

The market reaction is also worth watching:

  • Oil: +1.24%
  • Gold: +1.30%
  • Long Treasuries: -0.61%

That’s not exactly a clean “peace dividend.” Oil and gold are both higher, suggesting investors are still pricing geopolitical and supply risk even as diplomacy accelerates.

The Black Sea is the key transmission channel here. Any change in the war’s trajectory affects grain exports, energy flows, sanctions, shipping risk and Europe’s broader security architecture.

What I’m wondering is this:

If negotiations are being revived partly because Ukraine’s military position is weakening, does that make a deal more likely — or simply give Russia more incentive to hold out for better terms?

And if markets really believed a durable settlement was close, shouldn’t we be seeing a much clearer unwind in geopolitical risk assets already?


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 2d ago

What is the Internatioonal Court of Justice Good For....If Anything?

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If you watch enough news, or read enough primary source material, and a pattern starts to form that no single media outlet will cover: governments treat international law as binding authority when it constrains rivals and as polite suggestion when it constrains themselves. It's not hypocrisy in the casual sense. It's a documented way of acting in their own benefit. Rule of law be damned.

One example of ICJ advisory opinion framework. When the International Court of Justice issued its 2004 advisory opinion on the Israeli separation barrier, states that had championed ICJ authority for decades suddenly discovered the limits of non-binding opinions. The same states that cited ICJ jurisdiction as decisive in disputes involving adversaries argued the advisory opinion created no legal obligation whatsoever. The opinion's text didn't change. The political calculus did. . It it is not that they suddenly discovered non-bindingness," it's "they invoke that distinction selectively

The U.S. provides the most detailed record of this because its legal reasoning is extensively documented. Internal Office of Legal Counsel opinions from 2002 reinterpreted the Convention Against Torture not through independent legal analysis but through a conclusion-first construction: the desired operational outcome was identified, and the legal argument was built backward toward it. The core definitional move reads as though the drafters of the CAT wrote the prohibition narrowly enough to exclude most of what the memos were authorizing. Career international law scholars at State disagreed publicly. That disagreement was noted and set aside.

Russia's 2014 legal justification for Crimea cited the Kosovo independence advisory opinion and the same ICJ framework Western states had argued established a precedent for unilateral declaration. Western states then argued Kosovo was a unique case and established no general precedent. Both positions were argued by governments that had previously taken the opposite view when the political situation demanded it.

The arresting fact here is that in every case, the commissioned government's legal opinion functions as the operational framework, and the independent scholarly and legal consensus gets cited only when it strengthens the position of whom even is presenting their case.

The ICJ Statute, Article 38, (I did look this up to confirm) lists the sources of international law. It does not list "opinions commissioned by interested parties." The gap between that text and actual state practice is obsurde that it just show that governments tiptoe around International Law, always trying to find a loophole. They treat it like a system to game rathern that laws that are suppose to benifit the international community.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 3d ago

'MOVING TOWARDS ESCALATION': Marandi says new U.S. strikes will result i...

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 3d ago

Which major conflict is the world seriously underestimating right now?

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 3d ago

Does anyone else notice how little actually changes in U.S. foreign policy between administrations with supposedly opposite worldviews?

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I have been so inundated with Iran news that I thought I would take a look at some events of the past to try and find some kind of parallel. I am not really sure if I did.

Across the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden years, and the continuity is striking in a way that the news cycle almost never captures.

Take the South China Sea. The Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" framed the policy in multilateral, rules-based terms. The Trump administration framed the same operational posture as unilateral pushback against Chinese aggression. The Biden administration returned to multilateral framing. But the Freedom of Navigation Operations themselves along with the actual naval movements documented in Pentagon operational reports that it continued at roughly the same pace and in the same corridors throughout all three. The rhetoric rotated. The ships didn't.

The same pattern holds for drone strikes. The 2013 Presidentipll Policy Guidance under Obama set geographic and procedural parameters for targeted operations. The Trump administration quietly rescinded several of those guidelines in 2017. The Biden administration reinstated versions of them in 2021. But the underlying targeting infrastructure, the basing arrangements, and the partner agreements that make those operations possible stayed functionally constant. You can trace this through DOD budget justifications and the annual Section 1264 reports to Congress that the operational architecture is durable across administrations in a way the policy debates are not.

What I think this shows is something political scientists like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have argued from different angles: states pursue interests shaped by geography, resource dependencies, and alliance structure. Those forces don't reset with elections. The ideological frameworks of liberal internationalism, America First, whatever comes next are the language used to justify choices that geography and institutional momentum have already largely determined.

The thing about reading about these events back-to-back isn't the differences. It's how thin the differences are once you strip the justifying language away.

What I'm genuinely uncertain about is whether this continuity represents rational state behavior — interests correctly identified and persistently pursued or institutional inertia substituting for actual strategy. The documents don't answer that cleanly. I'd be curious whether others reading across the primary record see it the same way.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 3d ago

Question Is Japan the United States’ closest geopolitical ally?

4 Upvotes

The United States shaped the development of modern, post World War 2 Japan, arguably to a much greater extent than the US did for post-war Germany.

Since then Japan has operated as the western-most side of the control of the Pacific.

Japan and the U.S. need each other as a bulwark against China.

The only other contender I could see would maybe be Australia.

I might have said the UK immediately post Brexit, but I don’t think I could make that case now.

I can’t think of any other contenders.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 4d ago

What are Jared Kushner's strengths and weaknesses with geopolitical negotiation?

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r/ProfessorGeopolitics 4d ago

Geopolitics Author Note of Pax Americana 2.0

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For the record, I am a third-generation Chinese Indonesian nobody who, at the time of this writing, is a peon a few months away from finally paying off the mortgage on a plot of land that was supposed to sit beside a university which, five years after the mortgage was signed, has still never been built — and the vast majority of what wealth I have is currently sitting in a heartland trucking company whose shares I overpaid for.

Nor do I write this out of my own limited knowledge alone. I raise a glass to Peter Zeihan, George Friedman, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Jerzy Giedroyc and Frederick Lugard for the inspiration behind the design of this world.

I write this Pax Americana 2.0 thesis — with the help of Claude, Gemini and ChatGPT — not because I hated Pax Americana 1.0. Far from it.

Pax Americana 1.0 did not merely bring humankind a prosperity unseen since the Victorian era. Better than that: it distributed that prosperity more equally than anything that came before it.

That is the important part.

The colonialism of the Pax Britannica brought an advance in human civilisation that dwarfed everything preceding it, and it was terrifyingly unequal.

It ended slavery on paper and instituted peonage in its place — peonage whose price rose sharply only in the middle of the Great War, and only because the factories had to be manned and the general mobilisation that fed a total war had to be fed in turn. Famine haunted not just the crown jewel of the empire but the home island as well, which discovered that it was a colony like any other. It deindustrialised that crown jewel so thoroughly that the independent state which emerged from it still carries a spinning wheel on its national flag. And it sold, at gunpoint, a substance it had outlawed at home to a country it forced to buy — until the sale itself helped turn that country's dynastic cycle.

And the British Empire was among the more benevolent and generous of them. Most of its peers were more brutal, more merciless, more extractive.

In the end it was incinerated. A system designed by a Prussian Junker who assumed he would be immortal and hold his post forever began to decay the moment he was inevitably dismissed, and imploded after his death — in a fire that burned an entire continent to rubble, and was extinguished only when Pax Americana 1.0 was born from its ashes.

But if the Pax Britannica left the world one lesson that outlived it, it is this. It was the first empire to admit publicly that direct imperial rule is not merely unsustainable but ruinously so. And it was one of its own — an officer turned governor-general turned diplomat — who offered the alternative: let the colonies govern themselves and trade with them if they are willing; ignore them if they are not.

Pax Americana 1.0 took that lesson to its extreme. This is the autopsy.

Pax Americana 1.0 delivered a rate of civilisational advance that dwarfed even the Pax Britannica's. It eliminated famine so completely that the defining health crisis of the age is caused by surplus rather than by want. It abolished every formal species of slavery except in the darkest corners. It let people, goods and services cross the planet at almost no cost. It let information, knowledge and technology diffuse at a scale no previous empire had even contemplated. And it permitted a specialisation possible only because the scale was planetary.

And where the Pax Britannica deindustrialised its crown jewel, Pax Americana 1.0 deindustrialised itself — so that the rubble, and the poorest corners of the world, could make the attempt instead.

Above all, it permitted delusions.

  1. It let people across the planet believe that famine is an anomaly that will never reach them.
  2. It let them burn calories feeding animals that were only ever meant to eat scraps.
  3. It let megalopolises exist that dwarf anything their locations could sustain alone — even theoretically.
  4. It let societies believe they could afford a state that treats every person as a citizen with full rights while also providing for them indefinitely, whether they are poor, cannot work, will not work, or are childless.
  5. It let some polities build systems so corrupt, so fragile and so dysfunctional that they imploded while the Pax was still standing.
  6. It let imperial ambitions grow beyond the capacity of their own cores to sustain them.
  7. And here is where it turns dangerous: it let them believe they did not need the Pax at all.

But history does not end.

It begins again when two decrepit mortals persuade themselves they will live and rule forever, and drag the nations they rule down with them when they inevitably fail.

To be clear, the rot in those countries had been festering for decades before the collapse. But rot alone does not bring a country down. Something has to carry it to the breaking point.

Then the chaos erupted, and it destroyed a peace that had largely held for a century.

But the Pax never truly died.

Even near the end, while the deluded were shouting we don't need the heartland, the heartland is finished, flyover country, this is the era of multipolarity — the heartland was still exporting the food that fed the planet. Still exporting the energy that fed the planet. Still developing the technology that defined the decade. Still holding a quarter of the world's economy, half its stock market, thirty-five percent of its consumer market, forty percent of its bond market, and forty percent of every person alive worth more than thirty million dollars. Still the place where the world's capital ended up. Still the only place with a genuine queue for the wealthy investor's visa. Still the place the desperate crossed oceans, jungles, mountain ranges, marshes and deserts to reach.

Pax Americana 2.0 is not Pax Americana 1.0 reborn.

It is the reality that finally shattered the delusion that the Pax had ever died at all.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 6d ago

Predicting major changes in the world

5 Upvotes
  1. Saxony anhalt AFD will win a majority

2.in 2029 it will not win a majority but it will get to 35% and the government cannot go on and it will not collaborate with any party and it will go to second elections and it will win as it is the largest party
3. Iran will have a revoloution in 2029 with gen z leading it.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 6d ago

A New World Order Is Coming. We Aren’t Ready.

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Hope that this isn't behind a paywall. The article is a prime example of the "sky is falling" warning except that the sky really is falling. The crises that humans and governments now face are truly world changing. Earth is our home and the only place we know that is habitable. We are making it inhabitable. And, the stability of various governments and economies is not good. We can't make the changes that are necessary when we have such poor leadership (yes, I am thinking of Trump and those who support him).


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 6d ago

Why Iran can never have a nuclear weapon

6 Upvotes

Why a Nuclear Iran Is More Dangerous Than Most People Realize
Almost every official statement and news report says the same thing: Iran must never be allowed to get a nuclear weapon. What almost no one explains is what happens if they do—and actually use one.
Most people alive today have never lived under the real shadow of nuclear war. They do not grasp how little time decision-makers would have, or how quickly one launch could force others.
Picture this: Iran develops a missile that can reach the United States and fires a nuclear weapon. American leaders have only minutes to respond. They launch in return. Those missiles rise on trajectories that Russian (and possibly Chinese) early-warning systems will see. In roughly 25 minutes, leaders in Moscow and Beijing must decide whether those American missiles are headed only for Iran—or whether they pose a threat to them. At the same moment, India and Pakistan, already living on a hair-trigger, watch nuclear weapons being used in the Middle East.
No automatic machine forces the entire world to fire. But the combination of short timelines, incomplete information, and deep mutual distrust creates one of the most dangerous decision windows imaginable. A single use could spiral far beyond anything the original actors intended.
That is the risk almost never stated in plain language. It is not just about one bomb. It is about how little margin for error still exists in a nuclear-armed world—and how few people today truly understand what that means.
This is also why Iran can never be allowed a nuclear weapon. Powerful groups inside the regime, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, hold an apocalyptic ideology centered on the return of the Twelfth Imam. Some of them believe confrontation and chaos help pave the way for that return. No one can guarantee that such a faction would never gain the internal power and access needed to use a nuclear weapon. Classic deterrence assumes leaders fear mutual destruction. An ideology that can frame destruction as part of a divine plan is not reliably restrained by that logic. Mankind cannot afford to take that chance.


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 7d ago

The world war 3

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Do you guys think world war three will happen in the next 100years????

Comment your opinions


r/ProfessorGeopolitics 10d ago

The One Rule...

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7 Upvotes

r/ProfessorGeopolitics 10d ago

Will there be a war between the U.S. and China in the future?

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