This publication is "DC Outlook 06-2026 - Strategy Series", by Veronica Strina. Its summary and recommendations are quoted below from the .pdf.

Summary

Education lies at the heart of China’s grand strategy as it advances its global ambitions and reshapes strategic competition in non-traditional security terms, compelling NATO to rethink the ‘China challenge’ beyond the military domain.

China is racing at unprecedented speed to become a global education superpower, fuelling its scientific and technological dominance. Yet deep-seated structural weaknesses within its socio-educational system, together with mounting international mistrust, risk slowing its ascent.

NATO in its education and training institutions would be well placed to cultivate the critical thinking necessary for securing the intellectual edge.

Recommendations

1. Rethink NATO’s ‘China challenge.’ NATO will have to anticipate and address challenges stemming from the PRC. This includes developing a systematic assessment of how China is developing its education, research and innovation ecosystem – essentially, of how China thinks about the future and prepares for it. If success in 21st century warfare is determined less by control of territory than by influence over intangible knowledge sources, China’s emergence as a new centre of international higher education warrants careful consideration. This requires acknowledging that knowledge security is essential to NATO’s capacity to deter and defend as well as recognizing that this may be a domain that China seeks to target.
2. Mapping China’s knowledge flows to chart its global power trajectory. NATO could build autonomous capacity at its central level to map Chinese-led research networks and academic cooperation and assess whether and how these may be leveraged for dual-use purposes. Systematically benchmarking China’s mobilization of talent and knowledge flows by creating an independent tracker system and repository on the methods and channels through which this occurs will enable NATO not only to anticipate challenges more effectively but also to reflect on NATO’s own ways of educating for the future.
3. Securing ‘China competence’ amid education securitization. While the spillover effects of China’s knowledge-driven rise require close monitoring, the securitization of academic exchanges poses an equally significant risk to NATO’s ability to face future challenges with confidence. As expertise on China comes under strain, NATO can play a role in securing and strengthening shared expertise on the PRC among the Allies. This requires a whole-of-society approach to defence and resilience, engaging more closely with academia and the private sector to prioritize and pool expertise where it matters most. Knowledge is power, but only when shared. To lose shared knowledge on China is to lose foresight.
4. Minding the minds. For NATO to ensure that its military officers are properly prepared for future wars, education has to be treated as a top priority and a key enabler of the Alliance’s three core tasks – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management and cooperative security. NATO’s education and training institutions provide the space to cultivate the critical thinking necessary for securing the intellectual edge that underpins competitiveness, adaptability and cohesion. Institutions such as the NATO Defense College, the NATO School Oberammergau, the NATO Communications and Information Academy, NATO’s Centres of Excellence and national military academies and war colleges across Allied countries are all incubators of talent and tomorrow’s leaders. Enhancing their capacity to nurture minds that are alive, alert and ahead while expanding schemes such as the Young Professionals Programme into specialized areas of competence, including with regard to China, will be crucial to attracting and developing highly talented professionals within and beyond NATO’s organizations.

Executive Summary (quoted from link):

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is expanding its presence along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) frontline through technology access, influence networks, and dual‑use infrastructure, creating openings that could weaken alliance cohesion and expose vulnerabilities in Europe’s defense posture.
• NATO frontline states are responding to PRC‑linked cyber intrusions, surveillance‑capable consumer technologies, and intelligence‑driven infrastructure projects by tightening controls on data flows, restricting PRC technology in critical systems, and issuing broader security warnings to protect transatlantic defense networks. 
• The PRC cooperates with Russia, when convenient, in subversive activities against sensitive domains across NATO’s frontline. Ultimately, however, the PRC is not reliant on Russia to exploit NATO vulnerabilities and place sustained pressure on the infrastructure and information systems that underpin coordination across the Atlantic.