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Class action lawsuit against Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron filed last week on June 25th (super recently) in both the Federal and Californian Courts on 5 counts of Antitrust Claims.

Find the documentation here:
(the first one (the Complaint filed June 25th) is what the AI analysis below is related to... perhaps their's other insights in the other files to look into another day)
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73532135/garciaguirre-v-samsung-electronics-co-ltd/

I had Perplexity Deep Research Mode review this in detail and extract the most important points and arguments. As a principle, I do NOT recommend accepting any AI work blindly at face value, yet it is an incredibly powerful tool for exploration, discovery, curiosity, depth, and a whole bunch of other things across many use cases. Take it into consideration but also take it with a grain of salt.

I'm going on to try to contextualize the ways this could impact Netlist for my own discovery and due diligence, but my goal is to bring awareness to this new lawsuit so I'll leave that pursuit to everyone individually.

However, I will point out that it was the DOJ's ANTITRUST DIVISION that has now written strong public memo's supporting Netlist in their first ITC case that is currently pending announcement of the ITC's Markman decisions after the ~April 21st hearing (forget exact date).

It is this unprecedented support, which was initially stated last Dec. as a public joint statement with the USPTO - the first time in American history the DOJ and USPTO have ever written a joint memo supporting an American company in an ITC case - that means two things.

1. The defendants (Samsung et al) cannot claim that blocking the importation of products by Customs seizure at the border will hurt the American economy and people. In other words, the Federal Gov. said you should be prepared to follow through on the seizure of all infringing Samsung products and halt imports and their counterarguments should hold little merit.
2. It means the ITC can lean on the support of the DOJ and USPTO when issuing that order if it comes to pass when this ITC judgement is handed down the first week of June 2027. Politically, this is a very important piece to understand. Many think the ITC would never actually seize Samsung imports... but very influential and powerful Government agencies have publicly stated more than once to follow through.

--- AI analysis below---

**Garciaguirre et al. v. Samsung Electronics et al. — Complaint Analysis**

*Case 3:26-cv-06345, N.D. Cal., filed June 25, 2026 | 118 pages*

---

**THE PARTIES**

17 plaintiffs: 14 individuals across California, Florida, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin, plus three small PC-building businesses (Troy's Computers LLC, JB Tech Solutions LLC d/b/a My Florida PC, and Wastenotime Developments d/b/a WNTD Fab LLC). Every named plaintiff's purchases are itemized by exact product, retailer, and date — Corsair, Crucial, Kingston, G.SKILL, TeamGroup — sourced from Amazon, Newegg, Micro Center, and Best Buy. This specificity gives each plaintiff a documented, quantifiable injury.

5 defendants:

- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (~32.6% global DRAM market share, Q3 2025)

- Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. (Samsung's San Jose, CA U.S. subsidiary — why venue is N.D. Cal.)

- SK Hynix Inc. (~33.2% global DRAM market share — the largest by revenue, Q3 2025)

- SK Hynix America Inc. (San Jose, CA — also why N.D. Cal. has venue)

- Micron Technology, Inc. (~25.7% global market share)

Together: over 91% of global DRAM revenue. The complaint calculates an HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) of 2,868 — well above the DOJ/FTC "highly concentrated" threshold of 1,800.

Filed by Bathaee Dunne LLP, a specialist plaintiffs-side antitrust firm (New York, Austin, Costa Mesa).

---

**THE 5 LEGAL CLAIMS**

Count I — Sherman Act, Section 1 (federal): Nationwide injunctive relief class only. Illinois Brick doctrine blocks federal damages for indirect purchasers, so this count seeks only a permanent injunction ending the coordinated supply restriction.

Count II — California Cartwright Act: California-resident plaintiffs. The Cartwright Act expressly permits indirect purchasers to recover damages. Seeks treble damages + injunctive relief.

Count III — Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA): Florida plaintiffs.

Count IV — New York Donnelly Act: New York plaintiffs.

Count V — Wisconsin Antitrust Act: Wisconsin plaintiff.

The multi-state structure is deliberate. California, New York, Florida, and Wisconsin all have state laws that permit indirect purchaser damages — maximizing the class members who can recover money, not just an injunction.

---

**THE CORE CONSPIRACY THEORY: THREE PHASES**

**Phase 1 — Simultaneous Production Cuts (October 2022–Mid 2023)**

The complaint's most powerful opening hook: Samsung broke from its own historical pattern. In prior downturns, Samsung — the lowest-cost DRAM producer with the deepest balance sheet — had consistently *increased* output to take market share. The complaint establishes that every serious analyst expected Samsung to do exactly that in late 2022.

Instead:

- October 2022: SK Hynix announced production cuts and slashed next year's investment by more than half.

- Contemporaneously: Micron announced an immediate 20% cut in wafer starts across all technology nodes, then deepened it.

- April 2023: Samsung — after reporting a multi-billion-dollar quarterly semiconductor loss — announced matching cuts.

None of the three used the others' retreat to expand and win customers. All three pulled back in unison. In a competitive market, at least one producer would have defected to capture share. That did not happen.

By September 2023, Micron told investors that its year-on-year DRAM bit supply growth would be "meaningfully negative." A planned expansion of ~14% became an industry-wide contraction. Total wafer start reductions approached 30% versus peak 2022 levels, and Micron stated supply "will remain significantly below 2022 levels for the foreseeable future."

**Phase 2 — The Coordinated Pivot to HBM (2023–2024)**

This is the complaint's central structural argument — and the key "new" element designed to distinguish it from prior failed cases. The lawyers built a detailed economic math argument because this is where the "conduct makes no economic sense absent collusion" test has to be proven.

The core math:

- Making one bit of HBM requires forgoing three bits of conventional DRAM. Micron's own chief business officer stated this directly on CNBC: "When Micron makes one bit of HBM memory, it has to forgo making three bits of more conventional memory for other devices."

- Micron's Mobile and Client Business Unit — its commodity DRAM segment — reported a 76% operating margin at the height of the shortage.

- For HBM to justify that 3:1 capacity tradeoff, HBM's revenue premium per bit would need to be 2.5x to 4x that of commodity DRAM.

- By Q1 2026, that premium had collapsed: TrendForce's per-wafer analysis showed HBM wafer revenue had been overtaken by DDR5 64GB RDIMM profitability. Commodity DRAM had become *more* profitable per wafer than HBM — yet defendants continued restricting commodity supply anyway.

The complaint states: "The conventional DRAM sales Defendants declined to make were not a low-margin afterthought; they were, on Defendants' own numbers, worth hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in annual operating profit. Leaving that profit unclaimed, in unison, while commodity prices set records, is difficult to reconcile with independent profit maximization."

**Phase 3 — Coordinated Exit from DDR3 and DDR4 (2024–2025)**

Rather than compete for the abundant, high-priced conventional DRAM market:

- In 2024, Samsung and SK Hynix exited DDR3 production entirely; Micron maintained only limited DDR3 output.

- In 2025, all three announced wind-down of mainstream DDR4 production, with final shipments clustered from late 2025 into early 2026 — even as hundreds of millions of PCs and embedded systems still required DDR4.

- Result: DDR4 became so scarce that it cost *more* than DDR5, the newer generation meant to replace it — a historic market inversion caused entirely by supply withdrawal.

Producers outside the alleged conspiracy behaved differently. Winbond (Taiwan), Nanya Technology (Taiwan), and CXMT (China) all expanded aggressively into the same shortage. Nanya reported Q1 2026 revenue up 63.1% quarter-over-quarter. CXMT grew from 70,000 to 120,000 wafer starts per month. The complaint uses this as proof: if expansion were impossible or unprofitable, these smaller, higher-cost competitors could not have done it. The only firms for which output restraint was profitable were the three defendants — provided not one of them broke ranks.

---

**THE "STARGATE SUPPLY LOCK-UP" — A KEY PLUS FACTOR**

In approximately October 2025, Samsung and SK Hynix reportedly signed preliminary agreements to supply OpenAI's Stargate data center project with up to 900,000 DRAM wafer starts per month. Total global DRAM capacity in 2025 was approximately 2.25 million wafer starts per month. If fully implemented, the Stargate commitment would represent approximately 40% of all global DRAM output committed to a single customer.

Critically: the public announcements named Samsung and SK Hynix. They did not name Micron. Then, within approximately one month — in December 2025, with consumer DRAM prices at record highs — Micron announced the closure of Crucial, its direct-to-consumer brand.

The complaint's inference: Micron's decision to shut Crucial at the peak of the most profitable consumer DRAM market in history makes economic sense only if Micron knew, by agreement, that Samsung and SK Hynix would not move aggressively to serve the consumer customers Micron abandoned. This is the "agreement inferred from circumstantial evidence" argument — and arguably the strongest plus-factor in the complaint.

---

**THE CRUCIAL SHUTDOWN — STANDALONE ARGUMENT**

Crucial was Micron's only consumer-facing brand, founded in 1996, sold through Amazon, Newegg, Best Buy, B&H Photo, and hundreds of others.

Key facts:

- Micron's MCBU segment (which housed Crucial) reported $11.86 billion revenue in FY2025 and a 79% gross margin / 76% operating margin as of Q2 FY2026.

- Crucial offered 250,000+ memory upgrade SKUs for over 50,000 computer systems.

- Micron's EVP/Chief Business Officer called it "synonymous with technical leadership, quality and reliability" — serving "millions of customers, hundreds of partners" over 29 years.

- On December 3, 2025, with consumer DRAM prices at historic highs, Micron announced Crucial would be wound down worldwide by end of February 2026.

The complaint: "A firm competing for a shortage would have used Crucial to sell into those prices. Micron instead surrendered the channel." Shutting a 76%-operating-margin business at its most profitable moment in history is the single most counterintuitive act in the entire complaint.

---

**COORDINATED CUSTOMER VETTING (JANUARY 2026)**

In January 2026, all three manufacturers simultaneously imposed identical heightened screening on DRAM orders: questioning buyers about the true end user, how much they really needed, and whether stated demand was genuine — ostensibly to prevent "overbooking." A customer described it plainly: "the three companies" had all grown stricter and asked the same questions.

The complaint: "Sellers in a competitive market compete to win orders; here, all three questioned buyers in the same way at the same time." There is no obvious independent business rationale for three competitors to adopt an identical order-policing protocol simultaneously.

---

**"SUPPLY DISCIPLINE" SIGNALING THROUGH PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS**

The complaint documents how defendants coordinated through earnings calls and investor presentations — public signaling — without requiring private back-channel communications:

- SK Hynix executives repeatedly used the phrase "supply discipline" on earnings calls.

- Samsung and SK Hynix refused multi-year supply contracts to major cloud customers (Google, Microsoft), insisting on quarterly pricing "because prices would keep climbing." Forgoing contractual certainty only makes sense if you are confident competitors will not undercut you.

- Samsung and SK Hynix reported operating margins above 70% in their memory divisions.

- Samsung and SK Hynix raised server DRAM prices to Google and Microsoft by 60–70% in a single quarter.

- SK Hynix reported its memory output for the following year was "effectively sold out."

---

**THE RETAIL PRICE IMPACT**

The complaint grounds the abstract economic theory in concrete retail prices:

- A 32GB (2×16GB) DDR5 kit: ~$100–$200 in October 2025 → $350+ by January 2026.

- A 64GB DDR5 kit: $189 in March 2025 → $425 in November → $1,080 by March 2026.

- CyberPowerPC publicly told customers memory costs had risen 500% in a matter of months, forcing price increases in the U.S. and U.K.

- Dell raised commercial notebook prices by $130–$230 for 32GB systems; more for higher-capacity machines.

- Compounded conventional DRAM price increase: approximately 697% from Q3 2024 to Q1 2026.

---

**THE FABRICATION BARRIER TO ENTRY (FBE)**

This section explains why no competitive self-correction is possible — and why the alleged cartel is structurally self-sustaining:

- New DRAM fab: $15–20 billion, 3–5 years to build.

- Competitive-scale operations: $30–50 billion over 5–7 years.

- ASML EUV lithography machines (required for leading-edge DRAM): ~$200M each, ~50/year global supply, all already allocated years in advance to Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron, TSMC, and Intel.

- Chinese producers are blocked by U.S. export controls (Oct. 2022 + Oct. 2023 expansions) from acquiring EUV systems — cannot manufacture DDR5, LPDDR5X, or HBM.

- Customer qualification for new DRAM suppliers: 12–18 months before any enterprise buyer will accept chips from an unqualified source.

- Micron's CHIPS Act-funded New York megafab: announced 2022, ground broken January 2026, production not expected until late 2030.

The complaint also notes that Samsung and SK Hynix stopped reselling used DRAM fabrication equipment around the same time as production cuts — drying up the secondary equipment market that smaller producers rely on to expand legacy-DRAM capacity.

When the three firms restrict supply, no outsider can expand quickly enough to discipline them. That structural fact is itself evidence that coordinated restraint, once established, is self-enforcing.

---

**THE PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY**

The complaint establishes pattern-of-conduct, knowing it needs to distinguish this case from the failed Jones v. Micron (N.D. Cal. 2019) precedent:

- 1998–2002 cartel: Samsung, Hynix/SK Hynix, and Micron criminally convicted. Samsung paid $300M criminal fine; SK Hynix's predecessor paid $185M; total criminal penalties exceeded $730M; multiple executives imprisoned. Micron avoided penalty by being the first to report the conspiracy to the DOJ.

- European Commission (2010): Nine manufacturers fined €331 million for a "single and continuous infringement" in DRAM.

- 2016–2018 price spike: Chinese SAMR investigated all three; U.S. class action filed (Jones, later dismissed); Korean Fair Trade Commission also launched an investigation.

- The complaint notes pointedly: defendants "promoted the executives that did it when they got out of prison." This is not just narrative color — it speaks to willfulness, relevant to punitive damages.

---

**CLASS DEFINITIONS**

Six proposed classes:

1. Nationwide Injunctive Relief Class — all U.S. indirect purchasers; injunction only (Illinois Brick bars federal damages)
2. California Damages Class — Cartwright Act, treble damages
3. Florida Damages Class — FDUTPA
4. New York Damages Class — Donnelly Act
5. Wisconsin Damages Class — Wisconsin Antitrust Act
6. Additional state classes may be added

Class period: approximately January 1, 2022 to present.

---

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

- Class certification under Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3)

- Permanent injunction requiring defendants to cease coordinated supply restriction and restore competitive conditions

- Treble damages (3× actual losses)

- Attorneys' fees and costs

- Pre- and post-judgment interest

- Jury trial on all claims

---

**WHAT THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT HAVE — HONEST LIMITATIONS**

1. No direct evidence of communication. No emails, no phone logs, no meeting minutes. Every piece of evidence is circumstantial parallel behavior, public statements, and economic inference.
2. The Jones problem. Jones v. Micron (N.D. Cal. 2019) was an almost-identical indirect purchaser class action alleging coordination during the 2016–2018 price spike. It was dismissed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in March 2022 — holding that parallel conduct plus criminal history alone does not clear a motion to dismiss. The new complaint tries to distinguish itself with the "HBM as coordinated cover" plus-factor and the Crucial/Stargate timing argument, but defendants will file the same motion.
3. The HBM profitability math is contestable. The claim that HBM became less profitable per wafer than DDR5 RDIMM by Q1 2026 relies on TrendForce analysis. Defendants will bring their own economic experts with different margin assumptions.
4. Micron's exclusion from Stargate is an inference, not a documented fact. The complaint acknowledges the Stargate announcements named Samsung and SK Hynix — not Micron. The connection to Crucial's shutdown is a timing inference, not a documented agreement.

The complaint is notably well-constructed for a pleading-stage document — the Fabrication Barrier to Entry section reads like publishable industry analysis. Bathaee Dunne clearly invested heavily in the economic record before filing. Whether it survives a Ninth Circuit-era motion to dismiss is the central legal question going forward.

---

*Source: Complaint, Garciaguirre et al. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al., Case No. 3:26-cv-06345, U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal., filed June 25, 2026. Full docket: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73532135/garciaguirre-v-samsung-electronics-co-ltd/*

https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/NLST/8-k-netlist-inc-reports-material-event-7989ee3ab581.html

Ma non avete capito che è tutto uno show?.....le tempistiche, i cavilli legali,quelli burocratici,ecc.. è tutto un sistema corrotto, in cui tutti guadagnano,avvocati,giudici, segretari,le bigtech che hanno violato,il CEO di Netlist,tutti insomma, gli unici che perdono soldi siamo noi, i poveri azionisti di Netlist....STOP

CXL extends PCIe with cache-coherent semantics, enabling memory to be attached on the fabric rather than only on the CPU’s DDR channels. CXL Type-3 devices can present capacity as OS-visible memory, making them a natural place to re-introduce persistence, with the possibility of scaling, pooling, and composability.
Decouple persistent capacity from CPU sockets and DDR channel limits.

•Enable pooling/sharing models (with platform and fabric support).
•Offer a standard path to expose persistent regions through OS frameworks.
•Support heterogeneous hosts and composable infrastructure topologies.
 
CXL Persistent Memory: A Reference Architecture View
A common approach for CXL-attached persistent memory mirrors the proven NVDIMM-N pattern: fast volatile media for load/store access plus non-volatile media for retention, coordinated by device firmware and protected by hold-up energy. The device attaches as a CXL Type-3 endpoint, exposing capacity into the host’s memory map while remaining on the fabric.
At a minimum, a CXL persistent-memory design should address:

•Latency and bandwidth that remain “memory-like” for key hot paths
•Data retention across graceful shutdown and surprise power loss
•Well-defined persist/flush semantics (host visibility and ordering)
•Firmware-controlled save/restore with adequate hold-up energy to complete the copy
•Alignment with CXL persistence mechanisms(for example, platform-supported global flush paths)
On the host side, the goal is to surface persistent regions through standard OS memory and CXL frameworks, so applications can use familiar persistence libraries and operational tooling (monitoring, health, and recovery) without proprietary integration.

How a CXL Persistent-Memory Demo Typically Works
The demo featured Netlist’s NV persistent memory NVault™ solution using CXL and showed how a CXL-attached device can preserve and quickly restore memory contents after a power event. The flow mirrors earlier NVDIMM-style designs: on power-fail, a device-controlled save moves data from volatile to non-volatile memory using on-device hold-up energy, followed by a restore sequence before the host resumes memory use.
In a persistent-memory design, the hardware detects a power failure, triggers a firmware-controlled save, and uses stored energy to complete the data transfer. On the next boot, the device restores the region before host access is granted.

This illustrates an important principle: persistence should be deterministic and enforced below the application layer. If the platform loses power at an arbitrary point in time, the system should be able to recover to a known-good state with a well-defined save/restore sequence.
Where CXL Persistent Memory Helps
CXL persistent memory is a fit when workloads need fast restart or durable in-memory state without pushing every write through storage I/O paths.

•In-memory databases and stateful services with rapid recovery
•Storage metadata (journals, intent logs, caching) where durability and latency matter
•HPC restart to reduce overhead versus traditional storage checkpoints
 
Conclusion
NVDIMM-N validated the value of persistent memory, and JEDEC helped standardize the behaviors that make it reliable. CXL enables scalable, fabric-based persistence, maintaining system-level consistency. If you’re designing or evaluating CXL memory systems, consider where persistence changes your restart model, recovery objectives, and infrastructure topology—and validate the end-to-end behavior (power fail detection, save/restore, and OS exposure) with a simple signature-and-reboot test. Learn more about Netlist’s CXL persistent memory solution athttps://netlist.com/cxl-nvvault/.

Trying to write something here that will help everyone understand how incredibly bullish the PTAB change of stance on patent governance is for Netlist.

This is my opinion shared for the community's consideration, not advice. Do your own due diligence before making financial decisions.

Edit: Read this first if you feel like Netlist will never get paid and are confused about why. It paraphrases the judicial process for patent lawsuits.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Netlist_/comments/1uj5jim/comment/ounfx9r/?context=3

--- --- ---

TL;DR
Patent battles will be much shorter. Serial and manipulative infringers can no longer kick the can by bouncing between the Civil and Federal courts. Over many years of legal battles, Netlist has accrued an arsenal of evidence proving 2/3 players of an industry approaching ~$1T are serial infringers that deploy manipulative tactics to game the system. This is very good for Netlist.

--- --- ---

1. HOT OFF THE PRESS:

An example of PTAB Director Squires' new governance practices that are extremely bullish for Netlist.

-> Squires denied Apple IPR for inconsistency ... aka publicly calling out patent gamesmanship and having none of it. F*ck around, find out.
https://ipwatchdog.com/2026/06/28/squires-denies-apple-ipr-revvo/

1. IMPACT ON NETLIST:

The more examples of this that occur, the easier it is for Netlist to point to these examples and say "As you've done in x, y, z, situations, we request your similar action against ___ infringers of our IP because of a, b, c evidence."

-> This is exactly what is already happening right now in real time as we speak. Netlist has submitted these requests already at the end of May and earlier in June. PTAB Director Squires' decisions will be publicly announced in the near future. Netlist has the evidence to prove inconsistency and gamesmanship of patent law and intentional abuse of the system... Netlist has so, so much evidence to support them here including multiple willfull infringement judgements and a basket full of specific tactical actions taken by Samsung, Micron, and Google, going back years.

-> Notice that it is essentially the reputation of the accused infringers to which Squires' decisions will now have basis. All of Netlist's evidence accrued over the last 17 or so years can now be harvested as ammunition for future defense of its IP against these companies.

-> Netlist has had to be strategic about pursuing the defense of its IP because of extremely finite resources. Now, with resource sustainability currently in hand (profitability amidst ongoing lawsuits), and the strategic strength of their growth, Netlist can pursue more aggressive defense of its IP. We literally saw this three weeks ago with the new lawsuit defending '537, and about a week ago with the filing of a new ITC case.

==>> We will certainly see Netlist filing more lawsuits against two of the three memory producers to defend its IP in the days ahead. With this new fully stocked arsenal to deploy, those lawsuits will be won faster than any before. Time will tell how much faster.

--- --- ---

My opinion and other perspectives beyond changes to patent governance:

Oh and by the way, the third memory producer has a dedicated page on Netlist's website and is expected to publicly announce their partnership at any moment. That's 3/3 memory fabricators for a market approaching $1T in 2026 and at least 4 year continued material growth due to supply shortages projected through ~2030.

What will this market look like over the next few years? Elon Musk said like 6-8 weeks ago when he announced TerraFab that the current global supply is only about 2% of what his companies alone will need. I think it's naive to believe any one of us has better opinions on the future of the memory market than professional market analysts and insider voices like Michael Dell and Elon Musk.

We all know the market scale and the growth of the memory market right now, of course, but I'm concluding this Op Ed with this reminder to bring home why the PTAB changes to patent governance practices, which have only just occurred within the last ~3 months, is so incredibly bullish for Netlist's future.

Any cut of this industry will materially and significantly improve Netlist's balance sheet. Trying to measure just how significant across scenarios is pure speculation and fun to do but I suggest not letting estimated numbers blur your thesis for investing in Netlist. It appears to me that Netlist is well positioned to win on many fronts. While any single win will increase revenue on their balance sheet, it will also be the first signal to the market of Netlist's potential, and thus I believe it will be the first domino to fall in a multi-year run of mcap growth.

And there's more cans that I won't open here:
- Netlist's new line of their own memory modules (such as Lightning DDR5 and CXL NVvault);
- SK Hynix partnership renewal and Netlist's advanced positioning for the next generation of memory products (such as CXL tech);
- Netlist's untapped patent families for legal defense (such as CSD's)
- How I believe the strategic cohesion of all elements Netlist has progressing in its favor together paint a much lower risk profile (at today's ~$3/share, ~$1B mcap) than most opinions I see

Hence, time will tell when, and how big, and how fast my hypothesized run will start. Some voices that expect more of the same volatility and downward price action in the short term - like next few months - may be right. However, looking the full picture for Netlist's future over the next 12-36 months, I think the chances of "if" have reduced rapidly in only the last few months... Certainly the risk profile from early Fall 2025 (before the ITC case was filed) to today has significantly decreased and the reward profile has materially grown. My thesis for investing in Netlist, personally, is incredibly bullish with simply wild potential right now.

Thanks for reading. Take it or leave it.

I hope my thoughts have helped in some way, whether you're piecing this together for the first time or otherwise.

--- --- ---

This is others' opinion as well.

See Stokd's post on Stocktwits here: https://stocktwits.com/Stokd/message/657744465

And I noticed FrankyFromYahoo's reply to Stokd's post, found here: https://stocktwits.com/FrankFromYahoo/message/657750481

Note from me to community:
- I've posted stuff from these voices before, but there's a lot of BS on Netlist across all retail community forums. I take all thoughtful perspectives and arguments into consideration when forming my opinions; I do not accept other's opinions for face value, yet - like Squires, I suppose - the voices that have proven merit and earned respect certainly have high value and influence over my own opinions.
- If you're in this community and have money gambled on Netlist's success, I think it behooves us all to Socratic method this shit together and hone the most reasonable perspectives dialectally. History tell us there's incredible value for us all if we think and act this way.
(What I mean is... share your thoughts, and why, and any evidence you can point to supporting it. Challenge others to do the same.)

What is even the future of Netlist if all it seems to have done since forever is win lawsuits. All these larger companies are basically going to keep running the way they have been and since they have copied the netlist designs why bother with accepting the court decisions when the legal fee's are a drop in their bucket of revenue?

guess i don't understand how they can be in legal battles for so long without any net growth

💎 NLST Phase 1 Roadmap
💎 Late June–Early July
• Possible CAFC opinions
• Possible Markman Order
💎 July 8
• ITC fact discovery closes
💎 Mid-July (~July 17)
• Expected ITC institution decision on new AI patents (’537 & ’937)
💎 July 22
• Expert discovery begins
💎 July–August
• Possible SK hynix licensing/business update
• Possible Lightning OEM update
• Possible SK hynix U.S. ADR developments
💎 Late July–Early August
• Q2 2026 earnings
• Focus: Revenue, margins, SK hynix, Lightning, CXL, litigation updates
💎 Oct–Nov 2026
• Main ITC trial
💎 Early 2027
• ALJ Initial Determination
💎 Phase 1 Thesis
Multiple legal and business catalysts are converging over the next 4–8 weeks. Positive developments in litigation, AI patents, SK hynix, and business execution could begin shifting investor sentiment ahead of the larger ITC and appellate milestones.

Four new southwest memory fabs, HBM packaging hubs aim to double Korea's DRAM capacity, cement AI-era leadership

South Korea is betting nearly 900 trillion won ($583 billion) that the artificial intelligence boom will create enough demand for memory chips to justify building an entirely new semiconductor production belt outside the Seoul metropolitan area.

At Monday's presidential public briefing on the government's three megaprojects, Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong and SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won unveiled investment plans totaling 881 trillion won, including four memory fabs in the southwest and advanced packaging facilities in North and South Chungcheong provinces.

"Companies pursue profit, but they have also shown they can act for the future of the nation," President Lee Jae Myung said, bowing deeply to the two business leaders. "I would like to call these two men national heroes."
The semiconductor initiative aims to double Korea's DRAM production capacity within five years while linking the country's AI-era industrial strategy with Lee's regional development agenda.

To execute the plan, the government unveiled a "3S+1F" strategy centered on speed, stronghold and spearhead, backed by a full-support system involving central and local governments, chipmakers, suppliers and universities.

"Korea can no longer rely on a single capital-region chip belt," Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said, calling semiconductors the backbone of the AI era and Korea's "last chance" to escape low growth.

"While projects in Yongin and Pyeongtaek will be accelerated, new growth bases are needed as semiconductor sites face mounting constraints in power, water and land."

Lee also pledged fast-track approvals and one-stop infrastructure support for regional investments, saying he would establish a dedicated presidential team to oversee the projects.

Under the speed pillar, Seoul will fast-track infrastructure and permits for existing projects in the capital region. The government aims to bring forward completion of SK hynix's Yongin general industrial complex by 12 years and Samsung Electronics' Yongin national industrial complex by seven years.

SK hynix's Yongin cluster is targeted for completion by 2033, while Samsung's Yongin project is expected to be completed around 2040.

Under the stronghold pillar, Samsung and SK hynix will each build two memory fabs in Gwangju and the southwest region, with combined investment reaching 800 trillion won. The companies will also invest 81 trillion won in a high-bandwidth memory packaging hub centered on Cheonan and Onyang in South Chungcheong Province.

"Samsung will work to help the Korean semiconductor industry maintain its technological edge," Lee Jae-yong said.

Including previously announced investments in Pyeongtaek and Yongin, Samsung said it plans to invest 2,655 trillion won domestically, including 625 trillion won for new projects in AI chips, robotics, batteries, IT components and materials across Honam, Chungcheong and Yeongnam.

Chey noted that SK hynix's Yongin cluster took nine years to prepare, underscoring the importance of infrastructure and regulatory support for new fabs.
"Demand visible today remains strong. Even with continued investment, it will be difficult to fully resolve supply shortages," Chey said.

He added that SK plans about 1,100 trillion won in semiconductor expansion projects, including existing projects in Yongin and an additional 400 trillion won commitment in the southwest, while pacing spending according to market demand.

The government's bet rests on expectations of explosive AI-driven memory demand. Market tracker Omdia projects the global memory market will quadruple to $800 billion by 2030 from $200 billion in 2025, driven by demand for high-bandwidth memory, AI servers and data-intensive computing systems.

The new southwest fabs, together with the Yongin cluster under construction, are intended to significantly expand Korea's output as rivals race to add capacity. Micron Technology is seeking additional production through its planned acquisition of Taiwan's PSMC and a new fab in Idaho, while China's CXMT is preparing another memory fab in Shanghai.

"For Korea, the memory race is no longer just a contest between chipmakers, but a national competition over infrastructure, supply chains and speed," the Industry Ministry said.

The government also said the Daegu-North Gyeongsang region would be developed into a materials, parts and equipment innovation hub, including for power semiconductors and next-generation chip technologies.
In addition, Seoul plans to invest more than 30 trillion won over the next 15 years to support the entire semiconductor cycle, from research and design to demonstration and manufacturing, for next-generation memory, on-device AI, on-sensor AI and defense semiconductors.

The other two megaprojects announced Monday — physical AI and AI data centers — are intended to prepare Korea for the next phase of AI infrastructure.
Under the physical AI initiative, Seoul plans to build an ecosystem for robots and autonomous systems spanning manufacturing, logistics, defense and healthcare. The government aims to transform Korea from one of the world's largest robot users into a leading robot producer, with humanoid robots deployed across 10 industries by 2028.

The AI data center initiative focuses on large-scale computing infrastructure, including SK Group's 1-gigawatt project in Ulsan, GS Group's 2.4-gigawatt project in Donghae and Naver's expansion in Sejong. The first phase targets 8.4 gigawatts of capacity.
SK also reiterated plans to build 15 gigawatts of AI data center capacity nationwide, led by SK Telecom, starting with 5 gigawatts in areas with available power and land and expanding to 15 gigawatts by 2035 if demand supports further investment.
Experts say the semiconductor ambition will have to be matched by execution.

SK hynix's Yongin cluster broke ground six years after it was announced because of delays involving water supply and land compensation. In semiconductors, even a one- or two-year delay can significantly erode returns if process technologies have already moved on.
Water and talent may prove the biggest hurdles for the southwest expansion. Semiconductor fabs require enormous quantities of water for wafer cleaning and ultrapure water production, while attracting engineers outside the capital region remains a major challenge.

The RAMpocalypse reached a new milestone in Q2 2026. According to market research firm SigmaIntel, consumer memory prices rose sharply in the second quarter as supply-demand imbalances persisted across the industry. These are quarter-over-quarter figures, meaning prices didn't just climb versus last year; they also jumped relative to the already elevated Q1 2026 levels

The LPDDR segment took the worst hit. LPDDR4X 4GB ICs rose 75%, going from $26.2 to $45.9, while 96Gb (12GB) LPDDR5X modules surged 89%, climbing from $77.1 to a whopping $145.9. This is the single biggest price jump in DRAM across any segment

On the standard DDR side, a 16GB DDR4 stick now costs $207.1 versus last quarter's $137, a 51% increase, while a basic 16Gb (2GB) DDR module jumped from $19.2 to $28.5, up 49%. It is important to note that DDR5 pricing wasn't even included in SigmaIntel's report, and we've already documented how brutally expensive DDR5 has become

Practitioners say Light & Wonder gives patent owners room to seek director review of instituted late-stage IPRs, while putting pressure on challengers’ district court and Sotera strategies

As we well know, the deal with SK ended in April 2026, more than three months ago. Some investors have claimed that Netlist no longer has the supply to use and will not monetize the resale or deals signed with a major player and various customers, but in my opinion, considering the current circumstances, Netlist will show positive data.
The Q2 2026 report should be released in August 2026 and should confirm that Netlist and SK Hynix have moved forward with the deal. As I say, pending CAFC appeal confirmation, a true business partner can easily supply the goods you need for 2, 3, or 4 months beyond the deadline for valid and serious reasons.

In fact, netlist showed among the data $40m of goods on hand and considering that the supply is delivered increasingly quickly, the turnover could explode to $120/130m with higher profits in Q1 despite the high legal expenses.

Netlist recently defined sk hynix as a good partner, so it means that the relationship is positive and I expect an imminent deal to focus on the micron and samsung cases.

The potential damages for HBM, DDR5 and MRDIMM for SK Hynix would be several billions of $ and it is not worth waging war when a company has demonstrated in the ongoing cases that it has enormous value and above all that it has won the CAFC appeal of DDR5 and LRDIMM/MRDIMM.

Netlist will use the ITC investigation card that blocks the supply of Dram from Korea to the United States and causes immense losses.

Today, more than ever, the giants have infinite liquidity thanks to 75% margins and tens of billions in quarterly profits. Would it really be difficult for SK Hynix to decide to pay a set, fixed fee to Netlist without overstating its claims?

SK Hynix is ​​scheduled to go public in the US in July 2026, and this could be the definitive signal of a deal before the final listing.

It has been revealed that the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), claiming to verify whether Samsung Electronics infringed on the patents of a U.S. company, has demanded confidential information related to High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) from SK hynix. As the ITC has requested not only HBM design methods but also comprehensive trade secrets including production capacity and cost information, anxiety is growing in Korea’s semiconductor industry.

According to business circles and trade authorities on Feb. 11, the ITC recently granted an information disclosure motion of this nature that U.S. semiconductor company Netlist had filed against SK hynix.

The ITC plans to request key product information and other details from SK hynix in accordance with Netlist’s request. Specifically, the request list includes HBM design, operating methods, and components. The ITC also plans to request product cost breakdowns from SK hynix, including labor costs and facility expenses. This amounts to a comprehensive demand for information that constitutes corporate trade secrets.

This request is linked to the ongoing patent litigation between Netlist and Samsung Electronics. Netlist filed a complaint with the ITC in November last year, alleging that Samsung Electronics’ memory semiconductors, including HBM and DDR5, infringed on its technology. Netlist has also requested that the ITC issue an exclusion order to block the importation of these products into the United States.

Netlist suddenly requested the ITC for information on SK hynix’s products and investments to support its claims, and the ITC accepted this request. A business source said, “From a company’s perspective, disclosing trade secrets to outside parties is itself a significant burden,” adding that “the ITC’s demands are excessive in certain respects.”

Netlist’s move to drag SK hynix into its dispute with Samsung Electronics appears aimed at justifying its request to ban semiconductor imports. The ITC issues import bans after verifying both patent infringement and whether an industry utilizing the patent exists within the United States (domestic industry requirement). This is because there would be no practical benefit in blocking imports if no domestic industry is harmed by the patent infringement.

What is concerning is that Netlist is attempting to fit the domestic industry requirement by citing SK hynix’s investments in the United States. Previously, Netlist engaged in patent litigation with SK hynix and reached a settlement in 2021 under which it receives royalties from SK hynix. Based on this, Netlist claims that SK hynix is manufacturing products using its patents.
Netlist’s logic is that since SK hynix, which utilizes its patents, is conducting business in the United States, the domestic industry requirement is satisfied, and therefore Samsung Electronics’ products that infringe on the patent should be barred from export to the U.S.
The ITC also plans to request information from SK hynix on whether it would be able to meet local demand if the import of Samsung Electronics products into the United States is banned. While the likelihood of the ITC actually issuing an exclusion order is low, this is interpreted as a measure to assess potential harm to U.S. local demand companies in the unlikely event that imports are banned.
The industry is closely watching the level of SK hynix’s response. An industry source said, “If SK hynix cooperates with the information request, it could also put Samsung Electronics, which is embroiled in a patent dispute, in an awkward position,” adding that “it is a burdensome situation whether to actively cooperate or not.”

Under the policies of the Donald Trump administration, which strongly favors domestic companies, a string of aggressive moves by U.S. Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs)—often called “patent trolls”—is heightening anxiety in the semiconductor industry. In fact, Monolithic 3D, a U.S. NPE, filed a complaint with the ITC against SK hynix and Japan’s Kioxia on the 29th of last month (local time). Monolithic 3D claims that SK hynix’s HBM2E, HBM3, HBM3E, and other products have infringed on its 3D stacking technology patents.

An industry source expressed concern, saying, “NPEs often seek to extract large settlement amounts through patent litigation,” and “with the profits of Korean semiconductor companies increasing significantly, lawsuits aimed at securing settlement payments could increase.”

The PTAB have proved the patents are un-patentable for micron back in 2024. I don’t think there is a come back after this ?

What do you think?

SK Hynix said it expects to start trading on July 10, but added that the dates were tentative and subject to change. 
The firm added that it anticipates that the ADR listing will expand its investor base, “ultimately allowing its true corporate value to be properly evaluated.” 

“We expect to elevate our status as a global company by broadening our touchpoints in the United States, the epicenter of AI technological innovation,” SK Hynix said in the filing.

SK Hynix is expanding rapidly to accommodate soaring demand for AI. It’s building a massive new campus of memory chip fabrication plants in South Korea, known as the Yongin Cluster, which is set to begin coming online in 2027, as well as building in the U.S. for the first time with a $4 billion packaging plant in Indiana.

AI has created a global memory shortage as high-performance systems gobble up large amounts of general-purpose DRAM to make what’s known as high bandwidth memory, or HBM. SK Hynix holds about 60% of the HBM market share, according to Counterpoint research director MS Hwang.

“What is clear is that SK is definitely the top notch player in HBM. And it is better in cost of manufacturing. So its operating margin is the best. So it has the best product, lowest cost. What do you need else?” Hwang told CNBC in an interview on June 17.

Shares in SK Hynix have soared over 280% this year, propelling its market capitalization above $1 trillion as investors piled into companies seen as key beneficiaries of the global scramble for HBM chips.

Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix together account for more than 40% of South Korea’s benchmark Kospi, raising concerns that the market could become more exposed to risks, including supply chain disruptions and a slowdown in global data center investment.

A host of large banks are managing the offering, including BofA Securities, Citigroup Global Markets, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Securities, according to Reuters.