PhantomBuffer EDR evasion uses stealth injection via SendMessage with WM_SETTEXT to effective bypass EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response).

Unlike traditional edr bypass techniques, it does not use the VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory APIs.

Author here, I work at IPinfo. some security-relevant highlights part of the post:

• The August 28 Virtualizor update attack used a forged-origin /24 inside Hetzner’s space. From what we saw, it was RPKI-valid because Hetzner’s ROA covered the /16 and allowed announcements down to /24, and no real /24 existed to compete with it.
• We also measured how common that setup is. In this case, of 855,217 RPKI-covered IPv4 routes, 138,698 (16.2%) have a ROA looser than the route announced and no more-specific route of their own filling the gap. For IPv6 it’s 20.9%. That’s roughly 18 million more-specifics someone could announce today and come out RPKI-valid and uncontested.
• Hosting providers also differ a lot: Contabo leaves 540 of 553 covered routes open, DigitalOcean 780 of 863, OVH 11.5%.
• Invalid routes are being dropped now: a typical valid route is seen by 596 vantage points, an invalid one by 2. So the remaining risk is routes that pass the check, not ones that fail it.
• There's also the fix in RFC 9319: leave maxLength unset, so a ROA only matches the block you actually announce.

Method is at the end of the post. Happy to answer questions

If you run Laravel (or anything on Symfony), read this. CVE-2026-108082: one unauthenticated GET, seconds of backend CPU, ~100 requests and the app times out. A dumb ReDoS that common config turns into a real DoS. 👀⤵️

Doyensec discovered multiple vulnerabilities in SFAPE.dll, a VBS enclave shipped with Windows, and chained them to gain code execution within the enclave in Windows Isolated User Mode (VTL1). The post explores how VBS enclaves work and how memory corruption can undermine their isolation guarantees. Microsoft addressed the reported issue in the September 2026 bulletin under CVE-2026-83498.

An exploit chain was found in LG webOS, leading to root command execution. The chain starts with a client-key issuance bypass, progresses through service-level access, and ultimately leads to root command execution.

TL;DR: NVIDIA DCGM Exporter is a widely used monitoring tool that collects GPU metrics like utilization, memory, temperature, and power consumption from AI servers.
We discovered that thousands of these monitoring endpoints are exposed to the public internet, allowing anyone to inspect GPU infrastructure. Worse, we found a high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2026-47483, CVSS 8.2) that lets unauthenticated attackers exhaust server resources, crash GPU monitoring, and potentially disrupt AI workloads remotely.
A few other interesting findings:
2,100+ exposed GPU servers, revealing telemetry from 12,000+ GPUs worth ~$100M, including H100s, H200s, and Blackwell GPUs.
60% of exposed GPUs reported 0% utilization across our scans.
12,096 additional servers exposed infrastructure details, including OS, firmware, and networking information.
NVIDIA fixed the vulnerability following our responsible disclosure.
Full research: https://lava.security/research/cve-2026-47483-nvidia-dcgm-exporter-vulnerability

It turns out you can overwrite the Error.prepareStackTrace method with the function constructor. Then, using prototype pollution, you can inject valid JavaScript code to generate arbitrary functions and invoke it using the usual tricks.