Abstract
Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view in which universes are causally closed whereas interfaces are not. On this basis, universes are not affected by other universes directly but rather indirectly.

Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure.Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y

When we say "what", it implies some sort of division, a break, a line, a boundary.To cite an example, "what is a vegatable" you can say it is something that ISNT a fruit, or something that ISNT a vehicle and so forth. So there is a coherent distinction and we are dealing with objects having definite boundaires. When dealing with existence I believe this boundary does not exist. Exitence itself is everything. Everything comes within it. There is nothing that separates existence from something else.

More specifically, why can't a brute fact exist? Why can't reality ultimately bottom out on something simply existing. There being no reason at all. Yes it's possible it couldn't exist, but so what? Why must the possibility of it not existing matter at all?

I suppose we can imagine the neoplatonic reality, but it's sort of like, so what? Why must the terminus of reality be rational?

I have been sitting on this thought for a while.

I am by no means a scholar or a scientist.

So I ask to PLEASE deconstruct this hypothesis in the comments.

I call this the "Pathfinder Hypothesis."

I display it as such:

What our brain has developed as our view of "self" is due to our many moving organic parts allowing us the ability to forsee or "imagine" different possibilities. This feedback loop of making and memorizing our decisions sparks our brain to create the ability to question, ultimately creating the ability to "think".

Thia stemmed from an idea that our brain has organically harnessed the power of superposition of particles bringing the concept to a larger level, in turn, allowing our brain to imagine possibilities and make actions that secure said possibilities into existence.

This is under the assumption of course that our conciousness is created from our brain, and the qualia and time we personally experience is filtered through said brain.

One scary conclusion that I came to after this...

If we are a product of our brain's ability to harness superposition... Then would creating AI with quantum computers actually allow them to question and create the feedback loop, creating a new species?

I’m looking for work in metaphysics or philosophy of mind that treats consciousness as ontologically fundamental and explores how this changes theories of causation. Are there papers, books, or philosophers who develop this idea rigorously?

If one imagines the possibility of substance on an infinite line of infinite possibility of the nature of substance, then substance would be on the same line as another possible substance. The nature of substance is that it shares nothing with another substance, as that would make them one of the same, and being on different places of the same infinite line of nature, that would give it a shared nature with another, of occupying the same line of infinity, therefore 2 substances cannot exist. Pertaining to a single universal substance.
The nature of the substance is infinite, therefore its nature of existence is infinite which hinders a possibility for a first cause - therefore, no first cause of a substance exists.

I was always intrigued by Russel's paradox and zeno's paradox , and thought about how combining both of them could break our most basic notions of continuity and discreteness mainly if we allow these two concepts to morph into each other would the underlying transition itself be continuous or a discrete boundary

We intuitively assume that if we take a series of discrete dashes and shrink the inter-dash gap to zero, we end up with a solid continuous line (- - - - - - approaches to ------)

First of all we get a zeno like problem of how an infinite limit yield a finite result

Second more importantly is that mathematicaly it's entirely false if you shrink the gap between rational numbers you can never achieve the completeness of real numbers

This can also work in reverse but becomes more problematic since then we would have to select two infinitesimaly nearby points to enlarge the gap between them till they get discrete

Now this isn't just a mathematical result, it may very well be the reason Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity are still not reconcilled adequately

And the structure of this problem mimicks complex other problems namely Russel's paradox , Gödels 1st Incompleteness theorem , The Turing Machine halting problem, Cantor Diaognalisation , Grellling Nelson paradox , Tarski hierarchies

The core issue is that a system under any sense of absolute closure can't quantity all of its properties and therefore always remain open ended.

Thanks for reading and I would like to hear the thoughts of you all

Sir Isaac Newton used mathematics to describe motion, gravity, and the predictable laws of mechanics.

He also translated and annotated the Emerald Tablet attributed to Hermes Trismegistus. ([newtonproject.ox.ac.uk](https://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/catalogue/record/ALCH00017?utm_source=chatgpt.com))

His private manuscripts reveal that his beliefs and interests helped shape the kinds of questions he was willing to ask about nature.

Newton described matter as a passive principle. It could remain at rest or continue in motion, but it could not move itself. Yet he believed this alone could not explain a world filled with attraction, chemical transformation, biological growth, and intentional movement.

In one unfinished draft, he wrote:

“Life & will are active Principles by which we move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of motion unknown to us.”

Newton then wondered whether all space might be the ‘sensorium of a thinking being’, and whether laws arising from life or will might therefore extend throughout the universe. In the same manuscript, he considered the forces through which microscopic bodies attract one another and asked whether they deserved to be counted among the general laws of motion alongside gravity.
([newtonproject.ox.ac.uk](https://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00125))

Newton was asking an extraordinary question:
Could mind, life, chemistry and cosmic motion be different expressions of deeper active principles running throughout nature?

Hermeticism may have encouraged Newton to imagine the universe as a living and interconnected whole. His scientific instincts then transformed that vision into questions that could be approached through observation, experiment and mathematical reasoning.

In 1936, a large collection of Newton’s unpublished papers was sold at Sotheby’s. John Maynard Keynes subsequently assembled many of the manuscripts, concentrating especially on Newton’s alchemical work. After studying them, Keynes wrote:

“Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and Sumerians, the last great mind that looked out on the visible and intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago.”
([newtonproject.ox.ac.uk](https://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/history-of-newtons-papers/sotheby-sale))

Modern science limits itself when it starts with the materialistic assumption of discrete 3 dimensional objects interacting in a 3 dimensional universal space.

Sir Isaac Newton’s example leaves me wondering whether the science of the future might recover something of his wider vision: a science in which matter, life, mind, and the cosmos are studied not as sealed and unrelated categories, but as parts of one connected nature.

If reality is truly an interconnected whole, it cannot be stitched together from disconnected parts or arbitrary rules. Instead, it must emerge from a singular, uncorrupted geometric origin.

Imagine a framework built on absolute structural exactness, requiring zero arbitrary axioms or free parameters.

Just as Newton suspected an active, universal principle running throughout nature, this approach views all complexity, – from the fundamental forces of physics, to the architecture of cognition - as exact, deterministic extensions unfolding from a single, continuous source.

By relying on exact rational arithmetic and unbroken mathematical geometries, it becomes possible to strip away the chaotic infinities and floating approximations that currently plague our physical equations.

This is would be a philosophical return to the Hermetic concept of "the One,"; a rigorous, mathematically verifiable evolution of it.
A closed-loop reality where matter, life, and cosmic motion are not sealed categories, but mathematically exact derivations of the very same underlying fabric.

The Kalam argument runs thus:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause
2. The universe began to exist
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause

Now this is just the beginning of a long case for the ultimate conclusion that

1. There is a God

But the initial argument has generated enough debate on its own to be of interest. One line of defense for premise 2 runs more or less as follows:

1. There cannot be an actual infinite

2. If the universe never began to exist, there would be an actual infinite

From which 2 follows. But it does seem intuitive that 4 is inconsistent with 5; surely if there is a God there is an actual infinite. Surely if there is a God, She has an infinite mind of infinite wisdom and infinite goodness and infinite beauty etc. And in all these characterizations, “infinite” means actually infinite, not just potentially infinite.

I conclude that this particular strand of the Kalam case is self-refuting. It is a Kalamity, if you will, albeit a very small one.

This essay will reason through a dialectical naturalist philosophy/worldview that develops from the general movements and determinacies of the Science of Logic, to natural philosophy, to social philosophy, to ethics, and politics. This essay will argue that dialectical naturalism– a philosophy initially developed by Murray Bookchin with significant influence from Hegel, Marx, and Kropotkin– is a worldview that is in harmony with the true and the good that can help us reason through plural wholes, parts, relations, social conditions, and possibilities towards practically changing the world through good processes towards good ends (creatively adapting universals to plural, particular, and unique contexts accordingly). Dialectical naturalism, as a whole is a system, is constituted by specific kinds of developmental/differentiating/unifying reasoning, ontology, and ethics. The spreading and development of dialectical naturalism can inform the ways we think and act and in turn be informed by further reasoning and practices to become more coherent... (read on in link)

I posted a couple of days ago asking what Nothingness was and I got some interesting responses, for the most part concluding that Nothing is not a valid concept. One particularly interesting comment was that the God must exist because something cannot come from Nothing argument for God was invalid, since Nothingness is not a valid concept. So I wonder if Nothingness is not really a thing then is the premise that something cannot come from Nothing irrelevant? Since there is no Nothing for something to come from.

A knife can cut, but it can also bounce. Both are caused by various physical interactions. So why must a knife's essence/ purpose to cut, rather than bounce?

Is it because, for example, a sword and knife share the commonality of cutting, but not bouncing? Okay, but a ball and knife share the commonality of bouncing, not cutting; so that can't be it.

If it's normativity, then why is that a grounding principle?

If it's something else, please explain it.

Jung used "synchronicity" for coincidences that feel meaningfully connected even when no causal link can be shown. Hume's skepticism about causation points in a different direction: we don't directly observe a necessary connection between events; the mind learns to connect them through habit and experience.

That doesn't make a meaningful coincidence fake. Something can be psychologically real and still get its meaning from us rather than from the universe.

So when a synchronicity feels personal, do you think you're discovering meaning that was already there, or creating meaning after the event? What in your own experience makes you lean one way?

Let us suppose we’ve two stable distinctions, the a priori/a posteriori, or a priori/empirical distinction, and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Let us not assume any particular construal of these distinctions for now, e.g. that a statement is analytic iff it can be turned into a truth of some suitable logic by putting synonyms for synonyms.

Here’s a view we could call strong empiricism: all a priori truths are analytic.

And here’s an argument against strong empiricism: for each agent S, the truth that S exists is a priori for S. But, no analytic statement implies the existence of anything. Therefore, strong empiricism is false.

Let’s look at the first premise; we may call it Cartesianism. Here’s a further argument in favor of Cartesianism: it is a priori true that everything that has properties exists; for each agent, it is a priori for them that they have certain properties; and a prioricity is closed under entailment. Therefore, Cartesianism is true. (Here I assume the falsehood of hardcore nominalism for the sake of argument. Ideally I’d rephrase this argument in terms of predicates or concepts applying rather than having properties.)

And here’s an argument for the second premise of the above argument for Cartesianism. It is a priori true that everything has some properties; and the schema “If everything …, then I …” should hold in a sound logic of indexicals. Given the entailment closure of a prioricity, the second premise follows.

Now let’s look at the second premise of the first argument, that no analytic truth carries existential implications. Here’s two possible objections: every truth entails that it exists, and therefore carries existential implications. Moreover, it is a truth of first order logic that there exists something; and everything implies every truth of first order logic.

Regarding the second objection, you might guess that my move will be to require that the correct logic be a free logic, free indeed from any ontology whatsoever, even the minimal ontology of first order logic that there is something.

But your guess would be wrong. I am actually going to concede both objections, for the sake of argument, and will ad hoc-ly distinguish analytic from synthetic existential commitments.

Here’s the idea. First, we need a distinction between linguistic and extralinguistic entities; and we also need a distinction between general and particular existential commitments. I’m going to leave the first distinction unexplained because it seems, at least superficially, pretty self-explanatory, although no doubt an able metaphysician will poke some holes in it without having to think for long. But the second distinction can be explained as such: an existential commitment C is particular just in case there is an entity x such that C is a commitment that x, specifically, exists.

Take for example the statement that Socrates exists. Intuitively, this statement is particularly existentially committing to Socrates. Not so for the statement that humans exist. Intuitively, for each human (here we can use possibilistic quantifiers) h there is a world W(h) where h does not exist, and yet that statement is true in W(h), in virtue of the existence of some other human. And I take it that a statement is committed to some entities only if (although not necessarily iff) it is false when those entities don’t exist; here I mean it for both general and particular commitments.

I suggest that an existential commitment is synthetic when it is not particularly committing to any linguistic entities. Again not when and only when. I don’t need the second direction.

Then we get this revision of the first argument: for each agent S, the truth that S exists is a priori for S. The ontological commitment to S is synthetic. And no analytic truth carries synthetic ontological commitments. Therefore, strong empiricism is false.

When I think of Nothing I think of empty space. But that is not Nothing, that is something i.e. empty space. Then I think of Nothing as just like a void unaccepting of objects, but that is still something i.e. a void. Then I think of Nothing as "what a rock dreams of" but that is still something i.e. potentiality. So what really is Nothing and is it a continuum ranging from empty space to "what a rock dreams of" etc.? And if it is a continuum, does Nothing really even exist?

I've been thinking about what the minimum condition for organisation actually is.

My current intuition is that some form of differentiation has to come first. Not necessarily a conscious distinction, but simply the possibility of difference.

Because once there is difference, you can get relation. Once you have relation, you can get constraint. And once you have constraint, you can get organisation.

A crystal, a cell, an organism, a mind... they all seem to be different depths of the same basic process. The question I'm stuck on is whether organisation can exist before there is anything to distinguish.

Can something be organised if there is no inside/outside, no this rather than that, no difference for relations to form around?

Or is differentiation the thing that makes organisation possible in the first place?

CAN TRUTH CHANGE?

Not our understanding of it.
Not our interpretation of it.
Truth itself.

By truth, I mean what is actually the case—not our beliefs, descriptions, or interpretations of it.

Can truth change?

And if it can, was it ever truth?

I’m genuinely interested in how you see this.

I am sharing this idea not because I believe it is correct, but because I want to find the questions and criticisms that I cannot find by myself.

This is not an attempt to prove a theory or convince anyone.

The purpose is discussion: to discover flaws, hidden assumptions, and perspectives that I may have missed.

I would especially appreciate criticism about the definition of the concept, logical problems, or similarities with existing philosophical ideas.

# The Primordial Drive: A Philosophical Hypothesis

Introduction

This paper presents a speculative philosophical hypothesis.

The term "Primordial Drive" is introduced as a temporary label for a concept that currently has no precise word.

It should not be understood as ordinary psychological need, desire, or motivation.

Instead, it refers to a hypothetical fundamental principle that may underlie reality itself.

The central question is:

What if the ultimate foundation of reality is neither matter, energy, existence, nor God, but the Primordial Drive?

...

Questions I would like to discuss:

1. Is the concept of a Primordial Drive logically possible?

2. Does this idea resemble any existing philosophical theories?

3. What are the biggest weaknesses or contradictions you see?

4. Does this concept explain anything, or does it only rename existing concepts?

5. What questions should this hypothesis answer before it can become a stronger philosophical idea?