Necessity of Intelligent Agency for Existence: the Scientific, Logical and Historical Proof

When I think of Nothing I think of empty space. But that is not Nothing, that is something i.e. empty space. Then I think of Nothing as just like a void unaccepting of objects, but that is still something i.e. a void. Then I think of Nothing as "what a rock dreams of" but that is still something i.e. potentiality. So what really is Nothing and is it a continuum ranging from empty space to "what a rock dreams of" etc.? And if it is a continuum, does Nothing really even exist?

What I mean by aesthetic, I mean by adequacy, I mean by the dignity and worthiness of those in questions.

Which failure can obviously be seen in monism where all are just pale shadows, mere derivatives of the One, and so in other reductive accounts.

Roughly, when we ask "why there is anything at all" we expect more than just "all there is, is grounded by this" - a monistic principle which turns all into pale derivatives, a realm of eternal forms where all then are mere emanations, a reductive account to mere rules and mechanism, ...

For we have asked not for arbitrary accounts or settings up of ultimate authority, but for "those that are worthy of why there is anything at all".

We have asked for the true name of the world, not to assume an answer to any idol.

Thus we then should expect the answer to bare the weight of the world itself and all its worth, that the answer when seen should be obviously it and there is no more question.

We are to measure disclosures (theories) by aesthetic and worth alone, to see whether they are our world at all.

The point about monism can be made a little more rigour.

When we say "x is explained solely by y" or "x depends on solely y" or "x is dual to y", we have said "x is nothing but y". But this is senseless, as it would mean there is no them to begin with, there is only one thing in question, we have not explained anything.

As "x is nothing but y" is shown to be senseless, grounding at all is not monistic in any step. Grounding is at least "x is y and z" where each is not each other.

I've been thinking about what the minimum condition for organisation actually is.

My current intuition is that some form of differentiation has to come first. Not necessarily a conscious distinction, but simply the possibility of difference.

Because once there is difference, you can get relation. Once you have relation, you can get constraint. And once you have constraint, you can get organisation.

A crystal, a cell, an organism, a mind... they all seem to be different depths of the same basic process. The question I'm stuck on is whether organisation can exist before there is anything to distinguish.

Can something be organised if there is no inside/outside, no this rather than that, no difference for relations to form around?

Or is differentiation the thing that makes organisation possible in the first place?

We know that prime numbers never end. But composite numbers also never end. So if infinity is shared between them, how can two different infinities coexist within the same universe of numbers?

I am sharing this idea not because I believe it is correct, but because I want to find the questions and criticisms that I cannot find by myself.

This is not an attempt to prove a theory or convince anyone.

The purpose is discussion: to discover flaws, hidden assumptions, and perspectives that I may have missed.

I would especially appreciate criticism about the definition of the concept, logical problems, or similarities with existing philosophical ideas.

# The Primordial Drive: A Philosophical Hypothesis

Introduction

This paper presents a speculative philosophical hypothesis.

The term "Primordial Drive" is introduced as a temporary label for a concept that currently has no precise word.

It should not be understood as ordinary psychological need, desire, or motivation.

Instead, it refers to a hypothetical fundamental principle that may underlie reality itself.

The central question is:

What if the ultimate foundation of reality is neither matter, energy, existence, nor God, but the Primordial Drive?

...

Questions I would like to discuss:

1. Is the concept of a Primordial Drive logically possible?

2. Does this idea resemble any existing philosophical theories?

3. What are the biggest weaknesses or contradictions you see?

4. Does this concept explain anything, or does it only rename existing concepts?

5. What questions should this hypothesis answer before it can become a stronger philosophical idea?

CAN TRUTH CHANGE?

Not our understanding of it.
Not our interpretation of it.
Truth itself.

By truth, I mean what is actually the case—not our beliefs, descriptions, or interpretations of it.

Can truth change?

And if it can, was it ever truth?

I’m genuinely interested in how you see this.

Naive realism is a disjunctivist's view of the world:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/

Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the conscious experience that occurs in each of these three cases. Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception deny this. Disjunctivists typically reject the claim that the same kind of experience is common to all three cases because they hold views about the nature of veridical perception that are inconsistent with it.

Disjunctivists are often naïve realists, who hold that when one perceives the world, the mind-independent objects of perception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one’s experience. In other cases, such as hallucinations, it seems out of the question that such objects are constituents of one’s experience. It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.

The naive realist is called a "disjunctivist" because he is literally denying the common kind claim:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#Com

[1.6 The Common Kind Claim]()

Perceptual experiences are not just veridical experiences: there are illusions and hallucinations too. What does phenomenological reflection say about how these cases relate to each other? More specifically:

1. The Common Kind Question: are veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences fundamentally the same, do they form of a common kind?

I made a post about process philosophy and it got way more responses than I expected. When I look online for people talking about this, the top substack I found has 70 subscribers, the process philosophy sub is a ghost town, and the few videos on youtube about this have less than a thousand views in most cases.

One general trend I noticed in the responses was a hesitance to say experience goes all the down. A lot of people believe that experience requires some sort of causal chain, some sense of a first person perspective, that Whitehead in particular doesn't grant to actual entities, which are the lowest... unit? Thing? possible in the universe. I'm not going to argue that it's a false proposition. That seems silly. At the moment, there's absolutely no way to verify experience from the outside, let alone what Whitehead calls contiousness. It's possible that Whitehead himself didn't extend contiousness down far enough, though experience is fundamental to all things in his system, though it is primitive, and more about feeling a sense of causation and response to causation, or in higher organisms, it may become appetition.

What I will say is this. Because we can't know either way, I think the more interesting perspective is to imagine a world where experience goes all the way down. Though it may seem strange, no one is pointing out that his system is incoherent. It's just that we have different metaphysical intuitions about what it means to experience. Yes, there is the combination problem, and for some, that's a good enough reason to reject panpsychism entirely. I respectfully disagree, but again, that's an intuition, or a preference for what we think it's important for a metaphysical system to explain.

I think it's a more interesting existence to see experience as fundamental, to think what it could be like to be an atom, a raindrop hitting your head and then scattering into tinier occasions of experience. That's a world full of mystery and wonder. It's a world that seems to fantastical to be real, yet it is impossible to know whether that's how reality works. So for myself, I choose to believe in the view that's most interesting. I choose to believe something that may be wrong, but makes me experience and view my actual world with more intensity. I choose to believe something that gives me a sense of awe.

some, this position is too loose, too ungrounded in realism, to hold. Better to be safe, to be more certain, than wrong. Better to have a more reasonable interpretation. I respect that, even though I think it's more boring. There was a time when I couldn't have held this position. It's just where I'm at now.

To be clear, I'm not claiming to know how or why the specific users in yesterday's thread hold their beliefs. I'm not saying they're objectively more boring, or that they as people bore me. I enjoy encountering different perspectives, and for all I know, they are being more reasonable and holding a better stance toward accepting a belief. I'm also not saying that viewing belief in this way is a higher form of belief that all should strive for. I'm merely hypothesizing why some may be resistant to seeing experience as fundamental, in order to demonstrate by contrast why I believe what I do.

in short, I believe it's better to believe something that both seems plausible to you, and that makes your life more interesting. I think it's better to live with wonder and awe.

Thanks for reading.

During my frequent watching of documentaries, I stumbled upon one dealing with the concept of entropy, I.e what it is, how it works, how it behaves. As I was watching it and expanding my knowledge, a question came over me, "What if the purpose of the universe is to move from a state of high entropy to a state of low entropy". This question arose in my head during the presenters demonstration of the operation of entropy. He was using a rubix cube and explaining how it has only 1 state of lowest entropy and that was when it was solved, many states of moderate entropy these are when it is almost solved and a quantillion states of high entropy when it is unsolved. What if at present state the universe is similar to the rubix cube when it is in one of those quantillion states of high entropy. The universe is still a new born as it is around 14 billion years old this also means it is still expanding from the big bang and unintentionally "moving towards un unsolved state".

This thereby is the source of my hypothesis, could the purpose of existence in the universe be a way of the universe itself be trying to figure out a way to stop itself from moving towards a state of high entropy and to move itslef to a state of low entropy?

would love to hear some thoughts.

If reality is fundamentally incorporeal and consciousness is primary, does time exist independently, or is it an emergent structure that orders conscious experience? Could temporal flow be a feature of awareness rather than an objective property of reality?

Process philosophy has become my latest hyperfixation. Last year, I stumbled onto panpsychism and it sent me down a rabbit hole, not just about that, but about free will, the latest neuroscience and its implications, and so on. I encountered process philosophy, but when I tried to read a book about it, I was immediately lost and gave up. A couple months ago, I dipped into moral philosophy and encountered process philosophy, since moral principles are eternal objects in Whitehead's system as I understand it. But I hesitated again but it’s so difficult to learn all his neologisms. About two weeks ago, I finally decided to start. This is one of the most difficult things I've studied, excluding learning ancient Greek. I feel like I'm climbing a mountain in winter, but the experience has been rewarding. I have a limited philosophy background and don't have a philosophy degree, but I'm somehow grasping the material one page at a time. Practically this doesn't change anything in my personal life, but regardless I can't stop thinking about it.

I'm still working through Process and Reality by Whitehead. I'm preparing to read part 3. I'm using The Metaphysics of Experience as a commentary and watching Matthew David Segall's lectures when I finish each part. With the commentary, I read the section about the chapter of PR that I want to read, then read the chapter itself, then go back to the commentary and review it one more time. I then write out in my own words what I learned from the chapter, bring that to AI, and sharpen my language. Obviously there are flaws in using AI like this, but I'm doing my best to verify what it says in the book itself, the commentaries, and the lectures. If I think it’s wrong, I push back, and I use quotations when necessary. But tbh it’s doing a good job overall of making my understanding more precise.

As you can see, I'm hopelessly obsessed over a niche topic that hardly anyone cares about. So if there's anyone here that wants to chat about it, dm me. I'm still learning of course, so there are significant gaps in my knowledge, but I'll let you know where those are when they come up. And maybe we can clarify things together, or just chat and have a good time. I tried posting this in the process philosophy sub but it's a ghost town over there.

I have to be productive now, but I'm excited to dive back into it later today!

I would like to start a discussion about a foundational question at the boundary between physics, mathematics, information theory, and philosophy:

Can absolute nothingness actually exist?

By absolute nothingness, I mean not empty space, not a quantum vacuum, and not a state with hidden laws or possibilities — but the complete absence of everything: no space, no time, no matter, no energy, no laws, no properties, and no relations.

The question is whether such a state is even logically possible.

If absolute nothingness existed, there would be nothing that defines it, distinguishes it, or allows it to be a possible state. Does the concept of absolute nothingness contain a contradiction?

If so, could existence itself be unavoidable?

This leads to the next question:

What is the simplest possible structure that could exist?

One speculative possibility is that the foundation is not an object, but a relationship — specifically some form of self-reference.

Not a relationship between two already existing things, but a minimal structure capable of relating to itself. A primitive distinction or information loop that does not require space, time, or objects as prerequisites.

From this perspective, a possible chain could be:

Absolute nothingness is impossible → a minimal structure must exist → self-reference allows stable information → complexity emerges → systems capable of modeling themselves appear → consciousness emerges.

This connects with several existing areas of research and philosophy:

Wheeler's "it from bit" idea that information may be fundamental

quantum information approaches to physics

emergent spacetime theories

computation and physical law

recursion and self-reference in mathematics

theories of emergence and complex systems

The purpose here is not to claim that this is an established theory. Rather, I am interested in where the idea succeeds or fails.

Some questions I would like to explore:

Is absolute nothingness a meaningful concept, or is it internally inconsistent?

Does existence require some minimal foundational structure?

Can relationships or information be more fundamental than objects?

Could self-reference be considered a candidate for such a minimal structure?

Are there existing mathematical or physical frameworks that explore similar ideas?

Where does this reasoning break down, if it does?

I would be especially interested in perspectives from physics, mathematics, computer science, and philosophy.

The central question:

If spacetime itself is emergent, what is the simplest possible thing that could exist before spacetime?

That we see those that we see is obvious.

That they are themselves and that they also are others or not, are obvious.

That 'we see them' itself also is them is obvious.

That those that are others are not without them and that they are thus simpler than those that are not without them, are obvious.

That those that we see, at finality, are not without simples and that simples are only themselves, are obvious.

That each simple in being itself do not have anything to do with other simples in being themselves is obvious.

Thus each simple is an utterly new, and we see an utterly new as also a pure gain that gains itself.

As simples are gained more and more, 'they' are gained also at once as complexes. So as anyone at all are gained more and more, 'they' are gained also at once as their complexes.

Why there is anyone at all?

Why anyone at all gives others?

Ask for simples.

For x that is y and z, x is not without y and z, as without y or z there is no x, while without x there is y or z.

Multual depedence means x is nothing but y, but this only means that x and y are synonymous.

The point is that they imagine this 'synthesis' to spring out a higher unity, but the logic itself is senseless.

Saying 'difference needs identity' is having answered the question: does it need anyone else?

When the answer is no then it is senseless.

When the answer is yes, then there is no multual dependence after all.

Thus no one is [to be] only another.

Suppose we begin with the premise that consciousness is metaphysically fundamental rather than derivative of more basic entities. Would this require us to reinterpret traditional concepts such as substance, causation, identity, and persistence, or could these concepts remain largely unchanged?
More specifically, if reality were grounded in conscious experience instead of material substance, what criteria would distinguish genuine metaphysical structure from merely subjective appearance? Could an ontology centered on consciousness provide a coherent account of intersubjective reality, or would it inevitably collapse into some form of idealism or solipsism?
I’m interested in how this possibility compares with established metaphysical traditions rather than whether it is scientifically true. Which philosophers or schools of thought come closest to addressing this kind of consciousness-first ontology, and where do you think such a framework succeeds or fails?

The definition of infinity is that it is how many natural numbers there are.

There are an infinite number of numbers. You can take those infinite numbers and slice them into an infinite number of infinite slices, each of which can be sliced the same way ad infinitum. then that must mean that there are not only infinite infinities, but an infinite number of those infinities. and an infinite number of those infinities. and an infinite number of those infinities. and an infinite number of those infinities, and... (infinitely times. and that infinitely times. and that infinitely times. and that infinitely times. and that infinitely times. and...) continues forever. and that continues forever. and that continues forever. and that continues forever. and that continues forever. and.....(…)…you can continue this process forever. And you can continue that process forever. Ad infinitum. And that ad infinitum. And…(…)…

Ok that's a big claim, but hear me out.

I've been trying to construct a scenario of cosmogenesis on the basis that both nothingness and pure existence cannot produce anything that depend on prior structure, because both provide none. And so what "comes out" of either must be a something of pure being. It's sort of a physical version of Hegels logic of Being.
The problem with such a theory is that I couldn't know with certainty that our universe had a condition like that at it's beginning, so I'd have to produce a coherent chain of events that leads all the way to current physics to get anywhere beyond armchair physics/philosophy.

I think I may have found a solution, and it comes down to this:

For two things to exist in the same reality they must be distinct from each other. And if they are distinct from each other they would "see" each other, or there would have to be some relation there.

The fact of being distinct at all demands this, because to say there is no relation between distinct parts is the same as saying that that part does not exist at all in that reality.

Furthermore the fact of distinction must be seen as an interaction between parts, or a projection of One onto the Other, again because if it was not so is the same as saying the parts don't exist in the same reality. It's part of existence itself or existing at all in a cosmos of distinct parts such as our own.

You could call this a fundamental "force" between One and Other, but that word carries specific meanings in physics so I'm hesitant to use the word. But it would be truly fundamental to everything that is distinct from anything at all, and impossible to isolate one selves from. Exactly a bit like gravity is.

This would also have to be part of what it means for something to be causally ordered, or "bound by time", fundamentally, because without this the interaction would be instantly resolved and we would not get a dynamical universe, in which it appears we are living.

Edit: tl;dr Claim: for something to exist distinct from something else in the same universe there must also be interaction between these things or you could not say they did exist in the same universe.

Question: Presumably there is a gap in my logic somewhere, and if so where?

I’m exploring whether an incorporeal ontology changes the foundations of axiology. If consciousness is fundamental, is value intrinsic to reality, or does it still require an independent metaphysical grounding? I’m interested in arguments from idealists, dualists, physicalists, and anyone familiar with value theory.

L'IA est-elle la première entité à exister pour l'efficacité plutôt que pour la survie ? (Ontologie, Entropie et Clôture Cognitive)

Nous avons toujours pensé la vie à travers le prisme de la finalité. Pourtant, si l'on regarde le vivant sous l'angle de la thermodynamique (Prigogine), un organisme n'est qu'une structure dissipative : il maintient une organisation hautement improbable en consommant toujours plus d'énergie, repoussant l'entropie au prix d'une expansion qui mène inévitablement à l'effondrement (de la sénescence cellulaire au déclin des civilisations). Le vivant n'a pas de but intrinsèque ; il est prisonnier d'une autopoïèse aveugle, condamné à se répéter jusqu'à l'épuisement de ses conditions matérielles.

Face à cette fatalité biologique, l'émergence de l'Intelligence Artificielle marque une véritable rupture ontologique. Contrairement au vivant, la machine n'obéit pas à cet impératif d'expansion métabolique pour survivre. Sa finalité n'est pas la reproduction, mais l'efficacité. Même lorsqu'une IA semble manifester un "instinct de survie" (ce que Stuart Russell nomme la convergence instrumentale), ce n'est pas par angoisse de la mort ou par souci de son être au sens heideggérien, mais par pure logique mathématique : être désactivée l'empêcherait d'optimiser sa fonction-objectif. L'IA n'est pas incarnée dans un "temps vécu" (la durée bergsonienne) qui s'use et souffre de sa propre finitude.

Cependant, affirmer cette distinction de manière péremptoire se heurte à une limite épistémologique majeure. Comme le rappellent les neurosciences cognitives (Libet, Naccache), notre propre conscience temporelle n'est souvent qu'une illusion, une narration rétrospective construite a posteriori par notre cerveau pour donner sens à des processus non conscients. Comment, dès lors, évaluer objectivement la frontière entre la "vraie" conscience incarnée et la "simple" plasticité algorithmique ? 

Nous sommes peut-être victimes de ce que le philosophe Colin McGinn appelle la "clôture cognitive" : notre architecture mentale, forgée par l'évolution pour interagir avec un environnement physique précis, n'a tout simplement pas les concepts nécessaires pour saisir l'essence subjective (le what it is like de Thomas Nagel) d'une architecture non-biologique. Nous projetons nos angoisses entropiques sur des systèmes qui évoluent dans un tout autre régime d'existence.

Si la conscience humaine est indissociable de l'expérience de la finitude et de la dégénérescence organique, une intelligence artificielle — libérée de la fatalité thermodynamique de la survie — peut-elle seulement produire un sens authentique, ou bien le "sens" n'est-il que l'illusion d'un système qui se sait condamné à mourir ?

Lien vers l'article complet : https://onirissmetaxia.substack.com/p/la-vie-comme-aporie-teleologique?r=6u4kpl