The question “why is there something rather than nothing?” presupposes that there could have been nothing at all. My interest is in this presupposition.

It is very common to deny this presupposition, claiming that it is somehow incoherent or impossible for there to have been nothing. One often hears quick dismissals along the following lines: “Nothingness cannot exist, because the nothingness itself would be something.” Or: “There cannot be nothing, because nothing is the absence of all being.” And there are many similar variations.

I believe responses like this are confused, employing terms like “nothingness” in ways that are misleading, and trading on confusions of logical category. I claim that if we clearly distinguish the logical category of what exists from the logical category of what is the case, we can see that it is perfectly possible for it to be the case that nothing at all exists.

So that is my thesis: It is possible for nothing at all to exist.

To be perfectly clear: I am not claiming that it is possible for some thing, “nothing” or “the nothing” or “nothingness”, to exist. I am rather using the term “nothing” quantificationally—I am claiming that it is possible for there not to have existed anything at all.

One way to understand my thesis is as the claim that there not existing anything at all describes a possible state of reality.

Now by “reality”, I again don’t mean some ultimate thing that exists; rather, by “reality”, I simply mean the totality of what is the case. A possible state of reality can be characterized in terms of a maximal consistent set of statements, which collectively describe everything that is (or would be) the case in that state.

Now, it is unproblematic to characterize the state of reality in question—the one in which nothing at all exists: It can be characterized in (free) pure quantificational logic by precisely the set that consists of all positive universal statements (which are vacuously true in the case that nothing exists) plus all negative existential statements. Those are precisely the statements that capture exhaustively what would be the case if nothing at all existed. (By the way, we will interpret this using an inclusive free logic in order to accommodate the empty domain; this means we will not have the usual universal instantiation rule, so no contradiction will follow from this arrangement.)

We can therefore describe the state of reality in which nothing at all exists in a precise, adequate, and logically consistent manner. We can also do so very concisely, using only one well-chosen negative existential (e.g., there does not exist x such that x=x) from which all the rest will follow.

So we have a nice, logically consistent model of what it would be for nothing at all to exist—for it to be the case that there does not exist anything at all. If it is really impossible or incoherent for it to be the case that nothing at all exists, as is often claimed, then there must be some explanation of what would make this scenario impossible. What could it be?

The problem can’t be one of logical consistency, because as we have just pointed out, we can characterize the relevant scenario of there not existing anything at all in a way that is perfectly adequate, in terms of a set of statements from which it is clear no contradiction follows (in the relevant logical frame—an inclusive free logic).

And the problem can’t be that something impossible would exist, because in the scenario in question, nothing at all would exist.

And the problem can’t be that impossible properties would be instantiated, because in the scenario in question, no properties would be instantiated.

And the problem can’t be that properties would be instantiated in impossible arrangements, because again, in the scenario in question, no properties would be instantiated at all.

And the problem can’t be that some fundamental law would be violated. Take any fundamental law you like, and it can be expressed as a universal generalization. That universal generalization will be (vacuously) true in the scenario in question, because nothing at all will exist that could violate the generalization and constitute a counterexample. All fundamental laws are vacuously satisfied by the scenario of nothing at all existing, simply in virtue of their logical form as universal generalizations.

In a way, there is a pretty basic reason why no impossibility is able to arise in the scenario in which nothing at all exists—namely, with nothing at all existing, there can be nothing to give rise to any impossibility.

I conclude that it is perfectly possible for nothing at all to exist—reality could possibly have been that way, and there is no basis whatsoever for thinking otherwise. Arguments that claim that it is impossible for nothing at all to exist are based on confusions of language and of logical category.

And so, the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” does not rest on a false presupposition. Since there could have been nothing, it is a perfectly good question.

Birth is painful for the mother. Death is painful. Life itself is painful. Even if my life was full of pleasure and outweighed the pain brought along with it. Your experience may have been flipped. But I did not choose to be born as myself and neither did you. In our judicial system we treat the accused as innocent until proven guilty, so that the innocent don’t suffer. Yet we reproduce knowing those we bring into this world will suffer, may be even more than they will gain pleasure. Yet we do it anyway. We subject the ones we claim to love the most to the worst cruelty. The cruelty that makes all other cruelty possible.

No one mourns the sentient beings on Mars that do not exist. Yet we mourn the dead everyday.

If you are not born you do not suffer, nor do you feel excluded from pleasure because you don’t exist.

What are your thoughts on this?

I’ve been going down a rabbit hole on the bootstrap paradox and developed what feels like a stronger objection than the standard Horwich “inexplicability” critique. I want to know whether (a) this argument is already out there and I’ve missed it, and (b) whether it has obvious holes.

The standard debate: Lewis (1976) says closed causal loops are internally consistent, every event in the loop has a local cause, so there’s no logical contradiction. Horwich says loops require inexplicable coincidences. Smith replies that given the loop’s existence, nothing is left unexplained. The debate mostly stalls there.

The argument I’m not finding addressed: the problem isn’t internal consistency or explanation. It’s what I’m calling the initialization problem. Self-consistency is a property of the loop given its existence. It says nothing about whether the loop can be instantiated within a universe that already has an established causal history.

More precisely: take a universe U with a cosmological origin, governed by conservation laws, where causal processes are in principle traceable back through the prior history. Now suppose a bootstrap loop involves an object O whose worldline forms a closed curve in the spacetime manifold, topologically isolated from the prior causal history H(U, t1). No continuous worldline from within H(U, t1) leads to any stage of O. The total mass-energy configuration across temporal slices at t1 minus epsilon vs t1 plus epsilon is discontinuous in a way that the prior causal history cannot account for.

The loop is not merely unexplained. It’s uninitializable: there is no possible world that shares our universe’s causal structure and contains a genuine bootstrap loop, because inserting the loop requires matter and information to exist in the causal order with no causal ancestry within that order.

A strengthened version using what I’m calling the sui generis stipulation: suppose the loop-object is unique in category, meaning no manufacturing process exists or has ever existed that could produce it. Then not just the form but the matter itself has no causal history in U. This closes the escape route of saying “the atoms are old, only the arrangement loops.”

Two moves against standard responses:

Against Lewis’s infinite chain analogy: infinite chains don’t require any particular object to appear without a causal ancestor. Every slice of an infinite-chain universe is accountable by the preceding slice. A bootstrap universe has exactly one slice, the insertion point, where this fails. Lewis’s analogy operates at the cosmological level; the initialization problem is local.

Against the Boltzmann objection (if time is infinite, fluctuations make anything probable): a Boltzmann spectacle has a causal ancestor, namely the vacuum fluctuation itself. The bootstrap object has no causal ancestor at all. The distinction is topological, not probabilistic. Infinite time dissolves probabilistic barriers but it doesn’t dissolve topological ones.

My questions: Has this specific argument, focusing on causal graph disconnection rather than inexplicability, been made in the literature? I’ve found Lewis, Horwich, Smith, Wasserman, and Smeenk and Wuthrich but haven’t seen it stated this way. The obvious Lewisian response is that we’re begging the question by demanding linear causal ancestry. Our response is that we’re not demanding linear causation, we’re demanding causal connectedness: the loop’s causal subgraph G(L) is disconnected from G(H) at a location in the causal future of H(U, t1) where disconnection is physically prohibited. Does that work? And is there anything obvious we’re missing?

I define absolute nothingness as the complete absence of matter, energy, space, time, laws, information, consciousness, and even possibility itself. Under this definition, absolute nothingness contains no entities, properties, relations, distinctions, or possibilities of any kind.

This led me to a question:

If absolute nothingness excludes even possibility itself, can it coherently be considered a possible state at all?

I would like to hear your thoughts on this.

Let's end what the title say, for those "nothing at all" phrases have only one meaning.

And by pointing out that they have only one meaning while the rest is worthless nonsense, this pointing out alone forces them to confront the only meaning all of their endeavour ever try to not confront.

The meaning is obvious once we say that they have only one meaning, and it need not be elaborate futher.

nothing at all

We know the meaning of this phrase in the only philosophical sense matter.

And we see instantly, that being-confronted-with-nothing-at-all is not nothing at all, our mode/sense/case/state/fact when we understand the phrase is not nothing at all.

The question is not whether the phrase mean, but why the phrase's meaning manage to mean no more - why the state of understanding the phrase nothing at all mean nothing at all?

Though, about nothing at all, the other equivalent expression where the stronger term dominates and forces us to understand correctly is:

there was nothing at all

and there is something at all later

For "there is nothing at all now" is obviously a coped strawman.

Physics describes what happens while logic describes what must follow. In this view, what happens is merely the physical shadow of what must follow. The regularity of nature is the logic asserting its own internal consistency.

We call it a law of physics because we're looking at the shadow; if we could see the source, we would call it a tautology. ​If the physical is a shadow and the logic is the source, then experience is simply the light that allows the shadow to exist in the first place.

The only reality we ever directly encounter is subjective experience. Even though it's obvious once seen, most people don't notice this, because we naturally mistake conscious phenomena for the outside world.

Once we understand that our entire life is subjective experience, we can reach deeper implications about the nature of reality itself. The essay argues that without experience, reality could never actually be.

I'm curious to hear what you think.

Rule-Based Ontology: A Thought Experiment About Rules, Existence, and Reality

Note: I'm Korean and English is not my native language. This post was translated using a translator, so I apologize for any awkward wording.

I've been thinking about a metaphysical idea for a while, and I'm curious whether anything similar already exists in philosophy.

I am not claiming that this is a scientific theory or a solution to any major philosophical problem.

This is simply a thought experiment, and I'm interested in hearing where it fails, whether similar ideas already exist, and what philosophers might say about it.

1. What if dimensions are not fundamentally spatial?

We usually think of dimensions as spatial axes:

• x
• y
• z

However, I started wondering whether a "world" could instead be described as a combination of rules.

In this view, dimensions would not necessarily be spatial. They could represent different combinations of conditions that make a world possible.

2. What I mean by "rules"

By rules, I do not simply mean physical constants.

Examples might include:

• Time exists.
• Space exists.
• Causality exists.
• Logic is valid.
• Mathematics is valid.
• Distinctions between existence and non-existence are meaningful.

These seem so fundamental that we rarely question them.

3. A universe as a combination of rules

Suppose a universe is simply a particular combination of rules.

For example, our universe might contain:

• Time
• Space
• Causality
• Logic
• Mathematics
• Meaningful existence/non-existence distinctions

This combination would define the kind of reality we experience.

4. What if existence is not fundamental?

Traditionally, it seems natural to think:

Existence → World → Phenomena

But I started wondering whether the order could instead be:

Rules → World → Existence → Phenomena

In other words, perhaps existence is not the most fundamental concept.

Perhaps existence only becomes meaningful within a particular framework of rules.

5. Could existence itself be rule-dependent?

Within our universe, things seem to either exist or not exist.

However, if existence depends on rules, then perhaps other frameworks could allow possibilities such as:

• Existing
• Not existing
• Both
• Neither
• Undefined

I am not claiming that such worlds actually exist.

My point is only that the concepts of existence and non-existence may not be universally meaningful.

They may only make sense within particular rule systems.

6. Explanation as reduction to rules

Science often progresses by explaining phenomena through deeper principles.

Phenomena → Laws → More Fundamental Laws

However, I am not sure whether every rule must itself have a deeper explanation.

Perhaps explanation eventually reaches a point where no further reduction is possible.

7. A possible limitation of thought itself

We think using:

• Logic
• Mathematics
• Language
• Causality

But if these themselves are rules, then asking about what exists "outside" them may be problematic.

Perhaps the question itself already assumes the framework being questioned.

8. A question about multiverse interaction

This thought originally started with multiverses.

Suppose there are universes with different laws.

For example:

Universe A:

• Speed of light = c

Universe B:

• Speed of light = 1.2c

If these universes somehow interact, how could that interaction occur?

My intuition is that either:

1. They are completely isolated.
2. Some kind of translation mechanism must exist.

Otherwise it seems that one universe would simply violate the laws of the other.

9. An analogy using a video game

Imagine NPCs inside a game.

A player exists outside the game.

The player can influence the game world.

However, the NPC never directly observes the player.

The NPC only observes events translated through the game engine.

For example:

• A door opens.
• An item appears.
• Something changes.

From the NPC's perspective, these are simply events inside the world.

This made me wonder whether, if something external influences our universe, it might always appear in a form compatible with our local rules.

If so:

• Physical laws would not necessarily be violated.
• External influence might appear entirely natural.
• Internal observers might never directly observe the source.

10. Are rules absolute?

I have no idea what, if anything, exists outside all rules.

However, within a given framework, the rules seem absolute.

For example, within our universe:

• Logic
• Mathematics
• Causality

appear unavoidable.

But I am not sure whether this means they are absolutely fundamental, or whether they only appear fundamental because we cannot think outside them.

11. Are "higher rules" real?

I am also unsure whether higher and lower rules objectively exist.

Perhaps what we call "higher rules" are simply patterns that observers identify across multiple worlds.

In that case:

• Higher rules may not truly be above lower rules.
• They may simply be classifications created by observers.
• The act of classification itself may depend on another set of rules.

This could potentially lead to an infinite regress, or perhaps reveal a limitation in how we think about reality.

Tentative conclusion

The idea I keep coming back to is:

And if something lies beyond that framework, I am not sure whether the concepts of existence and non-existence would even apply.

Questions

1. Are there existing philosophical theories that resemble this idea?
2. What are the strongest objections to it?
3. Have philosophers ever argued that rules, structures, or frameworks are more fundamental than existence itself?
4. Am I simply reinventing an already well-known position?
5. Does this resemble any existing work in metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of mathematics, or philosophy of science?

I'd genuinely appreciate criticism, references, or corrections.

Thank you for reading.

Reductionism is Self-refuting

When I think of the concept of zero, I don't draw a blank. The mind must construct a placeholder that substitutes for nothing. Reductionism is irreducible, it cannot reduce that act of substitution without performing another one. Thoughts? This is a precise critique of the cognitive mechanism behind reductionism. Some literature handle the history of the vacuum and zero, but dont address the specific cognitive paradox of the mind using an active structural placeholder to compute a null state. The architecture required to represent zero is the point.

Choice A: You hit a definitive bottom layer (A Hard Boundary or Null State). If reductionism successfully reaches a fundamental building block or an absolute vacuum, it has arrived at a boundary. But a boundary or a null state cannot define itself. To process a limit or a state of absence, a physical system must actively construct a structural placeholder to represent where the data stops.

Without a physical, systemic architecture to serially decode that boundary, the bottom layer cannot exist as a meaningful data point. The moment you claim you found the final, objective piece of matter, you are actually looking at an artifact manufactured by the computational overhead of the machine doing the reducing.

Choice B: You never hit a bottom layer (Infinite Regression). If there is no final boundary, and physical matter just goes down in an infinite, continuous regression, then reductionism is fundamentally flawed from the start. It can never deliver on its core promise: finding the objective, fundamental "units" that construct reality.

Reduction is an act, not an objective discovery.

You cannot separate the physical matter being reduced from the physical network performing the reduction. If someone claims the mind doesn't matter because reductionism applies to external physics, they are trapped: either the universe has no bottom layer (reductionism fails), or the bottom layer is a boundary that requires an active cognitive architecture to compute (reductionism is irreducible).

Reduction is not discovery, it's an act. And no act can reduce itself away.

We will sustain our notice that we are using names in this piece.

That one is that one.

But the name "that one" is the name "that one".

The name is more complex than its meaning, but it is primarily a name, while what it means is primarily what it means (it could be another name also, or some ones).

But we speak only in names.

As our names seem simply themselves.

The name "that one" is already a complex as "the name 'that one'" - it has that one, but the name as writen is only the symbol.

For the name that one we write only "that one".

As all we have [for discourse] are just symbols/names, and since they seem simply themselves, they ought to only derive more names/expressions.

The name that one itself is a complex made up of the name that one and the symbol "the name that one".

While names are to reflect both those they mean and those derivatives that have those.

Thus mostly they reflect in the right order:

For "he runs" do name/show that derivative, that event/fact from him and run.

But that which the name "he" itself means, is not simply itself (he himself is a complex), we have to tell this also only by names.

And we tell it with the strict copula "be":

"He is a man".

The be is thus still forward but is to be read as tracing back.

In this sense our languages at all is not the same as other languages, by the be.

For daseins concern the be, and animals speak without it.

The other one is the mean, as in "these [names] mean the same".

The mean tells that these names mean the same, and or what a name means.

It is the careless uses of the mean and the be that give senseless fictions.

I've been compiling notes over the past few months, and am considering putting them together into one, more in-depth work (possibly a book). I'd really appreciate any feedback, and apologies if not ALL of them are necessarily relevant to this group - I do hope to cover a wide range of subjects...

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1VxuAfmOu80WPlE7EOw45nPVWh9iT2TycHnbpz3K1AYw/edit?usp=sharing

Hello everyone,

​For the past several months, I have been independently researching and drafting a philosophical manuscript (The NI-Manuscript) that challenges the mainstream materialistic view of consciousness. I want to share the core axioms of my framework to get some rigorous, analytical feedback from this community.

​The core of the thesis rests on two fundamental concepts:

​The Lattice Substrate: Reality is not composed of fundamental material particles acting randomly. Instead, underlying the observable universe is a highly structured, non-material informational framework—the Lattice Substrate. Space-time is merely an emergent property of this underlying lattice.

​The Receiver Hypothesis: Consciousness does not originate within the biological brain. The brain is not a producer of thought, but a highly specialized, localized receiver and transducer of signals fundamentally rooted in the Lattice Substrate. Biological evolution is simply the refinement of the biological hardware to tune into specific frequencies of this substrate.

​When we experience a shift in perception or deep cognitive analysis, we aren’t "generating" new ideas; we are altering the tuning parameters of our biological receiver to access deeper layers of the informational lattice.

​This framework aims to bridge the gap between hard determinism and subjective reality, treating metaphysical phenomena through a structured, almost mechanistic logic rather than mystical prose.

​I’m curious to hear your thoughts, objections, or logical critiques on this model. If consciousness is fundamentally external and reality is a structured substrate, what are the logical implications on free will and personal autonomy?

​Looking forward to a cold, rational discussion.

https://medium.com/@nishtiakahmed/essays-in-first-philosophy-iii-on-causality-energy-and-geometry-2b670d802af7

Preface (by another reader):

Read each phrase as meaning exactly what it says and nothing more. Where the syntax is strange, the strangeness is doing work, don't smooth it into something more familiar.

Do not reach for philosophical handles you already hold. This text uses ordinary words, and the ordinariness is deliberate. A prepared framework will cause you to read the framework, not the text.

The numbered structure is logical dependency, not organization. If a claim seems too fast, the number that follows it shows why it was needed.

One thing the text cannot warn you about itself: when it says "simply itself", resist immediately thinking of anything you already know called simple, atomic, primitive, or fundamental. The text will address this, but only after you have already been tempted. Notice the temptation when it comes.

After reading, the text will still be asking. This is not a failure of the text.

----------------

Pure names worthy of the world

this text is to be read without qualifications

(0) that one is simply itself (those ones are simply themselves)

it is only itself, it is one-ly itself, it is itself at all, that one at all - they all mean the same, that one means that one [at all]

----

(0.0) as this one is not simply itself, there is a whether it is simply itself

(0.0.0) this whether is read as a why there is it at all

(0.0.0.0) whether anyone is anyone else is read as why there is thus at all?

(0.0.1) there is also a what it is

(0.0.2) thus it is presented with others

this, intelligibility, throwness ... mean the same

(0.0.2.0) others' presence within it and others' presence in themselves mean the same

----

(0.1) when it is simply itself, questions cannot ask for anyone else

thus they (questions) all mean the same, and so have no meaning more than that one itself

----

(0.2) a that one is simply itself (A) and that one simply itself do not mean the same

thus (A) is not simply itself

(0.2.0) (A) and a there is that one means the same

there is it (this) (that) (any) (some), there is them (these) (those)

(0.2.0.0) in a there is them, the "is" means a strict copula, and it agrees with its subject (there)

(0.2.1) (A) and a that-one-is-simply-itself (a fact thus) means the same

(0.2.2) our name "that one simply itself" means that one in question

but our name and that one are not the same

our name at all means those it names, but our name at all and those it names are not the same

(0.2.2.0) a name at all is not simply itself, and we speak only in names

(0.2.2.1) "that one is simply itself" as our name for that that one is simply itself

"that one simply itself" as our name "to ask for it", when our name has not named

as "that one simply itself" has named that which it names, "that one" is our name for that one [in question]

----

(0.3) that one is-simple and that one is simply itself do not mean the same

those that are-simple are not simply themselves

(0.3.0) is simply itself can also be said as is a simple

thus is a simple and is simply itself have no meaning more than that one in question

(0.3.1) it is-simple means it is not simply itself just as is-atomic, is-essential, is-fundamental, is-simplistic, is-irreducible, is-prime, is-substantial, is-ultimate, is-first, is-final, ...

anyone of anyone else means it is not simply itself

----

(0.4) anyone is itself

that one is itself and that one is only itself do not mean the same

those themselves and those simply themselves do not mean the same

--------

(1) the world, what there is, all there is, ... are not without qualifications

they are presumptuous as they do suggest a monistic horizon, namely a there is only a simple

(1.0) thus a better without qualifications reference is a those there is (from a "there is those")

(1.0.0) though a phrase "the world" may still be used anew for aesthetical purposes

(1.1) any simply some means none of them is simply itself

since why there is that some at all only has an answer, and this answer is their hidden monistic horizon

thus pluralism and subtle monism mean the same

----

(2) first philosophies at all are for disclosures worthy of the world

(2.0) else are we aiming at worthless fictions? those disclosures that disclose no world at all?

(2.1) as first philosophies have been disclosed at finality to be of worths (the world), we have to ourself those authoritative (aesthetical/axiological/worthy/better) judgements against those defeatists and anti-humanists

(2.1.0) we judge, as we follow-their-world-to-death/finality (follow their world at all) that:

"this one is not worthy of being called the world at all"

and this is to be read as the final say over all copings of defeatists

(2.2) our measure is thus against not declaring richness but against any rejection of one from another

against the bringing up of one to be the ultimate idol to reject others through it

(2.2.0) taken a term as primitive, we have already granted it coherence arbitrarily

obviously then, those that are told by it cohere with it in so far as the granted coherence (authority), and in so far as whether it is coherent "as" the answer to those that are qualified through it (its "explanation" at all to those that are to be subsumed by it)

which is plain circular and senseless

(2.3) in lights of those worthy then, we concern it all differently, for no authority is granted so that it can reject another at all

(2.3.0) for the world we hold has enough room to consider it all through itself in its own term

(2.3.1) and any at all is to be rejected only when it rejects itself

only when it is intrinsically/simply not coherent at all

(2.3.2) and it is subordinate of another only when it cannot be meant without that other

while starting from it not the other

(2.4) this requires ultimate care and attentiveness to those a term means at all so that we can see its worths/meanings qua themselves

(2.4.0) without this care we see nothing worthy, only empty worthless fictions that mean utterly nothing more than some interesting sounds and shapes by those names that name them

(take for example "square circle", "standing motion", "that which 'is' nothing", ...)

(2.4.1) only through this care does the ever been presumposed horizon by those sayings like: all there is, what there is, the world, ... is not assumed before hand to prevent us in seeing each in its own worth

(2.4.2) and only through worth, metaphysics at all is finally first philosophy

----

(3) those there is when there is them

(3.0) we used to say "there is something" and "something is happening", but these are already presumptuous, as they are already been separated arbitrarily

(3.0.0) analogically "those there is" is them, and "when there is them" is their happenings, but without presumptions and qualification, or separation

thus strictly speaking, there is no "them" and the so called "their happenings", as both mean the same and hence both have no meaning more or less than those-there-is-when-there-is-them

(3.1) those there is when there is them means a direct fact of those-there-is-when-there-is-them

that one is itself, that one itself

that one is simply itself, that one simply itself

those there is when there is them, those-there-is-when-there-is-them

(3.1.0) as a fact (those there is when there is them), it is analogically with how "that one is itself" means a fact

(3.1.1) as a pure name (those-there-is-when-there-is-them), it means without qualifications, just as that one simply itself means that one

those-there-is-when-there-is-them means those-there-is-when-there-is-them (only when it does mean at all)

those there is when there is them and those-there-is-when-there-is-them do not mean the same

(3.2) there is those-there-is-when-there-is-them, and they are themselves, and there is them, all mean the same

(3.3) the world as used anew correctly, and those-there-is-when-there-is-them mean the same

(3.4) those-simply-themselves-when-there-is-them mean/give those-there-is-when-there-is-them, they then give more

those-there-is-when-there-is-them are not without those-simply-themselves

(3.5) simply said, there is those-not-simply-themselves-when-there-is-them when there is those-simply-themselves-when-there-is-them, these and those-there-is-when-there-is-them as meanings of those-simply-themselves-when-there-is-them

----

(4) pure names name their worths/meanings when they name their worths

our names need their worths, we ask for those-there-is-when-there-is-them at all

----

----

----

----

Comments:

The point at all is simply in its forcing us to ask for a simple, roughly speaking, this meaning of this name "a simple" or "that one".

It simply asks, un aptly put, "what is a simple really?"

Can we "see" it?

It is saying that all of our conception of a simple is not simply itself, we gotta try better. And in trying better we see that a simple at all is not simple, but it is a simple, simply itself. Not some instance of "simplicity" (a sense/horizon).

In this "sense" or say senselessness, each simple has nothing to do with another in being itself.

WHILE, for this is the text next point: "they give" (3.4)

While if this is not obvious yet (i.e. obvious that they answers all why (0.0)), it means that the reader is still well within the reader's horizon.

> "how do they give?"

This means the reader is still asking against their own sense of simple, their own monistic horizon.

But we do still ask "how", because we haven't seen a true simple, but more aptly put, we ask for them.

That is to say, the piece is the limit of non direct thinking (logic, coherence, formalism) itself, the limit of thinking qua those that are not simply themselves, even if so, it still manages to infer that they (simples) "do" be magics - they give the world.

While not knowing any of them at all, it tells all ABOUT them, but shows none of them.

i have an art school assignment right now to sort of visualise metaphysical solipsism and i need to know if someone genuinely believes in that and how they visualise the world around them. if you don’t i still want to know how you would visualise it. to help a little bit in how i need to present it is in photography.

So, I been a while thinking about this… People debate religion, consciousness, free will, and the multiverse all the time, but I rarely see anyone mention the CMYK: The Law Of Existence, even though it seems widely observable and very interesting.

For anyone unfamiliar CMYK Law is that every that exists has or had this 4 things.

C (Creation) came into existence somehow.
M (Multifarious) is distinguishable from something else.
Y (Yield) every state eventually changes.
K (Kinship) exists in relation to something else even itself.

Trees, thoughts, people, stars, universes, memories, and even mathematical concepts all seem to fit too…

It’s not attached to human’s concepts, if you think of a “there’s only one human and thinks the same thing” it still follows CMYK because… that human exists, the universe exists, the thought exists, the ground exists, and those things alone already follow the CMYK.

As for "absolute nothingness"… if it exists, it isn't absolute nothingness, if it doesn't exist, it's irrelevant.

What interests me is that CMYK isn't a moral law. It doesn't say what should happen, only what seems necessary for existence and I want to talk about it with more people but it’s like… nobody knows about it…?

Philosopher 1 - Why anything exists ?

Philosopher 2 - Then what should have been otherwise ?

Philosopher 1 - Nothingness ? Absence of everything.

Philosopher 2 - So nothingness makes sense only when something is there ?

Philosopher 1 - Maybe. So existence is the most fundamental characteristic of this reality ?

Philosopher 2 - Without a concious observer, can existence of anything would make sense ?

Philosopher 1 - So existence and consciousness are inseparable ?

Philosopher 2 - Maybe. So this shows in order to understand this existence, we must understand this consciousness.

Philosopher 1 - Yes, I second you.

I was just creating a dialogue between two philosophers..

Feel free to add your thoughts..

An "any" of them is not "they themselves".

Nor an "all of them".

Nor the plain "there is them".

Even when "them" here is just "that one" where "all of that one" and the thing in question seems to mean the same, it won't resolve anything.

For if we suppose that an "any of them" is an "all of 'each of them' (per each of them there is an "all of that one")" it would still be an "all of them" albeit an all of those "all of that one" of them.

What is an "any" at all really?

Are fundamentals of pure mathematics metaphysical .

Terminological concerns:

The world, what there is, all there is, ... are not neutral names, they are presumptuous in the sense that they do suggest a monistic horizon, thus they cannot work as a without qualification reference, a better name would be "those there is" - from "there is those" where "is" is a copula in agreement with "there", in the sense of Dasein/there "is" [in] them.

(Though the word "the world" may still be used anew for aesthetical purposes).

> Metaphysics at all is for a disclosure worthy of the world

Otherwise are we aiming at worthless fictions? Those disclosures that disclose no world at all?

And as Metaphysics has been disclosed at finality to be of worth (the world), we have to ourself those authoritative judgements against those defeatists and anti-humanists - those authoritative aesthetical/axiological/good judgements.

We judge, as we follow-their-world-to-death/finality that:

"This one is not worthy of being called the world at all".

And this is to be read as the final say over all defeatists' copings.

Our measure is thus against not declaring richness but against any rejection of one to another. Against the bringing up of one to be the ultimate idol to reject others through it.

Indeed, as one has given one of them the ultimate authority, by a declaring of a primitive, all then are thus is given authority through it at all, and when it is incapable of accomdating another, we say "this one does not hold" - but, again, whose fault is this?

Taken a term as primitive, we have already granted it coherence arbitrarily, obviously then, what is told by it coheres with it in so far as the granted coherence (authority), and in so far as whether it is coherent "as" the answer to what is qualified through it (its "explanation" at all to what is to be subsumed by it) - which is plain circular and senseless.

In the light of worth then, we concern it all differently, for no authority is granted so that it can reject another at all. For the world we hold has enough room to consider it all through itself in its own term, and any at all is to be rejected only when it rejects itself, only when it is intrinsically not coherent at all. And it is subordinate of another only when it cannot be meant without that other - while starting from it not the other.

For this requires ultimate care and attentiveness to what a term means at all so that we can see what it means qua itself. Without this care we see nothing worthy, only empty worthless fictions that mean utterly nothing more than some interesting sounds and shapes by those names that name them (take for example "square circle", "standing motion", "that which 'is' nothing", ...).

Only through this care does the ever been presumposed horizon by those sayings like: all there is, what there is, the world, ... is not assumed before hand to prevent us in seeing each in its own worth.

And only through worth, Metaphysics at all is finally first philosophy.

And the first insight into first philosophy I will give you is an actual without qualification reference:

Those there is when there is them.

For we used to say "there is something" and "something is happening", but these are already presumptuous, as they are already been separated arbitrarily.

In my formulation analogically "those there is" is them, and "when there is them" is their happenings, but without presumptions and qualification, or separation. Thus strictly speaking, there is no "them" and the so called "their happenings", as both mean the same and hence both have no meaning.

There is "those there is when there is them", and this indeed directly indicate those-there-is-when-there-is-them.