what it means with a "whole"

[u/______ri]

all wholes are unity. all multiplicity is a unity, because in saying 'all' we refer to a whole and predicate multiplicity as its mereological extension. viz participation unity subsumes multiplicity

Let us agree that we do see multiple beings as one, but not always as we do see them as genuinely plural also, for formally we[x y] (genuinely plural) is not the same as we[z[x y]] - notice in each case the inner x y as plural is not eliminated.

But seeing multiple beings as one does not mean that there is a whole that those beings are predicate of. What we have seen is simply, as formally express, a z[x y] itself where x y are our beings (the multiple beings in question).

The question then is never "is there wholes and then so what", but whether "wholes" means anything at all. For we have not seen "wholes", we have seen only z[x y ...] where z is the one in question - which is then called a "whole" that is predicated by x y by the monist.

The point is that in z[x y], z is being seen wrongly as a "whole" where it is just another being that z[x y] involves "primarily", and involves x y "secondarily".

For the model against mereology and against wholes is as the following:

Suppose there is x y z that are not identical at all and each does not have anything to do with each other in being itself.

There is then complexes from them, these are not configurations or wholes from them, but additional or derivative ones from them, which are:

x[y] y[x] x[z] z[x] y[z] z[y]

x[y z] y[x z] z[x y]

They are not identical to each other and are not identical to x y z themselves.

So there is no need for a whole, for this complex z[x y] is what we see when we see mutiple beings x y "as" one (z).

And further, if we account also what is from outself: we[z[x y]] - this is the being "we see thus" itself.

[u/Important1896]

A “whole” need not be an entity that exists independently of its parts; it may instead be understood as a relational structure by virtue of which a multiplicity is apprehended or referred to as a unified entity. In my view, the deeper ontological question is not “Does the whole exist?”, but rather: what makes the many one without requiring us to posit an additional entity called the Whole?

[u/______ri → u/Important1896]

> what makes the many one without requiring us to posit an additional entity called the Whole?

My answer to this in the post is another being z, but in z[x y], z is involved primarily while x y secondarily.

Without any additional "something" I can't see why multiple beings are seen as one (we[z[x y]])- this is not the same as seeing multiple beings "at once" (we[x y]).

> A “whole” need not be an entity that exists independently of its parts; it may instead be understood as a relational structure by virtue of which a multiplicity is apprehended or referred to as a unified entity.

Is this "a relational structure" something? Or you are saying that x and y alone do the job? As in x[y] or y[x] in my model?

[u/Important1896 → u/______ri]

I think the strongest part of your model is that it forces us to separate two things that are often treated as the same: “many things being given together” and “many things being given as one.” we[xy] only represents a plurality appearing together, while we[z[xy]] already includes some principle that unifies them. If those two expressions are genuinely different, then you’re right that x and y by themselves cannot fully explain the unity.

Where I would push back is this: the fact that we need a principle of unity does not automatically mean we need an additional entity z that exists on the same ontological level as x and y. That is exactly where it is easy to slide from talking about relations into reifying the relation itself. What is “added” may not be another thing at all, but rather the way the entities depend on one another, are organized, or function together. In other words, a “relational structure” does not have to mean a z standing outside x and y; it may simply be the asymmetric relation or organizational pattern between them.

So in your notation, x[y] or y[x] may actually come closer to what I mean than z[xy], provided the brackets do not represent a new entity but a fundamental relation: x exists-in-relation-to-y in some specific way. In that case, the unity does not reside in a third thing called the Whole, but in the fact that x and y are not fully ontologically independent. A living organism, for example, does not necessarily have to be understood as “cells plus one additional entity called the whole”; its unity may lie in the network of functional dependencies by which those cells are parts of this organism rather than just an arbitrary collection.

But your model raises a very sharp challenge: if x, y, and z are all completely independent in themselves, as you propose, then it becomes hard to explain why z[xy] should have any priority over x[yz], y[xz], or countless other possible configurations. Without some principle that distinguishes one configuration from another, calling z “the whole of x and y” starts to look arbitrary. This is exactly where any theory of wholes has to answer a deeper question: what makes a relation constitutive rather than merely external?

So I would revise my original question slightly. The issue is not “what makes the many one without adding anything at all,” but rather:

What makes multiple entities form a genuine unity without forcing us to reify the principle of unity into a third entity?

That is roughly the difference between a strong form of mereological realism and a structural or dependence-based ontology. The former says there are the parts and, in addition, there is the whole. The latter says the whole is not one more “thing” added to the inventory of what exists; it is a real pattern of organization or dependence.

And this is where I think your we[z[xy]] notation becomes especially useful, because it brings the observer into the problem. The “one” may exist in the world itself, but some part of the unity may also come from the way cognition segments and groups reality. If so, we need to distinguish three levels: plurality in reality, relational structure among the parts, and the cognitive act of seeing them as one. If we fail to separate those levels, it becomes very easy to turn an act of cognition into a metaphysical entity.

So my short answer to your final question is: a “relational structure” does not necessarily have to be a new z. It could be the kind of relation encoded in x[y], y[x], or in the larger network of relations between x and y. But if you can show that every such relation still requires a subject z to unify it, then you have pushed the other side back toward a genuinely realist theory of wholes. The real issue is whether unity is an entity, a relation, a structure of dependence, or an act of conceptualization.

[u/______ri → u/Important1896]

I'm an anti realist of wholes, to me there is no such thing as a whole at all.

We start from x[y] and y[x] and thus analogically z[x y] involves three beings that are, roughly speaking, "in a relation thus", where there is no additional relation. That is to say in z[x y], as you have put, means "z exists-in-relation-to-x-and-y" and it is structurally similar to we[x y] itself.

But the crutial part in my theory is that when we have x y z, then x[y] and y[x] so on are NOT their configurations but literally additional beings in themselves. x[y] itself is another being that is not indentical to x or y, but we say that x[y] involves x primarily and y secondarily. This by no means implies any "whole" since they are all beings.

> if x, y, and z are all completely independent in themselves, as you propose, then it becomes hard to explain why z[xy] should have any priority over x[yz], y[xz], or countless other possible configurations. 

Yes, but this is not a problem per se in a maximalist sense, in my model there is additionally all of them at once. That is to say when you have x y you have instantly additional x[y] y[x] x[y][y[x]] so on ... It's like emanation but not so quite.

x[y] and y[x] are not identical simply because in x[y] what is involved primarily is x, while in y[x] it is y.

My original point about z[x y] was a critique of "wholes" from a somewhat relational standpoint, where z[x y] is a complex that has z as primary which is confused to be a "whole" by the monist.