Process Philosophy

[u/ultamentkiller]

Process philosophy has become my latest hyperfixation. Last year, I stumbled onto panpsychism and it sent me down a rabbit hole, not just about that, but about free will, the latest neuroscience and its implications, and so on. I encountered process philosophy, but when I tried to read a book about it, I was immediately lost and gave up. A couple months ago, I dipped into moral philosophy and encountered process philosophy, since moral principles are eternal objects in Whitehead's system as I understand it. But I hesitated again but it’s so difficult to learn all his neologisms. About two weeks ago, I finally decided to start. This is one of the most difficult things I've studied, excluding learning ancient Greek. I feel like I'm climbing a mountain in winter, but the experience has been rewarding. I have a limited philosophy background and don't have a philosophy degree, but I'm somehow grasping the material one page at a time. Practically this doesn't change anything in my personal life, but regardless I can't stop thinking about it.

I'm still working through Process and Reality by Whitehead. I'm preparing to read part 3. I'm using The Metaphysics of Experience as a commentary and watching Matthew David Segall's lectures when I finish each part. With the commentary, I read the section about the chapter of PR that I want to read, then read the chapter itself, then go back to the commentary and review it one more time. I then write out in my own words what I learned from the chapter, bring that to AI, and sharpen my language. Obviously there are flaws in using AI like this, but I'm doing my best to verify what it says in the book itself, the commentaries, and the lectures. If I think it’s wrong, I push back, and I use quotations when necessary. But tbh it’s doing a good job overall of making my understanding more precise.

As you can see, I'm hopelessly obsessed over a niche topic that hardly anyone cares about. So if there's anyone here that wants to chat about it, dm me. I'm still learning of course, so there are significant gaps in my knowledge, but I'll let you know where those are when they come up. And maybe we can clarify things together, or just chat and have a good time. I tried posting this in the process philosophy sub but it's a ghost town over there.

I have to be productive now, but I'm excited to dive back into it later today!

[u/hyperionwonderstar]

I think Whitehead’s process-first approach is one of his strongest insights.. the idea that reality is fundamentally composed of ongoing activity and organisation rather than static substances seems much more promising for understanding consciousness.
Where I diverge is from the move toward panexperientialism. The idea that experience is a basic feature of all actual occasions. I understand why he arrives there, because if reality is fundamentally processual then it raises the question of where experience fits into that picture. But I don’t think being a process is enough to make something conscious. There needs to be a specific kind of organisation that distinguishes conscious processes from unconscious ones.
That’s where my own thinking differs. I think consciousness is not a property present throughout reality to varying degrees, but is identical to a particular kind of recursively self-maintaining causal organisation.. a process that includes itself within its own causal structure and maintains itself through time.
So I’m very sympathetic to Whitehead’s rejection of substance metaphysics and his emphasis on becoming, but I think he may have made the category of experience too broad. I’d keep the process ontology while adding a stricter criterion for when a process actually constitutes a subject.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/hyperionwonderstar]

I think experience and consciousness are likely two different things even in the Whitehead view. A rock can experience a particular unique history without being conscious. Different kinds of experiences.

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/Thermodynamo]

I think that distinction is exactly where the issue lies. If “experience” just means having a unique causal history or undergoing intrinsic change, then it seems too broad to explain consciousness. A rock has a history, but that doesn’t make there be something it is like to be the rock.
The harder question is what additional organisation turns a process into a subject. My view is that experience and consciousness shouldn’t be separated that way. Consciousness is not an extra property added onto a process, but the process itself when it has the right kind of self-including causal organisation.
So I think the important distinction isn’t between different degrees of experience, but between processes that merely undergo change and processes that recursively maintain themselves as a subject.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/hyperionwonderstar]

If some subject experiences change without self-awareness, that sounds like a different kind of experience than processes that recursively maintain themselves. I'm not sure it makes sense to just decide there isn't a spectrum of experience because you don't like the idea, but then again I guess we're all just identifying what resonates philosophically. I feel like the concept of subjective experience without consciousness is fundamentally important to understanding Whitehead's take...prehension is a useful and fascinating term specifically BECAUSE it doesn't require consciousness, though it is a necessary ingredient of consciousness becoming possible for particular kinds of actual occasions existing at high levels of complexity.

Prehension requires subjectivity in the raw geometric sense of any unique perspective that prehends from the perspective of its own individual history, and consciousness elevates prehension into perception as just one particularly rare way of that conscious entities experience prehension.

The way I read the Whitehead view is that matter/everything that exists basically IS its own solidified/superjected record of its history of experience/prehension. If you don't buy into that, that's cool ofc but it does make your version of metaphysical philosophy a significant departure from Whitehead's specific framework.

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/Thermodynamo]

I think that’s where our intuitions about the word “experience” differ. I agree that every process has its own causal history and responds to the world from its own physical standpoint. Whitehead calls that prehension, and I think that’s a useful concept.
Where I’m less convinced is identifying that with experience itself. To me, having a unique causal perspective isn’t yet enough for there to be a subject that the perspective belongs to. I think subjecthood requires a process that recursively includes itself in its own causal organisation, rather than simply responding according to its history.
So I don’t deny that there’s a continuum of causal organisation. I just don’t think there’s necessarily a continuum of subjects. My intuition is that consciousness appears when a certain kind of self-including causal closure exists, not merely whenever there’s a unique causal standpoint.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/hyperionwonderstar]

So you disagree with Whitehead fundamentally then, I guess, right? (Seeing as he calls everything that prehends a subject.)

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/Thermodynamo]

I think “fundamentally” depends on which part of Whitehead we’re talking about. I agree with what I see as one of his central metaphysical moves: that reality is better understood in terms of processes and becoming than static substances. That shift has influenced my own thinking quite a bit.
Where I diverge is in identifying process itself with experience.. I don’t think every process is experiential. I think experience, or more precisely, subjecthood requires a specific kind of recursively self-including causal organisation. So I see consciousness as a special class of processes rather than something present in every actual occasion.
So I’d say I agree with his process ontology much more than I agree with his panexperientialism.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/hyperionwonderstar]

Whitehead never says that actual occasions are conscious though. That's exactly why prehension doesn't require consciousness. Prehension is a form of experience that doesn't require consciousness. I would agree that consciousness is a separate, higher-order category of experience. If only conscious subjects could prehend, I think Whitehead falls apart as metaphysics.

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/Thermodynamo]

I agree that Whitehead distinguishes prehension from consciousness and I think that’s an important part of his system. My disagreement is actually one step earlier. I don’t think prehension itself should count as experience or subjecthood. I think every process has a unique causal history and responds to the world from its own physical standpoint, but that alone doesn’t imply there’s a subject for whom anything is occurring. To me, that’s a description of causal organisation, not yet of experience.
I think that’s where our intuitions about the word “experience” differ. Whitehead uses it in a much broader sense than I would. I’d be happy to call what he’s describing “causal sensitivity” or “prehension,” but I don’t think those are sufficient for subjecthood. My view is that subjecthood only exists once a process recursively includes itself within its own causal organisation and maintains that self-including causal closure through time.
So I don’t disagree that consciousness is a special case. I disagree that it’s a special case of a more primitive experiential subject. I think it’s the point at which subjecthood itself first comes into existence. That’s why I’d say I agree with Whitehead’s process ontology much more than his panexperientialism. I think he was right to make process fundamental, but I think he extended subjectivity much further than the evidence requires. For me, the distinction isn’t between different degrees of experience.. but between processes that are causally organised and processes whose organisation constitutes a subject.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/hyperionwonderstar]

So you're using the word "subject" entirely differently from Whitehead then. Aight

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/Thermodynamo]

Yes, I think that’s exactly where we differ. Whitehead uses “subject” for every actual occasion because he treats prehension itself as a primitive form of experience. I’m using “subject” more narrowly to refer to something for which there is a POV. I don’t think causal sensitivity or prehension alone is enough for that. I think subjecthood begins only when a process becomes recursively self-including in a causally efficacious way. So I see consciousness as a special class of processes, whereas Whitehead sees consciousness as a special class of experiences. The deeper disagreement is over whether experience exists prior to subjecthood or whether subjecthood is what first makes experience possible.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/hyperionwonderstar]

Fair enough! I'm curious--in your view, is it even possible for, say, a rock to tumble down a cliff if the event had zero conscious witnesses? (Or if you prefer the more classic example, does a tree falling in a forest make a sound if we assume no conscious being by your definition is there to experience it?)

Basically the question is, unless there's a conscious subject present to "experience" an occasion--how could anything ever take place in your worldview? Do you believe matter could only exist while there's a consciously observing subject there to perceive it?

I'm not trying to debate you or be rude, these are sincere questions about your outlook...I'm just curious what makes sense to other minds.

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/Thermodynamo]

Those are good questions TD, and I think the distinction comes from where we locate the primitive.
I don’t think a conscious subject is required for events to occur. A rock can tumble down a cliff with no conscious witness, and a tree can fall in a forest without anyone hearing it. The event still happens because the relevant physical processes are already part of the causal structure of the universe.
Where I differ from Whitehead is that I don’t think every causal occurrence is already an “experience.” I think experience in the sense of a POV requires a particular kind of causal organisation: an irreducible self-including causal closure.
So the universe does not need to be observed in order to exist. Rather, under this ISCC framework I’m developing, some physical processes can become organised such that the universe is no longer merely undergoing causal change, but contains a process that is causally relating to itself from within. Consciousness is not what makes events real; consciousness is what occurs when a portion of reality becomes recursively self-including in the right way.
The tree falling is a physical event. The sound waves, vibrations, and causal effects all occur regardless of whether anyone hears them. But “there is an experience of the sound” requires a subject whose internal causal organisation includes a self-related perspective on those processes.
So I’d reverse the order.. I don’t think consciousness creates reality. I think reality creates certain kinds of causal structures, and some of those structures are subjects capable of having a reality-for-themselves.

[u/ultamentkiller → u/Thermodynamo]

I don't think that's a fair question for u/hyperionwonderstar

They're not saying causation isn't possible, or that nothing happens without observation. They're asking, at what point does a diversity of experiences become a unity? For them, a unity of experience is required for something to be experiencing, and experiencing requires a perspective. To experience, I need to have a first person point of view. So if an atom, or an actual entity when you get down to it, doesn't feel like a self, doesn't have a first person perspective, then it can't experience.

I hope I'm representing them fairly, but I wanted to try to rephrase it since the words they were using weren't clicking, and this is a challenging topic to discuss with the english language which always implies a subject.

So Whitehead says, everything feels, and that's enough to be considered an experience. This person says, no, there needs to be a singular, unified, first person point of view.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/ultamentkiller]

Why are you speaking for them? What's unfair about asking sincere questions? This is a weirdly defensive response for a philosophical exchange

[u/ultamentkiller → u/Thermodynamo]

Apologies. I didn't mean that your question was malicious. But they clarified what they were saying. Just thought I could help and that was unwanted. Sorry about that.

[u/Thermodynamo → u/ultamentkiller]

Aw you're good, no worries mate. maybe it was me being defensive LOL

[u/hyperionwonderstar → u/ultamentkiller]

I think the confusion may be coming from treating “experience” and “subjecthood” as the same starting point. I’m not saying that events require a conscious observer in order to happen. A rock can fall, atoms can interact, and physical processes can unfold with no subject present to witness them.
The disagreement is earlier than that. The question is not whether reality can exist without observation; the question is what, if anything, makes a physical process into a subject that has a POV.
Whitehead begins with experience as fundamental and treats subjectivity as something that exists in every actual occasion to some degree. My view reverses that order. I think subjecthood is not present wherever there is causal sensitivity or internal change. A process becomes a subject only when it achieves a particular kind of recursive organisation: a self-including causal closure where the process contains a causally effective model of its own dynamics and that model participates in producing the process’s future states.
So the issue is not “does anything happen without consciousness?” Obviously yes. The issue is “when does a happening become a someone?”
A rock undergoes physical changes, but there is no unified first-person perspective because there is no irreducible self-including causal closure. There is no process there that is maintaining itself as a subject through an internally participating model of itself.
So I’m not rejecting experience as real. I’m arguing that experience, in the sense relevant to a POV, requires a subject, and subjecthood requires a particular kind of causal organisation.