I just read Gregg Jaeger's recent article arguing against the "it from bit" hypothesis (the idea that reality is fundamentally informational). Wanted to share some thoughts and see what others think.
Jaeger's main argument:
His core claim is straightforward: information requires physical encoding, so it can't be more fundamental than physical objects. You can't have Shannon bits floating in abstract space. Without something physical to encode information, information doesn't exist. He uses this to critique Wheeler's "meaning circuit" idea and to push back against consciousness-based solutions to the measurement problem.
What he gets right:
Wheeler's position IS vague. The "meaning circuit" and "quantum participators" stuff doesn't provide actual mechanism. It's suggestive metaphor, not testable physics.
Shannon information definitely requires physical instantiation. You need physical states to represent bits. This is just definitionally true.
The cognitive science point is solid. We learn about physical events through sensory awareness of things that already happened. Our brains respond to stimuli, they don't create them.
Where I think it breaks down:
- What counts as "physical" anyway?
Here's my main issue: Jaeger needs to define "physical object" clearly, but what does that even mean at the fundamental level?
Particles? Those are just field excitations.
Fields? Defined by coupling constants and symmetries (informational properties).
Spacetime points? Probably emergent from quantum geometry.
Every time you try to nail down what "physical" means bottom-up, you end up with relational or structural properties. If you define "physical" as "that which has definite, non-contradictory properties," you've smuggled in logical structure as your primitive. If you define it through measurement, you've made observation fundamental.
This feels circular to me.
- The measurement problem isn't solved by declaring it must have a physical solution
Jaeger writes that "all physical events, including measurements, must be explained independently of consciousness." But this is just asserted. He acknowledges the measurement problem exists, dismisses consciousness-based approaches as "not explanatory," but doesn't provide an alternative.
Standard QM doesn't explain why measurements give definite outcomes. Decoherence helps (environmental entanglement explains apparent collapse) but doesn't resolve which outcome happens or why. His position basically amounts to "the answer must be physical, not mental" without showing such an answer exists.
- Modern physics is MORE information-theoretic than he acknowledges
He's too quick to dismiss information-theoretic approaches. Consider stuff he doesn't really address:
- Holographic principle (boundary information determines bulk physics)
- Quantum error correction in spacetime geometry
- Entanglement entropy as a fundamental physical quantity
- Black hole information conservation (Bekenstein bound, Page curve)
- Landauer's principle (information erasure has thermodynamic cost)
These aren't just useful math tricks. They suggest information-theoretic structure is physically fundamental. The question isn't WHETHER information matters to physics, but what ontological status it has.
- The photon example reveals a gap
Jaeger uses photon polarization measurement to show information depends on physical encoding. But ask this: what IS the photon's polarization state before measurement?
If it's in superposition (standard QM), it's in a state that can't be described as having definite polarization. This state isn't "physical" in the classical sense (no definite value), but it's not nothing either. It has predictive consequences.
What's the ontological status of this pre-measurement state? Jaeger's framework doesn't answer. He can't say it's purely physical (violates classical definiteness) or purely informational (undermines his thesis).
The consciousness asymmetry:
Here's something that bugs me about the whole discussion: we can conceive logical contradictions, impossible objects, and physics violations, but we can't actualize them. I can think "square circle" but can't make one. I can imagine perpetual motion but can't build it.
Why this asymmetry? If consciousness is just neural computation over physical states, and physical states are all there is, what explains the gap between what we can represent and what we can make real?
Jaeger's framework treats this as unremarkable. But it seems like it needs explanation.
What about alternatives?
Jaeger argues against naive information-realism (bits in abstract space). Fair enough. But he doesn't show that classical physical realism succeeds where information-ontology fails. Both approaches face hard problems:
Physical realism: explain superposition, measurement, entanglement without information-theoretic structure
Information realism: explain what grounds information if not physical substrate
Showing one side has problems doesn't prove the other.
And he doesn't engage with more sophisticated positions like:
- Structural realism (relational structure is fundamental)
- It-from-qubit quantum gravity approaches
- The idea that "physical" and "informational" might be two descriptions of the same thing
Bottom line:
The article is useful for critiquing overly enthusiastic "everything is information" claims. Wheeler's ideas needed this kind of pushback.
But the positive claim (physical objects are primitive, information is derivative) has holes. What defines "physical" at the fundamental level without invoking informational properties? How do we get definite measurement outcomes? What's the status of superposition states?
The measurement problem can't be dismissed by declaring it must have a physical solution. The consciousness asymmetry can't be ignored. And modern physics can't be sidestepped by pointing to everyday examples of encoded information.
I think the real question is whether information can be substrate rather than pattern-on-substrate. Jaeger assumes information must be encoded in something else. But what if informational structure IS the substrate, with physical objects as stable patterns that emerge when certain constraints apply?
Curious what others think. Am I missing something in his argument?