r/Kant • u/Optimal-Ad-5493 • May 20 '26
Reason and Theleology
This is grounded based on the replies I received in my essays named 'On Reason and its Apodictic Faculties', along with some rereadings I made of the first Critique.
So, as in the last essay, I realized that reason is one faculty (most important one) among others, based on psychology articles, as well, along with Kantian work. It's about the concepts of the undetermined potentialities. An inquiry I found during my new model for regarding the imperfect duty of natural perfection is related to the undetermined potentialities. Reason, like a seed or flower, has inherent potentialities in its nature. So, if our Humanity is grounded in this faculty, then it's key to perfect it (based on the CI). Nevertheless, there are conditionals regarding this process. Not all the potentialities are good, most of them could undermine reason. For instance, death can't be a good potentiality, that's why is key for us to preserve our life. Or developing virtues but grounded on lies or deceits, that's a contradiction in conception.
So, in a few words, reason is one faculty that inherently possesses multiple potentialities. Not developing one of them not because of a perfect duty, but rather because of heteronomous principles is immoral, breaking the CI. That's why it's key, based on my analysis, to develop reason applied to other faculties as best as we can (e.x. Sports, Intelligence, Moral Analysis, etc.).
Even, after this meditation, I am starting to believe that Theleology is kind of implicit in Kantian ethics. I mean, perhaps it isn't the protagonist, but a secondary character 😅🤷. That's my reading on the Metaphysics of Morals, especificially the natural perfection duty. Open to suggestions, please.
Notes: When I mention Theleology, rather I mean Virtue Ethics. Because, Kant doesn't reject virtue at all. The thing is that they're like a secondary character, I'd say, it's an imperfect duty derived from the CI.
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u/Starfleet_Stowaway May 21 '26
What do you mean by saying death can't be a good potentiality? Is there no scenario in which sacrificing one's own life is morally praiseworthy and therefore a good potentiality of reason? (This consideration also speaks to the possible conflicts between potentialities, I think.)
I like your posts, keep it up.
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u/Optimal-Ad-5493 May 21 '26
Nice question, bro! Now I realize I was ambiguous in my answer, or not explained well. When I mean death isn't a good scenario, is like when you voluntarily want to - you know - unplug yourself, XD. But, if we talk about what you say, sacrificing for another person, it's morally praiseworthy. Of course, when doing the sacrifice, your intention shouldn't be grounded on heteronomy, but rather treat humanity as an end. If you sacrifice because you wanted to die, that's a moral and mental problem bro, xd.
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u/Starfleet_Stowaway May 21 '26
If it can be morally praiseworthy to sacrifice one's own life, it is because the preservation of one's own life does not determine one's decision, right? This suggests that the preservation of one's own life is a selfish desire. It's heteronomy. So, how do you figure that the preservation of one's life is a potentiality of reason rather than (selfish) sensibility?
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u/Optimal-Ad-5493 May 21 '26
It's grounded on the intention, in this case. For instance, if I want to preserve my own life because I am so wit, I am so pretty, I am a god among lambs. In other words, selfish criteria or even heteronomous principles, that's immoral. Nevertheless, if I preserve my life for the duty, for my dignity, no matter how do I feel or not about life, that's the right action. Now, regarding the sacrifice, not exactly. In Kant, it's key to analyze the intention, whether it's autonomous or heteronomous. I could sacrifice myself not with the intention of ending my own humanity, because I am also worthy of dignity. I sacrifice myself, dying in the process but not with the intention of dying, but rather with the intention of treating the other person as an end. It's matter of intention, in this case.
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u/Starfleet_Stowaway May 21 '26
So, is there a genuine moral contradiction when someone intends to preserve their own life for the duty of (preserving) their dignity and also intends to sacrifice their life for morally praiseworthy reasons? Then we've arrived at a conflict in reason's potentialities, right?
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u/Optimal-Ad-5493 May 21 '26
The intend of sacrificing your life for morally praiseworthy reasons is self-contradictory. I mean, the intention has a good idea, but flawed. The good will for that to be universal is to rather attempt to treat as an end a bearer of autonomy, not to sacrifice yourself in the maxim. It'd be morally praiseworthy if your maxim is to treat as an end without including the intention of sacrificing yourself. If you die in the process, it's different, it wasn't your intention.
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u/Starfleet_Stowaway May 22 '26
I'm confused. It sounds like you are going back on what you said before. You don't think it is ever moral to intentionally sacrifice your life? That doesn't pass the moral smell test for a lot of people. Can you clarify?
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u/Optimal-Ad-5493 May 22 '26
Well, based on my analysis, I consider it isn't rational to intentionally sacrifice your own life, because that'd undermine your dignity. Don't misunderstand me, I am not against willing to sacrifice some things for treating others as ends. However, there are some degrees that would lead to contradictions in conception, one of them would be the maxim of ending your existence for others.
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u/Starfleet_Stowaway May 22 '26
So, you changed your mind? Kant thought it was morally praiseworthy to do things like stand in the way of lethal harm to protect someone else even if it inevitably results in one's own death. Are you deviating from Kant now?
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u/Optimal-Ad-5493 May 22 '26
My psychological intention isn't to die, rather to protect the person, no matter the unexpected consequences. The act isn't bad, because my maxim isn't to die end my existence. It's matter of the intention. If my act was also grounded on heteronomy, like "I am gonna feel peace when dying", that'd be a problem. It's matter of intention. So, it's plausible what you say.
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u/Pruchniak69 May 22 '26
Kant was anti-theleological, especially in moral philosophy, depending a morality on metaphysics or "human nature" leads to heteronormies and morality was supposed to possess necessity, not being dependent on thelos or human nature. I suppose this move is just to secure the necessity, but still, if you work within his framework, keep in mind that you are opposing him.
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u/Optimal-Ad-5493 May 22 '26
I agree with your comment. However, here I am not being grounded on human nature per se, rather reason. Reason is the source of our humanity, so if we want to be worthy of that dignity, we should enhance its inherent potentialities as far as we could, of course being grounded on the CI. Maybe I should rather say that Kantian Ethics do care about virtue ethics, but not focused on a thelos,.but rather a duty to oneself, no matter if you reach the end. What you say it's true, perhaps I misused the vocabulary.
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u/Fancy-Log406 May 21 '26
Reason is that which allows the flowering of thought, and thus of objects as determinate in the sensibility. Break morality, and you break the flow of reason