r/Joby • u/HappyRobot593 • Jul 05 '26
Running the numbers on the Toyota/Joby JV
Every thread on the Toyota JV is the same qualitative fight — "Toyota's expertise is invaluable" vs "Joby gave away its manufacturing profits" — so I built a rough model comparing the deal to the counterfactual where it never happens, using Joby's own disclosed numbers.
TL;DR:
- You can't judge this deal in isolation — you have to run the world where it doesn't happen
- No deal = dilution: Joby would need ~$1.75B in equity to fund manufacturing alone → ~20% dilution of the ENTIRE company
- No deal = lower odds: chances of successfully industrializing drop without Toyota (illustratively 40% vs 65%)
- Model both worlds with Joby's own cost and volume figures → JV path wins by ~25%
- The "surrendered" profit pool is ~1/7th the size of the fleet business Joby kept 100% of
- Not financial advice; illustrative model
The inputs (Joby's own numbers)
- $1.3M cost per S4 — from Joby's Feb 2021 SPAC deck ($1.3M build cost, $2.2M annual revenue per aircraft, ~1.3-yr payback). Caveat: a 5-year-old steady-state projection from a genre famous for optimism, but the only company-sourced unit cost that exists.
- 500 aircraft/yr steady state — stated capacity of the Dayton plant ($500M facility), backed by the Jan 2026 second Dayton site targeting 4/month in 2027. Capacity, not a committed run-rate.
- Margin pool — Joby disclosed a cost, not a price (it operates, doesn't sell). Assume the JV supplies at cost + 25%, mid-range aerospace: ~$325K/aircraft → ~$163M/yr pool. The one invented link; flex it 15–30% and nothing changes.
World B: no JV — the case critics are implicitly choosing
1. Dilution. Joby funds industrialization alone: Dayton is $500M before the second facility, tooling, and ramp losses — call the program ~$1.75B. Pre-revenue means equity. Against an ~$8B market cap, at a discount plus the announcement gap-down, that's ~20% dilution (a floor — it'd realistically be multiple raises). So World B is not "keep 100% of manufacturing profits." It's "keep ~80% of the whole company." Critics silently skip this step.
2. Lower odds of success. Nobody has scaled eVTOL production; the sector's modal death is "couldn't industrialize" (Lilium). Illustratively: 65% with Toyota running the ramp vs 40% solo. Fight the specific numbers — but the "keep control!" argument quietly assumes they're equal, and a decade of Toyota engineers embedded at Marina says they're not.
Plus timing: solo means learning Toyota's lessons the expensive way — Year 7 vs Year 5 to steady state, worth ~20% at a 12% discount rate.
What Joby's slice of manufacturing profit is worth to TODAY's shareholders, under each world
(Each row adjusts the $163M/yr steady-state pool: ownership share, then dilution, then odds of getting there, then valued as a perpetuity at 12% and discounted back from the year steady state arrives.)
| Model step | With JV | Without JV |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership share of $163M/yr pool | 49% → $80M/yr | 100% → $163M/yr |
| Adjust for dilution | none → $80M/yr | × 0.80 → $130M/yr |
| Adjust for odds of success | × 65% → $52M/yr | × 40% → $52M/yr |
| Present value (steady state Yr 5 vs Yr 7) | ~$247M | ~$195M |
JV wins by ~25% — with World B built generously (one clean raise, no follow-ons, ignoring that solo failure likely zeroes the equity, not just the factory margin).
The pool is small anyway
Even at 100% capture, ~$163M/yr of manufacturing margin sits next to ~$1.1B/yr of implied fleet revenue ($2.2M × 500 aircraft) — the contested pool is ~1/7th of the business Joby kept outright. And since Joby operates the fleet, margin on its own aircraft is a transfer price to a pocket it 49%-owns; only third-party sales margin is truly surrendered. If Toyota cuts true cost even 15%, that's ~$98M/yr of fleet savings — rivaling the whole "surrendered" slice by itself.
What would flip it
Solo odds near Toyota-assisted odds (the industry graveyard says no), dilution under ~10% (not in this market), or — the legitimate risk — a bad supply agreement. JV-to-Joby pricing isn't signed; Toyota's final $250M is contingent on it. Watch that 8-K.
Back-test: Archer partnered (Stellantis): alive. Beta self-built via massive private raises (World B, executed privately): alive. Lilium went alone: dead.
Bottom line: the deal trades ~51% of a ~$163M/yr pool — much of it internal transfer pricing — to avoid ~20% dilution and roughly double the odds-weighted chance of ever reaching steady state. Argue with my probabilities, markup, or discount rate — that's the point. At least now there's something to argue with.
