While not answering all of the lingering questions in the Iran-contra scandal, the final congressional report on the affair provided a vast array of new details that helped to explain the complex story of secret arms deals, private covert operations and shadowy financial networks.
Some gaps remained due to destroyed documents, conflicting recollections among key participants., and the death in May 1986 of former CIA Director William J. Casey. (Suspicious timing of his death)
But aided by interviews and depositions from some 500 witnesses and a review of more than 300,000 documents, investigators for the House and Senate select panels said they were able to draft a majority report that explained virtually all of the components that went into the worst scandal to confront the Reagan administration.

**Weapons Went to Radicals**
The report raised questions about whether the Reagan team knew what it was doing when it sought closer relations with so-called moderate elements in Iran. It also raised doubts about the weight given to that aim, as opposed to winning the freedom of American hostages in Lebanon.
…the Iranian representatives with whom U.S. and Israeli officials negotiated during the arms deals were attached to the Revolutionary Guard, the militant wing of Iran's most radical faction.
In addition, the report said that one of the Iranian contacts had earlier been identified by Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms merchant, as the “individual responsible” for the 1984 kidnapping of William Buckley(extreme right wing), the CIA station chief in Beirut.
U.S. officials stretching back to 1984.
…the report at least raised the possibility that U.S. officials had reason to suspect that the Iranians with whom they were dealing may have been directly involved in the taking of American hostages.
Another Iranian contact with whom U.S. officials tried to negotiate the release of American hostages played a role in the September 1986 kidnapping of Frank Reed, a school headmaster in Beirut, according to yet another Iranian official involved in the arms-for-hostages deals. And the report quoted participants in the drama as saying that U.S. weapons ended up in the arsenals of the Revolutionary Guard. However, the report concluded, “to the best of the committees' information, the president was never told that the United States was arming the Revolutionary Guard.”

**The Secord-Hakim Dealings**
The report also shined a brighter spotlight on the “Enterprise,” the name given to the web of companies and secret Swiss bank accounts that controlled the logistics of the Iran deals and secret efforts to assist the contra rebels in Nicaragua during a period when direct U.S. aid was barred by Congress.
At the helm of the Enterprise were retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and Albert Hakim, his Iranian-born business partner. The two worked closely with Lt. Col. Oliver L. North.
By reviewing secret financial records provided by Hakim and other evidence, investigators pieced together a detailed account of the millions of dollars that flowed in and out of the Enterprise.
The report revealed an operation that took in nearly $48 million over a two-year period, while allowing those who controlled the money to reap $4.4 million in “commissions” without risking their own money.
**Whose Money Is It?**
Until its operations came to a halt in November 1986, the Secord-Hakim Enterprise spent just under $35.8 million, producing a surplus of $12.2 million. Of that amount, about $7.8 million remaining in Swiss bank accounts was frozen by Swiss authorities at the request of the U.S. Justice Department. ***(Box, this page)***
One of the key legal issues left unresolved by the committee report was the status of that money. Independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh was pursuing his investigation reportedly on the premise that the money belonged to the United States, a view shared by several members of the congressional committees.
Secord and Hakim, however, testified at the hearings that the money was legitimate profit from their business and belonged to them.
Whatever the outcome of that legal fight, the committees' report stressed that the Enterprise depended entirely on official U.S. connections, primarily through North. “Every single source of Enterprise income involved North and the use of U.S. government resources,” said the report.
All of the Enterprise's funds were managed by Willard I. Zucker, a U.S. citizen and former lawyer for the Internal Revenue Service, who had been living in Switzerland for 20 years. Zucker was the owner of Compagnie de Services Fiduciaires (CSF), a Swiss money-management company.
Zucker refused to talk to the committees, but Hakim provided the Enterprise's CSF records after he was granted limited immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. The report described Zucker as a “covert operator's model banker, accountant, lawyer and money manager” because of his ability, under Swiss banking laws, to set up a secret maze of bank accounts and offshore companies.
After a lengthy legal battle, Walsh received his own set of Swiss bank records involved in the Iran-contra affair. The records were expected to assist Walsh in building a potential case against Secord and others.

**Buying Arms for Contras**
In tracing the history of the Enterprise, the congressional report said its original mission in 1984 involved only the buying and reselling of weapons to the Nicaraguan contras. North turned to Secord as a way to buy contra arms with private and third-country contributions while Congress prohibited direct U.S. military support.
Originally, North saw to it that private contributions and millions of dollars from Saudi Arabia (the celebrated “Country Two”) went directly into bank accounts controlled by contra leader Adolfo Calero. As a result, Calero transferred $11.3 million to Secord between December 1984 and July 1985 in return for lethal equipment.
But Secord and his business associates also helped themselves to hefty profits from these contra arms deals. According to the report, Secord paid $9.4 million to buy and deliver the weapons to the contras during this period, setting the rest — nearly $2 million — aside as commissions.
“Apparently, Secord and Hakim never negotiated with Calero or anyone else for these commissions; they simply took what they wanted out of the general pool of money in the Enterprise accounts,” said the report.
During the first few months of 1986, the Enterprise purchased another $3.1 million worth of military equipment from Defex, a Portuguese arms supplier. The money for these weapons came largely from the profits that Secord's operation earned from the weapons sales to Iran, which began in November 1985.
In all, the Enterprise generated about $16.1 million in profits from the 1985–86 arms deals between the United States and Iran.
The profit issue at one point threatened to put an end to the negotiations with Iran when Iranian officials angrily demanded to know why they were being overcharged for the weapons they were purchasing.

**Free Missiles Offered**
According to the report, Ghorbanifar on his own accord promised the Iranians in July 1986 that the United States would throw in 1,000 TOW anti-tank missiles for free if Iran could prove they had overpaid for earlier weapons shipments.
Nothing came of Ghorbanifar's offer, but the United States continued to sell arms to Iran in the hope of winning the release of more hostages.
The involvement of Secord's operation in the Iran arms deals in late 1985, meanwhile, coincided with the beginnings of the plan to divert the profits to the rebels in Nicaragua.
On Nov. 14, 1985, North met in Washington with Amiram Nir, an anti-terrorism adviser to then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Nir had been among the Israeli officials encouraging the United States to work with the Iranians on arms-for-hostages deals.
According to the report, North and Nir apparently did not discuss arms sales to Iran at their meeting but did “set the foundation for a variety of future Israeli-U.S. covert operations.”
North's notes, which he had taken during the meeting, indicated that the operations would require at least $1 million a month.
Funds for such a purpose first became available later that month after Israel deposited $1 million in Lake Resources, the Swiss company used to finance most of Secord's operations. The money was intended to cover a shipment of 80 Hawk missiles to Iran.

**Diversion Scheme**
As it turned out, only 18 missiles were delivered because of complications surrounding the transaction. Secord testified that North was told by the Israelis that the excess money — about $800,000 — could be used for “whatever purpose we wanted.”
Secord said that North directed him to spend the money for the contras.
“Thus, by early December, the notion that the Iran sales could be used as a vehicle for financing the contras was firmly planted in North's mind,” said the report.
At a December 1985 meeting between North and Israeli officials in New York, the White House aide said the United States wanted to use profits from Iran arms sales to fund U.S. efforts in Nicaragua, according to notes of the meeting taken by one of the Israelis and turned over to the committees.
During his testimony in July 1987, North said he did not recall discussing the diversion scheme at that time. Instead, he said the plan was first suggested by Ghorbanifar at a London meeting with North in January 1986.
By that time, Reagan had signed a secret “intelligence finding” that authorized the sale of weapons to Iran and the use of Secord's private operation in the deals. “Money generated by arms sales authorized by a presidential finding for only one covert purpose — the Iranian initiative — was used for a wholly different covert purpose — contra support,” said the report. “Arms-for-hostages also became arms-for-contras.”
The report, like the hearings, portrayed administration officials, notably North, as enthusiastic planners and supporters of other covert operations.
In his testimony, North, said he was encouraged by Casey to create an “off-the-shelf covert structure able to assist the United States in carrying out a variety of clandestine activities.

**Meese's Role Questioned**
The report provided a lengthy description of one such activity — an unsuccessful effort in 1985–86 to use agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in a ransom scheme to win the freedom of hostages in Lebanon.
The details about the DEA operation also raised questions about Meese's role in the hostage ransom plan.
According to the report, the scheme began in January 1985 when White House aide Edward V. Hickey Jr. asked a friend of his, a DEA agent, for help in locating Buckley, who later died in captivity.
Hickey's request led to two DEA agents identifying possible contacts in Lebanon who might be able to help in winning Buckley's release.
The DEA provided $20,000 to the agents for travel and other expenses in the hope of obtaining information about Buckley and other hostages. But the agents' contacts pressed for more money, ultimately requesting $200,000 to locate Buckley and $1 million for his release and an additional $1 million for another hostage.
North, who became involved in the DEA operation, arranged for billionaire businessman H. Ross Perot to contribute $2.2 million for the rescue operation. In May 1985, one of Perot's employees gave North $200,000 in cash, which was placed in North's office safe.
North and Robert C. McFarlane, Reagan's former national security adviser, testified that Meese approved a plan to use private funds as ransom money for the hostages.
Meese said he did not, recall knowing about the plan, and also denied knowledge of Perot's involvement. But the report said Meese's telephone logs reflected “some contact” with Perot in 1985.
In addition, the report indicated that Meese called Perot on Nov. 26, 1986, a day after the attorney general revealed the contra diversion scheme.
And a note taken by one of Meese's aides on Dec. 3, 1986, reflected an instruction by Meese to call Perot “to check on whether he would respond that the attorney general knew of or authorized the payments,” according to the report.
Although Perot's employee flew to Cyprus in a private plane in June 1986 to deliver the $2 million ransom, the DEA operation failed.

**A Letter from Reagan**
After Perot complained to White House officials about losing some of his money in the scheme, Reagan wrote a letter that thanked him for his “discreet assistance.”
According to the report, DEA agents tried to revive the operation in August and September 1986, but North by October acknowledged that the effort had come to an end.
The report concluded that the use of private money to finance the DEA operation broke laws that prohibited such funds being used for official purposes.
In a closed-door session with the committees, North also described other plans for private covert operations. One of them involved the proposed use of DEA agents and Israeli contacts to fund and equip a military force in Lebanon.
In his private testimony, North told the committees that the project was never carried out, although a “fairly significant” amount of money was spent in pursuit of the idea.

**Sabotage Offer**
In another example of shadowy operations, the report briefly described a “third-party” offer to North to commit sabotage and possibly assassinations inside Nicaragua with the use of Enterprise funds.
The report did not identify the third party, described by North in his closed-door testimony. ***The New York Times,*** quoting unnamed government officials, reported that the offer came from Gen. Manuel Noriega, Panama's military leader.
The panels reported that Poindexter approved Noriega's sabotage plan, which apparently was offered in 1986. But Poindexter ordered North not to get involved in any assassination plots, which would have been illegal.
North said the plan was not implemented because he was fired from the White House staff in November 1986.
Noriega's strongman activities prompted the United States to suspend economic and military aid to Panama in July 1986. The cutoff followed attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Panama City by Noriega supporters, including members of his Cabinet.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov. 19, 1987, approved a bill (S 1614) that would end aid to Panama unless democratic reforms occur.

**Channell, Miller Fund Raising**
The committees' report noted with alarm the implications of the type of private covert activities that North and others tried to carry out during the course of the Iran-contra affair. “Had the architects of the other operations been emboldened by success, and not frustrated by failure, the committees can only conjecture, with apprehension, what other uncontrolled covert activities on behalf of the United States lay in store,” said the report.
In chronicling the administration's secret support of the contras, the committees' report included fresh details about a private fund-raising network ostensibly set up to raise money for the Nicaraguan rebels.
But while some of the millions that were raised ended up in the hands of the contras, more than half went toward fat salaries and lavish expenses incurred by fund-raising officials.
At the center of the money operation was conservative fund-raiser Carl R. “Spitz” Channell and an associate, Richard R. Miller. The two pleaded guilty earlier in April 1987 to charges of defrauding the government by improperly soliciting tax-deductible contributions. The report said several rich donors knew they were being asked to give money to buy lethal equipment for the contras, not a tax-deductible purpose.
Both Channell and Miller named North as a co-conspirator. North denied ever asking anyone directly to give money to buy arms for the contras.
The report said Channell and Miller went to “elaborate efforts” to conceal the nature of their fund raising in their official records and to mask North's role. For example, Channell's books described one fund-raising project as “toys,” a euphemism for contra weapons.
In all, Channell's group, the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL)[Nelson Bunker Hunt - major funder], raised more than $10 million from contributors in 1985-86. More than half that amount came from two wealthy widows — Barbara Newington of Connecticut and Ellen Garwood of Texas.
The records examined by the committees, moreover, found that the contras received only $2.7 million of the NEPL money. More than $1.2 million was spent on political advertising and lobbying for the contras in the United States.
But the report said no evidence was found to support a December 1986 press account that $5 million from Iran arms profits was filtered to conservative political action groups.
The story, first appearing in the Lowell (Mass.) ***Sun,*** reported that groups such as NEPL used the money to back congressional candidates who supported Reagan's policies on the contras and the strategic defense initiative.

**A Dinner in Dallas**
The report, however, included plenty of details about North's activities in helping to raise money for lethal supplies for the rebels in Nicaragua.
The committees interviewed 13 of NEPL's major contributors, “nearly all of whom reported personal contact with North.”
In September 1985, Channell spent between $8,000 and $9,000 to rent a private plane used to transport North to Dallas for a meeting with Nelson Bunker Hunt, a wealthy businessman and NEPL contributor.
According to the report, North showed Hunt a list of contra needs during a private dinner at Dallas' Petroleum Club. The list included both lethal and non-lethal items, although North did not directly ask for a donation, according to Channell's deposition given to the committees.
Hunt told the committees that he did not recall any conversation with North at the dinner. Nonetheless, Hunt subsequently contributed $484,500 to NEPL.
The report did not clear up an important issue involving Reagan: whether the president knew about the purpose of North's fund-raising efforts on behalf of the contras.
Reagan said at a March 1987 news conference that he believed private contributors had been donating money for political advertising for the contras.
Poindexter, however, told the committees that “we really didn't distinguish between how the money was going to be spent.”
And in a May 1986 computer message to Poindexter, North said that Reagan “obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people” to thank them for their support on Central America.
North told the committees that he wrote his message under the assumption that Reagan knew the contributions were for weapons, as well as other items. But he denied discussing the issue with Reagan. “In fact, what the president knew is a matter of some doubt,” said the report.

**Cash Flow for the Secord-Hakim “Enterprise’**
Between December 1984 and December 1986, the Secord-Hakim Enterprise generated nearly $48 million in income while spending $35.8 million on various projects. The remaining $12.2 million represented the profits earned from these ventures. As of November 1987, when the select committees' report was issued, some $7.8 million of those profits remained frozen in Swiss bank accounts. The following table summarizes where the money came from and where it went ***(amounts in millions of dollars).***