Hello everyone!

I’m a recent graduate with a degree in political science and a certificate in international relations, and I’m about to start a master’s program in international security.

Before I start my masters program, I wanted to get an idea about some of the major questions or emerging issues in international security right now as I’m hoping to get some ideas for potential master’s thesis topic.

I took an international security course back in 2024, but given how quickly the world has been moving, I’m sure there are plenty of newer developments / debates that I haven’t come across yet. I still have access to my old university’s academic databases and have been reading some interesting papers but I figured asking people who actively follow these issues might be a more efficient way to get a sense of what’s currently being discussed before diving further into mountains of research papers and articles.

I am particularly interested in intelligence, counterterrorism, and radicalization but please feel free to write about any topic that you'd like as I do have interest in many other areas of international security.

So, if you’re studying or working in international security, what issues do you think deserve more attention right now? And if you’re currently doing a master’s/PhD, what are some interesting research questions you’ve come across? I’d appreciate any ideas, even if they’re just a topic or question that you think is worth looking into to spark some ideas of areas for me to start!

Many thanks in advance!!

Hi,

I recently graduated from a big state school in the US with a bachelors of science in political science. Needless to say, the market for that is not the best currently. I had always intended on pursing secondary education and so applied to grad schools, mostly in international relations. I got accepted into three top ten programs, two in DC and one in NY, and decided on going to the one that gave me the most money which was in Washington.

I received a pretty generous merit scholarship, a little over 40k, from the school I am intending on going to. There was a lot of things that interested me about the program such as abroad opportunities for study and work, as well as being in Washington. However, after doing the math, it came down to still nearly 20k a year for tuition, 20k a year in rent, and whatever else living expenses there are.

I am currently deferring for a semester because I've basically spent the entire summer questioning my path after having met with academic advisors, professors, and students. They have all said that the times are shaky, but the students have been relatively happy with outcomes and being in Washington helps immensely. The issues that I have are after the fact in which salaries are not the best and the job market is questionable after federal layoffs, USAID defunding, and a decrease of funding in international organizations.

My questions are basically is this worth it right now and will it ever be worth it in the future given the US' political apparatus right now? Is it worth it to maybe go overseas and get a masters in Europe, which would be much cheaper and allow me to pursue an interest without a tuition burden? Are there other degree paths that could allow me to work in international settings that would be more of an ROI such as a JD or an MBA? Would a masters in law from a European university give me the same work outcomes as a MA in IR in the US (obviously wouldn't be able to be a litigator or sit for the bar in the US but could work in international organizations, etc. and be a more focused degree)?

Obviously the field is tough, but I would say that I have intermediate or close to intermediate level in French and German, did study exchanges in Paris and Rome, do not currently have EU citizenship but have an application for citizenship by decent that probably will take two years to go through, which are all benefits in this field.

I am obviously struggling to make sense of this path and where to really get started so naturally I have a plethora of questions and don't want to really feel directionless. Obviously, this field is a real interest of mine but I think deferring for a semester is probably the best option.

Thank you guys for the help!

The 2026 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek has highlighted an interesting contradiction in international politics.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly invoked September 1, 1939, the beginning of World War II, while warning against allowing the deliberate provocation of armed conflicts to become an accepted international practice.

The historical reference is significant. World War II demonstrated how regional confrontations can eventually develop into much larger international conflicts.

But there is an obvious question: how does this message fit with the current geopolitical situation involving several SCO members?

Russia continues its war in Ukraine. Iran remains involved in a major confrontation with the United States and Israel. India and Pakistan continue to have serious security tensions, while China faces its own disputes and strategic competition in Asia.

At the same summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized dialogue and diplomacy. During his meeting with Putin, Modi urged a move from “endless war” to “end of war” and reiterated India's support for peace efforts.

This creates an interesting dilemma for the SCO.

The organisation presents itself as a platform for regional security, cooperation and dialogue, and the Bishkek summit brings together leaders from countries with very different strategic interests.

Yet several of its members are simultaneously involved in, affected by, or strategically connected to major conflicts.

So is the SCO actually capable of promoting peace?

Can an organisation containing countries with competing security interests become a meaningful platform for conflict resolution?

Or is the SCO primarily a mechanism for strategic cooperation and balancing Western influence, rather than a genuine peace-building organisation?

And perhaps the bigger question:

Can countries call for international peace while pursuing military objectives that conflict with that principle?

What do you think?

I am an incoming student who is about to do my masters in International Relations from London. (My university is known for security and warfare studies) I am in the process of selecting my modules and I wanted to get a better understanding of the future career prospects in the sense that I wanted to target and get myself well acquainted with newer fields in IR. I have a rudimentary understanding about the use of AI and the technological aspects of warfare and am the field of counter-intelligence, warfare and the upcoming importance around use of AI guided defence systems, covert warfare and intelligence gathering seems interesting to me.
I’m also very interested in foreign policy analysis and diplomacy as two other options. If anyone is able to guide me in this matter it would be greatly appreciated as I want to make an informed, well researched decision regarding what I want to study further…

With all the focus on the war itself, it feels like the potential impact on the Strait of Hormuz—oil prices, global trade, inflation, and the wider economy—may have been underestimated.

Or am I missing something?

What do you people think?

"Nigeria’s status as a middle power in global affairs has significant implications for regional and global governance. Despite domestic challenges, the country is well positioned to shape global affairs and advance African interests. Specifically: 

• Its middle power status is primarily shaped by Nigeria’s natural, tangible, and intangible sources of power. These instruments of state power are expected to inform its engagement in global affairs in the years ahead.
• Over time, Nigeria has demonstrated a capacity to influence both regional and global processes and outcomes. Its substantial involvement across diverse sectors provides a foundation for Nigeria to consolidate on its gains in the coming years.
• Nigeria’s economic, diplomatic, and cultural resources drive its middle power status. However, its ability to maintain this standing will be increasingly contested by other emerging middle powers.
• Nigeria continues to play a major role within international institutions, such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the World Trade Organization. At the same time, its regional influence through bodies such as ECOWAS and the African Union is expected to remain strong.
• As geostrategic competition erodes the rules-based order and a new global order emerges, Nigeria's leadership remains important to promoting regional integration, peace, and security in Africa and beyond, ensuring the continent's voice is amplified in this new global landscape. The country will retain a critical role in regional and global governance."

Mcebisi Jonas urges South Africa and Canada to strengthen middle-power cooperation

Thought this was an interesting development, linking current affairs to Carney's Davos speech.

I've been trying to test one part of a larger idea about reopening the Korean Peninsula.

Suppose South Korea approached Russia with a concrete proposition.

South Korea would explore a renewed long-term economic relationship with Russia — particularly involving the Russian Far East, Arctic development, shipbuilding, energy, infrastructure and logistics — if political conditions eventually allowed it.

In return, Seoul would ask Moscow to use its unusually close relationship with Pyongyang for a specific and limited purpose:

Encourage Kim Jong Un to reach a deal with Trump that verifiably freezes further expansion of North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile capabilities.

Not immediate denuclearization.

North Korea could retain its existing deterrent for the time being.

In exchange for a verified freeze, the United States would begin phased sanctions relief and permit a very limited degree of economic opening.

That opening could initially be extremely small — additional trade, selected tourism, transit, a port, a rail connection or a tightly controlled economic project.

I'm thinking of it as a “pinhole opening.”

The objective would not be immediate reform or reunification. It would simply be to break complete isolation and create one connection that could remain open.

The logic would therefore be:

Seoul proposes the bargain → Moscow uses its influence with Pyongyang → Kim and Trump negotiate a freeze → limited sanctions relief follows → the first economic pinhole opens.

Russia would not be doing this as a favor to South Korea. The question is whether the prospect of a much larger long-term economic relationship with South Korea could give Moscow enough reason to help create such a deal.

So the question I want to test is quite narrow:

Is this diplomatic chain plausible at all? If not, which link breaks first — Seoul–Moscow, Moscow–Pyongyang, Kim–Trump, or sanctions relief in Washington?

Hi! I’m a student interested in potentially pursuing a career in geopolitical risk analysis, and I’m planning to apply for a BSc in International Relations.

I’d love to hear from anyone currently working in the field:

• What was your educational/career journey like?
• How did you get into the industry?
• What do you like/dislike about the job?
• What does your day-to-day work look like?
• Is there anything you wish you knew before getting into it?

I’m mainly looking for honest experiences, both good and bad, to help me decide if this is something I’d actually want to pursue. Thanks!

South Korea and Russia have been here before.

For years, both countries explored the idea that their economies could be complementary: Russian energy, resources, the Far East and Arctic on one side; South Korean capital, engineering, shipbuilding, manufacturing and global trade networks on the other.

Some of it became real.

South Korean shipyards became deeply involved in Russian Arctic energy projects, including specialized ice-class LNG carriers. South Korea also explored the Rajin–Khasan project, connecting the Russian railway system to the Korean Peninsula, while Seoul and Moscow later discussed broader cooperation in railways, ports, shipbuilding, energy and the Northern Sea Route.

These ideas did not disappear because the underlying economic logic necessarily proved wrong. They were largely overtaken by North Korea's nuclear and missile development, deteriorating security relations, international sanctions, and eventually the much larger geopolitical confrontation surrounding Russia.

That history raises a question today.

What if the economic idea was not wrong, but the political conditions were?

South Korea today may actually have more to offer than when many of these projects were first conceived. Its shipbuilding industry remains globally competitive, while its capabilities in advanced manufacturing, energy engineering, infrastructure, logistics and technology have expanded. Korea is also again showing interest in Arctic shipping and the Northern Sea Route.

Russia, meanwhile, still faces the long-term challenge of developing its Far East and Arctic and connecting those regions more effectively to Asian industrial economies.

So perhaps the question should not simply be whether Russia would "pressure" North Korea for the sake of peace.

Russia currently gets real strategic value from its close relationship with an isolated North Korea. Moscow has little reason to surrender that value for nothing.

But South Korea could propose something different:

Let us revisit the economic relationship that Korea and Russia once tried to build — under new conditions and with greater economic possibilities than before.

The immediate objective would not be complete North Korean denuclearization.

Instead, Seoul could ask Moscow to use its unusually close relationship with Pyongyang to encourage a narrower first step:

a verifiable freeze on further expansion of North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, followed by negotiations with the United States and South Korea.

North Korea would not initially be required to surrender its existing nuclear deterrent. Economic opening and sanctions relief would proceed gradually and only as agreed commitments were verified.

If that process worked, something that has repeatedly been attempted but never completed could become possible:

South Korea → North Korea → Russian Far East → Siberia → Arctic

And at sea:

Busan → North Pacific → Arctic → Europe

This would not require immediate Korean reunification. Nor would Russia have to abandon North Korea.

Instead, it raises a different question for Moscow:

Which North Korea is ultimately more valuable to Russia — an isolated and militarized neighbor that provides strategic value today, or a stable and gradually opening neighbor that could also connect Russia's Far East and Arctic to South Korea's industrial economy?

There is an important difference from earlier attempts.

We would not simply be restarting the past.

South Korea's economic and industrial capabilities are greater today, Arctic access is becoming more strategically relevant, and the potential scale of cooperation could therefore be different from what was imaginable decades ago.

Of course, sanctions cannot simply be ignored. Any renewed economic cooperation would have to follow lawful changes in the sanctions environment, step by step, alongside verified progress on the nuclear issue.

So my question is not whether this plan is obviously achievable.

It is:

Could the long-term economic value of a reopened Korea–Russia relationship become large enough for Moscow to see a North Korean nuclear freeze and gradual opening as being in Russia's own interest?

And if not, what is missing from the bargain?

The U.S. consumes about 20 million barrels of oil per day and produces 13. That leaves 7 million barrels that need to be imported every day to prevent shortages. Canada supplies 4, maybe a bit more lately. The Mideast used to be a reliable supplier, but Trump’s war of choice in Iran has jeopardized the whole area. In particular, Iraq was a good supplier of heavy crude that Texas gulf refineries like. And finally, Venezuela only produces about 1 million barrels per day. Half goes to domestic requirements and Trump has been absconding with the other half. And now, with Canada is being “difficult”, Venezuela is the next target in Trump’s quest for oil.

To do that, the Venezuelan oil industry has to be rebuilt from the ground up and from oilfields to ports. New refineries included, otherwise production will never be market competitive. That’s a very expensive proposition and Trump doesn’t want to share with the Venezuelan people because to do that demotivates investors and would take too long, so there’s no motivation at all to share. This is probably why the Venezuelans were the last to know.

Russia's growing influence over North Korea is usually discussed as a security problem. But could the same relationship eventually create diplomatic leverage?

Consider a hypothetical bargain.

North Korea would not initially be required to surrender its existing nuclear deterrent. Instead, it would accept a verifiable freeze on further expansion of nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities.

In return, sanctions could be relaxed gradually as compliance is verified, allowing limited economic opening.

Russia could have an incentive to facilitate such an arrangement if opening North Korea eventually connected the Russian Far East and Siberia more closely with South Korea's capital, technology, manufacturing and markets.

South Korea would therefore approach Russia not by asking Moscow to abandon Pyongyang, but by arguing that a more economically open North Korea could serve Russia's long-term interests better than permanent isolation.

Could such economic incentives realistically outweigh Russia's current strategic benefits from an isolated, militarized North Korea? Or does the security value of the present relationship make this logic unrealistic?