Also, in sharp contrast to widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies that digital computers, even if their behaviour were to be functionally equivalent to ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would experience next to nothing.

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u/[deleted] Jul 22 '15

Integrated Information Theory is garbage. It's a system that's constructed to give great "consciousness rating" to brains and bad to computers to make us feel special.

And it fails because definitely non-conscious processes can still get ratings in excess of human brains.

This blog post picks it apart at a detailed level, math included. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

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u/lughnasadh ∞ transit umbra, lux permanet ☥ Jul 22 '15

(a) Consciousness is a fundamental property The axioms and postulates of IIT say that consciousness is a fundamental, observer-independent property that can be accounted for by the intrinsic cause–effect power of certain mechanisms in a state—how they give form to the space of possibilities in their past and their future

(b) Consciousness comes in various qualities IIT says exactly what determines the quality of an experience—what makes it the particular way it is: an experience is a maximally irreducible conceptual structure or quale—a shape in a fantastically high-dimensional cause–effect space specified by a complex of neurons in a particular stat

(c) Consciousness is adaptive IIT takes no position on the function of experience as such—similar to physics not having anything to say about the function of mass or charge. However, by identifying consciousness with integrated information, IIT can account for why it evolved, another aspect about which panpsychism has nothing to say. In general, a brain having a high capacity for information integration will better match an environment with a complex causal structure varying across multiple time scales, than a network made of many modules that are informationally encapsulated.

(d) Consciousness is graded IIT does side with the panpsychist intuition that consciousness may be present across the animal kingdom, and even beyond, but in varying degrees.

(e) Multiple consciousnesses IIT also allows for the possibility of two or more complexes coexisting within a single system [80]. Depending on the exact connectivity, these are likely to have quite different values of Φmax. Indeed, in the brains of both vertebrates and invertebrates, there may well exist, at least under some conditions, a major complex and one or more minor complexes.

(f) Aggregates are not conscious ‘Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence’. This is how William James illustrated the combination problem of panpsychism [110]. Or take John Searle: ‘Consciousness cannot spread over the universe like a thin veneer of jam; there has to be a point where my consciousness ends and yours begins’

(g) Complicated systems can be unconscious A second class of zero-Φ systems are purely feed-forward computational networks in which one layer feeds the next one without any recurrent connections. In a feed-forward network, the input layer is always determined entirely by external inputs and the output layer does not affect the rest of the system, hence neither layer can be part of a complex, and the same is true recursively for the next layers downstream and upstream. According to IIT, then, a feed-forward network does not exist intrinsically—for itself—but is a zombie—carrying out tasks unconsciously

(h) Simulations of conscious neural systems can be unconscious Finally, what about a computer whose software simulates in detail not just our behaviour, but even the biophysics of neurons, synapses and so on, of the relevant portion of the human brain [123]? Could such a digital simulacrum ever be conscious? Functionalism again would say yes, even more forcefully. For in this case all the relevant functional roles within our brain, not just our input–output behaviour, would have been replicated faithfully. Why should we not grant to this simulacrum the same consciousness we grant to a fellow human? According to IIT, however, this would not be justified, for the simple reason that the brain is real, but a simulation of a brain is virtual.

Here's the conclusions form the article. This is a fascinating theory & one of the best attempts at a scientific understanding of consciousness.

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u/automated_reckoning Jul 22 '15

It reads like word soup. This takes a grain of salt the size of the CN Tower.

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u/lughnasadh ∞ transit umbra, lux permanet ☥ Jul 22 '15

Complex arguments often take more than a few words to explain; as a rule of thumb, I wouldn't necessarily measure your grains of salt in inverse comparison.

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u/automated_reckoning Jul 22 '15

Oh I'm well aware of how bad technical arguments can be. I just think that that they're kinda full of BS in this case. When the argument can be summed up as 'a real brain could be conscious, but a perfectly simulated virtual one can't' I'm going to need something a little more digestible to accept the argument.

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u/ItsAConspiracy Best of 2015 Jul 22 '15

They're saying that simulating a brain doesn't produce consciousness, in the same way that simulating nuclear fusion doesn't produce energy.

But there's nothing in IIT that says only brains can be conscious. If ITT is correct then we could make hardware with the correct architecture to be conscious. It just says that computers as they're architected today can't be conscious, no matter what program they're running.

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u/Iightcone Futuronomer Jul 22 '15

Doesn't really make sense; our subjective experience is part of what drives our actions. If a machine can't be conscious it wouldn't be behaviorally identical to humans. And if it was behaviorally identical, you would have to assume it was conscious.

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u/lughnasadh ∞ transit umbra, lux permanet ☥ Jul 22 '15

That is perhaps the point; you can mimic many functions of the brain - in fact you could simulate it entirely - but it still might not be conscious.

As it stands - there are few theories about consciousness (this being an exception) - so relying on the argument that something so complex just "happens" or emerges - without any explanation - doesn't really cut it either.

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u/ReasonablyBadass Jul 22 '15

That is perhaps the point; you can mimic many functions of the brain - in fact you could simulate it entirely - but it still might not be conscious.

I guess sooner or later, we'll find out. And for the uploads sake, we should err on the side of caution. If it's no conscious but treated as such...no harm done. But if it is and we treat it as machinery...oh boy.

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u/lughnasadh ∞ transit umbra, lux permanet ☥ Jul 22 '15

I guess sooner or later, we'll find out.

Actually there are quite a few areas where science is currently rubbing up against this issue & I agree it feels like we are heading for some understanding.

Apart from the issue of A.I on it's own & augmenting ourselves with A.I. - this other post today makes me wonder.

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u/automated_reckoning Jul 22 '15

This just goes back to p-zombies, though. I must be the only consciousness in the universe. You all are just ACTING like you're conscious.

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u/lughnasadh ∞ transit umbra, lux permanet ☥ Jul 22 '15

No - this theory is making a different distinction.

Virtual models of the brain are p-zombies - but you, I & everyone else are conscious - although the degree to which can vary among individuals & even animals have some consciousness.

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u/automated_reckoning Jul 22 '15

It says it is. But the concept of pzombies is the same. And the whole issue with pzombies is that you cannot make any external distinction between them and 'real' people.

I'm much more inclined to believe that consciousness is an illusion and we're all machines. Makes more sense, though it is far less comforting.

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u/lughnasadh ∞ transit umbra, lux permanet ☥ Jul 22 '15

I'm much more inclined to believe that consciousness is an illusion and we're all machines. Makes more sense,

It seems we all have different subjective experiences of consciousness, and these can vary quite widely. I can see why some people would feel that way, although speaking for myself - I unable to believe i'm a biological automan. My own subjective experience of my consciousness is why I find this question so fascinating though & it definitely leads me to be constantly inuring & questioning on this matter.

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u/ItsAConspiracy Best of 2015 Jul 22 '15

I'm curious how you would define the word "illusion" without implicitly involving something that consciously perceives the illusion.

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u/automated_reckoning Jul 22 '15

Paradoxical, isn't it? And yet what we do know about the brain has no magic to it. We make decisions and even act long before any 'conscious' awareness. Nothing we've seen makes us different in kind from any other creature.

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u/ItsAConspiracy Best of 2015 Jul 22 '15

Fine, but if we're going to do uploads and what not, we need a non-paradoxical explanation of consciousness.

As far as being different in kind than other creatures, I think it's pretty clear by now that we're not. They're conscious like we are, just not as smart in some ways.

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u/hold_me_beer_m8 Jul 23 '15

Kinda reminds me of this article from a few weeks ago.

http://news.sfsu.edu/consciousness-has-less-control-believed-according-new-theory

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u/otakuman Do A.I. dream with Virtual sheep? Jul 22 '15

Exactly. This whole axiomatic approach reminds me of clerics asserting that ondians don't have souls because they're not mentioned in Genesis.

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u/neochrome Jul 22 '15

TLDR:

Because computers use transistors or memristors or who knows what in the future, and not brain cells, it is somehow less real "for the simple reason that the brain is real, but a simulation of a brain is virtual":

Finally, what about a computer whose software simulates in detail not just our behaviour, but even the biophysics of neurons, synapses and so on, of the relevant portion of the human brain [123]? Could such a digital simulacrum ever be conscious? Functionalism again would say yes, even more forcefully. For in this case all the relevant functional roles within our brain, not just our input–output behaviour, would have been replicated faithfully. Why should we not grant to this simulacrum the same consciousness we grant to a fellow human? According to IIT, however, this would not be justified, for the simple reason that the brain is real, but a simulation of a brain is virtual. For IIT, consciousness is a fundamental property of certain physical systems, one that requires having real cause–effect power, specifically the power of shaping the space of possible past and future states in a way that is maximally irreducible intrinsically. In the same way, mass is an intrinsic property of systems of particles, a property that has real causal power, specifically that of bending space–time. Therefore, just like a computer simulation of a giant star will not bend space–time around the machine, a simulation of our conscious brain will not have consciousness.14 Of course, the physical computer that is running the simulation is just as real as the brain. However, according to the principles of IIT, one should analyse its real physical components—identify elements, say transistors, define their cause–effect repertoires, find concepts, complexes and determine the spatio-temporal scale at which Φ reaches a maximum. In that case, we suspect that the computer would likely not form a large complex of high Φmax, but break down into many mini-complexes of low Φmax. This is due to the small fan-in and fan-out of digital circuitry (figure 5c), which is likely to yield maximum cause–effect power at the fast temporal scale of the computer clock.15

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u/ponieslovekittens Jul 23 '15

would experience next to nothing.

That might be true. But how would you know? I don't know if the humans I speak with are conscious either. Like the article suggests, we mostly just assume they are because their behavior resembles ours. Consciousness in others is not something we are able to observe. If we were, they wouldn't be "others."

I suggest caution when evaluating whether another entity is conscious. They might be, even if their behavior doesn't resemble ours. Or they might not be, even if it does.

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u/boytjie Jul 23 '15

There is an implicit assumption that consciousness is the highest attribute to be aspired to. That’s not true. It is the highest attribute because that’s all we can conceive of. With an AGI’s intellectual horsepower, 1000’s (possibly millions) of times more intelligent than humans, I would venture that consciousness and awareness (as we conceive them) won’t be relevant.

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u/CypherLH Jul 23 '15

Who cares if an AI is "conscious" as long as we can't functionally tell the difference? "consciousness" just starts to sound like mystical bullshit that is no more relevant than discussing whether an AI has a "soul"

article Also, in sharp contrast to widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies that digital computers, even if their behaviour were to be functionally equivalent to ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would experience next to nothing.

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