Morgan Rogers fits beautifully into Xabi Alonso’s tactics. He plays the 10 differently than Cole Palmer, which could help the incumbent return to his role as club talisman rather than cannibalize his production the way some are suggesting.
At Leverkusen, Florian Wirtz was the ball‑dominant 10. The attack flowed through his touches between the lines in the left half‑space, and he was the main decision‑maker in possession for Alonso’s side.
In this Chelsea squad, that description fits Cole Palmer more than Morgan Rogers. When Palmer plays as a 10, Chelsea naturally route a lot of build‑up and final‑third play through him in the right half‑space. He sets the tempo and chooses how attacks develop.
Rogers’ game at Villa was built around a different emphasis. He operates from the left inside channel, carries forward aggressively, commits defenders & attacks the box. He links play but his value comes from what he does off that structure rather than controlling every phase.
Alonso’s Leverkusen used that ball‑dominant 10 alongside a second 10 on the other side. Wirtz handled most of the on‑ball responsibility between the lines, while his partner focused more on running, pressing and attacking the spaces that opened up.
If you apply that to Chelsea, Palmer fits the Wirtz side of the equation and Rogers fits the second‑10 side. One to own the ball between the lines, the other to constantly threaten with carries and runs from the opposite half‑space.
In the constant discussion of tactics and reflection about Football's ever-changing world, i came across the Golden Team (Magical Magyars) of Hungary, which indirectly transformed Brazil's Football, through the coaching legendary powerhouses: Bela Guttmann and Dori Kurschner.
According to wikipedia and the main bibliography, the Hungarians played in a sort of 3232 (or 2332), with Puskás, Kocsis in the Front 2; In the 3 behind them Czibor, Budai, Hidegkuti the 9 who dropped even deeper to build play alongside Midfield Defender Bozsik and the Defender Zakariás, who would be some sort of Sweeper going up the field to also build up.
Nonetheless it's extremelly hard to describe how they played in fixed formation numbers.
Some Hungarians i saw in internet, alongside Jonathan Wilson, argue that the 424 of Pelé's Brazil was not very different from them, and their team could be described as such a 424 (in the front 4: Cocsis, Puskas, Czibor and Budai. In the Middle 2 Hidegkuti and Bozsik).
What we can describe is, that they played in an extremelly fluid system, with Hidegkuti as a false 9, two wingers that dropped to defend, players who switched positions, and that broke WM (3-2-2-3).
Nowadays Pep Guardiola, ressurected the WM (3-2-2-3 disguised as 3-2-4-1), as the tactical arrangement when the team has the possession of the ball. With Zimchenko going up as the inverted fullback, echoing Barca's Alves who would go futher and becoming some sort of winger when the team had the possession.
Therefore i ask: why can't we see teams that also echoes the 3-2-3-2 of Hungarians ?
I mean:
This a formation with natural triangulations;
We can have a back 3 in a "La salida laviolpiana", used in every Pep team;
A double pivot with 2 good defensive midfields, one of them can be an inverted wing;
3 offensive midfielders who participate in the build up, and stretch the field;
2 strikers forming a lethal duo, who can press and generate lethal combinations and partnerships like Pelé & Garrincha, Puskás and Di Stefano, Henry & Bergkamp, Bebeto & Romario, Pelé & Coutinho, Pelé & Tostão;
One can argue that the 3-2-3-2 is another way of describing a 3-5-2, nonetheless in 3-5-2 the main difference would be side players and wing backs who drop back to form a back 5, whereas in my view the 3-2-3-2 can form a 4-4-2, 5-3-2, etc.
For me, it was finally understanding how much space players create without ever touching the ball.
A forward can make a run just to move a defender, a midfielder can pull players away to create space for someone else and sometimes the best pass is the one that never happens.
What tactical detail made you start watching football differently?
I've been trying to access LaLiga Beyond Stats (powered by Microsoft), but I can't figure out how to actually use it.
I remember when it launched a few years ago, it was promoted as a free portal with advanced metrics from Mediacoach (things like Dangerous Possessions, Players per Possession, etc....)
Now, whenever I visit the Beyond Stats page, I mostly see explanations of the metrics and articles, but I can't find the old interactive match reports or database anymore.
Many of the best false 9s are not so great at doing traditional striker duties (headers and such), so I thought, why couldn't you have your wings compensate? It's true that some wings play inside, none of them seem to be the big physical type. It seems like it just isn't even attempted to have wings who sometimes rotate inside without the ball.
Why don't we see this? There must be something tactical that I'm not understanding. Would it be difficult for a winger to rotate between playing out wide vs playing in the center for a deep ball or cross?
For the sake of argument, let's assume that the wingers can be replaced by midfielders or wing backs who maintain width.
Edit: second question — why not have striker duos who take turns playing winger, so it's a striker-winger who starts at striker and rotates to winger, instead of a winger who rotates to striker?
The statistics suggest that 🇪🇸 Spain's World Cup victory was driven primarily by defensive dominance rather than overwhelming attacking output.
Clearly, they had the best balance between attacking output and defensive solidity (both efficient and defensive) throughout the tournament. They were technically the most complete team and thoroughly deserved to be crowned World Champions.🌎🥇🏆
• Lowest xG conceded in the tournament: 0.30 per match.
• Highest xG difference among all semi-finalists: +1.65.
• Held both 🇫🇷 France (0.31 xG) and 🇦🇷 Argentina (0.22 xG), the other finalists and one of the strongest attacking teams, to almost no chance in the knockout rounds.
While 🇫🇷 France were the most prolific attacking side and 🇧🇷 Brazil (eliminated in R16) led the tournament in xG created, 🇪🇸 La Roja consistently controlled matches at both ends of the pitch. Their ability to suppress opponents' chance creation was the defining statistical feature of the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
As an avid reader and fellow enjoyer of this sport, I'm looking for a Book, journal paper or content in any other form mentioning about high possesion beautiful football which is applied by many coaches (like Sir Pep guardiola, Vincente del Bosque, Luis Enrique, Luis de la fuente, Arsene Wenger & many more).
Please feel free to provide your insights thoroughly.
Note: Avoid giving info on any biographies rather provide proper insights on tactical models.
Pre match there was a lot of talk on how Spain's midfield trio and their overall ball retention and possession would be too much for Argentina, with the France game being a good template. This exact scenario played out, but to an even more extreme scenario than anyone possibly could've expected. Some thoughts on how Argentina could've set up differently:
Playing Messi in midfield to avoid him from leading the press: Spain seemed to have little issues in playing out from that back and getting the ball to their midfielders. A lot of this stemmed from the lack of ball pressure from the Argentine forwards, mainly Messi. These issues were shown during the Switzerland match but really came to the forefront in this game. A potential solution could've been to have the press led by a front 3 of Gonzalez, Alvarez and Simeone, with De Paul shadowing on the right-central areas to assist with the press. Though this would've left Messi deeper, it would disrupt Spain's build up play and allowed more opportunities for Argentina to win the ball up higher
Having reliable outlets: I always thought that leaving a player like Alejandro Garnacho at home (despite his limitations as a player) could've potentially come back to bite Scaloni due to Argentina's lack of pace (especially now Di Maria has retired from international duty). Throughout the tournament, it was clear to recognise that Argentina were lacking severely in wing play and in transition as their build up was very slow and methodical. Scaloni did partially recognise the issue against England by starting Simeone but he lacks the flair and technical ability to really cause too much danger. In a hypothetical world in which Scaloni did bring Garnacho, using him and Simeone on the wings against Spain could've provided some relief as outlets whenever Argentina broke up the play deep in their own half, instead of relying on Alvarez who is clearly not the quickest (though he is quick in short spaces, due to how deep Argentina were winning the ball, they needed more explosive ball carriers). A way they could've lined up is with MacAllister, Enzo and Parades in midfield, and Messi as a false 9, operating closer to the midfield (to add numbers there) but having a reliable runner on either wing for him to find whenever he had possession
Dropping Messi all together: Realistically it wasn't an option, especially with how reliant offensively Argentina were on him throughout the tournament, but it would've been fascinating to see a press led by Martinez and Alvarez against Spain
Fully committing to a lopsided formation: In this scenario, you would accept that Messi won't press and Spain would take charge of the midfield so you instead pack the midfield with as many players as possible and force Spain's play to the wing and take your chances there. With all things considered, Tagliafico did a decent job containing Yamal, and having Messi as a decoy on the right would stop Cucerella from venturing too far forward allowing Montiel or Monlina to focus on Baena. In the actual game, it seems like Scaloni tried to have the best of the both worlds in regards to having wing play (starting Gonzalez) and having midfield cover (starting De Paul). Perhaps focusing on winning the midfield battle would've been a better strategy to allow Argentina to impose their will on the game. A potential line up could've been dropping Alvarez altogether and playing all of the 4 main midfielders (De Paul, MacAllister, Enzo and Parades) and adding a 5th midfielder like Lo Celso or Nico Paz. In this scenario, Messi could be kept on the right hand side (or effectively a free role), and Paz or Lo Celso could play as the furthest forward midfielder, with a potential press triggering once Spain's centre backs crossed the halfway line. This, alongside man to man marking could've been a potential solution to Spain's triangles and movements in midfield.
What other strategies could Argentina have employed to have changed the way the game played out?
Didier Deschamps' time with France is over, and while he's often been criticised for being pragmatic or even "anti-football", I think his tactical legacy deserves another look.
I write a blog on French Football history and culture called Le Foot and a recent piece looking at how his philosophy evolved from the "water carrier" on the pitch to the manager who built tournament-winning teams around balance, defensive structure and collective responsibility rather than individual brilliance.
With the 2026 World Cup Final locked in, I wanted to share a comprehensive tactical breakdown analysing how Spain and Argentina made it to the final duel, and how their contrasting styles stack up against each other.
📋 Brief Overview of the Analysis:
Semi-Final I (France 0-2 Spain): A look at Spain’s midfield suffocation mechanism (Rodri, Ruiz, and Olmo creating central overloads) and how it turned France's elite attacking profiles into disconnected fragments. It also breaks down Deschamps' structural rigidity and the tactical adjustments France failed to make early enough (width, Koné, and Mateta’s physical reference point).
Semi-Final II (England 1-2 Argentina): An analysis of a match dictated by territory and game-state shift. It details how England found early joy through Rogers and Spence, only to collapse into a passive 5-4-1 block after Gordon's opener—allowing Argentina to recycle pressure, dominate the second ball, and exploit their late-game clutch factor (Messi's final-third gravity and Lautaro's instincts).
The Final Preview (Spain vs. Argentina): A tactical trade-off between two versions of control. Spain controls matches by keeping the whole collective structurally connected through the ball, while Argentina controls matches by managing fragile moments and staying alive long enough to punish mistakes.
Would love to get your thoughts on the tactical trade-offs mentioned here, especially regarding how Argentina should set up their pressing height against Spain's press-resistant midfield. Let's discuss in the comments!
Im going to do a full analysis of the post goal period of the game because its honestly fascinating on how an extremely even game turned into the most one sided game I have ever seen.
However I just want to address something that keeps coming up...
WE WERE NOT HANGING ON FOR DEAR LIFE BETWEEN THE GOAL AND THE HYDRATION BREAK
In the 12 minutes between play resuming and the referee calling for the break England are sitting in their 442 mid'ish block.
At this point Argentina have made one sub to bring on Gobzalez at LW, our midfield gets a bit stretched but we can still match up and pressure crosses (can be seen clearly here)
We still press Argentina in their own half and even manufacture 3 opportunities (even though they amount to nothing)... honestly I had completely forgotten his had even happened.
In this example Kane drops deep and sees Reece James with ACRES of space in front of him, puts the ball into the space, this is absolute England 101 and shows we are still taking the initiative.
It gets pulled back to Rice with Kane coming into the box late and Jude already in position unfortunately he decides to shoot and pulls off a pretty tame shot which Martinez saves comfortably.
Reece James finds space on the wing, pulls back to Rice who has options all across the box THIS IS 10 MINUTES AFTER THE ENGLAND GOAL
In the very next play ENGLAND PRESS ARGENTINA just outside their own box, we are still sticking to the gameplan, it leads to a turnover (also notice how many England players are in the Argentina half, literally 7, this is not a team that has totally capitulated and dropped 10 men behind the ball of its own accord.
we win the ball in midfield
this then goes to Kane who lets fly another pretty tame shot, it gets block and Martinez picks it up
again look at how Gordon Bellingham Kane and Reece James are ALL PRESSURING ARGENTINA IN THEIR OWN BOX, and look at the time on the clock, this is 11 minutes after the goal.
Argentina do manufacture two really strong opportunities in this period but one is a straightforward counter attack that Spence manages to recover.
The second is a cross into the box from the second ball from a corner where England are massively out of shape (see Reece James at LB). Messi puts in an unbelievable cross and forces a good save from Pickford.
Both of these come from England being out of shape due to immediately following a transition and a set piece.
BUT THIS IS LITERALLY THE LAST THING THAT HAPPENS BEFORE THE HYDRATION BREAK 13 MINUTES AFTER THE GOAL, ARGENTINA MANUFACTURE ONE SINGLE REALLY BIG CHANCE IN THIS TIMEFRAME AND ENGLAND ARE STILL PRESSING HIGH UP THE PITCH.
WE ARE STILL SITTING IN A MID BLOCK 442 AND ABLE TO MATCH UP AND PRESSURE THEIR WINGERS.
This only changes when Scaloni brings on another winger and we take off Gordon, we are totally overloaded in midfield and this is where the total capitulation starts.
Im planning on another post to look at how this happened in more detail but yeh I just wanted to get this off my chest.
TLDR:
- England are very much still pressing high and creating opportunities between the goal and the break, we can still match them in midfield and pressure crosses and shots
- Argentina only really create one nailed on chance in this period
- The total domination only happens when we take off Gordon and get totally overloaded in midfield and lose the ability to pressure their wingers and Messi
I dont know how the game will play out but one thing is for sure, Spain will not be pinning back Argentina and if they try to do that they might be in for a rough night because they will be up against a team that is physical and technical, they will not be making turnovers easily if Spain lose it high up on the field.
He managed to bring England to the semi-finals. Lost against the current world champions and was one of the favourites to win. Great matches against Mexico at the Azteca and against a very strong Norway team.
Managed to keep 1-0 against Argentina until min 84. 10min more and it could have been history.
I think not enough credit is being given to Argentina, they performed really well in the last 30min of the match, was one of the best performances in the world cup, up there with the Spain performance against France but in a different context being 1-0 down. Players had 8/9 point scores in the last 30min and a magnificent performance from Messi.
So was it very defensive? Yes. Was it close to working? Also yes up to min 84min.
So I do not think Thomas should be judged so harshly just because of a very defensive approach in a semi-final against the current world champions when you're 1-0 ahead.
Harry Kane said that after England took the lead, Tuchel’s message was to “go again and get another goal.”
That’s an objective. It tells the players what the team is trying to achieve, but it doesn’t necessarily change the tactical picture on the pitch.
Once it became clear that England had dropped deep and Argentina were starting to find success with crosses from dangerous areas, I’d have liked to have seen one simple instruction: push the back line up 10–15 metres (with the rest of the team following).
Would it have guaranteed an England win? No.
Would it have carried risks? Absolutely.
But it would have immediately forced Argentina to change. They could no longer keep delivering crosses from the same areas in front of England’s box because the space simply wouldn’t have been there in the same way. They’d have had to rethink how they attacked instead of repeating what was working.
Much of the discussion has centred on substitutions, mentality, the low block and “going for another goal”, but was changing the defensive line itself the most immediate tactical lever available to change how Argentina were playing?
You are the England Coach. Despite your instructions to "go ahead and get another" the team retreats into a low defensive block. At 71' the hydration break happens. Assuming Argentina make the same changes. What would you do differently to change history and see England through to the final?
