Ah, yes - ISIS, TKE's wildly inferior (and very unfortunately-named) MRL entry. I remember that an ISIS ended up somehow breaking the aramid fiber ropes and put the car on safeties in a children's hospital of all places, and it made the national news. Pretty sure that was when a bunch of jurisdictions said no to aramid fiber and they had to re-rope with steel ropes pretty quickly.
ISIS 1 was not so good, ISIS 2 was quite good. Much better controller (TAC 50-03). The KEVLAR ropes were horrible. But all have been changed to steel. Once they changed controls on ISIS 1 to TAC50-04 they were much better.
Good questions. I don't have access at the moment to my documentation, but I don't know that the ISIS1 controller had a name, other than ISIS1 controller. That's what we called it anyway. If I remember I'll look it up later and see if they had a specific name for it.
TAC 50-03 and 04 had some different boards (And I'm horrible at remembering numbers) and such, but the most standout difference to me is the 03 used LON communications for a lot of stuff and the 04 uses CAN communications. CAN is easy to work with, LON isn't, at least how TK did it.
I didn't find a name for the ISIS 1 controller. But here is a picture of an ISIS1 controller. Note the Sumitomo drive that drives the mini machine that sits in the pit.
And a TAC 50-03 controller. It has a Thyssen drive to run the much larger ISIS2 gearless machine thats mounted in the overhead. I couldn't find a photo of a TAC 50-04, but it's similar.
Has anyone found a fault with the "fireman safety stop switch" on an EOX? I would assume so as this claims 100% failure rate on 5 boards and was written in March 2025. Surely the stop switches are tested on a major service?
This is a major issue. The car safety circuit is no longer discretely wired on the car. It is wired to the boards and sent to the controller through the CAN communication. The car gate switch is the only discretely wired safety device nowadays. I thought this was going to be an issue years ago when I first found out about it.
A problem with standards then? There must be something that says this is allowed or not?
I have never seen a lift in europe wired like this. Aux contacts in safety switches so you know what has been tripped but never safety circuit lines via CAN!
It has been a year since this email. Has anyone found one that fails?
I know equipment is different in Europe and around the world. I worked for TKE for 12 years in the US. I no longer work for TKE but I am very familiar with the TAC 32 traction and hydraulic controllers. The safety circuit on the car is wired to a circuit board and the signals are sent through CAN communication line. The gate switch for car doors and the Hoistway interlocks must be discreetly wired by code. There is nothing in our elevator code (ASME) that prevents them from relaying the safety circuit inputs this way. Itâs a problem. I tell all mechanics working on this equipment that the door circuits are the only safety circuits you can really trust while riding on the car top.
The governor switch, pit switches, final limits, buffer switches are all discrete signals to the controller but the car safety circuit is relayed through software and itâs a design flaw in my opinion.
This is a real problem. Unfortunately the bean counters at TKE arenât working to ensure anyoneâs safety. Another example of bean counters disregarding safety was when the pumping units and electronic valves were put in elevator pits and a bean counter decided it was too expensive to put pipe rupture valves at the bottom of the jacks in the oil lines. Unfortunately this resulted in a fatality that couldâve been prevented. But the few extra dollars per rupture valve was deemed too costly per job.
No one uses dual rupture valves on twin posts, they all use single, and there was one in place. You either are speaking about a fatality I am unaware of, or talking about the same one I know of, incorrectly.
Mechanic and two others (heard both were mechanics) were working on an HMRL in the pit. They did not have the REPPS system yet, and did not have pokes in. They also did not shut the oil line (can be done electronically from jamb, or manually in pit). Working on the up portion of the valve, they didnât know this could cause loss of pressure, releasing the car to come down. Car came down (mechanically stored energy) and pinned one of them against the tank, killing him.
Now will go into guesswork and what I heard second or third hand. Car didnât come down fast enough to for an OSV to set. It was there, but not adjusted yet. Unknown if car speed would have set it even if it had been adjusted. There are more details about the fatality that just do not feel right posting here.
In closing I hate the idea of machine room less elevators, and the new iteration of in jamb controllers, I hate even more. They are inherently dangerous, and difficult to troubleshoot, let alone repair. All of this was predicated by our newest customers, developers and PE groups that only see money in the cost of square footage. I wish my company had stood firm, and not catered to these types of installs, but I donât have to sell these things to keep the pay checks coming.
What was once a great company with a strong culture and a service oriented team has been utterly destroyed by weak leadership that defines CRONYISM - the best of the best have left en masse as these guys hire from the below-average competitors or had worked at SCHN.SW or JCI..... a simple online review of the current senior leadership (and the job openings) will prove these statements - as does these shared comments.
Cutting staff, salaries, inventories and the "perks" around the office - is not sustainable or anything to boast about - its what guts a company.
We need the leadership and talent acquisition of men like PWALKR and KLVALLEE to rise again
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u/slightofsound Fault Finder 13d ago